Zim Online
Fri 25
August 2006
JOHANNESBURG - There is a growing risk of a violent
explosion in
troubled Zimbabwe that could cost thousands of lives and
shatter the
relative stability of southern Africa, the influential
International Crisis
Group (ICG) said in a report released on
Thursday.
The Brussels-based ICG is an independent political
think-tank involved
in high-level advocacy to resolve conflict in many parts
of the world. It is
headed by former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth
Evans and has advocacy
offices in Washington DC, New York, London and
Moscow.
The group warned last June that Zimbabwe faced the prospect
of greater
insecurity and violence as a potentially explosive election to
choose
President Robert Mugabe's successor draws nearer in 2008, while the
country's bitter economic recession was picking up more pace.
In its latest report entitled: 'Zimbabwe - an opposition Strategy',
the ICG
said the southern African country remains "more polarised today than
ever
before".
The respected think-tank said prospects for
peaceful change look even
dimmer as political reform is blocked while
runaway inflation, poverty and
malnutrition feed rising public anger
"bringing ever closer the prospect of
a violent explosion whose shock waves
would rattle a region that has
otherwise mostly demonstrated considerable
stability and progress".
The ICG said the only way to avoid
spontaneous uprising that would
most likely degenerate into chaos and
bloodshed was for Zimbabwe's bickering
main opposition Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC) party to unite and
together with civic society
formulate a plan of non-violent resistance that
channels public anger into
pressure on Mugabe to keep his word to step down
in 2008.
While
cautioning that such a non-violent campaign would be still
fraught with
danger, the ICG said success could still be achieved if the
resistance
action focused on bread and butter issues capable of motivating
the ordinary
citizen into the streets.
The organisers of the resistance action
must aim at an incremental
process, focusing on issues that affect the
common man first and moving on
to larger political issues such as the
constitution, free and elections at a
later stage.
The protests
also had to be de-centralised and spread in many centres
all over the
country, a strategy that would stretch the security forces and
limit their
capacity to thwart the action, said the ICG.
The ICG said the
international community would still have a role to
play and said the
regional powerhouse, South Africa, should encourage Mugabe
to accept leaving
power in 2008 while the Southern African Development
Community should adopt
a more robust position in support of democratic
change in
Zimbabwe.
"SADC (should) take a strong position in support of
democratic change
in Zimbabwe including expressing a willingness to consider
expulsion from
the organisation if this is not forthcoming," the ICG said in
the report.
The European Union and the United States should
increase pressure on
the Harare administration by tightening targeted
sanctions against Mugabe
and his top officials.
But ICG Africa
programme executive director John Norris noted that
internal pro-democracy
groups had to act first in order to inspire the
international community to
take a more vigorous approach to Zimbabwe's
worsening crisis.
He said: "Two lessons are clear in Zimbabwe. The first is that,
despite his
deserved standing as a hero of the anti-colonial struggle in the
past, the
82-year old President Robert Mugabe is the key obstacle to a more
hopeful
future. The second is that to avoid the abyss, change must start
from
within." - ZimOnline
Zim Online
Fri 25 August 2006
HARARE - Zimbabwe could again fail to
produce enough food during the
2006/07 season unless adequate measures are
put in place to address
projected input shortages and clear the air over
land tenure of newly
resettled farmers.
These revelations were
made by ministers Didymus Mutasa, Joseph Made
and Munacho Mutezo during a
Wednesday public hearing in Harare by the
parliamentary portfolio committee
on agriculture, land reform, water and
infrastructural
development.
The three ministers are responsible for land reform,
agriculture, and
water and infrastructural development, respectively. They
were grilled by
the parliamentary committee on the continued decline in
Zimbabwe's
agricultural production at a time when a lot of money was being
pumped by
the government into the sector.
Made admitted that
Zimbabwe could again face "serious fertilizer
shortages" due to a breakdown
at one of the country's major producers of the
commodity.
Zimbabwe has over the years experienced shortages of fertilizer and
other
inputs due to a crippling foreign currency crisis.
Earlier this
year, the government unsuccessfully attempted to
nationalise the fertilizer
industry, accusing players in the sector of
sabotaging its land reform
programme by deliberately under-supplying the
market.
Mutezo
told the portfolio committee that the country would experience
problems in
meeting tillage requirements due to the shortage of diesel.
Mutasa
revealed that one of the issues hampering production was
"outstanding land
issues such as the security of tenure" on farms allocated
to new
farmers.
Most of the newly resettled farmers cannot borrow money
from financial
institutions because they do not have title
deeds.
The land reform programme has been dogged by administrative
problems,
with some farmers already allocated land by Mutasa's ministry
finding
themselves being removed by the same ministry, casting a cloud of
insecurity
among most newly resettled farmers. - ZimOnline
Zim Online
Fri 25 August 2006
HARARE - A frail-looking Tapiwa
Mukondo can hardly sit up straight as
he waits for his turn to be attended
to by nurses at a government-run clinic
in Harare's working class suburb of
Kuwadzana.
Mukondo, 33, coughs uncontrollably for some minutes
before spitting a
mucous-laced liquid into a small plastic
bottle.
Although the queue is moving at a snail's pace, Mukondo has
since
learnt that patience is a virtue in this business if he is to collect
his
monthly allocation of life-saving Anti-Retroviral Drugs
(ARVs).
But this hope is soon deflated when the nurse on duty
becomes the
deliverer of bad news - the ARVs had quickly run
out.
To his horror, the nurse says the next allocation of ARVs
would only
be available next month, meaning he has to make do with the
traditional
herbs that he takes when he fails to get his
allocation.
"I know they still have the drugs but the nurses keep
them for their
friends and relatives. The government must do something about
this soon,
otherwise poor people like us will simply die," Mukondo mumbles
as he
shuffles his way out of the clinic.
Zimbabwe government
statistics say at least one in very five of the
country's 12 million people
are infected with the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) that causes
AIDS.
Of these, only a paltry 60 000 people are benefiting from the
government's ARVs programme, leaving the majority to endure a slow and
painful march to their early graves. At least 3 000 Zimbabweans die every
week because of AIDS-related illnesses.
Much more worrying for
poor Zimbabweans is that even those who had
been accessing the
cheaper-priced drugs have of late been failing to get the
drugs as nurses
and health care workers at government hospitals and clinic
reserve the drugs
for their friends and relatives.
Only a handful of Zimbabweans can
afford the more expensively priced
drugs from private pharmacies where a
monthly course costs about Z$12 000
(revalued), which is many times the
salary of an average factory worker.
Zimbabweans are battling a
severe economic crisis most critics blame
on President Robert Mugabe's
mismanagement of the economy.
The nation's health delivery system,
once revered as one of the best
in southern Africa, is in shambles after
years of mismanagement and
under-funding.
With 80 percent of
Zimbabweans living below the poverty datum line,
buying ARVs from pharmacies
remains a pipedream.
AIDS activists in Zimbabwe say health care
workers are taking
advantage of the high demand for ARVs by charging
patients a "fee" for them
to access the drugs.
"If you don't
pay the fee, they will tell you that the drugs are out
of stock. In the end,
we pay because it's us who suffer," says Tryphine
Mungoni, of the Zimbabwe
Network of People Living Positively With AIDS
(ZNPP+).
Mungoni,
who was speaking on the sidelines of a conference on
"Accessing
Anti-Retroviral Treatment in Zimbabwe," held in Harare recently,
said the
health care workers were now demanding "cuts," (a euphimism for a
bribe) of
as high as Z$2 000 for a month's stock.
The executive director of
the Community Working Group on Health, a
coalition of non-governmental
organisations working to promote primary
health care in Zimbabwe, Rusike
accused government ministers of plundering
the AIDS drugs for their own
use.
"To tell the truth, many people are not accessing ARVs,
especially in
farming communities and remote rural areas. But what is
surprising is that
known AIDS-infected government ministers and officials
are still going
strong," said Rusike.
Earlier this year, there
were reports that Mugabe's ministers and
senior ruling ZANU PF party
officials, who are believed to be infected with
HIV, were grabbing AIDS
drugs which were meant for the poor in government
hospitals.
Health and Child Welfare Minister David Parirenyatwa, said the
government
was working with the private sector as well as NGOs to ensure
that more
people accessed ARVs.
"The government is doing everything possible
under the present
circumstances. You know, our economy is not doing well so
sectors such as
health are not being spared," he said.
But
Parirenyatwa's assurance that the government was "doing everything
possible"
might come too late for Mukondo and many other Zimbabweans who are
not
well-connected with the mighty and powerful to access ARVs. -
ZimOnline
Zim Online
Fri 25 August
2006
HARARE - Hard-pressed Zimbabweans on Thursday stampeded to
have a
chunk of zebra meat after the animal which had strayed from a farm on
the
outskirts of the city was knocked down by a car in the leafy suburb of
Mabelreign.
The residents only fled the scene after the police
and officials from
the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management
Authority arrived.
A spokesman for the National Parks and Wildlife,
Edward Mbewe,
confirmed the incident saying they had seized part of the
beast.
"We understand the zebra strayed from one Motsi's plot in
the
neighbourhood. The guy has about 70 zebras he keeps on his plot," said
Mbewe.
A Harare resident who witnessed the scramble for the
zebra meat told
ZimOnline yesterday: "I am surprised that such a thing can
happen in a
suburb like ours."
With a kilogramme of low grade
beef now costing about Z$1 500
(revalued), the zebra meat was like the
Biblical "manna from heaven" for the
residents.
High beef
prices have pushed the commodity beyond the reach of most
Zimbabweans who
are grappling with a severe economic crisis most critics
blame on President
Robert Mugabe's policies. - ZimOnline
Zim Online
Thu 24 August
2006
HARARE - Senior Zimbabwe government officials have approved a
report
jointly produced with relief agencies, saying 1.4 million people in
rural
areas will require food aid between now and next year, in what is
certain to
be a major embarrassment for President Robert
Mugabe.
Mugabe, always too eager to prove his controversial land
redistribution exercise helped expand agricultural production, has on
various occasions this year publicly claimed Zimbabwe would not need help
after harvesting enough food in the 2005/06 farming season.
But
the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) says in
the report
that 91 000 tonnes of cereals would be required to feed people in
rural
areas who did not harvest enough and who - because of worsening
poverty in
the southern African counrty - are not able to buy food even if
it was
available on the market.
The ZimVAC 2006 hunger report that will
only be made public once
Mugabe has seen and approved it, reads in part: "A
total of 1.4 million
people, which is about 17 percent of the rural
population are estimated to
be food insecure in the current consumption
year.
"The sum total household cereal deficit for
this population is
estimated at 91 000 metric tonnes. The 1.4 million people
are not able to
purchase the cereal even if it is made available on the
market."
There are several millions more of hungry people in
Zimbabwe's poverty
stricken cities and towns but these were not covered in
the ZimVAC report
which was focusing only on rural areas.
ZimVAC comprises the government, United Nations (UN) agencies and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). It carries out hunger vulnerability
assessments in the country and its latest report was compiled following a
survey on hunger carried in May this year.
In a covering note
accompanying copies of the hunger report sent to
heads of UN agencies and
NGOs, ZimVAC chairwoman Joyce Chanetsa wrote:
"Please find attached the
ZimVAC 2006 rural assessment summary and short
report which has been
approved by senior government officials."
Chanetsa however warned
the UN and NGO officials not to publicise the
report as yet, presumably to
ensure Mugabe is first briefed about the report
and gives his backing before
it can be released to the public. Without
Mugabe's approval, the ZimVAC
report would virtually be useless.
According to the report, a third
of primary school age children in
rural areas were prematurely dropping out
of school because of rising hunger
amid deepening poverty.
But
hunger is only one of many severe symptoms of Zimbabwe's
seven-year old
economic crisis that has also spawned shortages of fuel,
electricity,
essential medicines, hard cash and just about every basic
survival
commodity.
The main opposition Movement for Democratic Change party
and Western
governments blame the crisis on repression and wrong policies by
Mugabe, in
particular his seizure of productive farms from whites for
redistribution to
landless blacks.
The farm seizures
destabilised the mainstay agricultural sector and
caused severe food
shortages after the government failed to give black
villagers resettled on
former white farms skills training and inputs support
to maintain
production.
But Mugabe, who has ruled Zimbabwe since the country's
1980
independence from Britain, denies mismanaging the country and says its
problems are because of economic sabotage by Western governments opposed to
his seizure of white land. - ZimOnline
[ This report does not necessarily reflect
the views of the United Nations]
HARARE, 24 Aug 2006 (IRIN) - After
the initial chaos of Zimbabwe's farm
invasions, a tenuous truce based on a
survival philosophy of negotiations,
barter and political alliances has left
about 600 white farmers on their
land.
Sustained by a belief that
things "will get better", after nearly 4,000
other white farmers were driven
off their land by the ZANU-PF government's
fast-track land redistribution
programme that started in 2000, these
diehards are overcoming the insecurity
that their farms can be taken in an
instant.
The trade-off for dairy
farmer Alan Geluck is downscaling of the Midlands
Province farm he acquired
in the 1970s: his dairy herd once roamed 5,000ha,
now it makes do with
1,000ha. "Most of my dairy cows were stolen during the
height of land
invasions, and much of the equipment was vandalised. My farm
was drastically
reduced to accommodate new settlers, who are growing maize
even though the
land is hardly suitable for crops."
Geluck is negotiating with some of
the province's "high-ranking" politicians
to relocate some of the new
farmers and reacquire some land. He said it was
a proposal that ruling party
officials were warming to because the resettled
farmers have not been
producing enough and the country is again facing food
shortages.
Most
of Zimbabwe's white farmers gave up hope and took their agricultural
skills
to Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, New Zealand,
Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia, but he has chosen to stay in Zimbabwe, the only
home he knows, with his son and daughter-in-law - all his other relatives
have made new homes in South Africa and Australia.
While Geluck has
found favour with the province's politicians, other farmers
are embroiled in
the politics of land. Thomas Beattie, farmer in Mashonaland
West Province,
is in a court tussle with the deputy minister of information,
Bright
Matonga.
Beattie claims that Matonga seized his workshop and farmhouse,
and harvested
soya beans and maize seed worth millions from his Chigwell
farm, after the
government carved up the land for Agricultural 2 (A2)
farmers. The A2 model
is for those with the financial means and agricultural
skills to maintain a
commercial farm.
It is one of the incidents in
the past month that the Commercial Farmers'
Union (CFU), which represents
white farmers, has blamed for a fresh wave of
farm disturbances.
"We
continue to be aware of the disruptions to farming and the appearance of
eviction notices, which some farmers have received in certain districts in
the country," the CFU said. "Despite assurances that these matters are being
dealt with, and that farmers should continue producing food for the nation,
we are aware that in certain areas of the country difficulties
remain."
In a speech this month to commemorate National Heroes' Day,
President Robert
Mugabe called for an end to farm invasions, saying they
were
counterproductive. But the government continues to run print media
adverts
announcing the acquisition of more farms from white
farmers.
After a conciliatory gesture by Denford Chimbwanda, chairman of
the
black-dominated Grain and Cereal Producers' Association, that "we can
learn
a lot from them [white farmers]", and a government at odds over
whether
white farmers should have farms returned, the CFU has been urging
"those
still farming, and those wishing to get back to farming ... [to]
apply for
A2 status as a matter of urgency".
Renson Gasela, former
secretary of agriculture for the opposition Movement
for Democratic Change
(MDC) party, said "those who are opposed to giving
support to the white
farmers are the ones who still want to grab their land,
while those who are
sympathetic to them, like [Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
governor] Gideon Gono,
realise that for agriculture to get back on its knees
they need them
back".
He said the remaining white farmers had abandoned their previously
combative
stance and adopted a new tactic. "They do not have a choice but to
appear
nice to the government, because they would easily be kicked out. What
I
noticed is that most of the farmers whose farms were not touched were
those
that were sympathetic to ZANU-PF or had won the trust of neighbouring
black
people."
Jo Stomberg, a maize farmer who managed to retain
700ha of an original
1,200ha farm in Mashonaland East Province, attributes
his survival as a
farmer to good relations with the local community. "When
the farm was
subdivided in 2003, there was a lot of tension between the new
settlers and
me. Even though some suspicion still remains, our relationship
is generally
cordial because I make sure that I help them both materially
and through
advice."
Reuters
Thu Aug 24, 2006 3:45 PM GMT
HARARE (Reuters) - Zimbabwe
is preparing for its key summer cropping season
but a lack of funding and a
scarcity of essential inputs may undermine
output, slashed in recent years
partly by disruptions linked to government
land reforms.
The southern
African country, a former regional breadbasket, has relied on
food imports
and donor aid since 2001 to supplement domestic output, which
fell sharply
due to drought and a controversial drive by President Robert
Mugabe to
forcibly distribute largely white-owned commercial farms among
blacks.
Critics say the often-chaotic programme resulted in poorly
equipped peasant
farmers failing to fully utilise the land, while some
members of the ruling
elite amassed multiple farms now lying
idle.
Local media reported on Thursday that three government ministers
told a
parliament committee the country had sufficient seed for the next
staple
maize crop but that a shortage of fertiliser and farmers' lack of
finance
were worries.
"The seed houses are ready...seed is already
being distributed in the market
(but) the fertiliser side is the biggest
challenge," Agriculture Minister
Joseph Made said in remarks broadcast on
state television, citing equipment
failure at one of the country's biggest
fertiliser manufacturers.
Made said this would force Zimbabwe, which has
suffered chronic foreign
currency shortages during an 8-year-old economic
recession, to import a
large portion of its fertiliser needs.
Water
and Infrastructure Development Minister Munacho Mutezo said a state
agency
that offers tillage to poor farmers for a nominal fee had been hit by
a
breakdown of equipment.
"We have not recapitalised (the agency) for a
long time. They have not been
buying equipment, they have also not been
adequately maintaining equipment
(because) they do not charge rates that
enable them to recover their costs,"
Mutezo said.
Mugabe's
government, which rejects charges that skewed policies including
the land
seizures have brought the agriculture-driven economy to its knees,
has set a
target of 2.4 million hectares of maize for the 2006/07 season.
But
farmers say the lack of inputs could be a major impediment.
"There are
many, many challenges. Farmers have been selling their produce
but when they
go to fertiliser companies, chemical companies, there is
nothing to buy,"
said Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers Union President Wilson
Nyabonde on state
television.
The government says the ailing agriculture sector is on a
recovery from a
five-year slump and has forecast 1.8 million tonnes of maize
from last
season which would largely meet domestic needs for the first time
since
2001.
But food agencies forecasts see a much smaller crop,
pointing to continued
maize imports mainly from neighbouring South Africa,
which Harare says are
meant to help build depleted strategic grain
reserves.
Mail and Guardian
Donwald Pressly | Cape Town, South Africa
24 August 2006 04:04
The Southern African Development
Community (SADC) held a closed
meeting of heads of State and foreign
ministers over the economic troubles
in member state Zimbabwe, South African
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Aziz Pahad said on
Thursday.
He was addressing a media briefing at Parliament --
beamed to
Pretoria -- and said simply: "The fact that they met is
important."
But the deputy minister divulged no further
details of the
meeting other than that it concerned "how [the] SADC could
help resolve the
economic situation."
Pahad noted that
the former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa
had been appointed the special
envoy to assist Zimbabwe and to deal with a
situation "that we all find
ourselves in".
He said the SADC process in trying to resolve
the Zimbabwe
economic plight will be driven by the current chair,
Lesotho.
At the conclusion of a two-day summit last Friday,
all but four
SADC heads of state signed a finance and investment protocol,
which aims to
transform the region into one that is able to do business with
itself and
the rest of the world through the harmonisation of tax and
banking laws.
The Sunday Times reported that Zimbabwe
President Robert Mugabe
was one of four not to sign the agreement. The
president was apparently
angered by the mention of his country as a
stumbling block to investment.
Lesotho's Pakalitha Mosisili
was reported as saying that Mugabe
was "not a young man" and suggested he
could be "slowing down" -- referring
to the fact that nothing should be read
into his early departure last week
from the conference.
SADC countries include Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic
of the
Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia.
The SADC is
headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana. -- I-Net Bridge
By
Tererai Karimakwenda
24 August 2006
On Friday the
International Office for Migration (IOM) and South
Africa's Labour Ministry
will inaugurate a new recruitment centre at
Beitbridge border post that they
say will help Zimbabweans to get jobs in
South Africa. It aims to reduce the
number of illegal immigrants in the
country. The centre will be manned by
officials from South Africa, Zimbabwe
and the International Office for
Migration.
But Zimbabweans have expressed concern at the criteria
for
qualification and at some of the procedural details. The South Africa
labour
department spokesman Mokgadi Pela was reported as saying the centre
would
help illegal Zimbabweans deported from South Africa to apply for work
documents before being sent back home, where they would wait for
government's
reply. Pela also specified that the centre would help those
seeking
employment in South Africa with legal documents, and that the
employers were
expected to be mostly farmers.
Mbiko Moyo of the
Mtwakazi Arts and Culture Project in South Africa
has had much experience
working with torture victims from Zimbabwe. He
expressed concern at the
involvement of the South African government, given
its attitude towards the
crisis in Zimbabwe so far. And he believes this may
be an attempt to stem
the tide of illegal refugees flooding across the
Limpopo and to monitor them
on behalf of the Zimbabwean authorities.
Moyo told us Thursday that
the centre will only process those who
already have visas, therefore the
most vulnerable Zimbabweans will not get
help. Moyo also said the fact that
there is a waiting period leaves room for
Zimbabwean authorities to
victimise anyone who has applied to leave the
country. Moyo did however add
that the only benefit would be that it will
help reduce abuses by South
African farmers looking for cheap labour.
The international group
Human Rights Watch released a damning report
earlier this month saying
Zimbabweans were not being paid the minimum wage
and were suffering numerous
abuses in South Africa. The report also
estimated that between 1.2 million
and 3 million Zimbabweans were living in
South Africa. Moyo said not all of
these people can be employed on the farms
and they need a different type of
assistance altogether, but he did agree
the centre should be a help in
reducing employer abuse.
SW Radio Africa Zimbabwe news
SABC
August 24, 2006,
18:15
It has been two years since Zimbabwe helped foil an attempted coup
de etat
in Equatorial Guinea after arresting about 60 suspected mercenaries
in
Zimbabwe aboard a chartered plane enroute to the country's capital
Malabo.
That arrest now seems to be paying dividends to Zimbabwean business
people.
Equatorial Guinea, a previously poor West African country, is now
among the
world's wealthy nations - thanks to the discovery of oil hardly a
decade
ago. With proceeds from oil, the country is transforming its
infrastructure.
Zimbabwean business people are being promised an open cheque
on some of
these development projects.
Shingi Munyeza, the chief
executive officer of ZimSun, says: "When you look
at the market - it is a
developing economy. Yet it is oil rich and therefore
the potential for it to
develop itself is there. We see that whatever we are
doing, we have to look
at the potential for economic growth." Munyeza is the
CEO of Zimbabwe's
largest hotel group - Zimsun.
President impresed with Zim hotels
After
being impressed with one of Zimsun's hotels in Victoria Fall during a
recent
visit, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, the Equatorial Guinea
president, has
contracted the Zimbabwean company to build a similar hotel in
his country. A
recent visit by Zimbabwean businessmen into Equatorial Guinea
is being seen
as cementing the business ties between Harare and Malabo.
Obert Mpofu, the
Zimbabwean minister of industry and international trade,
says: "There is no
doubt opportunities are available in terms of trade and
investment."
Had it not been for the arrest of the suspected
mercenaries, these two
countries might never have found anything in common.
A video featuring the
suspected mastermind of the foiled coup plot shown at
the exhibition in
Equatorial Guinea even had its president
glued.
Theodore Nguema Mbasogo, the president of Equatorial Guinea, says:
"We are
interested in Zimbabwean companies coming here and investing,
setting up
factories and industries." Several other companies are already
tying up
investments in agriculture, manufacturing and civil
construction.
IOL
Basildon
Peta
August 24 2006 at 12:11PM
There is outrage in
Zimbabwe after President Robert Mugabe's
government announced it had ordered
six more K-8 Chinese fighter jets worth
$141-million (R987-million) to equip
the army.
The order comes at a time when the country is
experiencing a severe
economic difficulties.
The government
ordered the first six Chinese fighter jets and other
military equipment in
2004 and took delivery early last year.
The first acquisition was
widely condemned because it came at a time
when nearly half the population
was being fed on donor handouts.
But Zimbabweans expressed even
more outrage on Wednesday after
Secretary for Defence Trust Maposa made the
announcement to a parliamentary
committee.
The
Movement for Democratic Change said the purchase proved Mugabe was
"hell-bent on turning Zimbabwe into a securocracy or military
state".
The latest purchase was not only indicative of the
government's skewed
priorities, but it exemplified the behaviour of a
"regime afraid of its own
people".
This article was
originally published on page 5 of The Mercury on
August 24, 2006
Engineering News
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zimbabwe now needs at least $3,6-billion ($900-trillion at the ruling
exchange rate) to fully develop its sagging electricity generation capacity
ahead of the power shortages anticipated next year.
The money
is needed to finance four projects namely; Hwange Power
Station (HPS),
Kariba South Power Station, Gokwe North and Batoka Gorge
along the Zambezi
River whose unrealised potential can rescue the country
from looming power
outages.
HPS will take the lion's share of $600-million, Kariba
($200-million),
Batoka Gorge ($2,4-billion) with Gokwe North taking the
remaining
$1,4-million.
ZESA Holdings, the country's power
utility, has been appealing for
help to stave off the anticipated shortages
without much success.
Of late, ZESA has taken its begging bowl to
China and Iran, considered
friendly capital markets, in view of Zimbabwe's
strained relations with
Western countries which used to fund such
projects.
Previous efforts to rope in hard-currency-rich external
partners fell
through owing to political interference, red tape and the
compounding
country risk profile that is unnerving foreign
investors.
Analysts this week said the contentious electricity
tariff regime,
which for far too long has remained sub-economic, might need
to be adjusted
if Zimbabwe is to entertain any hopes of attracting foreign
capital.
Engineer Munyaradzi Munodawafa, principal director in the
Energy
Ministry told The Financial Gazette this week that there is need for
players
in the energy sector to complement government's
efforts.
"Next year, Zimbabwe will require about 2 200 megawatts of
electricity
to be in the safe zone of the looming crisis," he said. "There
are four
projects that require funding so that we are assured of safety come
2007.
There is, however, need for the government and stakeholders in the
energy
sector to come together and look for ways in which these funds could
be made
available so that the projects can come on board," he
added.
A number of companies are said to be interested in investing
in power
generation but they must meet conditions set by the Zimbabwe
Electricity
Regulating Commission.
Two companies based in
Rusitu Valley and in Triangle have so far been
granted licenses by the
commission amid indications that several other
applications are to be
considered.
Munodawafa said the government is also encouraging
private players who
wish to establish quick or smaller stations to augment
current efforts to
avert the shortage of power to come on
board.
"South Africa, Zambia, Namibia, Mozambique are still in the
process of
establishing partnerships and alliances with independent or
private players
in their countries.
"As a country we are better
off than those countries because we
already have a number of projects
running while we consider other projects
that are likely to come on board,"
said Munodawafa.
IPS News
Thalif
Deen
STOCKHOLM, Aug 24 (IPS) - The U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP)
believes
that the growing environmental degradation of Africa is perhaps
most starkly
reflected in satellite images beamed from the skies.
And
so, the Nairobi-based U.N. agency introduced a new atlas at an
international
water conference here which shows "the dramatic and damaging"
environmental
changes sweeping across the beleaguered African continent.
"I hope the
(satellite) images in the atlas will sound a warning around the
world that,
if we are to overcome poverty and meet internationally agreed
development
goals by 2015, the sustainable management of Africa's lakes must
be part of
the equation," says Achim Steiner, the recently-appointed
executive director
of UNEP.
"Otherwise," he warns, "we face increasing tensions and
instability as
rising populations compete for life's most precious of
precious resources."
These resources -- most of them currently under
siege -- include Africa's
river basins, fresh water lakes, forests, coastal
lagoons and wildlife
preserves.
The atlas, released during "World
Water Week" concluding Saturday, presents
contrasting satellite images of a
seemingly unblemished Africa of the past
few decades against a contemporary
continent under environmental assault.
"The rapid shrinking of Lake
Songor in Ghana, partly as a result of
intensive salt production, and the
extraordinary changes in the Zambezi
River system as a result of the
building of the Cabora Bassa Dam sit beside
more familiar images of the near
90 percent shrinkage of Lake Chad," UNEP
said.
According to the U.N.
agency, Lake Songor emerges "as one of the most
dramatic visual changes in
the atlas." Described as a brackish coastal
lagoon in Ghana, the lake is
home to fish and globally threatened turtles,
as well as a vast bird
population.
In December 1990, the lake appears as a solid blue mass of
water some 74
square kilometres in size. But by December 2000, the water
body has been
reduced to "a pale shadow of its former self."
The
publication, titled "Africa's Lakes: Atlas of our Changing Environment",
includes satellite images that portray falling water levels of Lake
Victoria, described as Africa's largest freshwater lake and which is
currently about a metre lower than it was in the early 1990s.
With
some 30 million people living around it, Lake Victoria supports some of
the
densest and one of the world's poorest populations.
But according to
UNEP, about 150,000 square kilometres of land, equal to
25,000 football
pitches, have been affected by soil degradation, of which 13
percent has
been severely degraded.
The atlas also shows the extensive deforestation
around Lake Nakuru in
Kenya -- "some natural, some manmade which can only be
truly appreciated
from space." UNEP says the lake has declined in area: from
about 43
kilometres to 40 in 2000.
The statistics continue at an
alarming rate: Niger has lost more than 80
percent of its freshwater
wetlands over the past two decades.
And close to 90 percent of water in
Africa is used in agriculture, of which
40 to 60 percent is lost to seepage
and evaporation, according to UNEP.
Additionally, satellites images from
1995 and 2001 indicate that the green
swirls of hyacinth have disappeared
from many of the bays in Uganda.
Meanwhile, a new study titled
"Hydropolitical Vulnerability and Resilience
along International Waters in
Africa", says rainfall and river flows in
Africa have declined steadily over
the past 30 years. This is partly due to
higher evaporation rates caused by
climate change.
"Current water use patterns in the Volta River Basin (in
West Africa) have
already stretched the available resources almost to their
limits, and it
will be increasingly difficult to satisfy additional
demands," says the
report prepared jointly by UNEP and the University of
Oregon in the United
States.
With the sustainability of the Volta
Basin under threat, there is urgent
need for basin states to cooperate more
closely to jointly manage the
basin's water resources. The basin is shared
by six countries: Benin,
Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali and
Togo.
The report says that much more needs to be done to beef up legal
agreements
and treaties among African nations in order to reduce tensions
and avoid
instability in the future.
A separate study on
"Transboundary Water Management" by the Bonn
International Centre for
Conversion says that several international river
basins in southern Africa
are also approaching the point of closure,
"meaning that no more water is
left to be allocated to human use, that all
the water of the system is
already utilised."
The four most developed nations in the region --
Botswana, Namibia, South
Africa and Zimbabwe -- "are also facing the
greatest scarcity of water."
"They all share international river basins
with other states, and they all
face significant limitations to their future
economic prospects as a result
of looming water shortages." (END/2006)
Zimbabwejournalists.com
By a Correspondent
Bristol-Laywers and
Zimbabwe Community leaders in Bristol are making
frantic efforts to stop the
removal of Zimbabwean asylum seeker Mgcini
Silongwe who is facing
deportation to his home country today.
The 39 year-old man,
detained at Kempsfield detention Centre in Oxford
told the
Zimbabwejournalists.com that he faces being flown back tonight.
"I'm booked with the Britsih Airwars flight sheduled for Zimbabwe
tonight at
19:20pm."
Silongwe's sister, brother and uncle stay in
England.
"Its hard I'm being forced to go back to a country where there
is
noone who will look after me considering my severe health problems. All
my
relatives who were looking after me stay in UK."
Silongwe
was picked on 3 August when he went for his usual signing at
Trinity Centre
in Bristol.
In a statement to the Home Office, the Bristol Zimbabwe
Association
said: "Silongwe was deeply involved with the local community in
Bristol.
"Returning Silongwe to Zimbabwe would be to condemn him to
almost
certain violence and persecution, especially since his health
condition is
not good and all of his immediate relatives who can provide him
with support
now live in UK. I would urge you to respect his human right to
life and
liberty and grant him leave to remain."
His close
friend could only say: "Now he's going back to nothing."
The Home
Office resumed deportations of failed Zimbabwean asylum
seekers after a
tribunal judge ruled they would not automatically face
persecution. Justice
Henry Hodge said asylum-seekers linked to Zimbabwean
opposition parties were
most likely to face ill-treatment.
Deportations were halted in 2005
after the Asylum and Immigration
Tribunal (AIT) ruled Zimbabwe was unsafe
for all failed asylum seekers.
But in April the High Court ordered
the AIT to reconsider its
decision.
Approximately 300 Zimbabweans
were returned to the country, not all
forcibly, before the AIT effectively
halted all removals last October.
New Zimbabwe
By Gabriel Chaibva
Last updated: 08/24/2006
19:56:24
FOLLOWING the historic congress of the MDC held in February 2006,
which saw
the election of President Arthur G.O. Mutambara as the President
of our
party, the National Council has met on more than two occasions to map
out
strategies for the future.
The President's call for reunification
of all democratic forces in Zimbabwe
was unanimously adopted by the supreme
policy making body, the National
Council and unity has been our first
prize.
We believe that the problems leading to October 12, 2005, were
surmountable.
Firstly, we believed that any sensible Zimbabwean politician
would
eventually come to terms with the harsh reality that there is no
alternative
to elections. And we are happy that others have now realized
that whatever
they do is intended to persuade the governing party to the
negotiating
table, and not as a means to assume power.
Secondly we
believed that certain underlying matters leading to the October
debacle can
easily be resolved by merely reflecting on the founding values
and
principles of the party; non-violence, respect to established rules and
regulations of the party as enshrined in the constitution, respect and
acceptance of the constitution as supreme, respect of collective decision
making process, and respect for divergent views.
We are happy that in
the past months there has been a refocus, redefinition
of the nature,
substance and content of the change we desire. Thirdly, we
believed that
there shall be a realization that the MDC is a people driven
organization
which puts greater emphasis on national interest over personal
ego and
ambitions of individuals.
Today we find reason to celebrate in that all
our predictions have
eventuated and for these reasons, the National Council
endorsed unanimously
the principle of unity. Placing national interest over
personal desires, the
National Council further endorsed and adopted the
principle that all of us
be prepared to forgo whatever claim to leadership
we have, to pave way for
unity of all democratic forces.
The MDC is
governed by the doctrine of collective decision-making and nobody
can make
unilateral decisions and nobody can override resolutions adopted by
National
Council in its assembly. It is therefore totally malicious, false
and simply
untrue for anyone to suggest that the Secretary General Professor
Ncube or
any other officer of the party, is against unity and is at variance
with the
positions adopted by Council. It is pure mischief that certain
sections of
the media, have resorted to parade products of their fictitious
and
imaginative minds as fact.
In pursuing their devilish agenda, certain
sections of the media, quoting
unnamed hypothetical, imaginary and faceless
"sources" continue to suggest
that there exists a rift in the rank and file
of our leadership. It is our
view that purveyors of such falsehoods are
certainly scared of the prospects
of unity of all democratic forces in
Zimbabwe. The references made to
Professor Ncube, quoting his statement out
of context in calculated, vulgar
terms are attempts at attacking his
personal integrity and standing as an
individual.
We dismiss any such
suggestions that Professor Ncube is anti-unity, with the
contempt it
deserves. I put it on record, for the avoidance of doubt, that
the Secretary
General Professor Ncube, is in fact, an ardent supporter and a
relentless
advocator for unity, a fact we find hard to reconcile with the
demonic
utterances by merchants of doom and gloom. I put it further on
record that
it is delusional and dreadful wishful thinking that President
Mutambara will
join any other political grouping in the context of unity!
Let there be no
confusion about the need for unity of all democratic forces
and the
suggestion of the President " defecting" as has been peddled by some
people.
Any discussions around the subject of Unity shall remain
confidential until
such time it may be necessary to make statements in that
regard. There are
NO disagreements between the leadership of the party on
this very important
issue of unity and we are all in total unison with the
President and
overtures he makes directed at achieving that.
Gabriel
Chaibva is the Secretary for Information and Publicity for a faction
of the
MDC led by Arthur Mutambara
New Zimbabwe
By Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng
Last updated: 08/24/2006
19:08:28
THE PURPOSE OF THE WORK
THE Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC), the main opposition political
party in Zimbabwe, is
characterised by theoretical and practical weaknesses.
It has not waged a
decisive war against these weaknesses in its struggle for
state political
power. It is characterised by a profound failure to
understand and recognise
the importance of the primacy of internal factors
over the external factors
either in the resolution or the maintenance of
Zimbabwe's socio-political
and economic problems.
Its theoretical and practical weaknesses serve as
its lessons in its
struggle for state political power. To do justice to its
struggle for
political power, it must wage a decisive war against these
weaknesses. These
weaknesses are key challenges it is facing in its struggle
to defeat the
ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic
Front (ZANU - PF).
The MDC does not in practice do justice to its
position that the ruling
party has been using violent or repressive measures
and manipulating and
rigging elections so as to win them. The fact that it
has been maintaining
this position is such that if it is sincere in
maintaining it and wanted to
do justice to it in practice, it should have
decided and implemented
decision to go beyond its parliamentary opposition
tactics or electoral,
constitutional route.
One of the key questions
is whether it has ever raised the question as to
whether it was possible for
the ruling party to use violent or repressive
measures and manipulate and
rig elections so as to win them. Related to this
question is another key
question as to whether if it was convinced that it
was possible or obvious
that the ruling party was going to use violence,
repression particularly
against itself and manipulate and rig elections so
as to win them what was
its proposed programme of action against these
measures.
Our work
focuses on the MDC's profound failure to understand and recognise
the
importance of the primacy of internal factors over the external factors
in
the resolution of Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic problems.
Directly
related to this failure, is the fact that the MDC has not
recognised in
theory and practice the strategic importance of mobilising for
political,
economic and ideological hegemony and has been unable to provide
comprehensive theoretical and practical alternatives to the ruling party as
prerequisites to the realisation of its objective to be the ruling party. It
has refused to fundamentally transform itself to serve as the social agent
for change.
This work excludes the MDC faction led by Professor
Arthur Mutambara.
Mutambara and Morgan Tsvangirai have not yet effectively
articulated
political and policy programmes which constitute the qualitative
leap
forward in the struggle for the resolution of Zimbabwe's problems. They
have
not yet answered the question as to what is to be done in formulating,
adopting and implementing the appropriate tactics for achieving state
political power so as to effect socio-political and economic change. They
have not yet convinced the masses of the people of Zimbabwe that theirs is
the realisation of changes in power relations in socio-political, economic
and institutional terrains and in the material and non-material aspects of
their individual and collective life conditions. Tsvangirai still defends
the MDC's Restart: Our Path to Social Justice, the economic programme for
Reconstruction, Stabilisation, Recovery and Transformation, which is not
theoretically exciting and which cannot be regarded by the considerable
number of the people of Zimbabwe as their proud theoretical and ideological
national product in their struggle for the resolution of their
problems.
INTRODUCTION
The MDC is the historical child of
Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic
problems. It has proved that it is
incapable of solving these problems which
were responsible for its coming
into existence. Zimbabwe adopted and
implemented the structural adjustment
programme in the 1990s. It
substantially reversed its socio-economic
achievements made since political
independence. The structural adjustment
programme required the state to,
among others, reduce the seize of the civil
service, subsidies to
parastatals and social and economic services. The
state directed its
priorities at trade liberalisation, export promotion,
privatization of many
of its assets and investment promotion.
The
substantial decline in the further development and output of
manufacturing
industry, substantial increase in imports and decline in
exports, decline in
wages, increase in unemployment and the cost of food,
health care, transport
and education, and the unprecedented inability of the
majority of households
to afford the basic necessities such as food,
clothing, shelter and
transport were some of the consequences of the
structural adjustment
programme. Workers, poor people and professionals were
negatively affected
by these socio-economic problems. These socio-economic
problems Zimbabwe
faced in the 1990s not only led to strikes and
demonstrations by the masses
of the people, but also the alliance consisting
of various social forces and
organisations which led to the formation of the
MDC.2
The MDC became
the beneficiary of these socio-economic problems in the 1990s
and the early
2000s, demands by popular social forces and organisations for
the state to
solve them and the failure by the state to solve them. They are
some of the
key reasons behind its achievements in the 2000 and 2002
elections. Its
achievements in these elections have been substantially
reversed. They have
not been consolidated since the 2002 presidential
elections. Since 2003 the
MDC failed to prove that it is politically capable
of solving Zimbabwe's
socio-economic problems. It has failed to prove that
it is capable to
provide the alternative political administrative of the
society. As this
work demonstrates it has refused to accept strategic advice
it has been
provided with.
Munyaradzi Gwisai, its former Member of Parliament, and
his colleagues
provided it with the strategic advice in 2001. Gwisai
maintains that leaders
of the International Socialist Organisation in 2001
told the MDC leaders
that "unless they immediately changed their strategy of
opposing the land
reform programme and hanging on the aprons of white
farmers, capitalists,
the West and the International Monetary Fund and
instead adopt
anti-neo-liberal anti-imperialist stance they would be buried
in future
elections even without violence."3 The MDC has refused to accept
this
strategic advice and accordingly formulate and implement appropriate
tactics.
The MDC has not forged working relations with progressive
political parties
and civil society organisations throughout the Southern
African region,
African continent and beyond. Its closer working relations
with conservative
and moderate political parties, civil society
organisations which support it
politically, morally and financially has
prevented it from forging working
relations with progressive political
parties and civil society organisations
throughout the Southern African
region, African continent and beyond. It has
also prevented it from adopting
and implementing viable or progressive
strategies and tactics as well as
direct programmes of actions such as mass
action. Its socio-economic
policies are not fundamentally different from
those of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank - multilateral
organisations whose primary
task is to advance the interests of
neo-colonialism and imperialism. Its
views of democracy and political good
governance are fundamentally not
different from those of the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
The World Bank's democracy and political
good governance principles shape
its position on democracy and political
good governance.4 Its political
platform includes many of demands of
democracy and political good governance
defined by the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank.5
The
MDC lacks viable or progressive strategy and tactics and programme of
action
promoting and advancing popular national demands. It has refused to
learn a
lesson provided by both reactionary and revolutionary forces
throughout the
world. This lesson is the primacy of internal factors over
external factors
in any political, economic and ideological struggle. This
reality means that
the responsibility either to solve or to maintain
socio-political and
economic problems in any particular country lies
internally within it, not
externally outside it. This means that it lies on
the shoulders of its
people, not on the shoulders of the people of other
countries.
CRITICISM OF THE MDC AS ITS ADVICE
The MDC has been
advised by a considerable number of individuals and
organisations, including
its supporters, internally in Zimbabwe and
externally. This advice has been
offered to the MDC through criticism of its
theoretical and practical
weaknesses. It rejected this advice and, in the
process, refused to wage a
decisive war against these weaknesses in its
struggle for state political
power.
Barney Mthombothi maintains the position that the MDC has not yet
learned
this lesson or the primacy of internal factors over external factors
either
in the resolution or in the maintenance of socio-political and
economic
problems. He maintains this position in his article on why "Mugabe
still
wields power."6 He maintains that Tsvangirai's "diplomatic shuttle"
across
Southern Africa in the late 2004 was "a waste of time." His point is
that
there was "nothing he said in person to the leaders" of Southern Africa
that
"could not have been relayed down a telephone line" and that "the trip"
was
"more about Tsvangirai - an attempt at enhancing his status, his own
stature - than enlightening people on the current situation in
Zimbabwe."
The importance of the trip is that it exposed or highlighted
"the
shortcomings of the struggle" led by the MDC against the ruling party.
Instead of mobilising its supporters, the MDC "has been wasting time on
fervent pleas to the international community." Tsvangirai and his colleagues
should recognise the reality in practice that the masses of the people of
Zimbabwe are "the fount of their credibility, legitimacy, power and
authority" and that when "the masses are properly mobilised no autocrat, no
matter how powerful or repressive, can rule them against their will for any
length of time." He concludes that the MDC's "tactic so far has been to
appeal for international assistance in the form of sanctions and boycotts
without a concomitant intensive mobilisation of the masses within the
country" and that this tactic is incorrect in that it fails to come to grips
with the reality that the "home front is the theatre, the crucible, of the
struggle" or that the "engine of the opposition is in Zimbabwe, not
outside"7
the country.
The position articulated by Mthombothi is
basically advice to the MDC. The
point is that, as Alex T. Magaisa, a
Zimbabwean lawyer, maintains, the MDC
has "became misdirected in its
strategy and approach to the issues facing
the country." It has "found
itself between two constituencies - on the one
hand, the people of Zimbabwe
and secondly the international community." The
consequence of this
development is that it became a "captured" movement -
responding more to the
demands and concerns of the international community
and less to the daily
concerns of the local people. It became distant and
its leaders were more
interested in flying to Western capitals than they
were prepared to rally
the masses in the townships and the rural areas -
except during the
pre-election phases during which conditions were
manipulated to cause
maximum difficulty for the MDC.
In the end the MDC was not visible beyond
the urban areas. Yet Mugabe
plotted and repeatedly dismissed the MDC as an
instrument for Western
imperialism. . What did the MDC do to avert that
impression of being a
stooge for the West? Nothing, besides shallow media
denials that it was not.
Worse, perhaps drawing comfort from the support it
received as a
pro-democracy movement the MDC publicly displayed its
friendship with the
Western powers. Unsurprisingly, its folly the leadership
ended up eating
from the same plate with the "consultant", the notorious Ari
Ben Menashe,
who turned out to be Mugabe's spy.8
Magaisa further
maintains that the MDC's "biggest problem" is that it "seems
to have lost
focus on the primary reasons for its emergence in 1999 and the
key points of
challenge against Zanu PF that really matter to the people" of
the country.
This issue is directly related to its being the movement
"captured" by "the
international community." Instead of "focusing on the
wider primary reasons
for people's disgruntlement" against the ruling party,
it has became
"obsessed with the matter of "human rights." It has reduced
Zimbabwe's
problems to "the human rights paradigm" to such an extent that it
has
"marginalised" the "key challenges against the government" which it
discusses "on a "by the way" basis."9 Its obsession with human rights which
led it to base its "Mugabe must go" strategy has led it to "universalise"
Zimbabwe's problems and to find the issue that is "universal and affects
everyone" within itself. It has served it in managing contradictory and
antagonistic interests and positions it represents. It has also served it in
its struggle to win support from developed countries particularly those
which have made the promotion of human rights and the regime change the
integral part of their foreign policy. This obsession with human rights has
"also meant lost opportunities to challenge Mugabe on key areas that
directly affect people on the ground - education, health, transport,
employment, development, etc. "10
It is of strategic importance to
base the strategy on "issues that resonate
in the local context" or to put
at the forefront issues which are "uppermost
in the mind of the people, and
foremost in their hearts." Unless the MDC
refocuses its "energy" on these
issues, Magaisa concludes that it will
continue to look to the international
community - which frankly has more
interests elsewhere and will continue to
shout against Mugabe, but
ultimately do nothing, but all the while, their
businesses are still doing
business in Zimbabwe.11
Magaisa's position
that the MDC should base its strategy not on issues which
"universalise"
Zimbabwe's problems and on the issue which is "universal and
affects
everyone" within itself, but on issues which advance the interests
of the
masses of Zimbabwe is a strategic advice to the MDC. It is supportive
of the
reality that the democratisation struggle in Zimbabwe entails the
transformation of the material conditions of the masses of the people in
line with the realisation of their strategic and tactical interests. The
democratisation struggle is not only about respect for the rule of law,
promotion and protection of human rights, accountability, transparency, a
free flow of information and separation of powers between executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government. The view of democratisation
process only or largely in legal and constitutional terms runs the danger of
masking socio-political and economic interests in favour of the few within
the society. It is in this context that we can fully understand the
strategic importance of Amilcar Cabral's position that we
must:
Always bear in mind that the people are not fighting for ideas, for
things
in anyone's head. They are fighting to win material benefits, to live
better
and in peace, to see their lives go forward, to guarantee the future
of
their children.12
Zvakwana Sokwanele, a civic action support
group, responding to why the MDC
has not adopted and implemented viable
strategies in response to the
announcement of the date of holding the 31
March 2005 elections and
immediately after announcement of the results of
elections pointed out that
it has "shown a clear lack of leadership in
putting" viable "different
strategies" to its "benefactors" and "grassroots
supporters" and that its
leaders "seem to be as confused as
ever."13
Quoting Pius Wakatama that "as a people's movement, the MDC
should forget
the orthodox niceties of professional political conduct with
its feigned
diplomacy, tactics, gimmicks and meaningless political
correctness" and that
its "actions should only be shaped in response to the
cries of those in
bondage,"14 Zvakwana Sokwanele in its 20 April 2005
message to the MDC
leadership, maintained that the MDC should have embarked
upon a programme of
action which includes the use of mass actions,
especially strikes against
the state, the massive mobilisation of the civil
society organisations,
especially the churches to defy the ruling party
prohibitions, the staging
of peaceful protests to greatly embarrass the
government at international
and national high profile forums, the use of
targeted boycotts of goods and
services provided by leaders of the ruling
party, and the exposure of those
who have enormously benefited from Mugabe's
personal patronage, and at
expense of the people.15 The MDC has not embarked
upon the programme of
action which includes these
activities.
Zvakwana/Sokwanele maintains that if the MDC leadership
demonstrates that it
understand the dynamics of the Zimbabwean national
situation and is willing
to change its tactics in order to effectively
challenge and confront the
state, it will win the decisive support from the
majority of Zimbabweans. If
it does not change its tactics or delays too
long in changing its tactics,
it will risk losing its support substantially
within a short period of time.
If this happens, "the centre of resistance to
the Mugabe regime will
undoubtedly shift elsewhere." Its position that "the
party of change must
now show itself flexible enough to change its own
central strategy" and that
if it "fails to do so, and rapidly, we believe it
will become irrelevant to
the new form of political contest that is taking
shape in Zimbabwe" is a
strategic advice to the MDC that it "must adapt or
die."16
The MDC has refused to adapt. It has failed to adequately respond
to the
ruling party's view of Zimbabwe's problems. The ruling party views
Zimbabwe's
problems from the national level to the regional and continental
levels as
the Pan-African struggle against imperialist domination and
exploitation. It
has so far not recognised the fundamental need to have a
viable, progressive
national, regional, continental and international
strategy and tactics.
Despite the fact that it is the political party in the
former settler
colonial country, it has not yet articulated a clear position
on race
relations, North-South relations, redistribution of resources and
the
continental and international pan-African agenda. These are some of the
key
issues which should be addressed clearly by the serious opposition party
in
its struggle for state political power in a former settler colony such as
Zimbabwe.
The International Crisis Group supports this reality in its
report on
Zimbabwe after the 2005 elections and in its recommendations on
what should
be done by internal and external interested parties in the
resolution of its
problems. It recommended that the MDC should develop a
clear position on the
best, effective way to exert pressure upon the
government, revitalise
tactical and strategic alliances and working
relations with civil society
and other social forces, renew its leadership
and structures by holding
elections, develop viable alternatives programmes
on the socio-political and
economic issues affecting the people of the
country and rebuild external
relations, especially with Southern African
government and the African
Union.17
Critics of the ruling party
including some MDC members maintain that Morgan
Tsvangirai does not have the
intellectual capacity to lead effective
opposition party particularly given
the fact that it is challenging
hegemonic party which has been in power
since 1980 and whose intellectuals
have been providing it with enormous
intellectual capacity and resources in
its struggle for continued exercise
of state political power. They maintain
that he is no match for Robert
Mugabe in terms of intellectual capacity and
inspiring members and
supporters of their respective political parties. The
point is that he is
not a shrewd leader. He lacks "a degree of political
imagination and
ruthlessness."18 Africa Confidential has been consistent in
highlighting
Tsvangirai's profound lack of shrewd leadership qualities. In
2000
Tsvangirai made a crucial political mistake when he allowed
international
media to record white farmers handing over cheques to him.
These were the
same farmers who were practically against the national
liberation struggle.
The film made him appear either hungry for money or
"naïve." Mugabe's
advisors used the incident in a propaganda war that
presented the MDC is the
servant of the white minority and Britain.19
Tsvangirai's association with
these farmers, many of them soldiers of the
Rhodesian army which fought
against national liberation struggle, isolated
him from progressive people
nationally and internationally.20 Africa
Confidential and Newton Kanhema,
Zimbabwean journalist, agree that
Tsvangirai profoundly lacks shrewd
leadership qualities.
Kanhema maintains the position that Tsvangirai and
his advisers do not
constitute leadership material for Zimbabwe.
Tsvangirai's position on the
land question, which is popular among Africans
of the country, is not clear.
He has not articulated a clear, feasible plan
to solve Zimbabwe's economic
problems. His contribution to the debate on how
best to solve Zimbabwe's
economic problems has been his position that the
economic situation will get
better once Mugabe is no longer in power.
Instead of building alliances or
working relations with leaders of Southern
Africa, he has "elected to insult
them and, at the same time, court favour
with Western leaders." His way of
dealing with African leaders such as
President Thabo Mbeki and President
Olusegun Obasanjo. This is not the best
way to "win friends and influence
people, let alone get support" in the
struggle for state political power.21
THE MDC'S INHERITANCE OF THE
INCORRECT STRATEGY
The MDC inherited the position that solution to
Zimbabwe's problems lies on
the shoulders of leaders of African countries,
not on the people of Zimbabwe
from developed countries. Developed countries
and their supporters regarded
the need for political reform as a solution to
what they regarded as the
problem. President Mugabe was viewed as the
problem to this solution. This
proposed solution to Zimbabwe's problems was
best and briefly articulated in
their "Mugabe must go" demand. They hoped
that Tsvangirai would defeat
Mugabe in the 2002 presidential elections.
Mugabe defeated Tsvangirai in the
elections. They regarded elections not as
free and fair and the Zimbabwean
government as illegitimate. They embarked
upon various programmes of action
to isolate the Zimbabwean government
throughout the world.
They regard Mugabe as authoritarian, corrupt and
dictator who has been
stealing elections since the MDC posed a challenge to
his rule in the 2000
elections. Mugabe is regarded as a threat to the
socio-political and
economic development and progress not only of his
country and the Southern
African region, but also of the whole African
continent as well as Africa's
initiatives such as the New Partnership for
Africa's Development. Leaders of
developed countries have been exerting
pressure upon leaders of Southern
African countries to join them in
condemning Mugabe. They have been
demanding that South Africa must play a
leading role in acting against
Mugabe for what they regard as his violations
of human rights in Zimbabwe.
Robert Rotberg's article, "Dictatorship and
Decay: Only Mbeki can rescue
Zimbabwe"22 is the most advanced representative
of the position that the
solution to Zimbabwe's socio-political and economic
problems including the
issue of removing Mugabe from power is the
responsibility of President Mbeki
and other African leaders, not the people
of Zimbabwe. One of the key issues
central to this view is the profound
failure to view the Zimbabwean
situation beyond Mugabe. This view has helped
to marginalise the MDC in its
efforts to provide the solution to Zimbabwea's
problems. These are key
issues charactering the MDC's "Mugabe must go"
strategy.
Some supporters of the MDC have been misleading it in their
position that
Zimbabwe's problems are issues to be solved by leaders of
Southern African,
not by the people of Zimbabwe. Roger Bate is one of these
supporters. He
maintains the position that "pressure must be brought to
bear" on Zimbabwe's
Southern African Development Community neighbours to
"enforce the agreed
election protocols or they, and not just Zimbabwe,
should face the
withdrawal of aid, trade deals, and other United States
largesse."23 He
further maintains that:
Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice .Must convince SADC leaders that United
States aid,
military support, and other diplomatic favors such as trade
deals hinge on
their solving the problem on their doorstep. They must
believe that unless
they enforce the election protocols agreed by Mugabe
[SADC Principles and
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections], the United
States will withdraw
support for the region.24
The fact that the MDC has put this article on
its website is supportive of
the fact that it agrees with this incorrect
position that the solution to
Zimbabwe's problems lies on the shoulders of
the leaders of Southern Africa,
not on the shoulders of the people of
Zimbabwe under its leadership. Another
issue is the way it has been
criticising leaders of African countries for
their alleged support for
Mugabe and the ruling party. The way it has been
criticising leaders of
African countries particularly of Southern Africa is
such that it is of the
view that it is their responsibility to solve
Zimbabwe's problems, not only
to support the people of Zimbabwe in solving
their country's problems. Alex
Magaisa, a Zimbabwean lawyer, maintains that
the MDC has been "hoping that
the solution" to Zimbabwe's problems "would
come from outside" the country
"and that in the scheme of things, the people
of Zimbabwe were powerless and
had no role to play beyond participation in a
clearly manipulated electoral
process."25
The responsibility to exert pressure upon Mugabe necessary
for him to step
down as the president of Zimbabwe lies with the people of
Zimbabwe, not with
the leaders of African countries. This is contrary to the
position of the
MDC that this responsibility lies with the leaders of
African countries.
This position is maintained by its supporters internally
in Zimbabwe and
externally outside Zimbabwe. It is interesting to note that
it does not
maintain that this responsibility lies also with leaders of
developed
countries. This reality is supportive of the position that this
incorrect
position is a means of leaders of developed countries to use
African
countries particularly South Africa to play a leading role to
achieve their
objective in Zimbabwe.
This position and attempts by
developed countries to use African countries
to achieve their objective in
Zimbabwe have helped the leadership of the
ruling party in its position that
the MDC is a tool of imperialist powers to
achieve their interests in
Zimbabwe. They have supported the ruling party in
its position that the MDC
is a tool of imperialist powers, particularly
Britain in its intention to
recolonise Zimbabwe.26 The Herald, the newspaper
controlled by the
Zimbabwean state, quoting extensively from articles which
appeared in the
London press and from subsequent speeches by Tony Blair,
British Prime
Minister, articulated the state's position as follows:
In order to
safeguard the interests of their kith and kin in the country,
the British
and Scandinavian countries rallied behind the formation of the
opposition
MDC. Their intention was to install a puppet government willing
to bend to
their colonial designs and adventures . However, soon . the
British started
showing their real colours by advocating sanctions against
Zimbabwe for
alleged human rights abuses. But realising the hideous
intentions of the
British, countries in the Southern African Development
Community ad the
African Union supported Zimbabwe by saying that land was at
the core of the
problems in the countries . It is not surprising to note
that Tanzania,
Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Nigeria and South Africa have
all refused to
succumb to bullying tactics by Britain because they are all
aware of its
hidden agenda to topple the present Zimbabwean government . So
it is clear
that the victory by ZANU-PF in the just ended presidential poll
was indeed a
victory against imperialism.27
Pointing out that President Thabo Mbeki of
South Africa, President Olusegun
Obasanjo of Nigeria and President Bakili
Muluzi of Malawi "failed to
persuade Mugabe" when they "visited" him on 5
May 2004 in Harare to "say
whether, or when, he intends to step down,"
Africa Confidential maintains
the correct position that the responsibility
to exert pressure upon Mugabe
necessary for him to step down as the
president of Zimbabwe lies with the
people of Zimbabwe under their leaders,
not with the leaders of African
countries when it concluded that this
failure "puts the responsibility back
where it belongs, with Zimbabwe's own
leaders."28
The MDC's incorrect position that the responsibility to exert
pressure upon
Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of
Zimbabwe lies with
the leaders of African countries, not with the people of
Zimbabwe, is
defended by its president. After the efforts of President Mbeki
and
President Obasanjo to promote dialogue between the ruling party and the
MDC,
Tsvangirai pointed out in August 2002 that their efforts were attempts
to
"legitimise Mugabe" and enabled Mugabe to consolidate his power and
position. In his words:
They came in hoping to bring about dialogue
and reconciliation between the
parties - that was an attempt to legitimise
Mugabe, without confronting the
issue of Mugabe's legitimacy in the March
2002 election. They chose
diplomacy rather than democracy and gave Mugabe
space to consolidate his
position.29
Did the MDC, through its
theoretical and practical weaknesses, not help to
"legitimise Mugabe" and
"give Mugabe space to consolidate his position?"
Weizmann Hamilton
maintains that the MDC has enabled or "gave Mugabe'' and
the ruling party
political "space to consolidate'' their "position.'' The
fact that it is
supported by "big business and white farmers at home and
imperialism and its
institutions" has "undermined its support among the
masses in Zimbabwe and
throughout Southern Africa. Its support by white
farmers, "who continue to
oppress and exploit farm labourers" has helped to
undermine its rural
support. It has refrained from mobilising mass action
against the government
and concentrated on appealing to the external forces
to exert pressure upon
Mugabe and the ruling party. This programme of action
enabled Mugabe to
maintain that the survival of his administration is a
struggle against
external interference in defence of "white minority
business and farming
interests" and to present the MDC as the organisational
agent of
imperialism.30
Tsvangirai's harsh criticism of President Mbeki and
President Obasanjo is
reflection of his incorrect position that the
responsibility to exert
pressure upon Mugabe necessary for him to step down
as the president of
Zimbabwe lies with the leaders of African countries, not
with the people of
Zimbabwe. In his speech to the MDC Members of Parliament
in Harare on 18
December 2002, he maintained that President Mbeki had
"embarked on an
international safari to campaign for Mugabe's regime.
Pretoria is free to
pursue its agenda. But it must realise that Zimbabweans
can never be fooled
anymore."31 The relevant question is whether or not
Tsvangirai ever realised
that "Zimbabweans can never be fooled" by his
profound lack of shrewd
political qualities, his failure in leading the MDC
to provide viable
theoretical and practical positions, policies and
programme of action which
constitute the alternative to the ruling party and
his fundamental
weaknesses in articulating Zimbabwe's national
socio-political and economic
issues and taking strategic and tactical
decisions in the interest of the
MDC's struggle for power.
In
criticising the efforts of President Mbeki and President Obasanjo to see
to
it that Zimbabwe is readmitted to the Commonwealth of Nations, he
maintained
that these efforts represented:
The disreputable end game of a long-term
Obasanjo-Mbeki strategy designed to
infiltrate and subvert not only the
Commonwealth effort but, indeed, all
other international efforts intended to
rein in Mugabe's violent and
illegitimate regime. Through this diabolical
act of fellowship and
solidarity with a murderous dictatorship, General
Obasanjo and Mr Mbeki have
now openly joined Mugabe as he continues to wage
a relentless war against
the people of Zimbabwe. They are now self-confessed
fellow travellers on a
road littered with violence, destruction and
death.32
The MDC's incorrect position that the responsibility to exert
pressure upon
Mugabe necessary for him to step down as the president of
Zimbabwe lies with
the leaders of African countries, not with the people of
Zimbabwe under its
leadership is its misunderstanding of the importance of
the primacy of
internal factors over external factors either in the
resolution or the
maintenance of internal problems of a given
country.
RELATIONS BETWEEN ZIMBABWE AND DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
Zimbabwe as a social formation dominated by developed countries
within
international capitalism is a formation whose internal primary
economic
contradiction is dominated, controlled and exploited by developed
countries
to satisfy the needs, demands and exigencies of their national
socio-political and economic relations. The solution to this socio-political
and economic problem lies internally within Zimbabwe, not externally outside
it. This means that it lies on the shoulders of the people of Zimbabwe, not
on the shoulders of those who are not Zimbabweans. The same applies to the
maintenance of this problem. The state in Zimbabwe has proved the importance
of internal factors over external factors in its adoption and implementation
of its economic policies.33
The relationship between Zimbabwe and
developed countries particularly
Britain is primarily not the external
process. It is primarily the internal,
national process. Zimbabwe's current
national situation should be approached
by taking into consideration
primarily dynamics of its specific internal
movement which determines it.
The international, external situation in which
its specific movement takes
place is a general, universal condition. It is
not a particular condition.
Factors within Zimbabwe determine the
consequences of the international
situation upon its national, internal
situation. Discussion and explanation
of the relationship between Zimbabwe
and developed countries for their
concrete understanding should be executed
and achieved on the basis of a
profound, dialectical, concrete historical
and class analysis of Zimbabwe's
specific or particular national situation
without losing sight of what is
taking place throughout the world
particularly within international
capitalism.
The content of the relationship which developed countries
established and
maintain with Zimbabwe is the process which is, internally
and externally,
condensed materially in its state. Is the post-settler
colonial Zimbabwean
state, material condensation of the struggle between
labour and capital, the
material condensation of the process of exploitation
of the masses of the
people by the forces of exploitation or of the process
of liberation of the
masses of the people? Is it maintaining exploitation or
helping to end it?
Is it reconciling contradictions between the forces of
capital for the
defence of their strategic interests or is it reconciling
contradictions
among the masses of the people for the achievement of their
strategic
interests?
The point is that underlying the process of
economic transformation are the
key questions concerning the exercise of the
state political power: which
social class or class alliance exercises the
state political power in the
country, by what tactical means and to what
strategic ends? How is the
exercise of the state political power, its means
and ends, supported and
contested by other social forces in the society? The
fact that the masses of
the Zimbabwean people are experiencing
socio-economic problems is primarily
the result of the national
socio-political and economic policies pursued by
the state of Zimbabwe. It
is not primarily because of the relationship of
Zimbabwe's economy with the
international capitalist economic system. The
issue of managing this
relationship in Zimbabwe to effectively generate and
distribute its benefits
among the people of Zimbabwe depends on the state's
practical commitment to
the popular demands and interests and the balance of
forces among those
controlling the state on the satisfaction of the needs,
demands and
exigencies of Zimbabwe's national socio-political and economic
relations.
The practical implementation of the theoretical
understanding of the
importance of the primacy of internal factors over
external factors is of
crucial importance to either resolution or
maintenance of relations of
socio-political and economic problems in
Zimbabwe including inequalities,
domination and exploitation, which
developed countries established and
maintain with Zimbabwe. It is through
the process of confronting and
resolving internal relations of inequalities,
domination and exploitation
within Zimbabwe that relations of inequalities,
domination and exploitation
between Zimbabwe and developed countries will be
resolved. Relations of
inequalities, domination and exploitation between
Zimbabwe and developed
countries cannot be resolved without resolving
internal relations of
inequalities, domination and exploitation within
Zimbabwe.
The fundamental resolution of social relations of inequalities,
domination
and exploitation within Zimbabwe is the prerequisite means for
the
fundamental resolution of relations of inequalities, domination and
exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries. Relations of
inequalities, domination and exploitation within Zimbabwe facilitate the
defence and expansion of relations of inequalities, domination and
exploitation between Zimbabwe and developed countries. This is the key
central issue essential to the realisation of the qualitative, fundamental
socio-political, ideological and economic transformation of
Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe, because of its problems and the way it has decided to
solve them,
threatens to provide a hope to the masses of the people of
Africa to solve
relations of domination and exploitation between their
countries and
developed countries. The way it has decided to solve these
relations has
helped to send a clear message to the masses of the people of
Africa that
beggars cannot be choosers and implementers of strategies and
tactics to
solve these relations.34 These relations between African
countries and
developed countries are characterised, among others,
by:
(a) the dominance in the national economy of foreign ownership of the
means
of production, distribution and exchange; (b) the consequent foreign
exploitation of indigenous resources; (c) various forms of socio-cultural
and political dependence which sustain[ed] these ownership and exploitative
relations; (d) the external orientation of the national economy; (e) the
confinement of national participation in the international division of labor
to primary production for export and the importation of manufactured goods;
(f) confidence in the salutary nature of external conditions; (g) high hope
of benefits from foreign relations; and (h) appeals to the humanitarian
sentiments of the advanced [capitalist] countries, as the major means of
international influence [and national development - S.M.].35
Some of
these factors characterising relations between African countries and
developed countries no longer characterise Zimbabwe in its relations with
developed countries. Zimbabwe is also threatening to resolve the penetrated
nature of its political economy. According to James Rosenau:
A
penetrated political [economy] system is one in which nonmembers of a
national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions
taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its
values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its
goals.36
Zimbabwe is challenging the position of Oxfam in its Make Trade
Fair
Campaign that the "future of Africa, more than that of any other
continent,
hinges on the collective global action" and that the "ways in
which Africa
trades, receives aid and debt relief and governs itself is not
the
responsibility of Africans alone; these issues are the responsibility of
decision-makers and global citizens everywhere."37 This position is
supportive of the reality not only that the political economy of Africa is
the most open, penetrated, dependent and dominated formation, but also that
the African continent and its people are viewed as objects of compassion and
contempt by some individuals throughout the world.
This position is
also maintained by Britain. The British High Commissioner
to South Africa
maintains it as follows:
The whole world is demanding that we act,
collectively, to bring greater
prosperity to Africa. If we fail to take this
opportunity, we will betray
the future not only of the children of Africa,
but the children of the
world. We will be condemning generations of Africans
to poverty and despair.
Now is the time to act, together, in true
partnership.38
CONCLUSION
Our work has provided analysis of the
theoretical and practical weaknesses
of the MDC and its failure to
understand and recognise the importance of the
primacy of internal factors
over the external factors in the resolution of
Zimbabwe's socio-political
and economic problems.
The MDC has not addressed itself seriously and
effectively to the issue of
power relations in Zimbabwe and the fundamental
need to change them in
favour of the interests of the vast majority of the
people of Zimbabwe. It
has not seriously, in theory and practice, recognised
the importance of
organising or mobilising the people to achieve political,
economic and
ideological hegemony as prerequisite not only for removal of
those
controlling the state from political power, but also for establishing
alternative socio-political and economic order.
It is for these key
reasons that it has not seriously and effectively
challenged the ruling
party in its struggle to "legitimately exercise power
and authority over the
control and management of the country's affairs in
the interest of the
people and in accordance with the principles of justice,
equity,
accountability and transparency."39 This has led some individuals
and
organisations to conclude that the resolution to Zimbabwe's problems
lies
within the ruling party, not the MDC. The position that the resolution
to
Zimbabwe's problems lies within the ruling party, not the MDC is
articulated, among others, by Godfrey Kanyenze's when he maintains that we
should focus on Mugabe and the ruling party, not Tsvangirai and the MDC and
that the "greatest threat to ZANU-PF right now is ZANU-PF itself, not the
MDC."40
Zimbabwe is one of African countries which in their
post-colonial era have
not become free and independent of what they have
inherited. This
inheritance is the socio-historical result of the relations
of domination
and exploitation developed countries have established and
maintained with
them before achievement of their political independence. The
history of
post-colonial Africa is the history of the consolidation of its
domination
and exploitation by developed countries. The post-colonial era in
African
countries is characterised by the emergence and expansion of the
national
bourgeoisie, which serves largely to maintain relations of
domination and
exploitation between their countries and developed countries
through the
defence of capitalism in their countries. The majority of
African leaders
have not only inherited these relations, but have also been
defending them
so as to enjoy the benefits and opportunities of
international capitalist
system.41
This reality is captured by
Professor Jonathan Moyo when he maintains that
the "assertion that the
majority of African governments are now democratic
is premised on
contentious notions of democracy with external origins," that
apart from
this," this "assertion has no empirical basis," that "multiparty
elections"
which "are now common in Africa" do "not describe a fundamental
development"
and "have not led to new power relations in Africa" and that
"Zambia and
Malawi since the fall of Kenneth Kaunda and the late Kamuzu
Banda" are
supportive of this reality, that "Zimbabwe is following suit with
reckless
abandon," that the "claim that African governments are now running
liberalized market-driven economies" is "an acknowledgement of the power of
international financial institutions over local policymaking" and that
imperialism "is a pivotal force in international affairs and the frenzy of
liberalized market economies makes" the "analysis of imperialism "even more
urgent, especially in the light of the proliferation of corrupt regimes bent
on hoodwinking their citizens by hiding under the canopy of IMF and World
Bank-dictated policies."42
Central to the fundamental and structural
need for the MDC to fundamentally
transform itself is the reality that it
must strive to have credible
policies which are alternatives to those of the
ruling party and of
international organisations such as the International
Monetary Fund and the
World Bank. It must also have programmes of action
cable of responding to
socio-political and economic challenges in Zimbabwe.
It should also have a
concrete understanding of socio-political and economic
developments and
debates in other countries particularly Southern African
regional and
African continental countries and view them progressively
within the context
of Pan-African agenda of resolving Africa's
problems.
In other words, it should implement understanding that for the
political
party or a movement to effectively mobilize the people, generate a
viable
alternative agenda, and develop a capacity to establish a
responsible,
democratic, and accountable government on coming to power, it
must have
certain qualities: effective and flexible organization; ability to
generate
resources for its operations; a viable alternative program for
overall
reconstruction and rehabilitation; an effective foreign policy;
legitimate
and visionary leadership; a strong internal and public education
program to
challenge the established world view; a transparently democratic
and
accountable structure; and in-depth knowledge of existing political
(even
theoretical) debates, blueprints, developments in other nations, and
of the
local political economy.
Such a movement must cultivate and
retain the support of alternative
constituencies; its politics must be seen
to be different from the
discredited past; and the leadership must be
principled, consistent in its
philosophy, and be above board morally.
Finally, the leadership and movement
must be capable of distinguishing
between rhetoric and practical politics,
and must consistently strive to
stay and operate above primordial and
opportunistic
considerations.43
* Dr Sehlare Makgetlaneng is the Head of Southern
Africa and SADC programme
at the Africa Institute of South Africa, Pretoria,
South Africa
2 Stefan Andreasson, "Economic Reform and 'Virtual
Democracy' in South
Africa and Zimbabwe: The Incompatibility of
Liberalisation, Inclusion and
Development," Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3
(September 2003), pp. 393-7, Suzanne Dansereau,
"Liberation and Opposition
in Zimbabwe," Journal of Contemporary African
Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May
2003), pp. 181-5, and Lloyd Sachikonye, "The
Year of Zimbabwe's political
watershed," Southern Africa Political &
Economic Monthly, Vol. 14, No. 3
(December-January 2000-2001), p.
7.
3 Munyaradzi Gwisai, interviewed in Alternative Information and
Development
Centre, "Zimbabwe after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections,"
Alternatives,
Vol. 3, No. 14 (April-May 2005), p. 8.
4 Suzanne
Dansereau, ''Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Zimbabwe's
Development
Impasse,'' in Henning Melber (editor), Zimbabwe - The Political
Economy of
Decline (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2005), p. 23.
5 Ibid., p.
24.
6 Barney Mthombothi, "Why Mugabe still wields power?" The Star
(Johannesburg), 3 November 2004, p. 14.
7 Ibid.
8 Alex T.
Magaisa, "The pitfalls of opposition politics in Zimbabwe,"
newzimbabwe.com,
8 August 2005
(http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/thirdforce11.12923.html),
pp. 1-2.
9 Ibid., p. 2.
10 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
11 Ibid., p.
3.
12 Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea: Selected Texts by Amilcar
Cabral
(New York: and London: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 86.
13
Sokwanele: Civic Action Support Group, "A Message to the MDC Leadership,"(http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005),
p. 1.
14 Pius Wakatama, quoted in Sokwanele: Civic Action Support
Group, "A
Message to the MDC Leadership,"
(http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005),
p. 2.
15 Sokwanele: Civic Action Support Group, "A Message to the MDC
Leadership,"(http://www.sokwanele.com/articles/sokwanele/amessagetomdcleadership-20april2005),
p. 2.
16 Ibid.
17 International Crisis Group, Post-Election
Zimbabwe: What Next? Africa
Report No. 93 (7 June 2005), p. 3. This report
is available on the
International Crisis Group website: http://www.crisisgroup.org.
18
Africa Confidential, ''Zimbabwe: The road to ruin,'' Vol. 42, No. 20, 12
October 2001, p. 4.
19 Africa Confidential, ''Zimbabwe: Who is
next?'' Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May
2003, pp. 4-5.
20 Newton Kanhema,
''Who is going to succeed Mugabe?'' Sunday Times
(Johannesburg), 11 May
2003, p. 5.
21 Newton Kanhema, ''Who is going to succeed Mugabe?'' Sunday
Times
(Johannesburg), 11 May 2003, p. 5.
22 Robert Rotberg,
''Dictatorship and Decay: Only Mbeki can rescue Zimbabwe,''
Business Day
(Johannesburg), 8 December 2004, p. 9.
23 Roger Bate, ''Zimbabwe's
Impending Elections - What Other Countries Can
Do, and Why,'' Movement for
Democratic Change Online, 2 March 2005
(http://www.mdczimbabwe.org/Archives/2005/march/zimimpendingelec.htm,
p.1.
24 Ibid., p. 6.
25 Alex T. Magaisa, "The pitfalls of
opposition politics in Zimbabwe,"
newzimbabwe.com, 8 August 2005
(http://newzimbabwe.com/pages/thirdforce11.12923.html),
p. 2.
26 Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulous, ''Mugabe, Mbeki and the
Politics of
Anti-Imperialism,'' Review of African Political Economy, No.
101, 2004, pp.
385-400.
27 The Herald, quoted in Ian Phimister and
Brian Raftopoulous, ''Mugabe,
Mbeki and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism,''
Review of African Political
Economy, No. 101, 2004, p. 387.
28 Africa
Confidential, ''Zimbabwe: Who is next?'' Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May
2003, p.
3.
29 Morgan Tsvangirai, quoted in Africa Confidential, ''Zimbabwe: Who
is
next?'' Vol. 44, No. 10, 16 May 2003, p. 3.
30 Weizmann Hamilton,
''Cling to Power in Zimbabwe,'' Socialism Today: the
monthly journal of the
Socialist Party, Issue 63, March 2002, p. 2.
31 Morgan Tsvangirai, quoted
in Patrick Bond, ''Can NEPAD Survive its
Proponents, Sponsors, Clients and
Peers?'' OSSREA Newsletter, Vol. XX1, No.
3, October 2003, p. 14.
32
Ibid.
33 Hevina S. Dashwood, ''The Relevance of Class to the Evolution of
Zimbabwe's
Development Strategy,'' Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol.
22, No. 1,
March 1996, pp. 127-48.
34 Cheryl Hendricks and Elias
Mandala, ''Beggars Can't be Choosers:
Reflections on the Zimbabwe
Quagmire,'' CODESRIA Bulletin, Nos. 1 and 2,
2002, pp. 9-11.
35
Okwudiba Nnoli, Self Reliance and Foreign Policy in Tanzania: The
Dynamics
of the Diplomacy of a New State, 1961 to 1971 (Lagos: NOK
Publishers, 1978),
p. 7.
36 James Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (New York:
Free
Press, 1971), pp. 127-8.
37 Oxfam, ''Fair Trade,'' African
Decisions, July-September 2002, p. 22.
38 Paul Boateng, ''Gleneagles
Agenda: Britain wants whole hog for Africa,''
Business Day (Johannesburg),
28 June 2005, p. 11.
39 Sam Moyo, ''Policy Dialogue, Improved Governance,
and the New
Partnerships: Experiences from Southern Africa,'' in Hennock
Kifle, Adebayo
Olukoshi and Lennart Wohlgemuth (editors), A New Partnership
for African
Development: Issues and Parameters (Stockholm: Nordiska
Afrikainstitutet,
1997), p. 61.
40 Godfrey Kanyenze, quoted in
Charles Rukuni, ''Tsvangirai still all the
MDC has got,'' Financial Gazette
(Harare), 31 May 2005, p. 2, and Godfrey
Kanyenze, quoted in Charles Rukuni,
''Tsvangirai still all the MDC has got,''
The Insider (Harare), 31 May 2005,
p. 2.
41 Sehlare Makgetlaneng, ''Challenges and Solution in the Struggle
for
Independent African Foreign Policies,'' in Louis Serapiao, Sehlare
Makgetlaneng, V.S. Sheth, Francis Makoa, Moses Ralinala, Christopher
Saunders and Wilfred Ndongko, African Foreign Policies in the 21st Century
(Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2001), p. 14.
42
Jonathan N. Moyo, ''African Renaissance: A Critical Assessment,''
Southern
Africa Political & Economic Monthly, Vol. 11, No. 7 (May 1998), p.
11.
43 Julius O. Ihonvbere, ''On the Threshold of Another False
Start? A
Critical Evaluation of Pro-Democracy Movements in Africa,'' in E.
Ike Udogo
(editor), Democracy and Democratization in Africa: Toward the 21st
Century
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), p. 127.