http://business.timesonline.co.uk
March
4, 2010
Jan Raath Harare
Lawyers for Morgan
Tsvangirai's office have a list of 184 people, including
a boy of 3, who were
murdered during the run-off presidential elections in
June 2008 that ended
with Robert Mugabe having himself declared the winner.
Alongside the
names of the dead is a column of those who have been
identified as
perpetrators by witnesses. Not one of these killings, all
carried out by
people serving President Mugabe, or one of thousands of cases
of torture,
rape, arson and looting against supporters of Mr Tsvangirai's
Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), have been investigated or prosecuted.
Instead,
the Attorney-General's office and police are prosecuting on
fabricated
charges 26 MDC MPs who were trying to stay alive in the storm of
savagery
around them.
At the same time, President Zuma of South Africa meets
Gordon Brown today
during his three-day state visit to Britain to discuss
lifting the travel
bans and asset freezes imposed by the European Union and
the United States
on Mugabe and other members of his Zanu (PF)
party.
Yet a year after the inauguration of the coalition Government
between Mugabe
and Tsvangirai, the Prime Minister - which committed itself to
"justice, the
rule of law and respect for human rights" - the administration
of justice,
led by the Attorney-General's office, is embarked on an onslaught
of
malicious harassment of opponents of Zanu (PF). Human rights lawyers are
as
much a target as are prosecutors, magistrates and court staff for the
merest
deviance from party zealotry.
The evidence against Zimbabwe's
judges and prosecutors - with notable
exceptions - for taking orders from
Zanu (PF) has been inescapable over the
past decade, but, says Beatrice
Mtetwa, the celebrated Zimbabwean human
rights lawyer, "it has never been as
bad as it is now."
Apparently alarmed that the new power-sharing
Government would stop violent
farm invasions, Johannes Tomana, the
Attorney-General, with the chief
magistrate and the Justice Ministry
permanent secretary, went on a
countrywide tour early last year with
directives to district law officers,
police and government officials for
"quicker prosecution" of white farmers
fighting to stay on their land. They
were told that titledeeds were
worthless and all white farmers, by being on
their land, were effectively
guilty of illegal occupation. Under a paragraph
headed "lawyers tactics",
the directive warned: "Another trick is to refer to
case law. Watch out."
By then the Attorney-General's office was using a
weapon of disturbing
vindictiveness. Zimbabwean law gives prosecutors seven
days to lodge an
appeal against a bail order - during which time the accused
stays in
custody. So far 145 MDC civic activists have been forced to spend a
week in
jail. Only four appeals have been filed and each summarily
dismissed.
The most prominent of the MDC parliamentarians to be
prosecuted, and given
the seven-day treatment repeatedly, is Roy Bennett, one
of Mr Tsvangirai's
closest lieutenants, arrested on charges of banditry a day
before he was due
to be sworn in as a deputy minister. He is now into the
fourth month of his
trial.
The only evidence against is from a
supposed state witness, Michael
Hitschmann, and it was repudiated in 2006 for
being obtained under torture.
When Hitschmann's lawyer, Mordecai Mahlangu,
advised the Attorney-General's
office that his client had no evidence to give
against Bennett, he was
arrested for obstruction of justice and held
overnight in foul police cells.
The same happened to a leading solicitor,
Alec Muchadehama, for asking a
judge's clerk to process a judge's release
order for a group of MDC
officials kidnapped by the secret police. For good
measure the clerk was
arrested as well, and jailed for a week under the bail
provisions. During
the clerk's trial, a senior prosecutor, Andrew Kumire, was
given five days
in jail for contempt for his vulgar protest at the
magistrate's decision to
dismiss charges. He walked from court unhindered by
police and was granted
bail by the magistrate's superior. The junior
magistrate resigned in protest
and Kumire was promoted.
"The effect of
this is that it's difficult even to get a stamp from court
officials on
papers for an urgent application," said Irene Petras, the
director of
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. "You won't get any
co-operation after
hours. They are too scared."
Muchadehama's trial dragged on for six
months as the State switched the
charges three times. He was finally
acquitted after the magistrate ruled
there was no prima facie evidence
against him. In Mahlangu's case, the
magistrate said that "writing a letter
from one lawyer to another does not
constitute an offence". Again, charges
were dismissed. Ordinary magistrates,
unlike more senior judges, Petras says,
"are still willing to make
professional decisions".
Contempt of court
violations have become "so outrageous, even judicial
officers cannot ignore
them", she says. "But the procedure is so slow, the
executive can do anything
and nothing will happen."
The decay is good news for friends of Zanu
(PF). A former deputy minister
was accused of $150,000 graft in 2003, but the
trial sat in abeyance until
last year when the Attorney-General's office
revived it, and then declined
to prosecute. The same happened to a party
loyalist running a hospital and
accused in 2008 of stealing 15,000 litres of
state fuel, and a wealthy white
businessman caught last October with
US$250,000 of gold. In each case the
decision not to proceed ran counter to
overwhelming evidence, according to
the court documents.
The coalition
Government is due to hold elections, after a referendum on a
new
constitution, sometime after 2012.
"If we are going into an election, we
have to look at what happened in
2008," Petras warns. "None of the
perpetrators were prosecuted." It is
vital, she says, that institutions such
as the Attorney-General and the
judiciary, are functioning professionally and
with integrity. "If you don't
have these institutions, you are not going to
have an election that brings a
different result."
http://www.zimonline.co.za
by Charles Tembo Thursday 04 March
2010
HARARE - Zimbabwean civic society on Wednesday appealed for
protection from
President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan
Tsvangirai's unity
government in the wake of rising threats and harassment
of human rights
activists by state security agents.
Addressing a
press conference in Harare ZimRights director Okay Machisa said
despite the
formation of the government of national unity last year, the
last three
months have seen an escalation in threats, intimidation and
harassment of
civic activists by state security agents working with the
supporters of
Mugabe's ZANU PF party.
Machisa said last week members of the ZimRights
board received a series of
mobile text messages warning them against going
ahead with plans to conduct
civic education in rural areas on the
constitution making process.
Several other activists such as ZimRights
regional chairperson for
Mashonaland West Nunurai Jena, Chitungwiza regional
chairperson Netsai
Kaitano and Jabulisa Tshuma, the organisation's treasurer
had received the
threatening messages.
"Security agents should
strictly observe the principles of the rule of law
and should adhere to the
laws and regulations governing their operations,"
said Machisa in a
statement.
"ZimRights and ZLHR have also taken note of the renewed
rhetoric against
NGOs emanating from some ministers and governors accusing
some NGOs of
interfering in the stalled constitution making process," he
added.
The press conference was attended by leaders of various civil
society
organisations including the National Association of Non-Governmental
Organisations (NANGO), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.
The civil society leaders said they had
approached Tsvangirai highlighting
the increase in incidents of violence and
threats against their members.
Their efforts to engage the co-Home Affairs
ministers were fruitless.
State security agents have been accused in the
past of repression against
human rights defenders and other representatives
of civil society in
Zimbabwe to try to intimidate them from recording or
publicising cases of
rights violations. - ZimOnline
http://www.thezimbabwetimes.com/?p=27694
March 4, 2010
By
Raymond Maingire
HARARE - The mainstream MDC party led by Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai
has called for crisis meeting of its national executive
council members
Thursday to discuss the party's deteriorating relations with
President
Robert Mugabe's Zanu-PF party."We are dealing with a whole array
of issues
affecting Zimbabweans, ranging from the state of the inclusive
government,
issues to do with the constitution-making process, the dialogue,
the general
life of the GPA, you name it," party spokesperson Nelson Chamisa
told The
Zimbabwe Times Wednesday night.
"The environment is fast
deteriorating and we are going to receive reports
from all the provinces on
what is happening in the country."
The MDC national executive council
comprises 48 members drawn from all the
country's 10 provinces.
It is
the highest decision-making organ in between national councils and
national
congresses.
Pressure continues to mount on MDC to pull out of the
one-year old unity
government led by long serving leader President Robert
Mugabe.
Prime Minister Tsvangirai, despite having acquired executive
authority in
terms of the unity agreement signed September 2008 by Zanu-PF
and the two
MDC parties, is still fighting to assert his authority within
the
government.
Hard-line elements within the country's security
forces have shown open
disdain for the MDC leader, who won the 2008
elections but could not form a
government. His votes fell short of the 50
percent plus majority required of
one to become President.
The MDC is
also agitated by Zanu-PF's continued refusal to abide by all the
terms of
the Global Political Agreement. President Mugabe continues to make
unilateral decisions.
The MDC also wants to see the constitution
reform process take off.
The crucial process, which should pave way for
fresh free and fair
elections, has been delayed by endless haggling among
the parties in
government on who to draft in the thematic committees and as
rapporteurs.
Fresh political violence has also been reported in some
parts of the country
where Zanu-PF's militant supporters have reportedly set
up torture bases to
intimidate MDC supporters ahead of the constitution
outreach process.
Civic society organizations have also reported an
increase in the incidence
of harassment at the hands of security agents
directly linked to Zanu-PF.
The MDC has stated it continues to experience
frustration by the delay by
President Mugabe in implementing the process to
liberate the media through
formalization, in the first instance, of the
recently appointed Godfrey
Majonga-led Zimbabwe Media Commission.
The
past few months have witnessed an increase in a propaganda onslaught
spearheaded by the current vilification of the MDC in a state-controlled
media network, which is still firmly controlled by President Mugabe's
loyalists.
Relations in the GNU deteriorated last month when Youth
and Indigenization
Minister Saviour Kasukuwere, a Zanu-PF ministerial
appointee, gazetted the
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment (General)
Regulations 2010, which
spell out Zimbabwe's new policy on
indigenization.
The controversial law, which became operational beginning
this month,
compels foreign companies operating in Zimbabwe to cede 51
percent of their
shareholding to Zimbabwean citizens.
The MDC says
the law is too harsh, ill timed and detrimental to the
inclusive
government's efforts to attract foreign investment in an economy
that is
still recovering from 10 years of sustained recession.
Zanu-PF has also
hardened its stance towards the MDC in the wake of the
extension of
western-imposed targeted sanctions on some of its officials and
associated
companies.
Zanu-PF says the sanctions were invited by the MDC in the
first instance.
The MDC says the sanctions were a result of electoral theft
in April2008 and
the abuse of human rights thereafter by President Mugabe's
Zanu-PF party.
http://www.zimonline.co.za
by Tafadzwa Mutasa Thursday 04 March
2010
HARARE - Zimbabwe's government has set up a cabinet committee to
review
regulations published last month that force foreign and white-owned
companies to 51 percent of their shares to blacks, Industry and Commerce
Minister Welshman Ncube said yesterday.
Ncube's comments are in sharp
to contrast to those of his counterpart, Youth
Development and
Indigenisation and Empowerment Minister Savior Kasukuwere
who has in the
past month said there would be no further debate on the new
rules.
But Ncube said the gazetting of the Indigenisation and
Empowerment
Regulations had been done prematurely and flouted laid down
procedure, which
requires that all such laws have to pass through a cabinet
committee, which
then makes recommendations to full
cabinet.
"Unfortunately those regulations were published prematurely
before the
discussions which ought to have taken place had taken place,"
Ncube told
business leaders at a meeting.
Ncube's comments seem to
support comments by Prime Minister Morgan
Tsvangirai, who last month said
the regulations were "null and void" because
they had been published without
consultation with cabinet.
The regulations came into effect on Monday and
give the companies 45 days to
submit proposals to Kasukuwere on how they
plan to bring on board locals to
take 51 percent of their
businesses.
Ncube said the cabinet committee should determine whether
regulations were
consistent with the constitution, the enabling
Indigenisation and Economic
Empowerment Act and government
policy.
The committee would also seek views of other ministries, which
oversee
industries that may be affected by the legislation.
"That did
not take place in this case. It is now taking place," Ncube said.
The
rules have been a source of controversy and besides dividing the unity
government along party lines, they have rattled foreign investors who
analysts say may continue to stay away from the country.
The
coalition government of Tsvangirai and President Robert Mugabe has been
struggling to win donor support from the West, who want the government to
implement irreversible economic and political reforms.
Ncube said
while there was consensus on the need for indigenisation, the
government was
divided on how to implement it.
"We have consensus that there is need for
indigenisation. We have not
consensus as to how we should achieve that
indigenisation in a manner that
empower our people and grow the economy,"
Ncube told the business leaders.
"We don't have it (consensus) in the
inclusive government either in terms of
methodology."
Critics fear
Mugabe's ZANU-PF wants to press ahead with transferring
majority ownership
of foreign-owned companies as part of a drive to reward
party loyalists with
thriving businesses.
Analysts say the empowerment programme could see
Zimbabwe being shunned by
investors again who fear a repeat of the land
seizures, at a time the new
government is out to attract to grow an economy
that was in decline for ten
years.
"Because of the land reform,
everything we do is placed under a great deal
of scrutiny and we must act
with a bit of care so that we don't jeopardise
what we want to achieve,"
said Ncube. - ZimOnline.
http://www1.voanews.com
Under the
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act of 2007, indigenous
Zimbabweans
must hold a controlling stake in all companies - though some
exceptions will
be made in the national interest
Gibbs Dube | Washington 03 March
2010
Daily trading volume at the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange plunged from
US$2
million US$500,000 from Monday to Tuesday after regulations governing
indigenization of companies took effect, sources said
Wednesday.
Economists said the slump in activity on the exchange
reflected investor
fears that traded companies could sustain heavy losses
under indigenization,
directly due to the requirement that indigenous black
Zimbabweans must hold
a 51 percent stake in companies within five years, or
indirectly due to the
hit to the economy.
Economist Prosper
Chitambara of the Labor and Economic Development Research
Institute of
Zimbabwe told VOA Studio 7 reporter Gibbs Dube that the
government should
consult widely before it fully implements the
indigenization
law.
Chitambara said the law is being implemented at a time when Zimbabwe
is
struggling to recover from serious economic problems that many observers
say
resulted from fast-track land reform since 2000.
"I think the
government has to go back to the drawing board because these
regulations
came into force without the due diligence of consultations," he
said.
Economist Rejoice Ngwenya said the law will mainly benefit
senior officials
and supporters of President Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF party
as the majority of
Zimbabweans do not have the means to raise funds to buy
shares in companies
slated for indigenization.
All businesses with
assets of US$500,000 or more, publicly traded or
privately held, must report
on their shareholding structures within the next
six weeks to the National
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Board set
up by Indigenization
Minister Saviour Kasukuwere one week ago.
Under the Indigenization and
Economic Empowerment Act of 2007, indigenous
Zimbabweans must hold a
controlling stake in all companies though some
exceptions will be made if
they are determined to be in the best interests
of the country.
http://business.timesonline.co.uk
March
4, 2010
Jan Raath Harare
Zimbabwe's dispossessed white farmers
will at last be able to put the heat
on President Mugabe. Four former
farmers have been given the right to seize
Zimbabwean government property in
South Africa in pursuit of their
compensation claim.
In December
2008, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
tribunal, the
international court to which citizens in the region can appeal
when their
national courts fail them, declared that Mugabe's land reform was
"an act of
theft" and racist.
It ordered the Government to allow those left to
continue farming unhindered
and to compensate the rest. Didymus Mutasa, then
the Lands Minister, neatly
expressed the Government's attitude: "They are
dreaming."
Mike Campbell and Ben Freeth, the farmers who led the SADC
litigation, had
their farms burnt down. There are 300 white farmers still
active on their
land. Only 40 of the 4,500 who were ejected from their farms
have been
desperate enough to accept partial compensation - in junk
Zimbabwean
dollars.
The farmers applied to the Harare High Court
to have the SADC decision
registered and make it enforceable in Zimbabwe. It
was dismissed, because of
the "enormity" of reversing the land seizures, the
judge said.
However, last week the North Gauteng High Court ruled that,
as South Africa
was a signatory to the SADC tribunal treaty, its decisions
were enforceable
there. The Zimbabwean ruling was registered.
It
potentially opens non-diplomatic property owned by the Zimbabwean
Government
in South Africa to attachment. As a first step, the farmers are
seeking
payment of the £12,000 costs order made in their favour in the
Gauteng case.
Willie Spies, their lawyer, says that he has identified two
properties in
Cape Town for attachment. "We regard this as a trial run for
the much bigger
case involving compensation" for the four farmers, he said.
Zimbabwean
politicians say they do not believe that President Zuma would
allow such
actions. However, Spies says: "I cannot see why political
interference
should be a possibility. The South African Government last year
affirmed
that it would honour the SADC tribunal ruling. It was made an order
of
court." Further, the Gauteng North High Court decision was uncontested,
so
there is little possibility of appeal.
"If the South African Government
now turns around and repudiates its own
standpoint," Spies says, "I would be
very surprised. I do not expect that."
http://www1.voanews.com/
Botswana's statement on sanctions was part of a communique
issued Tuesday
after a bilateral meeting on the weekend in Victoria Falls -
the meeting in
two years of the Zimbabwe-Botswana Permanent Joint
Commission.
Sandra Nyaira | Washington 03 March 2010
Signaling
a thaw in relations between Harare and Gaborone, Botswana has
called for the
West to lift sanctions against President Robert Mugabe and
his inner circle,
saying travel and financial restrictions are impeding
efforts by the
inclusive government to address issues affecting the people
of
Zimbabwe.
Botswana's statement on sanctions emerged within a joint
communiqué issued
Tuesday following a bilateral meeting on the weekend in
Victoria Falls,
Zimbabwe - the first meeting in two years of the
Zimbabwe-Botswana Permanent
Joint Commission.
Botswana President Ian
Khama has been one of Mr. Mugabe's most outspoken
regional critics. The
country last month announced it was withdrawing two
attachés from Harare and
asking Harare call home corresponding envoys - this
over the detention of
Botswanan game wardens who had crossed the border
chasing a pride of lions
that had been preying on livestock.
The communiqué said sanctions were
"constraining and impeding the efforts of
the (Zimbabwean) government to
effectively tackle the economic, political
and social difficulties affecting
the people of Zimbabwe."
The U.S. government on Tuesday followed the
European Union in renewing
targeted sanctions aimed at Mr. Mugabe and his
inner circle in 2003 in
response to alleged human rights abuses and
ballot-rigging.
Co-Home Affairs Minister Giles Mutsekwa, present at the
commission meeting,
told VOA Studio 7 reporter Sandra Nyaira he hopes it
ushers in better
relations between the countries. He said the commission
meeting was attended
by ministers and senior security officials of the two
countries who agreed
to improve bilateral relations and step up economic
cooperation.
But political analyst John Makumbe of the University of
Zimbabwe commented
that the two countries have a long way to go to normalize
relations.
http://www.zimeye.org/?p=14272
By Gerald
Chateta
Published: March 3, 2010
Harare - Female
officers in the Zimbabwe Defence Forces have been forced to
join
Independence Parade rehearsals after their male counterparts resisted
the
exercise having raised a pretext over incentives.
According to highly
placed sources at National Army Headquarters KG6, Police
General
Headquarters (PGHQ) and Harare Central Prisons where most of the
officers
forming the independence parade are drawn from, there was
resistance by
senior male officers to join this year's independence parade.
"We faced
great resistance from senior male officers who said they were no
longer
interested in being year in and year out inspected by President
Mugabe.They
said we should use junior officers this time a thing which we
can not do
because the parade need experienced officers. We were left with
no option
but to take senior female officers for the task.
"The problem we are
faced with now is that these female officers have to be
transported from
town to Dzivaresekwa Army barracks the venue of the
rehearsals every day
because the accommodation there is not fit for female
officers," said a
senior instructor.
One government source said the resistance has forced
authorities to order
female officers to go to the rehearsals.
One of
the male officers who refused to go for the rehearsals said:
"Besides
being inspected by Mugabe we have challenged the authorities to
improve food
provision because last year we were forced to march on empty
stomachs. We
were afraid of being victimized as they told us that we should
be patriotic
and this year we are not going to the parade unless they
guarantee us food
and good accommodation," he said.
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces comprise
Zimbabwe National Army, Airforce of
Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police and
the Zimbabwe Prison Service.
The four security organizations form a
parade which is inspected by the
President Robert Mugabe at the country's
annual Independence Day
celebrations on the 18th of April
.
Traditionally a month prior to the Independence Day the uniformed
forces
embark on an intensive rehearsal in preparation of the big day.
http://www.newzimbabwe.com
04/03/2010 00:00:00
by Percy F.
Makombe
WHEN Professor Jonathan Moyo parted ways with Zanu PF
in 2005, President
Robert Mugabe remarked that the professor was clever but
not wise.
In making appointments to Zanu PF's politburo, Mugabe and his
fellow
Presidium members demonstrated that they are neither clever nor
wise.
It is difficult to see how Zanu PF thinks it can win elections
given that
most of the politburo appointments are tired and
uninspiring.
It is not in the interest of Zimbabweans to have a
dysfunctional Zanu PF.
This is not least because a dysfunctional Zanu PF has
an unmatched
propensity for violence. How can this uninspiring, tired
politburo be
expected to win elections other than through
violence?
The Presidium has done itself and the country a disservice by
treating a
matter of national concern in a factionalist, flippant and
retrogressive way
that can only plunge the country into violence come the
next elections.
How can people who believe diesel comes from a rock be
entrusted with
modernising the party?
What new communications impetus
can be given to the party by both Rugare
Gumbo and the utterly clueless Cain
Mathema?
What for instance is the added value of Stan Mudenge and Abigail
Damasane to
the politburo?
Why trouble old-man Nathan Shamuyarira by
dragging him into this politburo?
Ultimately the question is: How does a
liberation party define itself in a
changing world when new forces are
asserting themselves and the party wants
to cling on to a decaying
order?
It is a cause for concern that three decades after independence we
have a
party in our country that seems to operate under the misguided notion
that
only those who participated in the liberation struggle should hold
senior
positions, never mind their limited capacities in those positions.
Modern
Zimbabwean political discourse is replete with grand nationalism
narratives.
At the heart of these narratives are serious questions about
identity,
history and the notion of a nation.
What does it mean to be
a Zimbabwean, and who is responsible for these
definitions? Liberation
history in this day and age should no longer be used
to demonise and exclude
others.
Whatever spin is put on Zimbabwe politics, there is no escaping
that Zanu PF
is in trouble. Those who do not believe this will do well to
revisit the
results of the March 2008 elections. Before that election, the
combined MDC
had 41 seats in a 150 parliament. After the elections, they had
a combined
109 in a 210 chamber.
That March election wiped out Zanu
PF's two thirds majority and what is
more, the MDC made serious inroads in
areas that were traditionally thought
to be Zanu PF's. More worrying for
Zanu PF was that their presidential
candidate Robert Mugabe actually
received fewer votes than the party. These
are the signs of the times, and
if Zanu PF intends to win the elections
without using violence, then they
would do well to read the signs. The signs
at the present moment are that
most of the people in the current politburo
have gone past their best-before
date.
The time has also come for President Mugabe, one of the founding
fathers of
Zimbabwe, to call it a day. He owes this not just to himself but
to Zanu PF.
He is currently gripping Zanu PF in a mortal embrace that
threatens to have
dastard consequences for his party and poses a threat to
national security.
This is more so against the back ground of Zanu PF's
factional politics and
a hushed succession debate.
As a political
ship, Zanu PF is sinking and is desperately in need of a
captain who can
think beyond violence and understands how to transform this
liberation party
into a vibrant modern party that can give a better life to
all Zimbabweans.
And here we are not talking about looting national
resources and political
patronage.
There are a lot of good people in Zanu PF who out of respect
to President
Mugabe, and the presidium, dare not challenge its decisions.
Some have said
in private discussions that they are doing something about
trying to
transform their party from within. The problem with this is that
it is very
much like winking at a beautiful girl in the dark. You know what
you are
doing, but nobody else does.
There is no knowing what
President Mugabe or what the other members of the
Presidium think. Georg
Buchner says: "Every man is an abyss, you get dizzy
looking into
it."
Here the point is that when we think about other people's
differences to
ourselves, we get dizzy. Our history is not necessarily one
of collective
experience. Each one of us is isolated. Trying to account for
a person in
terms of class, race, or even nationality is bound to be a
terrible over
simplification. Yet sometimes we do think like that because of
the history
of colonialism, oppression and violence that has visited us and
our loved
ones.
Theological people talk of free will, but in essence,
there is very little
freedom for anybody. Not even for our leaders, however
democratically
elected. They are tied by their fears, fears of uprisings;
fears of losing
elections; and fears of being persecuted.
The fact of
the matter, however, is that if the oppressed deal only with
their
oppression, then they are denying themselves and others any freedom
outside
the chains that bind them.
Zanu PF cannot forever be ensconced in the war
mode. Much more critically,
President Mugabe is 86 years old. Whatever
shouts of bravado, his biological
clock is ticking -- he is after all human
like everyone else. The old man
needs a rest and the time has come to pass
on the baton. Zanu PF as a party
is tired and needs renewal. That renewal
will not come with the kind of
politburo announced by the
Presidium.
Percy Bysshe Shelley once wrote a poem called Ozymandias that
Zanu PF will
do well to note. It goes:
I met a traveller from an
antique land
Who said: "Two vast and trunkless legs of stone
Stand in the
desert . . . Near them, on the sand,
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies,
whose frown,
And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,
Tell that its
sculptor well those passions read
Which yet survive, stamped on these
lifeless things,
The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed:
And on
the pedestal these words appear:
'My name is Ozymandias, king of
kings:
Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!'
Nothing beside remains.
Round the decay
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare
The lone and
level sands stretch far away.
This was a great statue but now remains
bits and pieces. This is about
history and power. It is what is called
mutability -- the only thing that
remains the same is change. The poem lifts
the veil about leaders in power.
We realise the full significance of words
on the pedestal. It is the voice
of a man who thinks he is in control, but
when we look at the stature in
bits and pieces, we realise the folly of such
words. Nothing remains of the
stature besides the bits and pieces. There is
absence of any kind of life
even as the stature proclaims: Look on my works
yu mighty and despair.
Makombe writes from Cape Town and can be contacted on
pfmakombe@yahoo.com
http://www.zimonline.co.za
Thursday
04 March 2010
I. OVERVIEW
As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a
unity government, the challenges
to democratic transformation have come into
sharp focus. Despite reasonable
progress in restoring political and social
stability, ending widespread
repression and stabilising the economy since
February 2009, major threats
could still derail the reform process. In
particular, resistance of
intransigent and still powerful security sector
leaders and fractious
in-fighting between and within the Zimbabwe African
National Union (ZANU PF)
and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) must
be addressed now. South
Africa and other countries in southern Africa - who
monitor the accord that
guides the transition - must press the parties, and
particularly President
Robert Mugabe, to see the transition through to a
successful conclusion.
Donors should back their efforts.
The unity
government, created under the Global Political Agreement (GPA)
signed by
Mugabe and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur
Mutambara, was
born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers gave it
little chance,
predicting that, even as prime minister, Tsvangirai would
fall prey to
Mugabe's "divide, rule, co-opt and destroy" strategy. Against
the odds, the
government started well: schools and hospitals re-opened;
civil servants
were paid and returned to work; the Zimbabwe dollar was
shelved; goods
returned to store shelves; and a cholera epidemic was
controlled. Human
rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses.
Donors generally
received well an ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction
programme calling
for $8.5 billion in foreign aid and investment.
But major concerns
undermining the transition process have come to the fore.
Hardline generals
and other Mugabe loyalists in ZANU PF are refusing to
implement the
government's decisions, boycotting the new national security
organ and
showing public disdain for Tsvangirai. Farm seizures have
continued
virtually unabated. Most attention has focused on completing the
GPA, but
ZANU PF has delayed or ignored important commitments in that
document, while
stalling constitutional reforms by insisting on preserving
broad executive
privileges. Key blocked steps include a land audit,
appointment of MDC
governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests,
regular functioning
of the National Security Council in place of the
infamous Joint Operations
Command, public consultations on a new
constitution and preparation for
elections.
These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which this
briefing
concentrates. First, a mature political system must develop, so
that ZANU PF
and MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and
partners in
the inclusive government. This will be difficult, especially
under the
divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU PF leaders, including the factions
led by
Vice President Joice Mujuru, and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa,
know
that their party has lost much popular support and needs a generational
shift. For its part, the MDC must keep faith and engaged with its broad
following in the transition process, including trade unions, human rights
groups and women's organisations. It must also show the country as a whole
that it is a viable custodian of the state - competent, transparent, and
capable of preserving social change since independence.
Equally
challenging are security issues. A relatively small number of
"securocrats"
use their positions and symbiotic relationship with Mugabe to
exercise veto
power over the transition. They are motivated by differing
factors: fear of
losing power and its financial benefits, fear of
prosecution for political
or financial abuses, and a belief that they guard
the liberation heritage
against Tsvangirai and the MDC, which they view as
fronts for white and
Western interests. Zimbabweans across the political
spectrum are quietly
considering how to ease these officers into retirement,
even at the cost of
allowing them to keep their assets and providing them a
degree of impunity
from domestic prosecution, while simultaneously
professionalising security
forces respectful of human rights and a
democratically elected
government.
While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, the
Southern African
Development Community (SADC) must take seriously its GPA
guarantor role.
South African President Jacob Zuma's activism as mediator
must convey the
message that the region will abide no alternative to the
GPA. His recent
actions, including appointment of three respected advisers
to oversee the
Zimbabwe account, are welcome indications he will be tougher
vis-à-vis
Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for rule of law.
The
broader international community, especially the UK, US, EU and China,
should
support and complement SADC's efforts through careful calibration of
trade,
aid, and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of targeted
sanctions
on those thwarting the transition; and lifting of sanctions on
entities key
to economic recovery. Donors should provide new recovery and
development
assistance - including for rural development, health and
education and
strengthening of the judiciary, legislature and civil
society - through
transparent mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Trust
Fund.
This
briefing focuses on political party and security issues, as well as
South
Africa's mediation. Subsequent reporting will analyse other topics
vital to
the transition, including constitutional and legal reform, justice
and
reconciliation, sanctions policies and security sector reform.
II. THE
INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT'S MIXED RECORD
Ten months after the violent and
disputed 29 March 2008 elections that led
to political stalemate with the
long-time ruling ZANU PF party of President
Mugabe, Morgan Tsvangirai's wing
of the opposition Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC-T) announced it would
enter the government alongside ZANU PF and
the splinter MDC-Mutambara
(MDC-M) faction. This followed an extraordinary
summit of the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC) on 26 January
2009, whose final
communiqué called for Tsvangirai to be sworn in as the
prime minister by 11
February and the remainder of the government two days
later.
The
unity government was formed under the auspices of the Global Political
Agreement (GPA), which had been hammered out with SADC assistance during
lengthy negotiations. The GPA spelled out a specific continuing role for the
regional mediators in monitoring and supporting its implementation. This was
especially important, since most observers believed that the agreement was
essentially unworkable, having established two centres of power within a
single government but leaving most real political and military authority
with Mugabe, his party and the hardline security establishment. Many
considered that the African Union (AU), SADC, and the primary mediator, the
then South African President Thabo Mbeki, had been too accommodating and
respectful of Mugabe during the negotiation process. Additional concerns
emerged after the GPA was signed, as Mugabe was allowed to ignore deadlines
and otherwise repeatedly undermined the agreement without
consequence.
Now into its second year, however, the inclusive government
is making
discernible, if slow and painful progress in a number of areas,
bringing a
degree of stability and predictability to a country that twelve
months
earlier was on the brink of collapse. Most notably, schools and
hospitals
have reopened, multi-million per cent inflation has come down to
single
digits, government revenue has begun to pick up and shops are fully
stocked
with food and other commodities.
Key Western donors have been
slow to embrace the new government largely
because of its failure to fully
implement the GPA and their continuing
antipathy toward Mugabe. For much of
2009, donors provided welcome expansion
of humanitarian assistance, but
generally adopted a wait-and-see posture on
longer-term financial support
for recovery and reconstruction. This risked
thwarting the very changes the
international community is seeking, both by
weakening the hand of relative
moderates in ZANU PF and more generally by
undercutting popular support for
the reform process. More recently, the US,
UK and European Union (EU), among
others, have expanded the definition of
"humanitarian assistance" to cover
many important social and economic
sectors, such as agriculture, health,
sanitation and education.
A. ECONOMIC REFORMS
Rebuilding a
devastated economy with a 90 percent unemployment rate is a
daunting
challenge for the inclusive government. Finance Minister Tendai
Biti has won
praise for his steps to restore a degree of confidence and
fiscal stability,
but the prospects for rapid recovery are weak, not least
because the fragile
inclusive government and incomplete GPA have caused
investors to shy away.
Recently, government workers have gone on strike to
demand a pay increase
beyond the $160 monthly stipend they are generally now
receiving, which they
point out is insufficient to cover even basic costs of
living in Harare and
other urban centres.
Nevertheless, there are some signs of recovery. GDP
grew 4.7 percent in
2009, the first positive totals in a decade. The 2010
budget aims for 7
percent GDP growth, underpinned by 10 percent growth in
agriculture, as was
already achieved the previous year, and 40 percent
growth in mining. Since
the Zimbabwe dollar was suspended and the US dollar
and South African rand
adopted as legal tender, inflation has fallen from an
official 231 million
percent in July 2008 to a 6 percent average in 2009 and
is forecast at 5.1
percent in 2010. The International Monetary Fund extended
$510 million to
Zimbabwe as its share under an expansion of the Special
Drawing Rights (SDR)
facility that was authorised as a response to the
global economic crisis.
This has been earmarked for debt clearance, support
of the budget and
productive sectors, and water and sanitation, health and
education needs.
The improved economy and donor pledges to cover half the
$718 million
required to cope with disease and hunger have been reflected in
a lessening
of the formerly dire humanitarian situation. Cholera, which had
become
rampant in late 2008, was brought under control in 2009, but there
are
warnings of a potentially new serious outbreak during the current rainy
season.
B. POLITICAL REFORMS
Ultimately, the economy cannot be
restored to health through technical
measures alone. The political reforms
envisaged in the GPA are needed.
Helped by the regional re-engagement that
resulted from the SADC Maputo
summit in November 2009, there has been some
gradual progress on
implementation since the MDC-T briefly suspended
participation in the unity
government the previous month to protest
ZANU-PF's intransigence in
discussions to move forward on GPA
requirements.
Independent commissions have now been formed to address
media, human rights
and election issues. Notwithstanding statements to the
contrary by senior
ZANU-PF officials, a land audit may soon begin that would
not just be a
survey but rather an attempt to lay the groundwork for
addressing this most
sensitive reform area, including multiple farm
ownership, production by new
farmers, compensation for former white
commercial farmers and an end to farm
invasions. Arbitrary and politically
motivated detentions and arrests have
declined, though they have not ceased
entirely, and the repressive Public
Order Security and Access to Information
and Protection of Privacy Acts
(POSA and AIPPA) remain on the
books.
The challenges of completing the GPA, crafting a new constitution
and moving
toward elections could yet cause the inclusive government to
collapse. A
number of issues are still outstanding in the protracted
negotiations over
GPA implementation. Indeed, the six on the original agenda
have ballooned to
27, as the MDC-T, MDC-M and ZANU PF have brought in
additional topics they
considered had either been overlooked when the
mediation began or had gained
prominence during the course of the
negotiations.
The negotiators have agreed to postpone to the end the
especially
contentious appointment of MDC-T's Roy Bennett as deputy
agriculture
minister as well as the status of Mugabe stalwarts, Reserve Bank
Governor
Gideon Gono and Attorney General Johannes Tomana, whom the MDC
believe were
re-appointed to their positions unilaterally by Mugabe in
violation of GPA
provisions requiring consultations. Agreement has been
reached on sharing
provincial governors, though the dates of their
appointments have not yet
been determined. How the new National Security
Council (NSC) is to function
as a successor to the infamous Joint Operations
Command (JOC) is still
sharply contested.
Controversial matters
introduced by the MDC-T and remaining open include
security sector reform
and compliance with the National Security Act, a
framework for government
operations (including procedures for chairing of
the Cabinet when the
president is not present) and rule of law topics such
as freedom of assembly
and association.
ZANU PF has put forward for consideration such issues as
removal of
sanctions, donor-funded parallel government structures, the role
and funding
of non-governmental organisations, selective funding of
ministries and other
entities by donors and the functions of the Multi-Donor
Trust Fund, a basket
fund coordinated by the international community to
support the inclusive
government.
The constitutional reform outreach
programme intended to lead to a new
constitution kicked off on 7 January
2010 but needs greater impetus. There
is a growing recognition that this
process cannot be the exclusive preserve
of government and legislative
committees, but rather must be a national
exercise with full participation
of civil society groups. This is especially
essential for the MDC, since
there are concerns that the party is losing
contact with its popular base.
Civil society activists and unions have
complained, however, that the
process is being driven by political elites
for their own purposes, and some
have even called for the international
community to withdraw support for the
transition until a credible
consultation process has been adopted.
It
is positive, nevertheless, that there is increasing acceptance across the
political divide that the "Kariba Draft" - agreed by the inclusive
government's three parties under Mbeki's mediation - cannot be the only
reference for the new constitution, since it incorporates a number of
potentially anti-democratic principles, most notably further enhancement of
executive powers at the expense of legislative or judicial
authority.
While many political figures believe a broadly acceptable
compromise draft
is likely by the end of the year, sharp differences remain
between the
parties. A blueprint written by ZANU PF strategists linked to
the hardline
camp around Emmerson Mnangagwa suggests that the party remains
committed to
an all-powerful presidency. While the 41-page document - a
comparative
analysis of ZANU PF and MDC-T constitutional positions - gives
an insight
into the long-time ruling party's intention to preserve an
authoritarian
centralist government, the notion of an imperial presidency is
not shared by
the party wing around Vice President Joice Mujuru and her
husband,
ex-general, now prominent businessman Solomon Mujuru. The MDC-T
wants
executive authority to be shared between president, prime minister and
Cabinet, with internal checks and balances within the executive.
ZANU
PF - arguing that the past year has shown two centres of power are
unworkable - supports a presidential system of government. The ZANU PF
document states:
The experience of the people of Zimbabwe with the
inclusive government since
February 2009 has shown that sharing of executive
power by the President and
Prime Minister will result in . . . always a
fight for power rather than
progress. If there has to be a Prime Minister,
he [should] not have
executive authority. He is only a senior minister
appointed and accountable
to the President. In the SADC region, the
prevalent arrangement is Head of
State and leader of
government.
Finally, preparations need to be made for presidential and
parliamentary
elections. There is much discussion of delaying these for
several years,
perhaps until 2013, so as to put electoral politics aside
while the country
copes with massive economic and social tasks. Many in
Tsvangirai's camp
believe their party has not yet built a strong record in
government and are
equally concerned over how the military would react to a
potential MDC-T
victory. Meanwhile, many ZANU PF stalwarts believe their
party would be
convincingly defeated, since recent polls indicate its
support is now less
than 20 percent.
Though it is still possible that
Mugabe might dissolve the government in an
attempt to catch the opposition
off-guard with a rigged snap election as
early as 2011, this seems unlikely
at present, partly because of increased
international scrutiny and
engagement.
C. THREATS TO THE TRANSITION
Despite the current
stalemate on outstanding GPA issues, there is some
prospect that compromises
can eventually be reached, though only with the
help of intense mediation.
However, security sector reform - firmly rejected
by Mugabe - has emerged as
a key challenge. Failure to initiate this process
could unravel the
inclusive government, prevent a smooth transition to the
post-Mugabe era and
raise real prospects of a coup, with accompanying
instability that would
affect the whole region. A dozen or so
"securocrats" - senior military and
intelligence figures - are widely
considered to hold de facto veto power
over any real transition. A cabal of
powerful generals, with the support of
elements in ZANU PF, still believes
that Tsvangirai should not be permitted
to lead the country, even if he wins
an election. The MDC-T leadership has
raised this implicit threat with SADC
leaders. The issue is so sensitive
that it was not addressed in the
Mbeki-led GPA negotiations, but it has
become a key agenda item for the new
mediation team appointed by Jacob Zuma,
his successor as South African
president.
Moreover, even if the
inclusive government completes the GPA, achieves a new
democratic
constitution and addresses the electoral process, the transition
will not be
assured unless a broader challenge is met, namely development of
the
political system to ensure that ZANU PF and the MDC-T balance political
competition with cooperation in governance. This will be particularly
difficult as long as the divisive Mugabe is at the helm. At the December
2009 ZANU PF congress, he retained his party presidency unchallenged for an
additional five-year term, thus positioning himself to contest another
national election.
III. POLITICAL PARTY STRATEGIES
The three
principal parties to the GPA went into the inclusive government
with a
stated objective of securing political stability, initiating economic
recovery and holding fresh elections under a new constitution within
eighteen months, that is, by March 2010.
While that date is no longer
realistic, the government's perceived successes
and failures have emerged as
the key battleground between the parties as
they position themselves for an
eventual electoral test.
ZANU PF - divided along factional lines on
strategy, still seized with its
Mugabe succession problem and battling to
retain power that it has only
reluctantly shared in the inclusive
arrangement - comes close to unity only
in its intent to frustrate reforms
whose benefits would accrue primarily to
the MDC-T. The MDC-T believes that
success for the inclusive government in
instituting political reforms and
economic recovery would pave the way for
it to win the right to form the
next government after elections. MDC-M
leaders, recognising their party
lacks a solid base, are hedging their bets,
seeking to keep the inclusive
government functioning, while searching for an
advantageous alliance ahead
of a national vote.
A. ZANU PF'S DIVISIONS
1. The Mnangagwa camp's
hard line
ZANU PF's overall objective in the inclusive government is to
undercut any
major political and economic reforms associated with the MDC-T
and Prime
Minister Tsvangirai. Under Emmerson Mnangagwa, the defence
minister and
presidential hopeful, and with the support of military leaders,
ZANU PF's
participants in the unity government want to neutralise Tsvangirai
and his
party's ministers, while taking advantage of the former opposition's
presence in government to push for the removal of targeted travel and
related international sanctions on Mugabe and his party's
ministers.
This approach has Mugabe's backing but, for reasons related to
ZANU PF's
ongoing internal power struggle, not that of the Mujuru faction.
Mnangagwa
allies control the state bureaucracy, while Mujuru allies control
what
remains of grassroots support in those provinces the party dominates.
Mugabe, conscious that neither faction commands overwhelming support within
the party or sufficient national popularity to ascend to power on its own,
plays them against each other in order to maintain his grip on the divided
movement. While he has tended to side with Mnangagwa in dealings with the
MDC-T, he has mostly favoured the Mujurus on internal ZANU PF
decisions.
The attempt to frustrate the MDC-T includes at the national
level:
. securing a five-year term for the inclusive government
(to 2013),
with Mugabe at the helm until then or he decides to retire, while
making
both it and the parliament dysfunctional; steps in this regard
continue,
including acts of lawlessness such as continued farm invasions,
violations
of property and investment rights, and resistance to political
and economic
reforms so as to discredit the MDC-T both nationally and
internationally as
an effective political force;
. retaining
control of key state institutions and reducing
Tsvangirai to a ceremonial
prime minister, while discrediting, compromising
and corrupting him and his
party's ministers;
. derailing the pace of the constitutional
reform process; and
. inducing fears of a military coup should
Tsvangirai win the
election and attempt to take over from Mugabe.
The
plan is executed at government level by ZANU PF permanent secretaries,
whose
appointments Tsvangirai accepted in the misguided belief that they
would act
as professional civil servants.
All these ZANU PF loyalists selected by
Mugabe were first recommended by
Misheck Sibanda, chief secretary to the
Cabinet and a key Mnangagwa ally. In
general, the permanent secretaries have
taken advantage of the inexperience
of MDC-T ministers to acquire free rein
in determining the pace and
implementation of government decisions and
policies.
Permanent secretaries in education and public service
ministries, for
example, have in effect overturned decisions by their
ministers with regard
to new school fees structures and a manpower audit of
the civil service, on
whose payrolls ZANU PF has placed more than 20 000
youth militia members.
George Charamba, the influential permanent
secretary in the information and
publicity ministry, who doubles as Mugabe's
spokesperson, has denigrated the
work of the government in which he serves,
saying, "I am in the kitchen;
there's lots of smoke but hardly much cooking
going on".
This characterisation suits those in ZANU PF who fear that the
electorate
would credit successes primarily to Tsvangirai and the
MDC-T.
Likewise, strategists aligned with Mnangagwa calculate, failures
of the
inclusive government are more likely to cast doubt on Tsvangirai's
capacity
to provide effective national leadership.
Tsvangirai is also
being prevented from demonstrating authority. He has not
been able to chair
a single Cabinet session, even though the GPA makes him
deputy chairman of
Cabinet as well as prime minister and leader of
government business in
Parliament. He should normally exercise the chair
function in the
president's absence, but ZANU PF argues at the GPA
negotiations that
allowing him to do so would make the two vice presidents,
Joice Mujuru and
John Nkomo, redundant, causing further tension in the
already fractious
party.
Consequently, those senior ZANU PF members alternate in chairing
the Cabinet
when Mugabe is absent. On 25 January, Mugabe issued a written
order for all
ministers to report to the vice presidents and their permanent
secretaries,
not to Tsvangirai, on the execution of government business.
While the order
was subsequently withdrawn, the MDC-T considered it a
blatant attempt to
neuter the prime minister's office.
In addition to
frustrating the constitutional reform process so as to extend
the lifespan
of the inclusive government, a second strand of the strategy
involves
ensuring that parliament does not pass laws that would affect ZANU
PF
control of state institutions. Even though the two MDC parties together
constitute a small majority in the legislature, only eight bills have been
passed in more than a year, two of which were meant to facilitate formation
of the inclusive government, and the parliament has limited its work days
due to inadequate funding.
While ZANU PF's bloc has used
parliamentary procedures to stall movement,
this meagre legislative record
is also partly the result of the MDC-T's own
failings (see
below).
Mnangagwa supporters believe that despite its problems, the
inclusive
government could well limp on for a full term until 2013, with
Mugabe at the
helm, as the constituent parties have no better alternative.
They consider
that this would give their camp time to regroup from its
failure to tilt the
balance of power at the ZANU PF December 2009 congress,
when it supported
the unsuccessful candidacy of ZANU PF Women's League chair
Oppah Muchinguri
to oust incumbent Vice President Joice Mujuru. They hope
also that, after
elections, they can dominate a new coalition government
through alliance
with MDC-M and perhaps even some MDC-T elements.
The
Mnangagwa camp and its military allies, led by Defence Forces Commander
General Constantine Chiwenga, was behind the resolution at the December
congress instructing Mugabe to make no further concessions on outstanding
GPA issues until the MDC-T provides satisfaction on a number of ZANU PF
demands, including the removal of targeted Western sanctions against party
leaders.
2. The Mujuru camp's pragmatism
The Mujuru
camp believes the successes the inclusive government has achieved
and its
ability to put a crimp in Mnangagwa's presidential ambitions at the
December
congress have strengthened its chances to control the party and
retain
significant national power when Mugabe eventually retires or dies.
Its
dominance in the new politburo announced on 10 February 2010 by Mugabe
confirmed that it is tightening its grip on the party
leadership.
Mujuru supporters no longer call for Mugabe's early exit,
instead supporting
him to stay until a moment of his own choosing. This
shift results from a
conclusion that he is too strong to be forced out at
present and that his
continued prominence provides cover for their largely
behind-the-scenes
manoeuvres to consolidate their position for the eventual
showdown with
Mnangagwa. Consequently, the Mujurus seek to promote further
achievements
for the inclusive government and building lines to Tsvangirai
and the MDC-T
that could eventually result in a coalition. They realise that
it would be
difficult in the immediate term for any ZANU PF candidate to
beat Tsvangirai
and the MDC-T in reasonably free and fair elections but
conclude that
Zimbabwe is likely to need an inclusive government for at
least the next
decade regardless of which party does best in a national
vote.
This strategy requires Joice Mujuru, 54, to retain the country's
senior vice
presidency, a position that gives her the inside track to ascend
to the
presidency if Mugabe retires or dies before the end of his term. The
current
constitution provides that in such a contingency the senior vice
president
acts as head of state for a 90-day period followed by elections.
The GPA
stipulates that ZANU PF would appoint a successor for the remainder
of
Mugabe's term. Because of her seniority, that would also favour Joice
Mujuru.
In either event, the Mujuru camp considers that an alliance
with Tsvangirai
would be necessary to solidify Joice's position. She herself
has privately
told supporters she would have no problem working with
Tsvangirai in the
post-Mugabe period, though in public she talks tough about
the MDC-T leader.
A senior ally in the ZANU PF politiburo said, "she
recognises Tsvangirai as
an undeniable key player in Zimbabwe politics and
in any future arrangement,
hence strategic political relations are being
cultivated across the party
divide using the platform of the inclusive
government".
Cabinet ministers linked to the Mujurus have established a
degree of
confidential collaboration with their MDC-T counterparts and
Tsvangirai to
promote the reform agenda. This is still mainly preparatory
and has not yet
produced concrete legislative achievements, however, because
the Mujurus
rightly fear that to come into the open now would leave them
vulnerable to
criticism from the hawks within their own party.
The
Mujuru camp advocates a constitution providing for an executive prime
minister and a president with considerably less power than at present. Its
assessment is that there will need to be a second inclusive government of
some kind after Mugabe leaves the scene and that such a constitutional
arrangement would be advantageous under the two likeliest scenarios - both
of which acknowledge that it may have to be content with the junior role in
a partnership with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T. If the Mujurus lose the
internal party battle to Mnangagwa, they might throw their support behind
MDC-T in the elections and Tsvangirai as a strong prime minister in exchange
for the backing of Joice as a relatively weak president. Even if the Mujurus
win control of ZANU PF, however, they doubt they could defeat Tsvangirai
nationally, so the presidential post would be a reasonable second best in a
political settlement to which they would bring their presumed ability to
placate a critical mass of the military.
A close Mujuru adviser
summed up: "Tsvangirai and MDC-T would be key in any
future dispensation,
and our political strategies are alive to that reality".
3. Clan
politics and the Mugabe succession - the "Zezuru mafia"
The December
congress that retained Mugabe at the helm of the party for
another five
years appeared to confirm the view that the octogenarian wants
to die in
office rather than face an uncertain future in retirement. Barring
any major
midstream leadership changes, Mugabe, who turned 86 on 21 February
2010, now
seems likely to stand for re-election. However, clan and regional
fault
lines that will influence the question of his eventual successor as
party
leader were also highlighted at the congress.
While Mugabe has kept his
authority in the party in part by skilfully
playing the Mujuru and Mnangagwa
factions against each other, he has also
relied heavily on the fact that the
presidium - the party president, two
vice presidents and the national
chairman - is dominated by members of his
Zezuru clan. He used that
connection again in December 2009 to keep his
position unassailable. In
particular, the Zezuru line-up in both the
presidium and politburo beat back
relatively marginalised clans, mainly the
Karangas led by Emmerson
Mnangagwa, who believe it is their turn to have
more power. A key
consequence of this latest round of clan politics was,
therefore, the
strengthening of the Mujurus' position vis-a-vis Mnangagwa.
The Zezuru
dominance results from the 1980 division of Zimbabwe into ten
provinces.
Mashonaland (Zezuru) was cut up into four provinces: West, East,
Central and
Harare; Matebeleland (Ndebele) into three: North, South and
Bulawayo; and
Masvingo (Karanga) into only two, Masvingo and Midlands, while
Manicaland
(Manyika) remained undivided.
On any decision in ZANU PF, the Zezuru
grouping, now headed by the Mujuru
camp, has a virtual veto and needs only
two other provinces to carry the
day. Moreover, the strength of the
Mashonaland East and Central vote for
ZANU PF in past national elections has
increased the leverage of the Zezurus
generally and the Mujuru camp
specifically.
The Karangas, who are 35 percent of the national population
to the Zezurus'
25 percent, received none of the top five party posts at the
2004 congress
and were determined to do better in December 2009. By the eve
of the
congress, however, it was apparent they would fail. Basil Nyabadza
resigned
as party chairman for Manicaland in protest at what he described as
a flawed
nomination process and told Crisis Group: "Some leaders are like UN
permanent Security Council members", a reference to Mugabe's rigid
allocation of presidium positions based on the ZANU/ZAPU 1987 unity accord.
While the congress's rejection of the Karanga-Mnangagwa initiative and
confirmation of Zezuru dominance within the party gave the Mujuru camp an
edge in the succession struggle, it at the same time exacerbated clan
tensions that risk erupting into conflict at the national level in the
post-Mugabe era.
4. Tsholotsho II
Mnangagwa, 65, has
the support of the ZANU PF leadership in Manicaland,
Midlands, Masvingo and
Matebeleland South, but these provinces have been
MDC-T strongholds in
recent elections. This suggests that he starts well
behind in any three-way
national contest against Tsvangirai and Joice
Mujuru. He is a resilient
politician, however. Despite a series of setbacks
in the past ten years, he
continues to marshal support and remains a serious
contender for power.
Having been thwarted in the campaign to bring down
Joice Mujuru at the
December congress, his camp is having more success in
its current campaign,
called Tsholotsho II, to return key allies -
suspended or marginalised in
the aftermath of the 2004 congress defeat - to
influence in party
structures.
A Mnangagwa supporter in the ZANU PF politburo said, "we are
creating our
party within the main party - it's one of the strategies which
we are
crafting to ready ourselves for the challenges ahead to win the
presidency".
Mnangagwa is also using his defence minister portfolio to
strengthen ties to
the security establishment, and his emissaries have even
begun to explore
possible alliances with Tsvangirai and the MDC-T, or at
least some elements
of that party.
Nothing is impossible in politics.
There are no permanent friends or
enemies. All options are open for
consideration. Our Plan A is for our
preferred candidate to ascend to power
on his own. Our Plan B is to consider
how we can forge an alliance with
MDC-T and Tsvangirai, though this is still
a remote possibility at this
juncture.
B. MDC-T
1. Advancing the inclusive
government
The MDC-T leadership believes that it will ultimately be
judged by the
electorate on its record in office. As a result, it has been
focused over
the past year on pushing implementation of the GPA and making
the inclusive
government functional. Thus, it has given relatively little
attention to
growing the party by building alliances and to shoring up its
structures
countrywide. Tsvangirai considers that a successful inclusive
government
would pave the way for the MDC-T to take responsibilities more
firmly into
its hands after fresh elections, since it can prove to sceptics
that it is
competent and can be entrusted with stewardship of the country.
He told
Crisis Group:
We are in this inclusive government to restore
political and economic
stability and give Zimbabwe hope for a better
tomorrow and a chance for a
fresh beginning, and we believe, besides the
setbacks and frustration, we
have managed to do that in the past year . . .
Zimbabweans have seen a
modest peace dividend and want more. Our challenge
is to deliver on that
front.
The decision to enter government was
driven by a pragmatic assessment that
Mugabe, ZANU PF hardliners and the
security forces held a monopoly of force,
were willing to use it against
opponents and were favoured by Mbeki, the
SADC mediator. The MDC-T
calculated that in those circumstances, its
capacity to effect change would
be greater inside than outside government,
and it believes that events are
proving it correct.
The party is proudest of the inclusive government's
ability to overcome
obstacles put up by the ZANU PF hardliners and its
limited financial
resources to record some impressive economic gains.
Finance Minister Tendai
Biti said the MDC-T had managed "to stop the
bleeding and to bring sanity to
the governance of economic affairs under
very difficult circumstances . . .
An economy works on the basis of
predictability and trust, and what we have
done in the past ten months is to
bring predictability, consistency and
therefore some
legitimacy".
Though Biti added that the recovery is fragile, and more
donor support is
needed to sustain the momentum for change and avoid a
relapse, economic
stability has caused Tsvangirai's popularity to rise. A
poll by the
reputable Harare-based Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) in
September
found that 57 percent would vote for Tsvangirai, 10 percent for
Mugabe in
new elections.
Tsvangirai believes that the international
community should reward progress
by extending aid for reconstruction and
development. "There is no dispute in
everyone's assessment that there is,
indeed, progress being made in
Zimbabwe, and how do you reward that
progress? By moving away from just
humanitarian aid to economic growth,
development aid and ensuring that any
existing restrictions are
removed".
Attempting to walk a tightrope with its ZANU PF partners in the
inclusive
government, the MDC-T wants the lifting of "non-personal
sanctions" - those
impacting government entities vital to economic recovery,
such as the
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe - but targeted measures retained
on
individuals who continue to block meaningful political
reforms.
Tsvangirai has written to EU leaders, including UK Prime
Minister Gordon
Brown, urging a general review of restrictive measures,
while Biti requested
the EU to free eight government companies from its
sanctions. On 15
February, the EU responded by renewing the sanctions regime
for a year,
while dropping nine companies from the list.
2.
The Tsvangirai/Mujuru axis
The MDC-T originally anticipated that the
inclusive government would last at
most two years, during which rapid
political and economic reforms would be
followed by fresh elections. This
expectation has been modified by political
realities, and a senior
Tsvangirai aide summed up the frustration: "You
really wonder whether Mugabe
is in charge. Maybe we should have directly
negotiated with the military
during the mediation, because they appear to be
the ones calling the
shots".
Tsvangirai has suggested publicly that an early election might be
necessary
to break the impasse, but this appears to be a tactic to put
pressure on
ZANU PF. He realises that more time is required to democratise
state
institutions and put a new constitution in place, so the MDC-T may be
prepared to stay in uneasy harness with ZANU PF in the inclusive government
for a full five-year term.
Tsvangirai and his team are consequently
taking a two-pronged approach,
pushing for incremental gains on political
reforms through the negotiation
process, while seeking to take full charge
of the economy through Biti's
finance ministry. Jameson Timba, the MDC-T
deputy information and publicity
minister, told Crisis Group:
We have
ring-fenced the ZANU PF economic tsar, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon
Gono,
and our minister, Biti, is in control. On that front, we have made
huge
strides because the treasury has reclaimed its power, which was not the
case
before. Now we are going to pitch the fight to expedite political
reforms.
Party strategists worry that if the inclusive government
collapses before
meaningful political reforms are implemented, elections
would be held under
the current constitution in an even more hostile
environment conducive to
ZANU PF rigging than March 2008.
ZANU-PF
hawks are mainly responsible for frustrating reforms, but the MDC-T
shares
blame for failing to lead in parliament, where it has not used the
speakership and its plurality to initiate progressive legislation to open
political space. It has not moved aggressively, for example, against
restrictive laws like AIPPA and POSA. The MDC-M leadership has threatened
its legislators with party expulsion if they get too close to the Tsvangirai
wing of the once unified movement, and, as noted above, the Mujuru camp of
ZANU-PF is not yet prepared to cooperate openly. But some MDC-T leaders in
government and parliament appear satisfied with the temporary arrangement
and the accompanying perks it provides. There are also allegations, as yet
unproven, of corruption involving ministers and local councils the party
controls.
The MDC-T constitutional proposal - an executive prime
minister and a weaker
president - is similar to what the Mujuru camp
supports, and Tsvangirai,
like Joice Mujuru, has privately indicated to
confidantes a willingness to
work together. However, Tsvangirai seeks to
maximise his leverage by keeping
options open, since both ZANU PF factions
are privately reaching out to him
about possible post-Mugabe
alliances.
MDC-T insiders told Crisis Group the past year has convinced
Tsvangirai he
would still need to work with some ZANU PF elements after an
electoral
victory "to complete the transition and neutralise hawks in ZANU
PF and some
elements in the securocrats who still control most key
institutions".
A close adviser said, "we would need to form a second
inclusive government
with some elements in ZANU PF out of our own
magnanimity to complete the
transition and soft-land the crisis, even if we
were to win outright in the
next election".
But worry about a
military coup explains much of the MDC-T leadership's
interest in exploring
a second inclusive government, in particular with the
Mujuru camp, which
commands loyalty from some influential generals.
C.
MDC-M
The MDC-M faction, which has ten members of parliament, exercises
limited
influence and recognises that its very survival is heavily dependent
on the
durability of the inclusive government. While publicly stating that
an early
election would favour ZANU PF, its leader, Deputy Prime Minister
Arthur
Mutambara, acknowledges that he needs the full five-year term to
raise his
political standing and give the splinter party time to forge new
alliances
that might allow it to stay relevant in the post-Mugabe era.
Mutambara's
claim that he and the party play a critical unifying role in the
GPA and
keeping the government functional despite Mugabe's and Tsvangirai's
often
tense relationship is less than fully persuasive in view of their
unhelpful
role in parliament.
Without solid grassroots support, it
is most likely that the MDC-M will
eventually collapse, with some leaders
rejoining the larger MDC-T, a revived
ZAPU or ZANU PF, depending on which
faction gains control of the old ruling
party. Industry and Commerce Minster
Welshman Ncube, the MDC-M power broker,
would favour collaboration and an
inclusive government pact with the
Mnangagwa camp.
IV. THE
SECUROCRAT PROBLEM
A. OPPOSITION TO THE TRANSITION PROCESS AND
HINTS OF A COUP
After almost a year in the inclusive government, senior
MDC-T officials told
Crisis Group that they believe the greatest threat to
the power-sharing
coalition and to the country's stability will come from
leaders of the
national security services who are refusing to accept the new
dispensation.
One said:
We can implement the GPA to the last line,
but if we don't deal with the
contentious issue of the security leadership
in this country, we will be
haunted by it at the next elections. We will
have a Madagascar-like
situation if the military is left with free rein to
dictate and influence
key decisions with regards to political developments
in the country,
including national leadership.
In private discussions
in South Africa, Tsvangirai and other senior MDC-T
officials highlighted the
issue of "phased security sector reform" as his
principal concern in the
run-up to new elections.
Most observers believe that up to 20
high-ranking security officials (the
"securocrats") maintain a de facto veto
over the transition process. Among
those frequently cited as hardliners are
Defence Forces Commander General
Constantine Chiwenga, Police Commissioner
Augustine Chihuri and Central
Intelligence Organisation Deputy Director
General Maynard Muzariri.
In hushed conversations, MDC-T officials and
civil society activists express
fears that a coup could come shortly after
an MDC-T electoral victory or
should Mugabe die in office. Mugabe has fully
backed the military
leadership, his last remaining line of loyal support
given his fractious
party, in part by ruling out attempts to carry out a
security reform
programme. He left no doubts about this symbiotic
relationship in his
closing remarks to the ZANU PF congress on 19 December
2009:
ZANU PF as the party of the revolution and the people's vanguard
shall not
allow the security forces of Zimbabwe to be the subject of any
negotiations
for the so-called security sector reforms . . . That is the
most dependable
force we could ever have, it shall not be tampered
with".
The issue of the military command was not specifically addressed
in the GPA
negotiations. Still, the parties agreed to establish a new
coordinating body
for defence and security policy, the National Security
Council (NSC), that
would include Tsvangirai and his two deputy prime
ministers and replace the
ZANU PF-dominated, secretive and abusive Joint
Operations Command (JOC).
Over the past decade, the JOC has been behind
the strategy of repression to
keep Mugabe and ZANU PF in power. It is the
instrument through which Mugabe
has masterminded the rigging of elections
and the continuing wave of violent
farm seizures. The fact that the NSC has
met only once in the past year
while the supposedly defunct JOC holds
numerous weekly sessions with no
MDC-T participation is deeply worrying.
Most recently, the JOC was
reportedly behind the January decision by the
ZANU PF politburo to make no
further concessions to implement the GPA until
sanctions are lifted.
A number of generals are now contemplating moving
into full-time politics in
ZANU PF, including Chiwenga, who is eyeing a
leadership position in the
party's campaign in the new elections. This
pattern underlines their
determination to remain at the centre of national
political and economic
life.
B. "SOFT LANDING"
CONSIDERATIONS
The motives driving the senior security leaders to
undermine the transition
process and the inclusive government are diverse.
In the past, they have
reportedly benefited from packages administered by
Reserve Bank Governor
Gono through so-called "quasi-fiscal measures", as
well as largesse
channelled through Mugabe's wife, Grace, and
Chiwenga.
A number of generals have reportedly built up substantial
landholdings,
either personally or through family members and other proxies,
as a result
of farm seizures ostensibly designed to assist the rural poor.
Their desire
to protect these holdings is a key reason ZANU PF is opposing
implementation
of the GPA requirement to conduct a comprehensive land audit,
since that
exercise would expose these ownership patterns. Mugabe is
reportedly still
sustaining the livelihoods and patronage network of a small
group of
generals, mainly through proceeds from the controversial private
sale of
diamonds being mined in abusive conditions from the Marange fields
in
eastern Zimbabwe and through loans extended to the military by the
Chinese
government.
Some senior security officials fear prosecution
for gross human rights
abuses committed in recent repression campaigns,
especially those associated
with the 2008 presidential and parliamentary
elections, as well as
decades-old abuses, such as the killing of over 20,000
mainly
Ndebele-speaking people in Matebeleland in the 1980s in a campaign
known as
Gukurahundi. Amnesties have been granted frequently in the
post-independence
period, including in 1980, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1995 and
2000. The amnesty
provision in 1990 provided a full pardon for security
force members for any
offense committed during "anti-dissident" operations
"if that offence was
committed in good faith for the purpose of or in
connection with the
restoration or maintenance of good order and public
safety in Zimbabwe".
Still, a number of senior security officials have
quietly expressed concerns
that such amnesties could be revoked under an
MDC-controlled government and
legislature and that these provisions do not
afford protection from
international prosecution.
Others generals are
motivated by a continuing sense of ideological fervour,
viewing their acts
of repression against "dissidents" and white farmers over
the past three
decades as simply a continuation of the liberation struggle
of the
pre-independence period. In the extreme, they believe that Tsvangirai
and
the MDC-T are mere puppets for white farmers and business interests, as
well
as foreign interests, especially British. They see themselves as the
bulwark
and Praetorian Guard of the revolutionary struggle, and thus handing
over
power to Tsvangirai, who has no liberation war record, would amount to
selling out. One implication of this attitude is that these security
officials would be loath to appear before anything resembling a truth and
reconciliation commission and acknowledge their abuses, since they believe
that their acts were not crimes but heroic feats to protect Zimbabwe from
its enemies.
Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are
increasingly debating the
question of how to secure the retirement of these
security officials during
the life of the inclusive government. Many are
highly reluctant to consider
any concessions to the officials, viewing them
as rewards for past abuses
and undercutting rule of law in a future
Zimbabwe. While even these
individuals see the threat from the generals,
they also believe that the
threat can be minimised by playing on the growing
divisions between senior
security officials and the rank-and-file military
and police, who have
themselves suffered under the economic implosion
brought about by Mugabe and
his cronies. Further, they doubt that
concessions would have the desired
effect, given the varied motivations of
the generals and their scepticism
regarding the permanence and utility of
past amnesties.
Some suggest that security sector reform, leading to
higher salaries,
improved housing and educational benefits and a greater
sense of pride in a
professional security service, would better undercut the
capacity of senior
officers to use troops against a democratically-elected
government.
Expanded international pressure on Mugabe and ZANU PF to
ensure the full
functioning of the National Security Council, truly disband
the Joint
Operations Centre and proceed with the land audit to settle issues
of
ownership and compensation, if necessary, would go a long way toward
diminishing the threat of the security officials.
At the same time, a
number of MDC-T and MDC-M officials and human rights
activists, including
some who have suffered the worst of the abuses, have
raised the possibility
of arranging "soft landings" for the securocrats.
Persuading them to
retire peacefully will not be easy, given their fears of
the post-Mugabe
era. Among the ideas being discussed is a new domestic
amnesty for acts
committed since the last amnesty in 2000, in exchange for
the retirement of
the officials, but revocable should they be found to be
engaging in actions
to thwart the transition to democratic governance. In
keeping with past
Zimbabwean practice, such an amnesty would not apply to
so-called "specified
offences", such as murder, rape and theft of public
property, nor would it
protect the officials from international prosecution
for crimes against
humanity, war crimes and genocide.
Another idea being discussed is to
allow the generals to keep their assets,
including perhaps even their
farmlands, by arranging legal transfer to them
as retirement compensation,
but also providing compensation to those
illegally dispossessed. The US, EU
and others could sweeten the deal by
removing targeted sanctions on those
who comply with its terms, since they
would no longer be thwarting the
transition.
It is unclear whether these measures, even in combination,
would be
sufficient to remove the threat posed by many of the incumbent
leaders of
the security forces. Having always associated the exercise of
power with the
use of force, they may never be satisfied that their economic
interest and
personal security could be adequately protected after they
surrender their
power.
V. THE ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND
SADC
Zimbabwe's economic implosion and Mugabe's increasingly
authoritarian rule
have had wide regional implications. The country
traditionally was Southern
Africa's bread-basket, and its relatively modern
infrastructure, extensive
mining and manufacturing sectors, prosperous
tourism and well-trained labour
force helped anchor the region. With the end
of apartheid in the early
1990s, many envisaged South Africa and Zimbabwe
driving a broad regional
market, complete with extensive energy and
transport links. Instead, Harare
has become a regional crisis and
embarrassment. Up to four million
Zimbabweans - roughly a third of the
population - have flooded across
national borders due to political
repression and absence of economic
opportunities, affecting the stability of
particularly South Africa and
prompting xenophobic attacks by those fearing
loss of jobs or a drain on
social spending.
Similarly, South African
business grew deeply concerned over the collapse of
Zimbabwe's mining,
manufacturing, tourism and agriculture sectors and
infrastructure, in all of
which it has major investments.
A month after the failed March 2008
elections and acting on behalf of SADC
and the African Union, Thabo Mbeki
launched the mediation that produced the
GPA in September of that year. As
described above, this mediation remains
essential, because of the
difficulties that immediately developed with GPA
implementation and the
operations of the inclusive government. Facing a
political crisis at home
that eventually led to his resignation as
president, Mbeki did little
further, but the advent of Jacob Zuma as his
successor has changed the
situation. While Zuma carefully refrained from
challenging Mugabe or the new
SADC president, the Congo's Joseph Kabila,
during the early September 2009
Kinshasa summit, he has subsequently
displayed a refreshing engagement and
toughness on the Zimbabwe account.
In a clear break with the Mbeki team,
Zuma appointed three of his most
trusted and powerful advisers -
international relations specialist Lindiwe
Zulu, anti-apartheid veteran Mac
Maharaj and former cabinet minister Charles
Nqaqula - as his point-persons
for the mediation process. Significantly, at
SADC's special summit on
Zimbabwe in Maputo in November 2009, following the
MDC-T's suspension of its
participation in the inclusive government, Zuma
was reportedly firmer with
Mugabe than anyone had been during the lengthy
crisis, reaffirming that
there was no alternative to the GPA and that a
tough response would be
forthcoming against any party that derailed it. "He
told the three
principals, including Mugabe, that with him at the helm of
the mediation, it
was no longer business as usual".
There is growing impatience among the
South Africans with the slow pace of
reform. Though it looks improbable, the
mediation team indicates that all
main outstanding issues should be resolved
before June, when the football
World Cup begins in South Africa: "We don't
want trouble in our backyard,
especially this year when we host the World
Cup, and our mediation team will
work hard to ensure that key issues are out
of the way before mid-year".
The South African intelligence leadership has
reinforced this message with
all principals in the inclusive government,
and Zuma has publicly urged the
three political parties in the power-sharing
arrangement to resolve
remaining issues in time for elections in
2011.
The Zuma team considers that ZANU PF and MDC-T have both been
guilty of
adding peripheral items to the negotiating agenda. Zuma has called
on the
principals to be more flexible and "park" a number of topics for the
time
being to allow progress.
A senior ANC executive member told
Crisis Group:
The heart of the crisis in Zimbabwe centres around security
issues which
have closed political space and yielded disputed election
outcomes for the
past ten years. That's what should consume our time in the
mediation
process. Getting Reserve Bank Governor Gono out today or arguing
about the
prime minister's residence is not going to result in a free and
fair
election and a smooth transition".
Zuma's mediation also
includes an effort to deal with the securocrat
problem. A selected group of
retired generals from South Africa and other
SADC countries are to hold
discussions with senior Zimbabwean officers about
the role of the military
in a civilian-led government. At the same time,
Pretoria is working on
issues related to a possible amnesty or other forms
of immunity for the
current security leadership in the post-Mugabe era. A
senior official in the
African National Congress (ANC), South Africa's
ruling party,
explained:
The way the security leadership in Zimbabwe is handled is
crucial to how a
smooth transition process can be achieved. Our mediation
process, as well as
the main parties to the negotiations, cannot turn a
blind eye to that
critical element given Zimbabwe history. We can complete
all the elements as
outlined in the GPA, but if we don't work on and begin
to engage that
sensitive issue now, it could create great instability and
roll back all the
gains which we would have achieved. We are very aware that
is the crux of
the matter, and we are exploring ways to delicately engage on
this sensitive
issue.
In order to influence the emerging power
dynamics in Zimbabwe, the Zuma
administration has also deepened its
relations with Tsvangirai and the
MDC-T, while privately urging ZANU PF to
consolidate and clarify its own
party succession plan.
A member of
the ANC executive told Crisis Group that because his party was
doubtful
there would be a smooth political settlement after another round of
elections or a Mugabe exit, it was drawing on its experience in ending
apartheid to encourage a private dialogue between moderates in ZANU PF and
the MDC-T with a view to building support for a coalition government after
the polls regardless of who wins.
SADC as an organisation has
continued to defer to South Africa on Zimbabwe
policy, while calling for
strict adherence to the GPA, continued
negotiations on outstanding issues,
new foreign assistance and investment
and a lifting of Western sanctions.
Many in Zimbabwe believe that only Zuma,
among current southern African
leaders, has the mix of political stature and
revolutionary credentials to
take a tough, effective line with Mugabe. While
Mugabe is reportedly
surprised and angered at his treatment by Zuma, recent
progress, though slow
and inconsistent, suggests the approach can work.
Aware of the impact of
Zimbabwe's continuing crisis on his own country's
economic and social
conditions, there are strong reasons for the South
African president to
remain engaged once the World Cup is over and indeed to
adopt the even more
assertive approach to the mediation and the parties that
may be necessary to
resolve the crisis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Zimbabwe remains at
risk from the long legacy of misgovernment that produced
the interlocking
political, economic and humanitarian crises of the past
decade. In addition
to the challenges of governance and security highlighted
in this briefing,
any of a wide range of problems, singly or in common,
could return it to the
edge of collapse, particularly as long as Robert
Mugabe remains head of
state and his long-time ruling ZANU PF party
maintains its intransigent
stance.
The reformist MDC, split into sharply opposed factions, has
performed
reasonably in government, but has not seized the impetus for
reform that
seemed possible after it gained a parliamentary majority in
2008.
But despite its internal contradictions, the widely divergent
ambitions of
its three participating parties and the reluctance of donors to
fully
embrace it, the unity government has important achievements to its
credit.
The economy has gained a degree of stability, arbitrary political
violence
has been reduced, and a dialogue continues, with South African
mediation, on
the major political, constitutional and electoral issues. Even
a bitterly
divided ZANU PF implicitly acknowledges the need for a
generational change,
and at least one of its two main contenders for
Mugabe's mantle is well into
exploration of ways to come to terms with the
main MDC wing and the
transition process.
South Africa's role remains
vital, especially now that Jacob Zuma is
bringing to it a more even-handed
and energetic quality of engagement.
Western governments need to offer
complementary financial as well as
political assistance, including the
maintenance of targeted sanctions on the
spoilers and the selective removal
of corporate sanctions that stand in the
way of economic
growth.
Above all, Zimbabweans themselves - both the parties in the
inclusive
government and broader civil society - must put the legacy of
"divide-and-rule" politics behind them and learn basic lessons of
cooperation essential for a successful democratic
transition.
Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010 - ZimOnline
Today I was talking to a friend about women’s rights in the constitution. She told me this story about how she recently met a young girl from a very impoverished school in a high density area – the kind of school where there are hardly any text books and you expect the kids to battle their way through to exams, and then probably do badly despite their very best efforts and despite the huge lengths their parents go to to try and get them an education. This bright young woman is apparently dreaming of a trail-blazing career and my friend asked her what she thought was standing in her way.
The young woman replied: “Please tell me how we address this patriarchal society and how we can reach a point where women are superior?”
“In those very words…?!” I asked, thinking it took University and many textbooks to ram that kind of language into my head.
My friend replied: “Ja! … eish, I wanted to stand on a chair and yell ‘Hallelujah!’”
I know what she means, because I also smiled at the young woman’s aspirations to not be equal – forget that! - but to be superior. I smiled because she’s going to need that kind of bull-headed feistiness to move herself forward in her life, especially if she stays in our country.
Truth is, I’ve been stunned by some of the comments left along the theme of women’s rights on our constitution resource so I was ready to hear something about someone standing up to it. Some of the comments have left me with a very heavy heart, thinking that for all the language about oppression, and now all the talk of affirmative action, there is a certain element in male society in Zimbabwe that just doesn’t get it. It’s depressing to think the constitution offers so much potential for such good things, but backward-thinking people who want to hang onto thier personal power-positions can’t see the light. I went back to the resource to remind myself (torture myself?) of the things that had been said – I wanted to read them thinking about this unknown bright young women my friend had just told me about.
I’m so glad I did, because today I found a comment left by a male visitor. His words were a response to someone else who was clearly not comfortable with women having certain rights and had argued that western norms and standards should not be imposed on Zimbabweans. The reply he left that struck a chord with me was this one:
It is true that we should preserve our norms. The fact is that we are greedy. When we find that western norms benefit us we go there, and we also take African norms when they benefit us. In this developing world we cannot live only on our cultures. We must interact with other people and copy from them what is right. If you look at yourself you are far much improved than your people of previous generations. We expect our children to develop better that us. I wouldn’t happy to be better than my offspring.
His words “The fact is that we are greedy” really chimed with me; I’ve been stewing for some time now about how “culture” and “tradition” are words that seem to be invoked by some more out of a desire to protect a position of privilege, or to justify oppression.
Many, many years ago I encountered another amazing young woman from a high density area where most of the people had zero prospects of a positive future: I’d been invited to attend a workshop in South Africa (this was a little while before the ‘new’ South Africa was born). The workshop was on addressing violence in the area. I remember being very tired and disengaged from the discussion, until, that is, the talk moved to the issue of violence against women in particular.
My friend, who had asked me to come along to keep her company, was talking to the group about how language used by some men in relation to women was not cool and could lead to violence. Before she could fully finish, a young man at the back of the group stood up and almost exploded with rage: his face was twisted with anger and he was pointing at her while leaning forward aggressively shouting. His rage boiled down to this very simple premise: “Don’t tell us how we should behave towards women, it’s not your culture and in our culture we do things differently”.
I was fully alert at this point: the whole group had been stunned into silence and my friend, I could tell, was struggling to find the right appropriate words to say – words that effectively did the right thing in the context of the workshop, but also respected this man’s culture. I was alive with interest, wondering how on earth she was going to navigate this minefield of fundamental human rights colliding with right-on political correctness. She couldn’t find a thing to say; the guy’s argument had led her into a cul-de-sac: if she insisted his culture should change to respect the rights of others, she would in theory be proving his thesis that she didn’t respect his culture. And that’s why that argument seems to carry weight, not because its valid or true, but because it carries with it wheelbarrow-loads of emotional manipulation.
The heavy silence that ensued was eventually rescued by a black woman in the group who quietly stood up – with an air of drama – and walked slowly over to the still-angry man. She started talking very quietly, but loud enough for us all to hear:
“I’m wondering which culture you are talking about?” she asked rather ominously and slowly. Then she raised her voice: “… because in MY culture, everything you have just said is rubbish!”
It was an incredible moment: the women in the group started to smile, and the whole room descended into chaos as men shouted at women and women shouted at men. It was not exactly what was meant to happen at a workshop about anger and violence – and my friend felt she had failed – but I left that room a changed person and I think that many other women did too. I have never ever forgotten that women and what she did that day.
As for the young Zimbabwean girl who had my friend nearly standing on a chair shrieking ‘hallelujah’ … I’m struck today by my sense of time shifting forwards. Here we are, many decades down the line – and there she stands, yet another amazing young women, fighting the same fight in a different country also on the brink of change.
I hope in my bones that she will be just as inspirational as that person I encountered in South Africa so many years ago. I hope she will change lives too. And I hope there are more men like the guy who left the comment on our resource who think just like him. I hope they will voice their thoughts and silence the few who are ‘greedy’ and seeking to preserve the status quo by denying rights to others.
Cash-strapped village sells potholes
* From correspondents in
Berlin
* From: AFP
* March 04, 2010 5:00AM
A
CASH-STRAPPED village in eastern Germany has put its many potholes up for
sale in a novel effort to finance the repair of its crumbling
roads.
People can buy a hole in Niederzimmern near Leipzig for E50
($75).
In return the authorities will repair it - and put a personal
message on
top, mayor Christoph Schmidt-Rose told local radio station
MDR.
"It's about using a funny idea to find people prepared to help us
sort out
our roads" who can then "sort of feel like they own the hole in the
road",
Mr Schmidt-Rose said.
He said that some potholes had already
been snapped up by television
channels and newspapers wanting to
advertise.
Experts estimate that months of severe winter weather have
left as many as
40 per cent of Germany's roads badly damaged, while the
recession has made
it hard for local authorities to patch them up.