Mugabe refugees pour into SA by the millions November 21 2004
at 03:53PM
By Caroline Hooper-Box
At least 1,2 million Zimbabweans
have fled to South Africa during the past three years; yet the department of
home affairs says there is no refugee crisis.
Historically there have
always been about 500 000 Zimbabweans who have come to South Africa to work.
But an additional 1,2 million have arrived here in the past 36 months,
bringing the total Zimbabwean population in South Africa to close to two
million.
In addition, the vast majority of Zimbabweans in South Africa
have no papers, making information collection difficult and making the
refugees illegal fugitives. Some estimates of the number of "undocumented
migrants" from Zimbabwe are closer to three million.
He cited three
major reasons for the exodus These figures were released in a report in
Johannesburg on Friday by the Solidarity Peace Trust, a southern African
faith-based organisation. Pius Ncube, the Archbishop of Bulawayo, is
chairperson of the trust.
The intention of the report is to raise
awareness and understanding of difficulties faced by Zimbabweans who are
pouring into South Africa and the region "in their millions".
The
trust hopes that governments and NGOs will start developing policies to deal
with the influx.
"The only official strategy at this stage seems to be an
endless revolving door of deportations at huge expense to the South African
public, that in any case barely scratches the surface of the number of
Zimbabweans in South Africa."
In an October interview, the Solidarity
Peace Trust report quotes Barry Gilder, home affairs director-general, as
saying that there has been no large-scale influx of Zimbabweans into South
Africa, as had been expected after the past Zimbabwean election.
But
the Trust says that "South Africans need to brace themselves for ever
greater numbers of Zimbabweans unless a lasting political solution is found
to the current [Zimbabwean] crisis."
The Zimbabwean government's own
analysis puts the number of Zimbabweans who have left the country in the
past three years at 3,4 million - 25 to 30 percent of the entire population.
This means that 60 to 70 percent of Zimbabwe's productive adult population
is now outside the country.
An estimated 400 000 Zimbabweans live in
Mozambique, 200 000 are in Botswana and 300 000 in England. Economic reasons
had forced Zimbabweans to leave, but there was also political motivation for
these conditions, Bishop Kevin Dowling of the Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace said on Friday.
There weren't piles of bodies and
rivers of blood in Zimbabwe, Dowling pointed out, but there was "nonetheless
a war".
He cited three major reasons for the exodus: the breakdown of law
and order including torture with impunity; the collapse of the economy; and
the shortage and "political abuse" of food.
"Commentators fear the
probability of food becoming a political weapon ahead of the 2005 elections
is even more likely in a situation where the ruling party effectively
controls all food in the country," the trust's report said.
Dowling
said he expected a huge increase in the number of Zimbabweans fleeing to
South Africa around the time of the Zimbabwe election in March next year.
The passing of Zimbabwe's Non-Government Organisation Bill would also be a
contributing factor.
The bill states that no foreign NGO can be
registered if its "principal objectives involve issues of
governance".
The bill defines "issues of governance" as including "the
promotion and protection of human rights". Sapa reports that the Bill is set
to be passed by parliament as early as next week.
To date only
approximately 20 Zimbabweans have been granted refugee status in South
Africa. About 5 000 have been given asylum-seeker status, which indicates
that the person is in the process of being considered for refugee status.
The permit is valid for one month at a time.
South Africa's reluctance to
give political refugee status to Zimbabweans needed to be tested in a South
African court, Dowling said.
"People can no longer be denied refugee
status when there is political motivation for economic crisis."
He
called on the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and
South Africa, in particular, to take a "more principled stand with the
people" of Zimbabwe. "They must move beyond solidarity with government and
political leaders to solidarity with African people."
According to
the trust's report, numerous would-be Zimbabwean asylum-seekers have been
told by home affairs officials that they have no right to asylum in South
Africa as "there is no war in Zimbabwe".
Zimbabweans are allowed to apply
for asylum only on Tuesdays, along with people from countries in the "Horn
of Africa". Fewer than 10 Zimbabweans are processed at the Johannesburg
refugee reception office each week.
Many queue outside every week for
months before making it into the office. Steve Paradza of the Zimbabwe
Political Victims' Association said his organisation had appealed to
government to increase this number to 15 a week.
Over the past three
years an average of 45 000 Zimbabweans have been deported from South Africa
a year, more than the total deported between 1994 and 2000.
More
Zimbabweans than any other nationality are deported. Zimbabweans are now the
second largest group of foreign Africans in South Africa, the largest being
Malawians.
Deportees are held at Lindela detention centre and are then
deported on a weekly or fortnightly train, at a cost to South Africa of R720
million a year. Many of these deportees return within hours or
days.
Nkosana Sibuyi, home affairs spokesperson, said his department was
not able to make a statement on the trust's report, but would "study the
report and formulate an informed opinion" on the matter.
"The
department will go through the report in its entirety."
This article
was originally published on page 3 of Sunday Independent on November 21,
2004
Hillbrow horror: 31 blind people in one room November 21
2004 at 03:53PM
Among the Zimbabweans in South Africa is a group of
31 blind people, ranging from two to more than 60 years of age, who live in
a one-room Hillbrow flat.
Cooking is done on one double hot
plate on the floor, and ablutions are in a communal bathroom down the
passage. Each day they are accompanied by a few sighted children who lead
them out into Johannesburg to beg. They make around R10 a day.
One blind man said that back home he had bought sugar in August 2002, which
was scarce at that time, and was selling it at a small mark-up on a corner
street. He was attacked by youth militia who accused him of being an MDC
member, stole his sugar and handed him to the police.
He
was detained in jail until January last year. On his release, he fled to
South Africa.
The money paid to this group by social services in
Zimbabwe for their disabilities is the equivalent of about two loaves of
bread a month. Most of them are in South Africa as undocumented
migrants.
From a report released on Friday by the
Solidarity Peace Trust, "No war in Zimbabwe - an account of the exodus of a
nation's people"
This article was originally published on page
3 of Sunday Independent on November 21, 2004
The Solidarity Peace Trust launched today a heart
wrenching television documentary about the plight of Zimbabwean refugees in
South Africa. The documentary and a report which is called "No War in
Zimbabwe," is an account of the exodus of a nation's people. The author
of the reports is The Solidarity Peace Trust which is an NGO committed to
human rights, freedom and democracy in the region. The Trustees of the Trust
are church leaders of Southern Africa. Zimbabweans are now the second biggest
group of foreign Africans in South Africa. Yet there is little formal
information available on their situation. Very few are being officially
recorded as political refugees. Many Zimbabweans say that it is hard to
access asylum seeker status. It was the intention of the authors to
investigate these allegations, as well as to detail other problems and
issues of relevance to Zimbabweans in South Africa. The report says that
South Africa needs to brace itself for ever-greater numbers of Zimbabweans
unless a lasting political solution is found to the current crisis. At both
government and NGO level, there is a need to devise policies to deal
humanely with the influx, and particularly to provide services on the
ground. For this, more information is needed. We got the details of the
report which was launched in Johannesburg today from Selvan Chetty, the
South African representative of the Solidarity Peace Trust Picture
gallery Front Cover: Razor wire on the border between Zimbabwe and South
Africa
Photo 3: Man brutally assaulted by army in Zimbabwe during the
mass stay away called by the MDC in March 2003
Photo 4: Tonderai
Machiridza, an MDC activist tortured in the custody of Zimbabwean police. He
died of his injuries the day after this picture was taken, on Independence
Day, 18 April 2003. Nobody has ever been held accountable for his
murder
Photo 7: Samuel Khumalo, a trade unionist, seeks medical
assistance after being tortured in police custody, in November 2003. This
same unionist was arrested again in October 2004
Photo 9: Minutes
after the previous picture was taken, Home Affairs guards started an
unprovoked attack on the Zimbabweans, whipping them with sjamboks
Photo
10: October 2004 - a year later in Rosettenville: the RRO is now accessed
down an un-signposted alley. The same long queues of Zimbabweans are there,
still mostly failing to access the office
Photo 11: Zimbabweans join
other vagrants on the streets of Johannesburg in the bitter cold of a
winter's night. Here a woman is roused for a cup of soup from the Methodist
church, July 2004
Photo 12: A Zimbabwean exile with two children receives
food aid from the Methodist church in Johannesburg: July 2004
Photo
13: A Zimbabwean deportee escapes from the shadow of the deportation train
that he has just leapt from: destination for him is now no longer
Beitbridge, but Johannesburg
Photo 14: a blind Zimbabwean child feels
the face of Archbishop Pius Ncube of Bulawayo
Photo 15: This
Zimbabwean was one of four who died after being detained in Lindela in
October this year
Photo 16: Zimbabwean deportees are herded on to a
deportation train in Johannesburg, September 2003
Photo 17:
Zimbabwean deportees are herded on to a deportation train in Johannesburg,
September 2003
Back Cover: Zimbabweans wait to be deported at
Lindela
"NO WAR IN ZIMBABWE" An account of the exodus of a nation's
people Solidarity Peace Trust - November 2004
"Any democracy is
only as strong as its weakest link. Refugees are South Africa's weakest link
and if we collude on impunity of our own officials, and allow corruption,
and deny refugees their rights, then South Africa is not a country to be
proud of." [Abeda Bhamjee, Lawyer, Wits Law Clinic, October 2003] "The
Zimbabwean situation of starvation and malnutrition, wilful political
violence and intimidation, and the immoral use of food aid by the Zimbabwean
government demands stronger and transparent intervention by African
governments through the AU. With more than three million people displaced as
a result of the crisis in Zimbabwe, a generation of exiles and refugees has
been created. This situation cannot be allowed to continue. The Government
of Zimbabwe must care for its own people." [South African Catholic
Bishops Conference, August 2004] "We would be better off with only six
million people, with our own people who support the liberation struggle. We
don't want all these extra people". [Didymus Mutasa: Zanu-PF Organising
Secretary, August 2002] "60% to 70% of Zimbabwean adults who should
constitute the productive population are living abroad." [Herbert Nkala,
Publicity Committee Chairman for Zimbabwe Reserve Bank's "Homelink",
September 2004] There is no civil war in Zimbabwe, so there is no reason to
apply [for asylum]. [Home Affairs official, Johannesburg Refugee
Reception Office, July 2004] Executive Summary Background Zimbabweans
are now the second biggest group of foreign Africans in South Africa. Yet
there is little formal information available on their situation. Very few
are being officially recorded as political refugees. Some Zimbabweans claim
that it is hard to access asylum seeker status. It was the intention of the
authors to investigate these allegations, as well as to establish other
problems and issues of relevance to Zimbabweans in South Africa. South
Africa needs to brace itself for ever-greater numbers of Zimbabweans unless
a lasting political solution is found to the current crisis. At both
government and NGO level, there is a need to devise policies to deal
humanely with the influx, and particularly to provide services on the
ground. For this, more information is needed. Method: data
sources Data for this report was collected between September 2003 and October
2004. Sources of data included: a desk study of media, human rights reports
and refugee laws; more than two hundred interviews with Zimbabweans in South
Africa; 7 field visits to the Johannesburg RRO; 10 field visits to places of
residence; two surveys involving a further 211 Zimbabweans; interviews with
key informants; 4 field visits to Musina; 3 field visits to
Beitbridge.
PART ONE: Zimbabwe's biggest export: its people Part One
of the report looks at: the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe; the
humanitarian crisis; the economic crisis. It examines numbers of Zimbabweans
in the diaspora and the implications of this. 1. The breakdown of law and
order: torture with impunity Human rights organisations estimate that a
minimum of 300,000 people have been victims of human rights violations of
various kinds over the last four years. Such violations include torture,
destruction of homesteads, massive displacement of persons fleeing political
persecution or farm invasions, and the denial of food to those perceived to
support the opposition. Around 300 have been murdered for political reasons.
The cumulative impact on life in Zimbabwe is harrowing. Recording and
publicising the problem is close to impossible because of laws restricting
freedom of association, expression and movement. Government agents have
impunity and very few cases of violation result in charges being laid
against perpetrators. Two hundred and fifty thousand school leavers each year
have little or no prospect of formal training or employment; further
training and jobs in the civil service now require youth to undergo the
politically biased and brutalising national youth service training. Some
youths flee Zimbabwe to avoid militia training. None has doubted the need
for land redistribution, including civil society and the political
opposition, but the well orchestrated abuse of a much needed programme by
the government has resulted in new injustices. 2. The Humanitarian
crisis The land invasions have resulted in a dramatic drop in Zimbabwe's
capacity to feed itself. The government has at times in the last three
years, used the food deficit situation to politically manipulate access to
food, denying opposition supporters the right to buy it from GMB. AI has
documented that Zimbabwe is in contravention of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which enshrines the right
to food, and to which Zimbabwe is signatory. The government has consistently
throughout 2004, claimed a bumper harvest, and has informed WFP that they do
not need food aid during 2004/5. Yet UN agents predict a 50% food deficit.
The GMB reports having purchased from farmers only 288,000 tonnes of maize,
a shortfall of 2,000,000 tonnes. Commentators fear the probability of food
becoming a political weapon ahead of the 2005 elections is great, in a
situation where the ruling party now effectively controls all food in the
country. Some Zimbabweans who have fled the country fear political
victimisation resulting in being denied the right to food. There is a need
to recognise this group of persons, which may become quite sizeable in the
year ahead. 3. Collapse of social services and the economy Social
indicators in Zimbabwe have fallen dramatically over the last four years.
There is 70% unemployment, 80% below the poverty datum line, 27% of adults
HIV positive. As a result of political decisions, around a million farm
workers and their families have been deliberately deprived of their
livelihoods, homes and infrastructure. Health, education and delivery of
services in municipal areas are collapsing under economic and skills
constraints. Economic collapse is the result of poor governance. The
government orchestrated farm invasions have led to the collapse of
commercial agriculture, which has had a knock on effect for other
industries. Key industries have contracted by between 40% and 60% in the
last three years. The mining industry has been destabilised by recent plans
by government to indigenise 50% of this sector. 4. Zimbabwe's biggest
export: its people An estimated 25% to 30% of Zimbabwe's population has left
the nation. Government's own analysts put the number at 3,4 million. Out of
a population of 12 million, around half is under the age of 15, and out of
the remaining 6 million adults, 1 million is retired. Out of 5 million
potentially productive adults, 3,4 million are outside Zimbabwe. This is a
staggering 60% to 70% of productive adults. The current exodus is not
part of the long established cross border movement between Matabeleland and
South Africa. Around 500,000 are estimated to have regularly migrated to
South Africa for work, but there is an estimate of an additional 1,200,000
now in South Africa. The loss of skills has impacted on health and education
in Zimbabwe. Many Zimbabwean have left their professions, either to go into
more lucrative careers, for example in the black market in Zimbabwe, or for
higher salaries abroad. Many professionals such as teachers, nurses,
policemen, artisans, have been driven out by political events and are living
like vagrants in South Africa. The government's "Homelink" scheme is
official acknowledgement that our biggest export is our people. Around US$
300 million is returned monthly to Zimbabwe from nationals in the diaspora,
98% of this via black market channels. "Homelink" attempts to increase the
return of foreign earnings via the Reserve Bank. With possibly 50% of
voting age adults outside Zimbabwe, the implications for democracy are dire.
Half the population will be deprived of its vote in next year's
election.
PART TWO: Destination - South Africa: Legal, administrative and social
issues involving refugees Part Two is an overview of South Africa's legal
obligations to refugees, together with the authors' own findings relating to
the Johannesburg RRO. Issues of quiet diplomacy and xenophobia are briefly
raised. 1. "Asylum seekers" and "refugees": South Africa's legal
obligations South Africa is signatory to various international conventions
and has had a Refugee Act since 1998. In terms of the Act, asylum seekers
need to approach a Refugee Reception Office and receive an asylum seeker's
permit. This should entitle them to work and study, but not all RROs are
ensuring this. ASPs have to be renewed monthly. If applicants get refugee
status, it entitles them to remain in South Africa for two years and to have
improved access to social services. The decision of refugee status is
future based. It is an assessment of whether returning to your home country
is likely to result in persecution. The authors suggest there is a need for
a test case in South Africa to establish whether being denied food on
political grounds is a "threat to physical safety", and whether Zimbabweans
fleeing politically induced famine or outright discrimination of access to
food should be given asylum. 2. The Battle for Zimbabwean refugee
rights It is only since June 2002, when the Wits Law Clinic prepared a test
case involving 5 Zimbabwean exiles for the Courts, that the Department of
Home Affairs conceded that any Zimbabwean had a right to asylum. The
attitude before then - and very often since - is that "there is no war in
Zimbabwe" and therefore no right to asylum for its people. However,
Zimbabweans who entered South Africa prior to the test case ruling are still
on occasion being denied the right to seek asylum, although June 2002 is not
the time at which human rights violations began. Victimisation is a
repeated experience in Zimbabwe. This is significant in terms of eligibility
for asylum, and also as Zimbabwe heads into another election phase. Those
persecuted before may well be persecuted again and may flee to South
Africa. 3. Attitude to Zimbabweans within Home Affairs RROs Refugees
International found that Zimbabweans do face more barriers than other asylum
seekers, in spite of denials by Home Affairs. A study by Themba Lesizwe
reported that only 4 out of 34 tortured Zimbabweans who had tried to access
asylum seeker status had managed to do so. RI noted that Home Affairs
officials, when interviewed, said that "there is no civil war in Zimbabwe,
so there is no reason to apply [for asylum]".
4. Refugee Reception
Office, Johannesburg: Observations of current authors Most Zimbabweans apply
for asylum through the Johannesburg RRO. We therefore observed events at
this RRO on 7 occasions and two different locations in the last year. We
noted many irregularities that indicate that Zimbabweans have serious
problems acquiring ASPs. Corruption, assaults by guards at the RRO, and
fewer than 10 Zimbabweans a week being processed were a few observations we
made. We noted that would be asylum seekers from the "Horn of Africa" who
queue on the same day had fewer problems in accessing the RRO. We further
noted that all asylum claims are being processed very slowly. In terms of
the Regulations to the Refugee Act, they are supposed to be finalised within
6 months. However, ASPs from any country frequently take longer than 3
years. Even so, Zimbabwean claims seem to take longer still, with only 1% of
claims having been finalised positively in the last two and a half
years. RROs have problems with capacity. The Director General assured us that
this will improve shortly, with 69 more refugee determination officers
entering the system. It was suggested by human rights lawyers that asylum
seekers are a "cash cow", and that it suits Home Affairs officials to
obstruct access to the RROs; desperate people are then prepared to pay
bribes to get an ASP. However, as some people still get ASPs through the
normal route, it is hard to prove bribery and inefficiency. Many potential
asylum seekers do not attempt to gain ASPs because they know they do not
have the money to bribe. Home Affairs Director General acknowledged the
system was full of corruption, and said there was a new "Counter corruption
and security" department now being set up. 5. Attitude of UNHCR to
Zimbabweans RI observed that the UNHCR showed a lack of commitment to
protecting Zimbabwean asylum seekers in South Africa. They made "appallingly
cynical" comments to RI about Zimbabweans, and had failed to visit the
border area for one year, or the Johannesburg RRO for 8 months. Human rights
lawyers noted that UNHCR is very reluctant to facilitate resettlement of
Zimbabweans outside of southern Africa. 6. Quiet diplomacy: at odds with
acknowledging political refugees? SADC nations including South Africa have
been reluctant to condemn human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and have accepted,
publicly at least, ZANU PF's claim that abuses are all linked to land reform
and to the need to resist "recolonisation" by British agents. There is a
clash between the policy of "quiet diplomacy" which plays down the crisis of
governance and simultaneously acknowledging that citizens of Zimbabwe have
genuine reasons to fear persecution and to run away in their
thousands. 7. Perceptions of Zimbabweans: "Makwerekwere" It is common for
refugees anywhere to attract negative perceptions and this is true in South
Africa as well. South Africa has 42% unemployment and migrants compete with
South Africans for unskilled work. This drives down wages and causes
resentment. Xenophobic attacks on Zimbabweans and other foreigners occur
regularly. There is a perception that Zimbabweans are involved in criminal
activities. There is some evidence in the media for this, although precise
figures could not be sourced from officials. Zimbabweans report criminal
acts against them, including rape, assaults, theft and having to bribe
police in order not to be deported. They have no right of redress as they
fear reporting these incidents. 8. South Africans: a history of
exile South Africa was hosted in the sub region during their own struggle for
freedom. Zimbabwean exiles have expressed disappointment that their own
struggle for democracy is not being recognised as legitimate.
PART THREE: The revolving door Part Three covers the experiences of
Zimbabweans themselves and the process of going into exile. This includes:
crossing the border; life in South Africa; access to health care;
deportation; repatriation. It also raises the issue of Zimbabwean deaths in
South Africa. 1. Crossing the border Zimbabweans face the hazards of the
Limpopo in flood, crocodiles and human predators such as the "Maguma guma"
and SANDF when entering South Africa illegally. Nonetheless hundreds do so
every week. 2. Life in the big cities: Johannesburg and Durban This
section describes the every day lives of: 26 political exiles living in one
two-bedroomed apartment: a group of 31 blind Zimbabweans who live in one
room; cross border traders in Durban. The very hard living conditions, lack
of privacy and lack of security is apparent. It is astonishing that such
lives are considered preferable to life in Zimbabwe, an indicator of both
how afraid and how deprived people in Zimbabwe now are. 3. Musina: life
in a small border town Most Zimbabweans pass quickly through Musina to other
places. Those who remain are usually farm workers or unaccompanied minors.
Some migrant workers have been working in this area for generations, but are
now joined by politically displaced farm workers from parts of Zimbabwe that
have not traditionally had farm labourers going to Musina Children aged 12
to 17 have formed informal groups here. They are hard to access, and very
prone to deportation and wage exploitation. Many girls this age and older
end up as sex workers. Girls also commonly report having to offer regular
free sex to police and army in order not to be deported. 4. Access to
health care A survey of 111 Zimbabweans conducted in August 2004 found that
out of 55 who reported having needed public health care since they arrived
in South Africa: 29 had accessed the public health care system 26 had
not accessed it Out of the 26 who had not, 17 had been denied health care by
a clinic or hospital, and 7 had reported they were too afraid of deportation
to even approach a health centre; 2 had reported they were too poor to
afford fees. Johannesburg hospital was the most likely to turn people away,
and receptionists were the category of employee most likely to turn people
away, for not having acceptable ID. 3 people reported verbal abuse from
nursing staff, being called a "makwerekwere". Although the sample was
small, these findings coincide to a large degree with the findings of a
larger refugee report released in November 2003. Additional anecdotal
evidence supports the survey findings that some Zimbabweans have problems
accessing health services, including torture victims.
5.
Deportation Around 45,000 Zimbabweans a year are deported. Deportees are held
at Lindela detention centre and are then deported on a once-weekly or
fortnightly train. Deporting Zimbabweans costs South Africa approximately R
720,000,000 a year. Most deportees are back in South Africa within a few
hours or days of deportation. Police and Home Affairs are not issuing 15
day permits to people picked up without papers who ask at that point for
asylum, and is rather going ahead and deporting them. This is illegal, and
also in defiance of the principle of "non refoulenent": people at risk of
torture are being returned to Zimbabwe. They are being deported without ever
seeing an immigration officer and having the chance to claim refuge.
Considering how hard it is to get an ASP, this puts political exiles at risk
of deportation. Corruption is a problem. Police commonly bribe Zimbabweans
R200 in order not to send them for deportation. Home Affairs officials
charge R800 to release people from Lindela before deportation. People who
are very ill are also being picked up, held in Lindela and deported. This is
in contravention of Lindela's stated policy and basic humanitarian law, yet
in one week in October this year, 11 deportees died in Lindela. Others have
died on the deportation train, or soon after arrival back in
Beitbridge. In Musina, there is no RRO, and all Zimbabweans are deported
without the opportunity to claim ASPs. Police do not have the resources to
cope with the numbers of detainees and are holding them in poor conditions.
They report deporting the same people three times in one week. In the
opinion of the police in Musina, this cycle of deportations is not
constructive. Unaccompanied minors have been regularly deported and this is
illegal. There was a test case ruling in September of this year confirming
this, and saying foreign children have the same rights as South African
children in terms of the Child Care Act. From time to time, parents get
deported without their children, who remain in South Africa until the
parents come back. 6. Back in Zimbabwe: the deportees on arrival Police in
Beitbridge do not have the capacity to hold detainees, and so release them
within minutes of repatriation. The authors witnessed that within an hour of
being dismissed by the police, most deportees are on their way back in the
direction of the border, by taxi or on foot. 7. Problems of the repatriated
in Beitbridge While most deportees head south again, some end up stranded
without money or too ill to continue their journey. Neither the police nor
NGOs here provide bus passes or any other support for deportees. Deportees
reportedly die on a weekly basis in Beitbridge hospital. We were shown
orphans whose mothers had died in this hospital, leaving small children
stranded far away from families. Human remains washed up on the banks of the
Limpopo also end up in mass paupers' graves here. Human remains, which are
assumed to be of border jumpers, are picked up fairly regularly in the bush
around the border area. There is a risk of being picked up by the Zimbabwean
police and tortured again, in the case of political deportees. 8. The
dead: a problem for the future? Zimbabweans are dying in South Africa,
possibly in large numbers, and not all of the dead are being repatriated for
a variety of reasons. They end up in paupers' graves, either in South Africa
or in Beitbridge, depending where they die. These dead are undocumented and
do not have death certificates in their names. This may cause practical
problems for their Zimbabwean families in the years ahead. Single parents
sometimes die and leave stateless, undocumented orphans, who may have
relatives in Zimbabwe, but who these may be and how to reach them is not
known. Families also need to know the fate of their loved ones abroad, yet
the dead are sometimes becoming "disappeared persons", without death
certificates or known places of burial. This may cause emotional problems
for families, who are left with unanswered questions about the fate of their
relatives. There is a need to address this problem and find ways of ensuring
that trusted persons or NGOs have ways of contacting relatives in Zimbabwe
in such situations. 9. Conclusion Zimbabweans are fleeing their nation
in their millions. There is no indication that this is going to change in
the near future. Three major reasons for the exodus have been identified:
the breakdown of law and order, including torture with impunity; the
humanitarian crisis, including political abuse of food; the collapse of the
economy. Going into exile is a difficult choice: living as a "makwerekwe" in
South Africa involves living with a very real threat of xenophobia, of
having to bribe police in order not to be deported, or of being deported. It
means being vulnerable to crime and exploitation without redress. It means
living in appallingly overcrowded and unsafe conditions, and not always
having access to basic facilities including health. It means that productive
people who once held respectable jobs have to adjust to being
beggars. That so many opt nonetheless to live a hard life in exile, is an
indicator of the severity of life in Zimbabwe; however tough things are in
South Africa, it is better and safer than being in Zimbabwe. For this
reason, would-be asylum seekers are prepared to spend weeks and months in
fruitless queues in the hope of ASPs. For this reason, young men are
prepared to leap out of deportation trains - risking death on the tracks is
better than being forced to go home. Zimbabweans in exile appear to face
a lack of political will in South Africa. While the laws to protect their
rights are in place, these are being undermined by the "politics of denial"
practised by government officials in relation to the nature of the crisis in
Zimbabwe; this results in victimisation at many levels. Zimbabwean exiles
have become a "cash cow" - the very government they have fled is trying to
harvest returns from them, and corrupt Army, Police and Home Affairs
officials in South Africa take bribes from them and other refugees in
exchange for another precarious day of not being deported. It is apparent
that the current inefficiency in the Home Affairs system plays into the
hands of corrupt officials, who are making significant sums of money from
bribes. It is not in their interests for the system to become
efficient. The needs of Zimbabweans in exile are those of refugees everywhere
- they need recognition and acceptance, and access to essential services. In
addition, Zimbabweans need greater understanding of why they have left their
nation, particularly from South African officials. The nature of Zimbabwe's
struggle for democracy and of the persecution of democratic forces in
Zimbabwe needs to be discussed and acknowledged, particularly among
government officials and departments. Zimbabweans need practical assistance.
They need greater access to health care, to ASPs, to education and skills
training for their exiled youth. Those who are very ill and those who are
dead need to have this information reliably conveyed to their relatives back
home, through secure and confidential channels.
Recommendations There have been several studies of general refugee issues in
South Africa in recent years. CASE has produced two major reports, one in
2001 and one in 2003. Both of these reports were accompanied by extensive
recommendations that were very thorough and consultative. There is little to
be gained by yet again reframing the good work that others have done in this
regard. The National Refugee Baseline Survey: Final Report, released a year
ago in November 2003 made recommendations to the South African Government,
the National Departments of Home Affairs, Health and Education; also to the
UNHCR and Service Providers, including NGOs and churches. Their
recommendations are attached as Appendix Four to this report. The
Solidarity Peace Trust would reinforce certain of the CASE recommendations,
2003, summarised here: To the Department of Home Affairs: . They should
investigate bribery within the department. . They should issue ASPs that are
valid for six months instead of one month . ASPs should be more formal and
should be laminated with anti forgery marks to make their recognition by
various service providers more likely. . Such changes should be combined with
a massive campaign to promote recognition of the documents in government
departments and with other service providers. In addition the Trust
recommends that: . There is a need to promote greater awareness and debate in
South Africa, including at the level of service providers, of the nature of
the crisis in Zimbabwe, the scale and type of human rights abuses that are
taking place, and the policies that are needed in South Africa to deal with
the numbers of Zimbabweans in their nation. Refugee reception
offices . The Department of Home Affairs should take action to issue greater
numbers of Zimbabweans and others with ASPs each week, as the backlog is
causing real hardship to many, among them victims of torture who are at real
risk if they are deported. . The Police need to be reminded of their
legal obligation to give 15 day permits to any person they pick up for
deportation who states that they want to apply for asylum, particularly
bearing in mind the fact that gaining an ASP can be so problematic. .
Civil society should be monitoring access to RROs on a systematic basis.
Personnel should stand incognito outside RROs and observe whether: o Home
Affairs officials are giving out helpful information to those waiting o Home
Affairs officials are illegally insisting on passports o There is brutality
towards those waiting o Bribery is taking place They should further note
how many people from which nations are being issued ASPs each day, and what
proportion this represents of those waiting each day. Health care .
Further investigations into how best to provide health care to Zimbabweans
who may not be accessing the public health services must be addressed. Some
are not accessing it because they do not have ASPs. If the above
recommendations are acted upon, then much of this problem will resolve
itself. . Until national service providers including the Ministry of
Health consistently recognise the rights of asylum seekers, refugees and
their documentation, as they are required to by local and international law,
there is a need to build a network of support via civil society to ensure
that asylum seekers and refugees, in particular those with torture related
injuries, have safe access to medical care. . Civil society should
monitor access to medical care, particularly at hospitals, and document
instances of denial of the right to services for further action. Denial
of the right to food . There is a need for a test case resolving the issue of
whether denial of the right to food on political grounds constitutes a
"threat to physical safety". Any civil society group that knows of
Zimbabweans in South Africa that have reported political abuse of food,
should consider taking the issue to Court. Deportations . The endless
cycle of deportations should be reconsidered: this is an expensive and not
very effective policy. In particular, urgently: o Very ill foreigners should
not be detained for deportation o Independent health professionals should do
an assessment of health conditions at Lindela and on the deportation trains,
to facilitate formation of a policy that will prevent communication of
diseases, protect the rights of the ill, and monitor deaths of deportees in
state custody. . The UNHCR should be playing a more active role to ensure
that minors, and political asylum seekers who may not have ASPs, are not
being deported. . There should be opportunity for deportees at Lindela to put
on record crimes against themselves including bribery by South African
Police, SANDF, and Home Affairs officials paid for both in cash and in sex.
Civil society would be in the best position to document such claims and lay
charges. Repatriation . There is a need to protect the rights of deportees
on the Zimbabwean side of the border. Among those currently deported, are
unaccompanied minors, victims of sexual exploitation, the very ill, and
those who have no resources to return to their homes in Zimbabwe and who end
up stranded. Also among those deported, may be political asylum seekers who
fled Zimbabwe in the first instance for reasons of persecution. . In view
of the fact that the Zimbabwe government is about to force through
Parliament an Act that will undermine activities of human rights NGOs and
churches, it is not obvious who is supposed to deal with this sensitive
issue, and protect the rights of these groups of deportees once they are
back in Zimbabwe. . If there was better screening of deportees on the
South African side, these problems would be reduced in the first
place. The dead . Zimbabweans are dying in South Africa and are ending up
as undocumented deaths in mass paupers' graves. This may create problems in
the future as relatives back in Zimbabwe do not know where their dead are
buried, and do not have death certificates. There is a need to facilitate
ways of keeping safe, confidential records of how to contact relatives back
in Zimbabwe, in the event of exiles becoming very ill or
dying.
Background The Solidarity Peace Trust has as part of its
mission, the role of providing assistance to Zimbabwean victims of torture
and human rights abuses. The Trust has documented the torture of many
Zimbabweans who have fled to South Africa as a result of persecution. It has
an interest in how these and other Zimbabwean torture victims are faring in
their country of refuge - in particular whether tortured political exiles
are receiving refugee status and access to health care. We are concerned
about their living conditions in South Africa, and their experiences at the
hands of South African officials. It is clear that Zimbabweans in South
Africa are not readily perceived as having a legitimate right to seek asylum
there: the assumption is that there is "no war in Zimbabwe", and that
therefore all migrants from Zimbabwe to South Africa are there for economic
reasons, and should be deported. The intention of this report is to raise
awareness of why Zimbabweans are pouring into South Africa and the region in
their millions, and of the difficulties they are facing, both formal and
informal, in the hope that groups including government, non governmental
organisations (NGOs) and churches will start developing more coherent
policies to deal with the needs and problems of this influx. The only
official strategy at this stage seems to be an endless revolving door of
deportations at huge expense to the South African public that in any case
barely scratches the surface of the numbers of Zimbabweans in South Africa.
Support to Zimbabwean exiles is small scale and ad hoc, consisting of a
handful of NGOs and churches who are trying to offer basic resources to a
few hundred individuals or families. This report does not claim to cover the
issue of Zimbabwe's exiles in exhaustive scientific detail. By their very
definition, Zimbabweans exiled in South Africa are fugitives. The vast
majority are illegal, without status or papers, subject to deportation. It
is difficult to access people who spend much of their time trying to avoid
detection, trying to be invisible. Over the last year, the authors of this
report have managed to interact with several hundred Zimbabweans in South
Africa and their stories of torture and persecution have provided a tragic
background against which other sources of information, including previous
refugee studies and media reports, have been situated. Exiles have been
visited in their places of abode, observed in the streets, and interviewed
in the context of church feeding programmes. To build trust has taken months
of work and all those who have come forward with their stories are kept
anonymous to protect them, unless they have specifically agreed to having
their identities revealed, for example in photographs. Even those who
would be considered to be in South Africa for primarily economic reasons by
officials, view their decision to leave as political. In their own eyes, the
collapse of the economy and the loss of livelihoods in Zimbabwe is the
result of political mismanagement; with good governance in Zimbabwe, they
would not be in South Africa. While this will not win them refugee status
with officials in terms of international criteria for what makes a refugee,
it should be noted that individuals do see it this way - political decisions
made in the last four years in Zimbabwe are what have driven them over the
border to take up tough lives in a foreign land. The Trust wishes to draw
attention to the fact that lack of access to food by any Zimbabwean may not
be a simple matter of poverty and/or crop failure. The current Zimbabwe
government has in the last four years used food as a political weapon; the
government controls access to maize, particularly in rural areas, and has
been documented refusing to allow those perceived to support the political
opposition from purchasing maize. The government and its agents have also at
times in the last four years interfered with donor feeding programmes for
political reasons, often before or after elections of one kind or another.
There is an urgent need for greater awareness among South African
authorities of this reality, and possibly for a court ruling on whether
political denial of access to food constitutes a "threat to physical safety"
and is grounds for asylum. The authors acknowledge that many groups apart
from Zimbabweans are claiming refuge in South Africa: since 1994, there has
been a steady influx of people from all over Africa, including Rwanda,
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Burundi, Uganda,
Cameroon, Sudan and elsewhere. Many of the problems raised as affecting
Zimbabweans in this report are common to all refugees. In the opinion of
the authors, there are good reasons for focusing exclusively on Zimbabweans
in this report. . Going by the number of deportees, Zimbabweans are now the
second biggest group of foreign Africans in South Africa. Yet there is
little formal information available on their situation. For example, the
most recent and major study of asylum seekers and refugees released in
November 2003, excluded Zimbabweans altogether. Their exclusion from this
report and others is a consequence of how recently and rapidly the influx of
Zimbabweans has occurred; since 2000, they have gone from being a negligible
group to a formidable presence in South Africa. There have been cross border
traders from Zimbabwe for the last twenty years, but their visibility was
close to nil. . While numbers of Zimbabwean have escalated, very few are
being officially recorded as political refugees. The Department of Home
Affairs (Home Affairs) claim that very few Zimbabweans apply for asylum
seeker status, using this as evidence that the vast majority of Zimbabweans
are here for economic reasons and do not consider themselves as having left
for political reasons. Others have claimed that Zimbabweans are finding it
hard to access asylum seeker status and that Home Affairs' assessment of the
numbers of asylum seekers is therefore unrealistically low. It was the
intention of the authors to investigate these allegations and
counter-allegations for ourselves. . Finally, it is the perception of the
Solidarity Peace Trust that South Africa needs to brace itself for
ever-greater numbers of Zimbabweans in their midst unless a lasting
political solution is found to the current crisis in Zimbabwe. -The
government of South Africa therefore needs to devise new policies to deal
with the problems, which could include greater efforts to mediate in
Zimbabwe itself to promote a return to peace, prosperity and human rights,
as well as more humane and comprehensive policies on how to treat the mass
of Zimbabweans in their nation. - While there is growing awareness of the
plight of Zimbabweans among churches and the NGO sector in South Africa,
there is a need for more developed services and support to be put in place
for exiles from all nations, including improved access to health care. While
many organizations seem to be involved in raising awareness around the
Zimbabwean crisis through workshops, papers and research, there is an urgent
need to supplement this with services on the ground to help those on the
receiving end of the crisis.
Method of compiling the report: data
sources Data collection: relevant issues The vast majority of Zimbabweans
who have arrived in South Africa in the last four years are considered
illegal immigrants. Very few have any official status. Working with a
community that is both hugely diverse and living underground, limits the
nature of the investigations that are possible. For example, it is not easy
in such a situation to work with randomized samples of people in order to
arrive at statistically sound conclusions based on structured
questionnaires. Zimbabweans in South Africa have an unknown demographic
profile and are of an unknown number. It is our experience that this group
is very mobile. Individuals mostly have no fixed address for any length of
time, which makes follow up interviews difficult, and the circumstances in
which people find themselves change rapidly. Issues of confidentiality are of
particular importance when dealing with persons who feel insecure and at
risk of deportation. There are also ethical issues in working with a very
underprivileged group that has limited access to essential services such as
health. It is problematic to identify people who need rehabilitative
services and merely to note the problem. Some individuals who came forward
to be interviewed are living in situations of severe deprivation and even
under threat. Wherever possible, individuals with specific needs have been
passed on to local NGOs and health professionals. The information in this
report has been compiled over the course of one year from: . A desk study
of media and human rights reports on the causes of the mass exodus of
Zimbabweans since 2000, including available information on the number of
Zimbabweans in the diaspora, and the impact of this mass emigration both in
Zimbabwe and in the region. . A review of the laws and international
obligations in relation to refugees in South Africa. . More than two
hundred interviews by the authors with Zimbabwean refugees, mainly in
Johannesburg but also in Durban and Musina. We interviewed a range of
Zimbabweans who claim to have left for political reasons; political abuses
including torture, forced conscription into the youth militia, property
destruction, displacement. In some cases, individuals were followed up over
time. . Six field visits to observe the refugee reception offices in
Braamfontein, Johannesburg, during late 2003 and then one visit to
Rosettenville, Johannesburg, in October 2004, in order to assess on site the
access of Zimbabweans to the offices granting asylum seeker status, and
general treatment by South African officials. . Ten field visits to
apartments/rooms/spaces where refugees reside in Johannesburg, Durban and
Musina to raise our awareness of living conditions. . Key informant
interviews with two South African Home Affairs officials, and with South
African human rights lawyers, church leaders and personnel in NGOs that have
been working with Zimbabwean refugees. . Two surveys of Zimbabwean refugees,
which are in addition to the 200 hundred interviews mentioned
previously; o A survey conducted in October 2003, of 100 Zimbabweans who were
among those in the queue outside Home Affairs in Johannesburg on the same
morning in October 2003, trying to access the building for asylum seeker
status. o A survey conducted in August 2004, of 111 Zimbabweans who are
informally registered with two different NGO refugee organizations in
Johannesburg. This involved in-depth structured interviews with each
interviewee, of around one hour each, and focused on reasons for leaving
Zimbabwe, access to asylum seeker permits and access to health care. .
Interviews with lawyers and refugees, and a desk study to establish the
process of deportation, including conditions in Lindela detention centre, on
the deportation train, and on arrival at Beitbridge in Zimbabwe. The
deportation of unaccompanied minors was of particular interest. . Four
field visits and key informant interviews with NGOs operating in the Musina
area to investigate conditions of Zimbabweans arriving there, in particular
unaccompanied minors; interviews on holding and deportation conditions in
Musina. . Three field visits and interviews with health personnel and police
in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe, to gain insight into what happens to migrants
forcibly returned from South Africa.
PART ONE Zimbabwe's
biggest export: its people
1. The breakdown of law and order: torture
with impunity Zimbabweans ordinarily live in fear, it is what I would call a
normal state of life in Zimbabwe today.it progresses into being captured.
Once you are captured, it transforms itself into terror. [Gabriel Shumba,
Human Rights Lawyer] The crisis in Zimbabwe has not produced rivers of blood
and mountains of dead. In global terms, events there cannot compete with the
horrors of Iraq, Palestine or Dafur in Sudan. Yet, the precipitous decline
of Zimbabwe on political, legal, social and economic fronts in the last five
years has created a problem that has spilled across neighbouring southern
African nations, as an estimated 25% of its population has fled the
political and humanitarian crisis at home. Zimbabwe's democratic space has
closed in the face of an upsurge in state organised political violence, the
implementation of repressive laws and the collapse of the judiciary.
Whenever there is a threat that people may exercise their democratic rights,
there is a flare up of state orchestrated violence. The crisis of governance
has impacted socially, as Zimbabwe's economy has become the fastest
contracting economy in the world. The crisis in Zimbabwe has been
referred to as a crisis of governance, which has arisen out of a profound
intolerance for political diversity. It is no coincidence that land
invasions began within weeks of ZANU PF's first ever defeat at the polls in
February 2000, in a referendum in which the government's revised
constitution, which would have entrenched the powers of the President, was
rejected by Zimbabweans. The referendum defeat was the result of campaigning
by the first national opposition political party of any standing in the last
24 years, the MDC, together with civil society forces. It is the MDC and
those perceived to support the MDC, including civil society movements such
as trade unions, which have borne the brunt of human rights violations and
state oppression since 2000 till the present. Zimbabweans live in a state of
oppression in which they have been forced to flee their homes for fear of
persecution, in a country where the police and army can detain, torture and
even murder perceived government opponents with total impunity. While the
death toll due to political violence remains small, at around 300, there
have been thousands of other human casualties of the situation. Human rights
organisations in Zimbabwe have estimated that around 300,000 people have
been victims of human rights violations of various kinds over the last four
years. Torture, destruction of homesteads, massive displacement of persons
fleeing political persecution, and the denial of food to those perceived to
support the opposition are among the violations that have been widespread,
systematic and well documented.
Not many of the individual incidents of abuse are headline catching in world
terms, and the vast majority go entirely unrecorded, but the cumulative
impact on life in Zimbabwe is harrowing. Recording and publicising the
problem has been made close to impossible because of draconian laws that
have shut down the only independent daily newspaper and thrown all foreign
correspondents out of the country. Yet the scars being left by state
sponsored violence are undeniable. Youth militia Three hundred
thousand school leavers each year have little or no prospect of formal
training or employment, and this problem is exacerbated for children who are
not prepared to undergo the politically biased and brutalising national
youth service training; youth militia training is now a prerequisite for
entering employment in the civil service, among the biggest employers left
in Zimbabwe. Many youths, both male and female, who have entered the youth
militia programme since its inception in 2001 have emerged traumatised and
have fled the country. Those whose training has coincided with election
periods have been used by the ruling party to conduct a brutal campaign. In
some rural areas, youths who refuse to volunteer for the training are
victimised; young people have fled to avoid both the training and the
persecution/lack of opportunities that accompany not having completed
it. Elinor Sisulu of the Crisis in Zimbabwe office in Johannesburg made the
following comment on the prospects for Zimbabwe's youth: Zimbabwe is not
a place for young people at this time. It really is not, whether they are
MDC or whether they are ZANU PF. If they are MDC, then they are victims of
violence, if they are ZANU PF they are in the "Green Bombers" [youth
militia] and they are victims because they are forced to become perpetrators
of violence. This needs recognition and there must be concrete programmes
for young people [in South Africa]. The "land revolution" The Zimbabwe
government has portrayed the repressive clamp down in Zimbabwe as being part
of a legitimate "land revolution", and all human rights violations as
somehow linked to white farmers; the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a
grassroots trade unionist-led opposition party has been portrayed as
"British sponsored", and the repression of the ordinary people of Zimbabwe
is portrayed as a noble revolution against recolonisation. None has doubted
or disagreed that there has been a need for land redistribution, including
the MDC, but the well orchestrated abuse of a much needed programme by the
government has resulted in new injustices. The fact that most of the
international media attention has focused on the issue of farm invasions,
has fed the misperception that the state violence is part of a black-white
struggle for land ownership. Without doubt, many human rights violations
have occurred and are still occurring in the context of the land invasions:
but very few of these violations involve white farmers, with poor rural
Zimbabweans being the victims in more than 95% of cases. The government's
own land audit recently revealed huge failings in the process. The
government originally claimed around 350,000 families had been resettled. In
fact, around 70% of families of farm labourers were displaced, representing
more than a million people, with only 140,000 families nationwide benefiting
from resettlement, most of them not from the displaced farm labourer
group. During late 2004, there has been a new phase in the land resettlement
- that of throwing off some of the newly resettled farms, those who have
been on them since the farm invasions. Thousands of the newly resettled have
been tear-gassed and burnt out of their homes by police, resulting in some
instances in deaths. In 2004, with the land redistribution programme
officially over, Zimbabweans still live under draconian laws that control
the media, prevent any form of civilian gathering, and most recently, laws
aimed at shutting down non governmental organisations, in particular those
that document human rights abuses and centre their activities on civic
education and issues of governance. The majority of human rights violations
continue to take place not in or near commercial farms, but in rural or
urban areas where support for the opposition MDC is strongest. Where the
ruling party is strongest, the MDC population is virtually under siege; in
some districts, people are only allowed to get past ZANU PF activists if
they know the secret password.Torture, harassment and state control at every
level continue.
2. The Humanitarian crisis "Why do I get the
impression that I have to beg you to feed your people?" Tony Hall, the
special US Ambassador to the World Food Program stated that he had asked
July Moyo, the Minister responsible for the food aid program in Zimbabwe,
this question in mid-October 2002. The deliberate destruction of the
agricultural sector has contributed to three consecutive years of famine.
Once more in 2004/5, despite earlier assurances by government, the nation
has an estimated 50% maize shortfall, which seems certain at this stage to
result in widespread hunger. Political abuse of food Amnesty International
(AI) released a substantial report on food abuse in Zimbabwe in October
2004, which illustrates systematic manipulation of access to food by the
government, and patterns of food abuse linked to elections. This report
points out that the Zimbabwean government is in serious contravention of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
which enshrines the right to food, and to which Zimbabwe is signatory. In
terms of the ICESCR, States must ensure availability and accessibility of
adequate food. Any discrimination in access to food on political grounds is
a violation of the Covenant. The Zimbabwe government has decreed that it is
almost the sole distributor and marketer of maize, through its parastatal
the Grain Marketing Board (GMB); all maize producers are obliged to sell
only to the GMB. During the last five years there has been repeated concern
raised and some well-documented incidents of ZANU PF using GMB maize as a
political weapon, denying the basic right to food to those who support the
opposition party, the MDC. Sales through the GMB have been reduced during
the last two years; the nation has produced less than half the maize needed
to feed itself. The WFP has run a massive feeding programme throughout the
country, which has kept the threat of starvation at bay. This has meant the
majority of very vulnerable people have had access to food through the
politically neutral WFP. At times, the government has interfered with
donor food distribution, although donors have made every effort to prevent
this and have taken action when this has been brought to their attention. A
few examples of abuse of donor food and of GMB sales follow: . In
mid-October 2002, the WFP had to suspend its feeding programme in the rural
district of Insiza, citing political interference with WFP food ahead of a
parliamentary by-election. The WFP reported that ZANU PF activists had
seized 3 tonnes of maize being distributed by the Organisation of Rural
Associations for Progress (ORAP) and had distributed it solely to ZANU PF
supporters, "in an unauthorised manner". . In October 2002, in the rural
district of Binga that had just voted strongly for MDC in the Rural District
Council elections, the government suspended all donor food to starving
school children. Officials were quoted as saying this was to punish the
region for its strong MDC vote. The Catholic Church was ordered to stop its
feeding, as were "Save the Children" and "Oxfam Great Britain". Feeding
programmes were effectively prevented for around 2 months, and it was 40,000
school children who suffered. . In Lupane in April 2004, in the context of a
parliamentary by-election, government officials used sales of GMB food to
manipulate voters. GMB sold maize at a reduced rate - on days that coincided
with opposition party rallies so that people had to choose between getting a
scarce and essential commodity, or attending the rally. These sales were
accompanied by threats that there would be no more food in this impoverished
and starving area if people did not vote for ZANU PF. The government's
political abuse of GMB sales in Lupane is typical of their "carrot and
stick" approach to food and elections. Maize and election 2005 Concern has
escalated during 2004, as it is apparent that the government is blurring the
issue of food security in Zimbabwe. The government indicated early in the
year that it would not be applying to the WFP to source any donor food for
distribution during the 2004/2005 season. The government is determined to
portray the land resettlement programme as a productive success, hence its
claims that Zimbabwe will grow enough food to feed itself. President Mugabe
said in a television interview in May that Zimbabwe was expecting a "bumper
harvest" and that they did not want to "choke" on too much food, so they
would not be extending WFP's programme into 2005. However, UN and other
sources were in April 2004 predicting a lower yield than that of the 2003/4
season, in which 5 million people had required food aid. In September
this year, the GMB itself admitted to a parliamentary committee that it had
only received 288,000 tonnes of maize deliveries from farmers, a massive
shortfall on the 2,4 million tonnes that the nation needs, and that
government predicted would be harvested locally. The government nonetheless
continues to obfuscate, and to deny a looming food shortage. As recently as
10 October 2004, Mugabe stated in Maputo that there was no need for donor
food this year. During 2004, the WFP has been forced by the Zimbabwe
government to scale down dramatically its operations, so that it is now
feeding around 500,000 recipients, mainly children. Previously, WFP was
feeding 5,000,000 people. Members of government including the President,
have insisted that government would not be purchasing and importing any food
this year. But it has in the meantime secretly been importing food while
denying it is doing so, with another 300,000 tonnes having allegedly been
brought in recently. Fears are, that the reason the government is shutting
the WFP out of some of the most vulnerable areas in need of food, and
importing food rather than accepting donor support, is so that it can have
total control of all food in the country. Then it can manipulate a hungry
populace in a food deficit situation, ahead of the 2005 election. At the
very least: The Zimbabwean government's lack of transparency on grain
availability in the country could jeopardise access to food for millions of
Zimbabweans in the coming months... [the government] is gambling with its
citizens' rights to food. The time of greatest hunger in Zimbabwe is in
the first few months of any year: by then those households that may have
produced some food in the previous season are likely to have run out, and
the next harvest is due only from April onwards. The government has
scheduled next year's election for March - the height of the hungry
time. The food situation looks set to continue being a cause for deep
concern. The latest reports indicate a serious shortage of both seed and
fertiliser ahead of the 2004/5 growing season, and only 32% of arable land
has been tilled ready for planting, with less than a month to go before
farmers should plant next year's crops. The food deficit will clearly
continue for the foreseeable future - as will the corresponding opportunity
to manipulate supplies. Some Zimbabweans who have fled the country have
done so as they fear political victimisation resulting in their being
denied the right to food. There is a need to recognise this group of
persons, which may become quite sizeable in the year ahead. These people
fleeing hunger do not fit the usual refugee profile, and are easily
dismissed as so called economic migrants. There is a need for countries
where Zimbabweans flee to be aware that the hunger of some would be asylum
seekers at least, is the product of politicians denying them food because of
their presumed support for the MDC.
3. Collapse of social services and
economy "The longer the problems of Zimbabwe remain unresolved, the more
entrenched poverty will become. The longer this persists, the greater will
be the degree of social instability, as the poor try to respond to the pains
of hunger. The more protracted this instability, the greater will be the
degree of polarisation and generalised social and political conflict. To
respond to this, the state will inevitably have to emphasise issues of law
and order, even as it has ever fewer means to address the needs of the
people. As it responds in this manner, the less will it have the possibility
to address anything else other than the issue of law and order. The more it
does this, the greater will be the degree of the absence of order and
stability." [President Thabo Mbeki: ANC letter, May 2003] Apart from
political persecution and related hardship, there is untold human misery
among the citizens of Zimbabwe, 70% of whom are formally unemployed, 80% of
whom live below the poverty datum line, and 50% of whom end 2004 without
assured access to food. Social services are collapsing as city councils
cannot keep up with inflation and loss of expertise. In Harare, water
shortages are now a daily occurrence, and breakdowns in the sewerage system
are becoming a serious health risk in overcrowded suburbs. Inflation rates
of over 400% have reduced people to a daily battle for basic survival.
Zimbabwe has one of the world's highest HIV infection levels, with an
estimated 27% of adults being HIV+. Simultaneously, the health system is
collapsing under the loss of human and financial resources; Zimbabweans have
the lowest access to anti-retroviral drugs in southern Africa. Life
expectancy in Zimbabwe has sunk from 52 years in 1980, to 35 years. One in
twelve Zimbabweans is an Aids orphan. The economic collapse is the
product of poor governance. The government orchestrated farm invasions led
to the almost total destruction of the commercial agricultural sector, which
used to be directly responsible for 18% of Zimbabwe's GDP. The indirect
downstream contribution of agriculture in the form of spending of
agricultural profits and wages amounted to a further 18% of
GDP. Information released from Zimbabwe's Central Statistical Office (CSO) in
June 2004 has revealed the calamitous decline not only of farming, but of
industry in Zimbabwe in the last four years. From 1990 to 1998, the
industrial sector showed a small but steady growth; however, there has been
a precipitous collapse since then, particularly in the last two
years: Transport industry has shrunk by 62% Textiles industry has shrunk
by 59% Non-metals industry has shrunk by 52% Wood industry has shrunk by
52% Drink and tobacco industry by 44% Chemicals industry has shrunk by
43% Food industry has shrunk by 42% Clothing industry has shrunk by
9% This collapse of industry has been a knock-on effect of the collapse of
agriculture: as agriculture diminished, so did consumer spending on
industrial outputs; as some industries consequently produced less, the
demand by these industries on others diminished. Run away inflation combined
with unviable price controls, poor fiscal policies and an artificial foreign
exchange rate have also crippled industry. Government statements of
intention to seize industries and a few ad hoc "invasions" of companies have
reduced confidence of potential investors. The IMF closed its Harare
office in September 2004, after releasing a report that noted that the fall
in Zimbabwe's GDP of 30% in the last five years, with a further fall of 4,5%
forecast for 2004, was the result of "inadequate economic policies". It
noted that "disorderly implementation" of the land reform programme has
"sharply reduced" agricultural production. According to the IMF, the
economic decline has had "dire social consequences"; unemployment is high
and increasing, social indicators have deteriorated and the HIV/Aids
pandemic remains "largely unchecked". "Severe food shortages" have caused a
"vicious cycle of malnourishment and disease". The IMF cites issues of
governance, the rule of law, human rights and property rights that have
"severely damaged confidence, discouraged investment and promoted capital
flight and emigration". Citing the "disruptive effects" of land reform, the
IMF quotes an official report that found that actual resettlement of 134 452
families and 6,4m ha fell far short of government's claimed 350 000 families
and 11m ha. Independent reports estimate unemployed farm workers and their
families at more than 1m people, or about 9% of the population. The
government has recently expressed an intention to indigenise 50% of all
mining ventures, sending insecurity through this sector. The President of
the Mining Association has warned that statements from government are
jeopardising six projects that would involve substantial investment and job
creation. Aquarius Platinum, a major investor in Zimbabwe has warned
shareholders of the intended government grab. It is unlikely that major
companies will continue with investment in new projects, in the wake of the
land invasions, and in the face of looming nationalisation or forced giving
of shares to indigenous Zimbabweans. The government intends to force
through parliament before the end of 2004, an NGO Act that will force all
NGOs to register with a government council. This Act bans foreign funding
for NGOs involved in human rights and governance, and forbids NGOs with any
foreigner on their Board from registering. Apart from the serious
implications of this for democracy, around 10,000 jobs in the NGO sector
hang in the balance. It is usual in the definition of who should be given
refugee status, to exclude those considered "economic refugees". ZANU PF
blames the economic collapse on Tony Blair and external forces, yet this is
a position that does not stand up to scrutiny. It is ZANU PF's economic
choices in the last five years that are primarily responsible for the
dramatic demise of Zimbabwe's economy. The economic crisis in Zimbabwe is
interlinked with the crisis of governance. As such, clear cut distinctions
between economic and political motives for fleeing Zimbabwe are not
possible. This is discussed more later in this report in the context of who
should be eligible for asylum. 4. Zimbabwe's biggest export: its
people "The time has come for African leaders to stand up and express their
concern over the deteriorating human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. If human
rights abuses continue to worsen, the political and economic crisis in
Zimbabwe will be difficult to heal.. The Zimbabwe crisis has affected the
entire Southern Africa region and there is need for African leaders to find
quick solutions." [Archbishop Desmond Tutu, October 2003]
From the regional perspective, the most obvious outcome of the deepening
humanitarian and human rights crisis in Zimbabwe has been the mass migration
of its citizens. There are no clear figures on how many Zimbabweans have
left in the last three to four years, but estimates are that between 25% and
30% of Zimbabweans are now outside their nation. President Thabo Mbeki has
said that around 3 million Zimbabweans are in South Africa; estimates by
Zimbabwean business analysts put the figure who have left for South Africa
in the last four years at around 1,2 million, but there may be in addition
around half a million Zimbabweans who have lived in or commuted to South
Africa for more than a decade. Mozambique allegedly has 400,000 Zimbabweans
and Botswana around 200,000. An additional 300,000 are estimated to be in
England, with a further scattering of hundreds of thousands around the
globe. All in all, an estimated 3,4 million Zimbabweans out of a total
population of 12 million are generally assumed to have left their homeland
in the last three years. These figures become more significant when it is
taken into account that of Zimbabwe's estimated population of 12 million,
more than 50% is under the age of 15, and around a million is over
retirement age. As those who have left the country are predominantly young
adults, this means that out of the potentially productive population of
around 5 million adults, 3,4 million or approximately 68% are now outside
Zimbabwe. . A Government analyst speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe Reserve
Bank's "Homelink" scheme in September 2004, estimated that: "60% to 70%
of Zimbabwean adults who should constitute the productive population are
living abroad."
Pre-existing cross border movement When is a Zimbabwe
immigrant a refugee, when we have a long history of economic immigrants from
Zimbabwe? [Barry Gilder, Director General, Dept of Home Affairs: Interview,
October 2004 ] The point needs to be made that this exodus since 2000 is
different from the long-standing cross border movement of Zimbabweans,
particularly from Matabeleland, which borders South Africa. There are strong
historical and cultural ties between the Ndebele of Zimbabwe and the Zulu in
South Africa. Their languages are nearly identical and they have a common
cultural ancestry. There were also strong political ties between ZAPU, a
Zimbabwean liberation political party that existed until 1987 and the ANC of
South Africa. During the 1980s massacres in Matabeleland, when an
estimated 20,000 Ndebele were murdered and thousands more tortured and
persecuted by the current Zimbabwean government, there was a large wave of
refugees who fled to South Africa from Matabeleland. Many of these never
returned; they now have permanent residence and are fully integrated in
South Africa. There has also always been a large group of migrant workers
from Matabeleland working as gardeners and in other jobs where their status
may not have been regularised, but who have nonetheless made homes in South
Africa. Zimbabweans who were well established provided a network and a
safety net for others coming and going for shorter periods of time.
SiNdebele-speaking Zimbabweans are very hard to distinguish from South
Africans and until the more recent influx of Zimbabweans, who now for the
first time include many Shona-speakers, not much attention was paid to
Zimbabweans by the authorities. The old safety nets are however now no
longer enough as the influx has soared, and many of those fleeing to South
Africa now, are not from parts of the country that have produced migrants in
the past, but are from all corners of Zimbabwe. The old extended cross
border family system cannot cope, or is entirely non existent for many
exiles, which is why thousands of Zimbabweans now arrive in South Africa
with nowhere to go. There are no clear figures on how large the group of
naturalised and semi-naturalised Zimbabweans might be, but some key
informants have put the number at possibly half a million. This 500,000 is
not taken into consideration in the estimate of 3,4 million who have left in
the past four years, or the 1,2 million estimated to have newly arrived in
South Africa. Internal loss of professional skills Within Zimbabwe, many
of the few highly qualified people who remain in the country have left their
formal professions for the informal sector, as salaries fail to keep pace
with soaring inflation. It is possible to make more money buying and selling
black market commodities than to earn a salary as a teacher, nurse, lawyer
or engineer. Furthermore, many rural teachers and nurses left their
professions and headed into the towns to take other jobs after political
persecution linked to elections.
Impact on essential
services Essential services in Zimbabwe have been severely hit by this
external and internal exodus of skills. Teachers and nurses in rural areas
were among the most targeted groups ahead of elections 2000 and 2002; they
were accused of being pro-MDC and hundreds of rural schools were forced to
close by war veterans. Teachers were beaten and threatened by state agents,
and many fled into exile at this time. Political attacks against health
personnel were also documented during 2002, mainly against rural nurses, but
also against doctors. More than 80% of doctors, nurses and therapists who
have trained since 1980 have left. The country has fewer than half the
doctors needed to staff its hospitals; the University of Zimbabwe has so few
qualified lecturers that is has reduced its yearly intake of medical
students from 120 to 70. President Mugabe has accused Britain and other
western nations of "stealing" Zimbabwean skills, but those who leave cite
political persecution, poor salaries and appalling conditions in hospitals,
which are without resources including essential drugs. During the
compilation of this report, the authors spoke to dozens of highly qualified
Zimbabweans who have left their nation as the result of political
persecution. They have left well-paid professional jobs, and find themselves
"living like rats" in Johannesburg, without asylum status and without formal
employment. "Harvesting" the exiles: Homelink The Zimbabwe government
itself has poured enormous publicity into launching an international
programme called "Homelink" that aims to persuade Zimbabweans abroad to send
home their foreign earnings through official banking channels, as opposed to
selling them on the black market; by so doing it has acknowledged that
Zimbabwe's greatest expanding export at this time is its skilled personnel.
With the agricultural and tourist sectors reduced to a fraction of their
previous foreign exchange potential, it is from the hard lives of
Zimbabweans in exile that the government now actively seeks to get a
return. In September 2004, it was possible to sell US$ 1 for around Z$ 5,600
in a Zimbabwean bank, but on the "black" market, the US$ was selling for Z$
7,700. This means it is more attractive for foreign earnings coming back to
Zimbabwe to change hands illegally. The Homelink policy has clearly not done
as well as government projected: Zimbabweans abroad are estimated to send
home in excess of US$ 300 million per month. Yet the Reserve Bank announced
in September that their total returns via Homelink between 1 January and 1
September 2004 were US$ 36 million. Most of this was returned in the early
months of the system, when Zimbabweans received their overseas payments in
foreign exchange; they are now paid in Z$ at the controlled rate. Returns
via Homelink equal 1,5% of the estimated monthly foreign returns from
exiles, indicating a reluctance by Zimbabweans in the diaspora to use this
system.
Implication of the exodus for democracy The absence from
Zimbabwe of possibly 50% of its adult population has dire implications for
democracy and the outcome of elections in Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans in exile are
denied the right to postal ballots, yet it can be assumed that many of the
most politically alienated and dissatisfied Zimbabweans are those who have
made the choice to leave the country. By denying this half of the population
the right to vote, ZANU PF is entrenching its own position. Zimbabweans in
England, USA and South Africa were recently canvassed by Zimbabwean
government officials to send their money home via official channels, yet
many have refused to support the Homelink scheme, stating that they objected
to the government wanting their money, but not their vote. Although it
remains embroiled in this seemingly interminable humanitarian and political
crisis, Zimbabwe is constitutionally bound to have general parliamentary
elections during 2005. Without the participation of that half of the adult
population that is now abroad, any election will not be a true reflection of
the will of the Zimbabwean people. Yet the vast majority of those we spoke
to long to return to their homeland, if only political and humanitarian
conditions there would allow them to do so. Summary Zimbabweans are
leaving their nation in their millions for a variety of reasons: .
Political persecution including torture, destruction of property, and
harassment . The humanitarian crisis and food deficit: hunger in Zimbabwe
is not a simple socio-economic issue, but a political one. The government
has a proven history in the last few year of manipulating access to food on
party political lines . The politically driven economic collapse has
driven thousands into the diaspora, seeking jobs.
PART TWO -
Destination South Africa: Legal, administrative and social issues involving
refugees
1. "Asylum seekers" and "Refugees": South Africa's legal
obligations All nations have the right to control the movement of people
across the borders. All governments have to protect the rights of their own
citizens and tax-payers, and to ensure that people entering the nation have
bona fide reasons for doing so, and means of supporting themselves in legal
ways. At the same time, most nations acknowledge a responsibility for
protecting the rights of those people who flee persecution in their home
country, and the need to recognise refugees. For this reason, there are
various international conventions protecting the rights of refugees, and
many nations also have their own refugee acts. South Africa is signatory
to the: . Convention Relating to Status of Refugees (UN, 1951) . Protocol
Relating to Status of Refugees (UN, 1967) . Organisation of African Unity
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
(OAU, 1969) . Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) In December
1998, the Refugees Act of South Africa became law. The South African Refugees
Act of 1998 prohibits Home Affairs officials from deporting persons in
certain circumstances. In 2000, the Regulations or implementing procedures
relevant to this Act were published. Procedure by Home Affairs in
implementing the Act has to be in accordance with the Regulations. In
terms of the South African Refugees Act, somebody has the right to claim
refugee status if, on return to the country of origin - a) he or she may
be subjected to persecution on account of his or her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on
account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other
events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the
whole of that country. [authors' emphasis] "Asylum seekers" In
terms of the South African Refugees Act of 1998, persons entering the
country and wishing to apply for political asylum, have to present
themselves at a Home Affairs Refugee Reception Office (RRO) in the country.
RROs are currently located in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban and
Port Elizabeth. There are plans to open a reception office in Musina, near
the border with Zimbabwe but this has not yet happened. Persons should
then have a preliminary interview to assess whether they might be eligible
for asylum, and if they are, then they are issued with an asylum seeker
permit (ASP). This is NOT refugee status, but indicates that the person is
in the process of being considered for refugee status. An ASP entitles the
holder to remain in South Africa while their application for asylum is
processed. However, the permit is only valid for one month at a time,
meaning that asylum seekers have to return to the reception office once a
month for a renewal stamp. The asylum seeker also has to return to the
office of issue, meaning that it is impossible to relocate within South
Africa while the application is in process. Work and study
Prior
to December 2002, ASP holders did not have the right to work or study
although they could apply for this after six months of waiting to be
processed. In December 2002, the Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town won a
challenge in the High Court stating that withholding the right of asylum
seekers to work and study was in violation of the South African
constitution. However, RROs have not always applied this ruling; the
Johannesburg office still allegedly issues ASPs that state that study and
work are prohibited, and other offices are reportedly still applying the six
month rule, and are not informing asylum seekers of their right to have the
prohibition clause lifted. "Refugees" Once an application has been
processed and asylum granted, the person is officially a refugee. A refugee
permit is issued for two years, and refugees have many of the same rights as
full South African citizens, including the right to employment, and to
access health care and education. A refugee may also have a UN Convention
Travel Document issued by the Government of South Africa and may leave the
country without jeopardizing their refugee status. Asylum seekers may not
leave the country without being deemed to have given up their claim to
asylum. After two years, if the review process deems that the person is
likely to remain a refugee indefinitely, he/she may apply for South African
citizenship. Refugee status - a future based decision To qualify as a
refugee, it is not necessary to prove personal experience of persecution
prior to having fled your nation, only that events of public disorder are
taking place in your home country and that if you are forcibly returned,
your "physical safety or freedom may be threatened". The decision as to
whether a person is granted asylum or not, is a future based decision, an
assessment of whether the home country is safe to return to, rather than
whether you were tortured before you left. However, in the opinion of human
rights lawyers in South Africa, in the case of those tortured before
fleeing, the case for asylum should be unambiguous. South African
officials maintain that only a very few Zimbabweans are eligible for asylum.
There is not a general official cknowledgement that "events of public
disorder" are taking place on a consistent basis in Zimbabwe. Barry Gilder,
Director General of Home Affairs, in October 2004, was asked why he thought
so many millions of Zimbabweans were leaving their nation: .I would
imagine a large number of them are [leaving] for economic reasons. It is a
well known fact that the Zimbabwe economy has not been healthy of late. It's
as straightforward as that.
An absence of acknowledging there are
legitimate political reasons for leaving Zimbabwe is a cause for concern;
the same ambivalence is experienced by Zimbabweans when dealing with Home
Affairs officers. Gilder consistently told us that RROs are under strict
instructions to give ASPs to Zimbabweans, but he himself seems reluctant to
acknowledge there are more than a very few genuinely deserving of
them. Paradoxically, the South African government's stance that there is no
public disorder is facilitated by the almost total shut down of the
independent press and civil society activities, which has meant that there
is ever less news in the international forum drawing attention to state
repression, including torture and organised violence, in
Zimbabwe. However, there is a very qualified acceptance that some Zimbabweans
are deserving of refugee status, although even this limited space has been
hard-won through the courts by South African human rights lawyers acting on
behalf of Zimbabweans. The general assumption is that the vast majority of
Zimbabweans in South Africa are illegal economic migrants, who have not
suffered political victimisation and who should be rounded up and
deported. In the words of Barry Gilder, "the UN Convention and our own laws
do not allow for economic refuge". While there are unquestionably many
economic migrants, the scale of the political problem and the number of
politically displaced persons seems to be underestimated by Home Affairs.
Furthermore, the destruction of the economy has been wilful and avoidable
and done for the political gain of the ruling party. This, too, makes
today's economic migrant different to yesterday's - whether or not the laws
are capable of distinguishing this. Political denial of food - a threat
to physical safety? It seems there is an opening for a test case in the South
African courts to determine whether or not being denied the right to
purchase food because of your presumed political affiliation constitutes a
"threat to physical safety". Home Affairs officials seem not to be aware of
the fact that at times who has access to food - and who does not - is a
highly politicised business in Zimbabwe and not a simple case of poverty and
economic collapse. As discussed earlier in this report, the Zimbabwe
government is in violation of the ICESCR by having failed to protect food
availability and access for its citizens, regardless of their political
affiliation. It appears the government has knowingly misrepresented food
stocks currently in the country to UN bodies, and has placed its people at
risk as a result. Food deficit situations have been repeatedly abused by
government on party political lines in the last four years. The collapse of
the economy and food security in Zimbabwe cannot be separated from issues of
governance: people who flee for so-called economic reasons often see their
decision as politically motivated; the arena is blurred. The South African
Refugee Act has only been in effect since 2000: there is scope for the
Courts and current experiences of political displacement in the region to
define how it should be applied, and to consider, for example, whether it is
ethical to forcibly return to Zimbabwe, those who have been actively denied
food by their government.
2. The battle for Zimbabwean refugee
rights The situation seems to be the same. There is not a significant
increase in Zimbabwean applications for asylum. [Barry Gilder,
Interview] To admit the scale of the crisis, of the refugee situation here,
would be to admit the gravity of the situation in Zimbabwe - I feel there is
a resistance to admitting just how bad things are. [Elinor Sisulu, Crisis
in Zimbabwe, Johannesburg, October 2003] The perception that Zimbabweans are
given ASPs only with the greatest reluctance, and are given full refugee
status with even greater reluctance, was confirmed by human rights lawyers
from both the Johannesburg office of Lawyers for Human Rights and the Wits
Law Clinic, both of whom have represented Zimbabwean refugees in the
Courts. For some years after human rights abuses began escalating in
Zimbabwe, the South African Home Affairs refused to grant any ASPs to
Zimbabweans. Although since April 2000 both Zimbabwean and international
NGOs have been documenting politically motivated torture, murder, massive
internal displacement and property destruction, predominantly at the hands
of the Zimbabwean State and its agents, it was only in June 2002 that South
African authorities began to recognise that Zimbabweans might flee for
reasons of political persecution. Home Affairs only agreed to begin
recognising Zimbabweans as asylum seekers after the Wits Law Clinic prepared
a test case in June 2002, representing five Zimbabweans who had fled to
South Africa. One asylum seeker was a woman who had been displaced from a
commercial flower farm as a result of farm invasions, and four were school
teachers who had been badly assaulted by war veterans in rural schools; all
had been accused of being supporters of the MDC. On the eve of the urgent
application being brought before the Court, demanding Home Affairs issue
ASPs, Home Affairs settled out of court by agreeing that the five were
entitled to seek asylum. This set a legal precedent, and since June 2002,
around 5,000 Zimbabweans have been granted ASPs; approximately 20 have been
granted full refugee status. The landmark decision by Home Affairs in June
2002 that Zimbabweans have a right to asylum is one reason that immigration
officers in Refugee Reception Offices ask to see passports; lawyers
confirmed that if those in line have passports showing they entered South
Africa prior to June 2002, they are being automatically denied the right to
claim ASPs, and are considered illegal immigrants subject to deportation. It
is only those who entered South Africa after the Home Affairs ruling in June
2002 that are even considered for asylum seeker status. In spite of the
Court ruling, and in spite of "strict instructions" from the Director
General of Home Affairs to grant asylum to Zimbabweans, the authors were
given numerous accounts of these papers being refused, and of would-be
Zimbabwean asylum seekers being told by Home Affairs officials that they had
no right to asylum, as "there is no civil war in Zimbabwe". Police who pick
Zimbabweans up from the streets reportedly say the same thing - "there is no
war in Zimbabwe." Victimisation: a repeated experience in Zimbabwe The
experience of the authors and of others documenting the pattern of human
rights violations over the last four years, shows that there is a high
likelihood of the same individuals or families being victimised repeatedly,
with assaults, torture, property loss and threats, every time an election
looms. It is the same individuals who are likely, on political grounds, to
be denied access to food and other resources, including at times health
care, schooling for their children and borehole water. A report produced for
the Zimbabwe Institute in June 2004 summarises the human rights violations
suffered by sitting opposition Members of Parliament since 2000. It provides
a shocking listing of multiple incidences of violations against persons who
in most countries would be offered the full protection of the law, by virtue
of their position in parliament. If even MPs are treated in the manner
documented, surviving multiple assassination attempts, destruction of
property, even torture in police cells, with no police action being taken
against perpetrators, then it should come as no surprise that ordinary
members of civil society or the MDC are also abused multiple times with
impunity. Cases in the current report confirm that threats and assaults
against people and families are repeated. Photograph 5 is of a victim who
had his house burnt down in 2000 - and then had his barely reconstructed
house burnt down again in 2002, as well as being tortured himself on both
occasions. In January 2002, he and his wife were pulled out of bed in the
middle of the night, stripped naked and tortured in front of their minor
children, who then had to watch their house burning, while their parents lay
unconscious. This victim lay outside his local clinic without treatment for
24 hours, because he was an MDC supporter. He eventually accessed private
treatment provided by a human rights organisation.
Photographs 5 and
6: Supporters of MDC assaulted with knives, screw drivers and barbed wire on
17 January 2002, ahead of the Presidential election. Photograph 7: Samuel
Khumalo, a trade unionist, seeks medical assistance after being tortured in
police custody, in November 2003. This same unionist was arrested again in
October 2004. The person in photograph 6 was stripped naked and whipped with
barbed wire on the same night by the same perpetrators as the previous case.
He had one eye poked out with a screwdriver, leaving him blind in this eye.
It seems common for the same perpetrators to operate with impunity in a
particular area, attacking people again and again without being
apprehended. In a 2003 report, Themba Lesizwe found that among 48 victims of
torture who had fled to South Africa and whom they interviewed, the average
number of separate experiences of torture was three per person, again
indicative of a pattern of the same individuals being targeted on multiple
occasions. As Zimbabwe heads into yet another pre-election phase, with
general elections looming in 2005, it is predictable that once more human
rights violations of various types will escalate, and that in many
instances, those targeted before, will be targeted again - by the same
perpetrators. Many of these will no doubt flee as persecution mounts, but
will they receive asylum seeker status?
3. Attitude to Zimbabweans
within Home Affairs Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) There have been
repeated claims in the last year that the Home Affairs RRO in Johannesburg
has an implicit policy of making it difficult for Zimbabweans to gain asylum
seeker status. Home Affairs consistently states that very few Zimbabweans
are trying to apply for asylum seeker status, referring to the fact that on
their records, Zimbabweans do not even make the top ten nationalities
seeking refugee status in South Africa. However, others claim that the
reason so few Zimbabweans show up on the computer database as asylum
seekers, is that they are being denied access to the reception offices and
therefore do not enter the official statistics. Refugees International (RI)
observed in July 2004 that Zimbabweans do face more barriers than other
nationalities, in spite of denials from Home Affairs that this is the case.
In their report, they cite their own observation that Zimbabweans start
queueing more than 24 hours before the offices open to Zimbabweans every
Tuesday, and that on the day RI were there, the person who was second in
line failed to access the offices, as Home Affairs only allowed in one
Zimbabwean that week. In the 2003 survey conducted by Themba Lesizwe, 34 out
of 48 Zimbabwean exiles who gave detailed interviews claimed to have tried
to get asylum seeker permits, and only 4 had actually succeeded in obtaining
one. In the assessment of Themba Lesizwe, all 48 qualify as political asylum
seekers, having all been tortured in Zimbabwe prior to fleeing their
country. RI comment that there is some official resistance in Home Affairs to
the idea that Zimbabweans have any right at all to qualify as refugees, the
court ruling notwithstanding. When RI personnel interviewed staff in the RRO
in Johannesburg, they informed RI that Zimbabweans were not a priority when
issuing ASPs, because "there is no civil war in Zimbabwe, so there is no
reason to apply. we do not put them at the top of the list". If this is the
attitude of the very individuals in whose hands the fate of Zimbabweans
lie, then it is no surprise that Zimbabweans face an almost insurmountable
task in getting asylum seeker permits.
4. Refugee Reception Office,
Johannesburg: Observations of current authors "There is no instruction, no
policy to disadvantage Zimbabweans" [Barry Gilder, interview] As the vast
majority of Zimbabweans are in the greater Johannesburg area, and have to
apply via the Johannesburg RRO for asylum, we have centred our own
observations at two different Johannesburg RRO locations over one year. We
have found that there is a dramatic lack of capacity in the Johannesburg
Home Affairs office to cope with the numbers of refugees from any and all
nations, and a clearly discernable lack of good will towards Zimbabwean
refugees in particular. This statement is made based on the following
personal observations, key informant interviews, and on comments received
from those in the queues. . The Johannesburg RRO office has had no fewer
than 4 venues in the last 12 months, and for long periods of time, there has
been no functioning office at all during the last year. Not only Zimbabweans
but asylum seekers of all nationalities have been sorely tested to keep up
with the RRO moves in the last year. . The RRO now in Rosettenville, is
not sign-posted in any way, and is accessed down a narrow side passage
littered with garbage. It took our team 40 minutes of searching in a motor
vehicle and on foot before we found the office. . Zimbabweans are allowed
to apply for asylum only on Tuesdays, along with countries from the "Horn of
Africa". They start queuing on Sunday or Monday for Tuesday's chance to be
processed for asylum seeker papers ie. Zimbabweans queue for up to 24 hours
ahead of the office opening to them on Tuesdays. This was also observed by
RI. . On the six Tuesdays of observation in Braamfontein in 2003, the
Zimbabwean queue was consistently between five and ten times longer than the
"Horn of Africa" queue. Yet the other queue moved extremely quickly into the
building while the Zimbabweans were kept waiting on the pavement, with a
reported average of between 5 and 10 Zimbabweans being accepted a week into
the RRO. The queue of Zimbabweans numbered hundreds every week - between 300
and 500 on weeks of observation. . To summarise - despite queuing for 24
hours or more, around 2% of Zimbabweans accessed the office on any Tuesday
on the 6 days we observed. On the same days, most or all people in the Horn
of Africa queue accessed the office. . On being questioned why the two
queues moved at such different paces, with Horn of Africa countries getting
preference over Zimbabweans on entering the RRO, the Head of Immigration in
the Braamfontein office said they process Zimbabweans more slowly because
"their queue is disorderly". It was not our observation that the queue was
disorderly, although it was considerably longer than the Horn of Africa
queue; however by late morning when people who had been queuing for two days
could observe the other queue moving in steadily and their own standing
absolutely still, they tended to start asking questions of officials, and
the queue at this time widened to fill most of the pavement. . Among
those interviewed, it is common to find individuals who have queued in
excess of 15 weeks running, and who have nonetheless failed to even enter
the RRO. Some individuals have been in the country for more than a year and
return from time to time to try to access the RRO and fail. . We spoke to
individuals who had made it into the building as far as the first desk, only
to be then thrown out altogether for not having a valid passport or ID on
them, although this is clearly in contravention of South African refugee
law. . South African officials were personally witnessed going down the queue
asking for those who had a valid passport with visa and South African entry
stamp, to give them preference in accessing asylum seeker permits. This
again is illegal. . This process of checking passports is also used to
identify those who entered South Africa before the June 2002 decision on
asylum seeker status for Zimbabweans- see previous section. Such individuals
are thrown out of the queue and are in danger of deportation. . The Home
Affairs guards were captured by our team on video beating Zimbabweans with
sjamboks (whips) in the queues outside the Braamfontein RRO, in the last
week of October 2003. This supports unequivocally the many claims we
received from asylum seekers of being assaulted by guards outside this
RRO. . Our video camera person was told to move away from the Braamfontein
office in October 2003, by touts who said no more Zimbabweans would be
allowed into the RRO until she was gone. We were later informed that as soon
as the camera was gone, people who had not been in the queue were led into
the RRO by touts. Those in the queue assumed that this group were among the
many who bribe to get papers, and the touts had not wanted them caught on
camera entering the building without queuing. . Those in the queue
indicated to us those who they knew to be touts, "selling" asylum seeker
permits. . Asylum seekers queuing and human rights lawyers also noted to us
that when observers of one sort or another - people with cameras, human
rights officials - are outside the RRO, then more people are allowed off the
pavement and into the waiting area inside, but we were also informed that
this does not mean more people are actually processed on these days. Rather,
people can sit inside the building instead of on the pavement for hours, and
then be ejected without processing at the end of the day. We could not
independently verify this by speaking to somebody that had been through
this, but heard it from multiple sources including South African
lawyers. . At the Rosettenville RRO in October 2004, we were informed by
those in line that for the previous three weeks running, no new claims for
ASPs had been issued, with the reason being given that the "computers were
down." By 10.30 am on the day we were there, not a single new ASP had been
processed, and the rumour in the queue was that the computers were down
again, for the fourth week running, although no Home Affairs official had
bothered to clarify this situation by mid morning. . Human rights lawyers
confirmed that the "computers are down" is a constant excuse for not
processing ASPs. One lawyer told us that during 2003 there had been several
consecutive months when not a single ASP had been issued on Tuesdays, when
Zimbabweans are there. Excuses had included the computers being down, and
the person with the keys to the safe being out of the office, week after
week. Identification papers In order to be given an ASP, refugees do not
have to produce formal identification. The Refugee Act accepts that if a
person is being persecuted and has to flee in adverse conditions, it is not
always possible to cross borders with a passport or other form of
identification to hand. Nationality and precise identity are subject to
confirmation through a process of interviewing by Home Affairs. Of course it
simplifies the process of identification if the asylum seeker can produce
photo identity of a credible nature, but it is illegal to deny persons the
right to even proceed with their claim if they cannot do so. Yet we were
informed by dozens of would-be asylum seekers that they had been turned away
from queues outside the reception office in Johannesburg because they could
not produce a passport. This is clearly in violation of South Africa's
Refugee Act. The Head of Immigration in Braamfontein denied in an interview
in October 2003 that his employees insisted on passports from Zimbabwean
refugees, saying they only needed some form of ID, but to insist on ID is
also not legal. In spite of this official denial, when the authors were
themselves outside reception offices in Johannesburg, Home Affairs officials
came down the line saying they were only looking for people with
passports. Photograph 8: an estimated 500 Zimbabweans wait outside the
Johannesburg refugee reception office on a Tuesday in October 2003, hoping
for asylum seeker papers. Only 5 accessed the office on this Tuesday: this
is a fairly normal weekly intake of Zimbabweans. Photograph 9: minutes
after the previous picture was taken, Home Affairs guards started an
unprovoked attack on the Zimbabweans, whipping them with
sjamboks.
Photograph 10: October 2004 - a year later in
Rosettenville: the RRO is now accessed down an un-signposted alley. The same
long queues of Zimbabweans are there, still mostly failing to access the
office.
The 2003 National Refugee Base Line Survey, which deals with
refugees from other nations excluding Zimbabwe, noted around 49% of their
respondents faced barriers in gaining an ASP. In relation to the
Johannesburg/Braamfontein office this study found: 35% of those who
reported barriers, claimed problems in accessing the RRO 35% " " reported
paying bribes While our own observations are not statistically validated, our
assessment based on several hundred interviews, 200 questionnaires and 7
mornings of observation at the RRO, have left us with the impression that
almost no Zimbabwean accesses an ASP without encountering barriers. It is
possible to eventually receive an ASP, but the process is invariably
problematic. It is interesting to note that the 2003 National Refugee
Baseline Survey found that asylum seekers from obviously "refugee producing"
countries - ie countries where there is/was a war, such as Angola, Rwanda
and DRC - were the least likely to experience problems accessing RROs, and
asylum seekers from Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia were most likely to experience
barriers getting access to RROs, because the officers do not see these
countries as genuinely "refugee producing". This report also noted that the
Braamfontein office was the worst in this regard. This finding of the CASE
study is consistent with the experience of Zimbabweans, who consistently
reported being told - "there is no war in Zimbabwe." There is an urgent
need to educate officers in these RROs, including the guards at the doors,
that it is not their prerogative to decide which countries are refugee
producing. There is a war in Zimbabwe. It is "not a bloody war: our war is
different; it's a silent, but it's a cunning war," - and it is sending
thousands of people fleeing into the region. It is miraculous that hundreds
of Zimbabweans and other asylum seekers still turn up every week to queue
when this is the quality of service they receive. But when the outcome of
being caught without an asylum seeker permit is deportation, people are left
with no real options at all but to queue week after week in the face of
official obstruction and poor - or no - delivery of service. Time taken
for processing of asylum seeker claims It is quite clear that the time being
taken to process claims by any asylum seeker is far in excess of a
reasonable limit. In terms of the Regulations for the Refugees Act, gazetted
in 2000, reasonable time limits are recommended. Schedule 3 states
that: . applications for asylum will generally be adjudicated by the
Department of Home Affairs within 180 days of filing a completed asylum
application with a Refugee Reception Officer. . an interview before a
Refugee Status Determination Officer should take place on a date specified
on the asylum seeker permit, normally within 30 days of the asylum
application being completed. While these time limits are not legally binding,
it is quite apparent that Home Affairs is both under resourced and
inefficient, as around only 20% of applications from asylum seekers from any
nation are being processed in the stipulated six months. CASE report that
since the 1998 Act came into effect in April 2000, approximately 71% of
asylum seekers who have applied, are still awaiting an outcome on their
applications. 38% of these have been waiting up to 2 years, and another 33%
have been waiting two years or more. Out of approximately 5,000 ASP holders
of Zimbabwean nationality who have applied since June 2002, approximately 20
have been granted asylum ; even in the context of the delays experienced by
other asylum seekers, this suggests an abnormally slow process: 0,4 % of
asylum claims from Zimbabweans have been positively finalised in the last 2
and a half years! This would suggest that Zimbabwean applications are being
kept on the bottom of the pile. Lack of capacity in RROs In an
interview in October 2003, the Head of Immigration of the Braamfontein
office indicated that he was dramatically under-staffed. There were only 4
members of staff in his office qualified to finalise asylum applications and
grant or deny asylum. This included himself, and he had many other duties as
Head of Immigration. He stated that his aim was to increase finalisations of
applications to 8 per qualified staff member per week. This would mean the
Braamfontein office could hopefully in the future finalise 32 applications
per week. However, with a backlog in South Africa of around 80,000 asylum
seeker cases in total, for the largest office in the country to finalise
less than 2,000 cases per year would do little to clear the backlog. In
October 2003, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then Minister of Home Affairs, stated
that there were 1,500 vacancies in his ministry, and no money in the
treasury to finance these jobs. In such a situation there is clearly
insufficient capacity to deal with the workload, and this creates a
situation that is then wide open to corruption and bribes. In October
2004, Barry Gilder, Director General of Home Affairs, indicated to the
authors that since he came into office a year ago, he has organised the
training of a large group of officers who will be capable of processing and
finalising asylum claims. He said that before the end of 2004, an additional
staff of 69 refugee determination officers will be deployed in RROs. In
Gilder's own words: This department is way back in the 19th century
somewhere.turning it around, it's a bit like trying to turn around the
Titanic, perhaps after it's hit the iceberg. Gilder is planning to
introduce more personnel with better training, and better information
technology to improve the department, but says this will take time. In the
meantime, we would point out that it is the refugees who have to deal with
the fact that there are not enough life-boats, that only those who can bribe
will get a life jacket, and the rest will sink without trace in the hostile
waters of Johannesburg. Length of permits: renewal stamps The fact that
asylum seeker permits are usually only valid for one month, means that the
approximately 80,000 ASP holders of all nationalities nationwide all have to
return once a month to RROs for a renewal stamp. The process of simply
keeping existing ASP holders in the system is therefore hugely time and
resource consuming. As neither the Act nor the Regulations state a time span
for how long an ASP stamp should be valid, a simple way to reduce the
backlog and free up staff time to process new asylum applications and
finalise old ones, would be to extend the validity of the ASP to six months
or one year in the first instance; in reality no ASPs are being assessed and
finalised in less than this time period. Increasing the length of validity
of the ASP would reduce the number of asylum seeker visits to RROs
dramatically Asylum seekers - a cash cow The department has indicated its
commitment to stamp out corruption.. These things take time to make happen..
You need to bear in mind that the Department of Home Affairs is eminently
corruptible. We provide a service people need desperately.. [Barry
Gilder, interview] Asylum seeker permits are free of charge. Yet the authors
were informed that there is a thriving black market in ASPs. The going rate
for an ASP is between R300 and R400. We were further informed by human
rights lawyers that renewal stamps can also be given without queuing, for a
fee of R100