• JAG PR Communique
• JAG Open Letters Forum No. 130
• The violence should be stopped before it starts
• Mugabe out to grab more land from SA family
• Zim airports collapse
• MDC dumps Mudzuri?
• Agriculture in disarray — CFU
• SA tightens visa requirements
• Plot thickens at Town House
• MP calls for govt to acquire stake in precious stones mining firms
• Review policy on empowerment
• The last straw
• Zim’s woes: Let’s focus on solutions, compromises
• Mammoth task for new CFU boss
• First steps towards recovery

      Officials said the Oppen-heimer family owned land in Zimbabwe that was
almost the size of Belgium.

      The family has disputed the allegations arguing that it owns only 137
314ha of land in Zimbabwe, whereas Belgium's total area is 3 051 900ha.

      The latest listing of the Oppeinheimer farms came after President
Mugabe announced that his government had completed the land reform in the
country last August.

      So far the government has acquired more than three quarters of the
farms owned by the 4 500 white commercial farmers. Fewer than 300 white
commercial farmers are said to remain on their farms.

      Some of the farmers have moved to neighbouring countries or emigrated
overseas.

      Many of the white farmers have taken legal action against the
government but still await judgment on their cases. - Sapa-AFP

      8/15/2003 8:58:24 AM (GMT +2)

      A QUIET revolution is underway in corporate Zimbabwe where the
plausible but probably not so-well-thought-out indigenisation policy has
sparked off a wave of company acquisitions by influential and "well-placed"
black businesspeople.

      These individuals are snapping up significant chunks in both public
and private companies in line with the government’s stated objective of
economically empowering the historically disadvantaged sectors of the
population.

      A very disturbing trend though, which could give indigenisation a bad
name, is beginning to emerge from the indigenisation drive. Only a chosen
few are benefiting from this policy. Whether it is leverage buy-outs,
hostile take-overs, willing-seller-willing-buyer arrangements, or through
the government’s stop-go privatisation drive, it is the same old names and
individuals which keep cropping up. This is aggravated by the fact that the
little-known National Investment Trust, which should help Zimbabweans
realise their dreams of economic emancipation, hardly registers on the
relevance radar in the country.

      With all due respect, without bringing into question the business
acumen and negotiating dexterity of these individuals, we find it difficult
to believe that it is only them and them alone that have guts, instincts and
above all the vision that allow them to spot sitting corporate ducks.

      It seems to us that most of these businesspeople are feeding from
Zimbabwe’s deeply rooted political patronage system. For some of these
people, who have been known to literally put guns to company owners’ heads
to force them to sell, it is not their acumen but their political
connections and back-scratching relationships that have thrust them into
company ownership. Some will argue that evidence to this is as yet sparse
and anecdotal. But a cursory glance at the company take-over syndicates
suggests otherwise.

      Most of these syndicates have, albeit as silent partners, politicians
who are known for their love for influence peddling. These are groupings
formed to wrestle companies from their owners using the political muscle
under the façade of black economic empowerment. It is indeed a sad
reflection on Zimbabwe that all we have done is dispossess the few whites
and replaced them with a privileged black clique.

      Unfortunately, as the politically well-connected enjoy the sweet
crumbs falling from the high table of political patronage, even banks, which
should sit at the heart of any well-functioning economy, seem to have been
unwittingly drawn into this mess. They are in the middle of this mess,
making it worse than it already is. We are experiencing in Zimbabwe today an
unprecedented rise in crony capitalism — where banks are channelling funds
to politically well-connected businesspeople who run up large debts in
somewhat misguided acquisition plans.

      Not only that, but a lot of aspiring businesspeople have largely
remained could-have-beens-that-never-were. Theirs have remained sorry tales
of unrealised ambitions with their plans scuppered after being gazumped by
this new breed of corporate predators.

      This makes us wonder whether Zimbabwe has a well-defined
indigenisation policy or we are just navigating without a compass? This is
why there is an urgent need to push for a radical review of the country’s
indigenisation policy to broaden it from the gravy train that it has
degenerated into. This is a policy which must benefit each and every
Zimbabwean, not only a selected few.

      8/15/2003 9:02:35 AM (GMT +2)

      EDITOR — The government’s latest plan to give a 20 percent share of
all businesses to the indigenous workers would be the last straw that broke
the camel’s back.

      As nothing more than a plan to try to win urban support for ZANU PF,
the plan is ill-conceived.

      Clearly the plan, if brought to fruition, would see businesses close
by the hundreds, and a further mass exodus of the businessmen who have
earned foreign currency for the government’s insatiable needs.

      PAYE, sales tax, company tax revenues will dwindle, and thousands more
workers will be on the streets chasing less and less jobs.

      The scheme cannot afford to discriminate, which would mean that all
registered companies will have to follow suit. Farmers would again be
affected as most farms are run through registered companies.

      Parastatals like the CSC, ZESA, NRZ and NOCZIM would have to be
included in the scheme or workers would cry foul. The civil servants must
too be included and be given 20 percent share of government’s losses. Not
doing so would see massive migration of skilled and unskilled workers from
the civil service and parastatals to the private sector.

      Black businessmen will not be excluded, and neither will the new breed
of ministerial weekend farmers. What about a firm of auditors which employs
a large number of black, white, coloured and Indian clerks all on the same
salary scales? Is it only the indigenous workers who get shares?

      When will our leaders grasp the nettle and realise that they cannot
buy their way out of the present fiasco?

      We need solid, brave well-thought out decisions to reverse the
downward slide of the economy. And more importantly, we need to fix the
problem instead of always tackling the end.

      They say when you find yourself in a hole the best thing to do is to
stop digging. Yet our leaders continue to dig, not just a hole but this
latest move would be tantamount to a grave! Mark my words.

      BR Charsley,

      Bulawayo.

      8/15/2003 8:56:41 AM (GMT +2)
      IN this article, the second in a five-part series, a Harare-based
legal practitioner Isaya Muriwo Sithole, traces the genesis of the South
African political negotiation process and indicates how Zimbabwe’s
transitional politics can take a leaf from the South African experience.
      The emphasis is on the importance of bilaterals, the extensiveness of
the process and the pragmatism that had come to characterise discussions
resulting in a shift in political ideological perspectives to a more liberal
approach.

      In theory a negotiation process has four phases: preliminary
discussions, pre-negotiaon positioning and creating the right climate, the
negotiation process itself, and implementation.

      In practice, these four phases naturally do not follow so precise and
organised a course.

      Negotiation is really a sojourn to and from, between and among these
four phases.

      The point of departure is that parties which are in oppostion about
fundamental issues deem it to be in their interest to settle the differences
to the benefit of all the parties by obtaining consensual decisions through
negotiation and entering into agreements.

      In South Africa preliminary discussions took place with the then
Minister of Justice Kobie Coetsee and Nelson Mandela during the latter’s
incarceration, and these resulted in a meeting with the then state President
P. W. Botha.

      Unconfirmed rumours were that functionaries of the National
Intelligence Services (NIS) also held exploratory talks on various instances
with ANC officials.

      Feelers were sent out through the right channels to certain overseas
government representatives concerning the steps announced on 2 February
1990.

      Other non-official discussion networks also emerged between business
people, academics, influential organisations, and professional institutes,
on the one hand, and the United Democratic Front and Mass Democratic
Movement (the comouflaged internal ANC) and also with ANC leaders in Lusaka,
on the other.

      In South Africa the phase of preliminary discussions took an extensive
and successful course.

      In Zimbabwe the phase of preliminary discussions between ZANU PF and
MDC still needs to be researched in depth.

      What is indisputable though is that efforts by the Commonwealth troika
on Zimbabwe have in a way facilitated initial contact between the two
parties which led to the aborted talks in April 2002.

      A visit by regional Presidents Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo and
Bakili Muluzi in May this year to facilitate a negotiated settlement looked
rather futile when the MDC decided to embark on what was code-named the
"final push" which resulted in Tsangirai’s arrest for second treason
charges.

      The bilaterals that took place between ZANU PF and MDC during
Tsvangirai’s arrest are still veiled in obscurity but there certainly was
some contact. Reports had it that Professor Welshman Ncube kept Tsvangirai
briefed about other pro-democracy forces is very disturbing.

      In my view, this goes on to show the importance of bilaterals as a
compromise-seeking and deadlock-breaking mechanism.

      Bilaterals must be aimed at identifying obstacles to dialogue and
finding ways of reaching a mutual compromise in a win-win situation.

      This is a very improtant lesson for the Zimbabwean transitional
process.

      National dialogue may resume and collapse but bilaterals must always
continue.

      This is how the South African process succeeded after initial failure.
Both bi and multi-laterals are also a potential source of alliances which
are critical for positional bargaining in the negotiation process.

      Fundamental or critical differences cannot be managed without what can
be called a "process alliance" between and among negotiating parties. The
now well-known harmonious working relationship between the then
constitutional Development Minister Roelf Meyer and the then ANC Secretary
General Cyril Ramaphosa was a symbol of this process alliance" in South
Africa.

      It meant that both groups, although differing fundamentally on
substance, realised that they needed one another for the process to succeed.

      It was a natural consequence of the "Record of understanding" reached
in September 1992.

      The dynamics of forming relationships have operated thoughout the
whole negotiation process.

      By rubbing shoulders with one another, focusing on solutions and
compromises, and taking stances, a process of shared discovery, involvement
and trust comes into being, leading to mutual respect, understanding and
acceptance.

      Centripetal and centrifugal forces develop in the process.

      This theory has been confirmed in South Africa’s negotiation process:
the NP-ANC-Democratic Party (grouped togetrher in the middle and the
concerned South African Group, or COSAG (Bophutha-tswana, Ciskei, the
Conservative Party (CP), and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) formed and
closed ranks as the Freedom Alliance.

      The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) tended to remain aloof.

      Evidently, the South African process was broad-based and
all-inclusive, and what stands out clear in Zimbabwe’s budding process is
its exclusion of key stakeholders like civil society, small opposition
political parties, religious movements and so forth.

      This is a major flaw in the management paradigm of our transitional
process and it appears there has to be a lot of lobbying and hard-bargaining
by the marginalised groups, including threats to disrupt the process. One
such threat has already been issued by the NCA and in my view, they have got
a case. I will re

      vert to this in the third part to this series.

      Meanwhile, suffice it to say that the marginalised groups must form
power blocks so as to be able to exert meaningful influence over the
process.

      Zimbabwe’s political negotiation process is presently in the second ph
ase, that of pre-negotiation positioning and climate creation.

      During this phase, the water is more specifically tested.

      Is there confidence in mutual intentions to settle? How can reciprocal
positive expectations of negotiations be built up? Who are the real leaders
who should be involved and what dynamics operate in their power bases? How
can the political ecology in the country be stimulated to encourage
receptivity to negotiation?

      In South Africa, these questions were asked in the National Party
circles and in ANC and Inkatha grouping. The media picked up the discourse
and wrote about these questions and in discreet ways. The messengers on each
side conveyed positioning messages.

      Answers were evaluated positively. The speech made by President F. W.
de Klerk on 2 February 1990 was the springboard, the framework and the
dynamo.

      This speech has often been said to be the final, irreversible turning
point in South Africa’s history. The die was cast.

      We hope that Zimbabweans across political racial, tribal and class
devides are already engaged in a serious process of looking for answers to
the above question.

      What should be noted in F. W. de Klerk’s speech is the element of
surprise therein. Everyone was caught off guard.

      Besides countrywide and worldwide applause for the breakthrough, there
was also confusion and disorganisation.

      Initially the ANC made uncompromising statements about violence,
nationalisation, and distrust. With new-found energy the CP mobilised
Afrikaner resistance against the NP. Within weeks F. W. de Klerk and Nelson
Mandela became the two who bore the key to the future.

      The meeting between the government and the ANC in May 1990 led to the
Groote Schuur Minute which was aimed at the identification of obstacles to
be removed before negotiations could begin.

      Working groups were formed. This resulted in the Pretoria Summit in
August 1990.

      Snags were further addressed in the D. F. Milan Airport Summit in
February 1991.

      Networks of pre-negotiations arose to prepare for the official
negotiations.

      Thereafter, the National Peace Accord was born on 14 September 1991.

      However, despite optimism that a political settlement would be
reached, there were negotiative developments.

      Violence within the country continued to increase and the economy
continued to decline. Foreign investors and governments were cautious about
the political changes in South Africa.

      Economic and social conditions could not satisfy the aspirations and
expectations of the black majority.

      There was an increase in militant far-right and far-left action. It
was difficult for the ANC and NP to find some way of seeing eye to eye so
that a suitable climate for negotiation could be created.

      This South African experience has important lessons for us as
Zimbabweans who find themselves in the same situation.

      It is clear in this country that apart from the initiatives of the MDC
and ZANU PF, other unofficial discussion networks must develop among
business people, church groups, women’s groups, students, workers,
intellectuals, academics, professional institutes and influential
organisations.

      The South African experience shows us that creating a conducive
environment for national dialogue takes more than just the initiatives of
the political leadership.

      The whole citizenry across various devides must be able to develop new
ways of communicating, new ways of thinking and new ways of relating to each
other.

      Every Zimbabwean has a stake in the unfolding national dialogue and
must be given an opportunity as much as possible to make an input to the
transitional process.

      The process must be broad-based, comprehensive and all-inclusive.

      This is the subject matter of the next contribution which emphasises
the centrality of constitutional reform in both the South African and
Zimbabwean political negotiation process.

      The actual negotiation process in South Africa kicked off with the
Congress for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) which opened on 20 December
1991 and was attended by 19 political groups and governments and notable
exceptions were the CP and PAC.

      CODESA established working groups to debate various issues, one of
which was the process of constitution-making.

      CODESA had three conferences but they ended in deadlock due to the
differences which emerged over the process mainly between the apartheid
government and the ANC.

      The government favoured a process where CODESA itself would draft the
constitution after which elections would be held while the ANC preferred a
two stage process involving the democratic election of a Constitution-making
body (stage 1) which would in turn write the constitution (stage 2).

      The failure of CODESA led to renewed negotiations between the key
players leading to the conveneing of another conference of political parties
and organisations called the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) which
was attended by 26 political groups.

      The MPNP managed to strike a compromise and agree on a negotiated
constitution for the transition to democracy within nine months, from March
to November 1993, in something of a miracle.

      The MPNP succeded in bringing about the essence of a compromise namely
that there were no winners and no lossers.

      The middle course won the argument.

      While the ANC had its two-stage process adopted, it had to drop its
insistence on a referendum.

      In return for accepting the ANC’s two-stage process, the apartheid
government won on federalism and the adoption of the constitution by the
constituent Assembly.

      Reminiscing on the seed, germination and birth of the South African
process, one realises that perharps the negotiation process had to mature
first, perhaps the time was not yet ripe for the political groupings to
realise that no-one could "go it alone’.

      The fact is that CODESA was a first trial run which, although serving
a purpose, was doomed to end in deadlock.

      Looking back, political leaders would perhaps also agree that, at the
early stages of negotiations, they were possiby not as skilled as they
subsequently became and had an insufficient sensitivity to what is called
"process": to main

      tain progress with negotiations which reaching "win-win" compromises
along the way.

      In retrospect, it is clear that the South African constitutional
negotiations process, starting on very weak legs with CODESA had come to
maturity in the MPNP. The lessons had been well learnt and taken seriously.

      An interesting development arising from the many bi- and multi-lateral
negotiations, which should be a lesson for Zimbabwe’s political leadership,
is the pragmatism that had become evident in political, economic, and
constitutional discussions in South Africa.

      All the parties had in some or other way undergone a shift from a
dogmatic ideological political approach to a more pragmatic, flexible
approach.

      It is especially since 1992 that the emphasis increasingly fell on
problem solving rather than dogmatic approach to issues.

      The pragmatism opened the door for mutually acceptable solutions and a
constitutional framework which few people would have predicted at the
commencement of negotiations.

      The process by which the South African constitution was born is now
being acknowledged globally as one of the most extraordinary phenomena of
modern-day constitutional history.

      Here in Zimbabwe, some voices are calling for caution on the part of
the MDC.

      Naturally, transition politics is characterised by uncertainity,
increasing violence, suspision, occassional despair, and the consolidation
of power base.

      There will also be constant "constituency pressures", whetehr in the
form of high expectations or criticism that it had "sold out".

      F . W. de Klerk ran a risk of rejection by radicals in his
constituency; Nelson Mandela also ran a similar risk of rejection by the
black masses.

      The danger of losing political power and leverage is omnipresent in a
political negotiation process but the political will to succeed, combined
with patience, endurance, and oftern sheer will power will make the success
of the process possible.

      It is my hope that this is going to be the case in Zimbabwe.

      lThe full recognition of each individual’s rights to the freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution

      lThe reaffirmation that productive assets will not be nationalised

      These requirements are equally important to every citizen of the
country, to every political party and to every facet of the country’s
future.

      No prospect of international recognition or an improvement in
prosperity would be possible without meeting them. Any reluctance to make a
full commitment to them would be interpreted as absolutely unacceptable
conduct.

      However, their formal acceptance would help generate support for

      lVery significant assistance from development agencies and donor
countries

      lThe formulation of terms for the raising of a syndicated foreign
currency loan for the purpose of retiring the total domestic debt, currently
about Z$200 billion.

      The government must curtail and quickly eliminate the crowding-out of
domestic investment through its local borrowing activities. Currently,
almost all of the borrowing is needed for the repayment of previous
borrowings, therefore nothing useful is being accomplished with the borrowed
money.

      However, one of the main reasons why so little domestic investment has
taken place is that the government has captured $450 billion of the public’s
savings, and additional amounts that might total another Z$400 billion are
owed by parastatals.

      To unlock the nation’s savings and make them available for productive
investment, foreign loans are needed. And to be able to make the commitment
that the new foreign loan can be repaid, Zimbabwe has to rebuild, secure and
rapidly add to its productive sectors and export base.

      The Reserve Bank’s inclination to take official transfers of foreign
exchange into its own coffers and to release equivalent sums in Zimbabwe
dollars into the market has caused sharp increases in liquidity in the past.
This generated the need to "sterilise" the highly inflationary extra
liquidity created, which is carried our by means of "open market
operations". This is usually accomplished by the sale of Treasury Bills.

      While this mechanism will have to remain available to the monetary
authorities, the initial foreign exchange inflows could be paid directly to
lenders in hard currency. This would be far less inflationary than the
duplication of cash balances, and it would stimulate very considerable
domestic investment. The authorities would need only to set an initial
condition that capital transfers out of the country would still require
Reserve Bank approval.

      By committing itself in advance to pay out local lenders in foreign
currency, the Reserve Bank would issue a clear signal to the international
markets that the full recovery of Zimbabwe’s productive sectors has been
given top priority. This in turn would help attract further investment
inflows. Reasonable success in this direction would ease the burden of
repayments on the sharply increased external debt.

      To the extent that recent inflation rates have been exacerbated by the
scarcity of foreign exchange, the inflow of US$2 billion would help reverse
the recent exchange rate trends on the parallel currency markets. This would
offer the best possible prospect of a steep fall in the rate of inflation
over the following year. The foreign loan would also provide a legitimate
basis for the desired lower interest rates.

      With help from the resurgence in exports, these improvements would
bring closer the possibility that the Zimbabwe dollar exchange rate would
become more stable. The need for direct intervention in the market to set
the exchange rate and interest rates will fall away, as will the many
distortions that have been caused by these disruptive policies.

      Working through the banking sector and foreign currency market, most
of the hard currency would quickly find its way from the institutional
investors into the productive sectors, where a substantial proportion of it
would help strengthen Zimbabwe’s export drive.

      A hard currency loan could therefore form the seed capital for
Zimbabwe’s full recovery if the required changes were made to overcome the
recent collapse in confidence.

      As a high proportion of the lenders are institutions, those planning
to purchase shares in privatising parastatals could be offered special terms
if they were prepared to pay for their shares in hard currency. Private
sector companies could offer similar incentives when they offer the
institutions shares through private placings or through the Zimbabwe Stock
Exchange.

      Zimbabwe needs much more investment in many new areas of industrial
enterprise. But for that to happen, the country must again become an
attractive option for new investors, and for that to happen, the country’s
investment regulations, tax and labour laws need to be drastically revised.

      The private sector faces constant challenges to get the best possible
mileage from its resources. Government is under no less of a challenge. Its
efforts to raise yet more money from people who have been struggling with
declining real incomes for the past 10 years has proved to be a futile
exercise. Accordingly, all recently imposed tax increases have simply caused
revenues in real inflation-adjusted terms to fall in other areas of
taxation.

      Labour unions also carry a burden of responsibility to help steer the
economy away from the edge of the precipice. While they might have the
leverage to force up wage levels, they lack the ability to create new jobs
to replace the ones that are destroyed when they prompt workers to price
themselves out of their own markets.

      Without losing a cent, the government could make a major contribution
to the attack on inflation by reversing some of its inflationary tax
decisions, particularly those affecting import duties and the cascading
effects of taxes on taxes. These not only make the goods more expensive to
local buyers, they also make them less competitive on export markets.

      Coupled with the effect of a fixed exchange rate and therefore fixed
export revenues, even though production costs are still rising at a
staggeringly high rate, the effects are endangering the survival of a great
many of our exporters and some have already given up the struggle.

      As we never could afford to lose a single one of them, we should be
doing all we can to stop the process now.

      Drastic economic policy changes are urgently needed immediately if we
are to succeed, and they have to start with the quality of governance.

      John Robertson is an independent economic consultant and a member of
the Zimbabwe Economics Society