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Zimbabwe AG to set up WikiLeaks commission

Sat Dec 25, 2010 2:27pm GMT

By MacDonald Dzirutwe

HARARE (Reuters) - Zimbabwe's attorney general plans to set up a commission
to investigate possible treason charges against locals over briefings with
U.S. diplomats that are part of confidential State Department cables
released by WikiLeaks.

The investigation appears to be targeting Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai
and follows state media reports that hawks in President Robert Mugabe's
ZANU-PF party wanted an official probe against Tsvangirai over his briefings
with the U.S. ambassador in Harare.

In comments that appear in one U.S. state department cable obtained by
WikiLeaks, Tsvangirai appears to suggest that his Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) was not genuine in calling for the lifting of Western sanctions
against ZANU-PF.

Attorney General Johannes Tomana said on Saturday he would appoint a team of
five lawyers to establish whether reports in the WikiLeaks amounted to any
breach of the constitution.

"The WikiLeaks appear to show a treasonous collusion between local
Zimbabweans and the aggressive international world, particularly the United
States," Tomana said in a statement.

"With immediate effect, I am going to instruct a team of practising lawyers
to look into the issues that arise from the WikiLeaks."

The U.S. Treasury Department on Tuesday imposed sanctions on Tomana, saying
his actions undermined the country's democratic institutions.

Tomana said the sanctions were an attack on the office of the Attorney
General and the constitution of Zimbabwe.

Tsvangirai has refused to be drawn into the WikiLeaks spat. His aides say he
is not guilty and describe the controversy as personal attacks on the prime

Mugabe's ZANU-PF last week said the government should craft a law that makes
it a treason offence to call for sanctions.

Tsvangirai's MDC has said the government should investigate charges arising
from WikiLeaks documents that senior officials close to Mugabe, including
his wife Grace, have benefited from illicit diamond trading from the
Chiadzwa mine in the eastern part of the country.

The WikiLeaks reports have added to tensions in Zimbabwe's inclusive
goverment formed last year by Mugabe and Tsvangirai, with ZANU-PF charging
that the U.S. cables have vindicated its claim that the MDC is working with
the West to oust Mugabe.

WikiLeaks has released several U.S. cables on Zimbabwe, including one on a
senior Tsvangirai ally seeking Washington's support to establish a fund to
buy-off the country's security service chief who are loyal to Mugabe and

Another cable showed former United Nations secretary general Kofi Annan
offered Mugabe a deal to step down and live in a safe haven, which the the
86-year-old leader rejected.

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Fears Growing of Mugabe’s Iron Grip Over Zimbabwe

Published: December 25, 2010

HARARE, Zimbabwe — The warning signs are proliferating. Journalists have
been harassed and jailed. Threats of violence are swirling in the
countryside. The president’s supposed partner in the government has been
virulently attacked in the state-controlled media as a quisling for the
West. And the president himself has likened his party to a fast-moving train
that will crush anything in its way.

After nearly two years of tenuous stability under a power-sharing
government, fears are mounting here that President Robert Mugabe, the
autocrat who presided over a bloody, discredited election in 2008, is
planning to seize untrammeled control of Zimbabwe during the elections he
wants next year.

“Everything seems to point to a violent election,” said Eldred Masunungure,
a political scientist and pollster.

Having ruled alone for 28 of the last 30 years, Mr. Mugabe, 86, has made no
secret of his distaste for sharing power with his rival, Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai, since regional leaders pressured them to govern together
22 months ago.

In recent months, Mr. Mugabe has been cranking up his party’s election-time
machinery of control and repression. He appointed all the provincial
governors, who help him dispense patronage and punishment, rather than
sharing the picks as promised with Mr. Tsvangirai. And traditional chiefs,
longtime recipients of largess from his party, ZANU-PF, have endorsed Mr.
Mugabe as president for life.

Political workers and civic activists who lived through the 2008 campaign of
intimidation and repression — in which many foot soldiers in Mr. Tsvangirai’s
Movement for Democratic Change were tortured or murdered — say ZANU-PF will
not need to be so violent this time around. Threats may be enough.

In Mashonaland West, Mr. Mugabe’s home province, people said they were
already being warned by local traditional leaders loyal to Mr. Mugabe that
the next election would be more terrifying than the last one, when their
relatives were abducted and attacked after Mr. Tsvangirai won some

“They say, ‘We were only playing with you last time,’ ” said one 53-year-old
woman, too frightened to be quoted by name, repeating a warning others in
the countryside have heard. “ ‘This time we will go door to door beating and
killing people if you don’t vote for ZANU-PF.’ ”

But even as many voice a growing conviction that Mr. Mugabe is plotting to
oust his rival and reclaim sole power, he has retained his ability to keep
everyone guessing. His political opponents and Western diplomats wonder if
Mr. Mugabe is bluffing about a push for quick elections, perhaps to force
the factions in his own party to declare their allegiance to him and
extinguish the internal jockeying to succeed him.

Further complicating the picture, Mr. Mugabe struck a statesmanlike pose on
Monday at a news conference where he graciously shared the stage with Mr.
Tsvangirai. The next day, the state-controlled newspaper quoted him as
boasting that he, Mr. Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara
had brought peace to the country after the 2008 elections. But he also said
that new elections would be held after the process of crafting a new
constitution was completed, and that the power-sharing government should not
be extended beyond August.

The contest between Mr. Mugabe, a university-educated Machiavellian, and Mr.
Tsvangirai, 58, a former labor leader who never went to college and is often
described as a well intentioned but bumbling tactician, lies at the heart of
Zimbabwe’s tumultuous political life.

Not long after Mr. Tsvangirai quit the June 2008 runoff in hopes of halting
the beating and torture of thousands of his party workers and supporters,
the two men suddenly found themselves alone in the same room. Thabo Mbeki,
then South Africa’s president and the mediator in the Zimbabwe crisis,
vanished during a lunchtime.

In his resonant, cultivated voice, Mr. Mugabe invited Mr. Tsvangirai to join
him for a traditional meal of sadza, greens and stew, prepared by Mr. Mugabe’s
personal chef, but Mr. Tsvangirai, who had been viciously beaten by Mr.
Mugabe’s police force the year before, refused to eat, aides to both men

“I can assure you,” Mr. Mugabe said, according to his press secretary,
George Charamba, “I’m not about to poison you.”

In 2009, under excruciating pressure from regional leaders, Mr. Tsvangirai
agreed to a deal that some in his own party saw as a poisoned chalice. It
made him prime minister, but allowed Mr. Mugabe to retain the dominant
powers of the state.

Mr. Tsvangirai admits he initially found Mr. Mugabe “very accommodative,
very charming.” The men met privately each Monday over tea and scones. When
Susan, Mr. Tsvangirai’s wife of more than three decades, died in a car crash
just weeks after the government was formed, Mr. Mugabe comforted him. Mr.
Mugabe also complained about problems in his own party, and the two men
commiserated about how to deal with their hard-liners, Mr. Charamba said.

But Mr. Tsvangirai said in a recent interview that he had come to believe it
was Mr. Mugabe himself, not military commanders or other members of the
president’s powerful inner circle, who was the principal manipulator.

“He goes along,” Mr. Tsvangirai said, “pretends to be a gentleman, pretends
to be accommodative, pretends to be seriously committed to the law, and
turns around, sending people, beating up people, using violence to coerce
and to literally defend power for the sake of defending power.”

After a decade resisting Mr. Mugabe’s rule from the outside, Mr. Tsvangirai,
other leaders of his party and a small breakaway faction have found
themselves at the table with him in Tuesday cabinet meetings. They have
studied the qualities that have helped Mr. Mugabe hang on to power for 30
years: stamina, mental acuity, attention to detail, charm and an uncanny
instinct for the exercise of power.

“Let me tell you, that man’s brain is still very, very, very sharp, but his
body is frail,” Mr. Tsvangirai said.

While polls show that Mr. Tsvangirai remains the country’s most popular
politician and the likely victor of a fair election, analysts say Mr. Mugabe
has been emboldened by a major development: the recent discovery that
diamond fields in eastern Zimbabwe, which fall under a ministry controlled
by ZANU-PF, may be among the richest in the world.

The minister of mines, Obert Mpofu, insisted in an interview that “ZANU-PF
has not gotten a cent from diamonds, not one cent.” But Mr. Tsvangirai and
analysts here say they assume that illicit diamond profits are enriching the
party’s coffers and helping buy the loyalty of the security services that
enforced ZANU-PF’s violent election strategy in 2008.

Mr. Charamba, the president’s press secretary, rejected the assertions,
saying there would be “an all-out deployment to assure there is no violence”
by any party.

Since Mr. Tsvangirai joined the government, Mr. Mugabe has openly tested the
limits of their deal, unilaterally appointing many senior officials and
refusing to swear in one of Mr. Tsvangirai’s closest advisers. Mr. Mugabe,
in turn, claims that Mr. Tsvangirai has not held up his end of the bargain:
lobbying the West to end travel and financial sanctions on him and his

Mr. Tsvangirai admitted that after leading the struggle against Mr. Mugabe’s
rule since 1999, he had no ready answers for establishing “a democratic
struggle without guns, without using violence” in the country.

“There’s no template about the solution to the Zimbabwe crisis,” he said.
“We have learned this over the last 10 years. There is no template for how
we’re going to deal with Mugabe.”

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Zimbabwe warns public transporters as Christmas death toll rises

APA-Harare (Zimbabwe) The Zimbabwean government on Saturday threatened stern
action against public transport operators violating road regulations as the
police reported that more than 30 people have perished in traffic accidents
since the beginning of the week.

Transport Minister Nicholas Goche said in a Christmas Day message that
public transport service providers should strictly adhere to road
regulations such as having roadworthy vehicles, desisting from over-charging
and avoiding drink-driving.

He said those caught violating the regulations risked losing their operating

The minister’s comments came amid reports that at least 35 Zimbabweans have
perished while more than 500 others were injured since Monday in road
accidents involving public transport vehicles.

In one of the accidents, nine passengers perished on Wednesday after a
commuter taxi they were travelling in crashed in the capital Harare.

In another incident, five people were killed and 42 others injured when two
commuter taxis collided on Friday along a highway linking the eastern city
of Mutare to Masvingo in the south of Zimbabwe.

The cause of Friday’s accident was a burst tyre on one of the taxis.


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Bleak Xmas For Unpaid Council Workers

25/12/2010 09:12:00

Karoi, December 25, 2010 - Karoi Town and Nyaminyami council workers are
likely to have a bleak Christmas on Saturday because they had not been paid
by Thursday.

Disgruntled workers told Radio VOP they had to borrow money so that they
could have a decent Christmas with their families.

'We did not get our December salaries as promised by top officials," the
workers said.

The council has 285 permanent and 40 temporary workers.

'I have been forced to borrow US$100 and repay with an extra US$20 after two
weeks. I have to buy groceries for my family' said a worker who refuse to be

He said he believed the council had made a lot of money from weekly hiring
of its halls.

However an official said 'Council is broke'.

A money lender in Chiedza high density suburb said she had run out of cash
to give to stranded clients.

'Council workers got most of my money here because they did not get

The town secretary Maxwell Kaitano said plans are underway to pay workers
hopefully next week.

'We will pay them next week as we faced financial challenges.''

Meanwhile, Nyaminyami rural council secretary Isaac Makenzie said they had
failed to pay workers because the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) was
taking S$100 000 from them for unpaid taxes.

'Zimra garnished what we had set aside for December wages. Workers will go
for Xmas without money. We may pay them salaries in January.'

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Top MDC Member Pushes for United Opposition Front in Zimbabwe's 2011 Polls

Officials from the MDC formation of Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara
said however, that they did not favor such a move

Brenda Moyo | Washington DC 24 December 2010

A top official of the Movement for Democratic Change formation of Deputy
Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara is pushing for a united front with the wing
led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai ahead of elections widely expected
in 2011.

Dr. Garry Ferguson says he wants a united MDC that would team up with the
reformed ZAPU party led by Dumiso Dabengwa.

But Mutambara MDC treasurer Fletcher Dulini Ncube told VOA Studio 7 that
forging a coalition between the MDC formations was not possible.

Tsvangirai MDC deputy spokesperson Thabitha Khumalo said her formation has
no position yet on the matter.

Unity promoter Dr. Ferguson said party leaders should put their personal
interests aside for the country’s good.

ZAPU spokesman Methuseli Moyo told VOA Studio 7 reporter Brenda Moyo that a
coalition would pose a formidable force that could shape the future of the

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S.African President Zuma Takes Lead In Drafting Elections Roadmap for Zimbabwe

Mr. Zuma, acting on behalf of SADC, had initially indicated that Zimbabwe’s
lead negotiators would draft the roadmap, but has now taken up the onus

Blessing Zulu | Washington DC 24 December 2010

Exasperated by the continued bickering in Zimbabwe's power-sharing
government, South African President Jacob Zuma is now taking the lead role
in drafting a roadmap to ensure that elections expected next year are held
in a free and fair environment.

Sources in President Robert Mugabe's former ruling Zanu-PF party and both
formations of the Movement for Democratic Change led by Prime Minister
Morgan Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara respectively,
confirmed the latest development.

Additional sources in Pretoria told VOA that the roadmap was being crafted
by Mr. Zuma’s facilitation team, adding it would be modelled around the
Southern African Development Community's so-called protocol on the
principles and guidelines governing democratic elections.

Mr. Zuma had initially indicated that Zimbabwe’s six lead inter-party
negotiators would draft the roadmap. But the South African leader,
negotiating the Zimbabwean dialogue on behalf of SADC, has now taken up the

The draft roadmap is likely to be completed before the January 2011 meeting
of the SADC Troika or committee on politics, defence and security.

A top Zuma aide, Lindiwe Zulu told VOA they were seized with the Zimbabwean
elections roadmap, but added Pretoria will not impose anything on Harare.

Chairman of the Zimbabwe Elections Support Network Tinoziva Bere described
Mr.  Zuma’s move as commendable.

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The Commercial Farmers’ Union of Zimbabwe (CFU) and its Politics after Jambanja

Soldiers on a tractor in an irrigation scheme, Matabeleland, March 2006.

by Dr Rory Pilossof – Post-doctoral Fellow at the University of Pretoria (January 2011)


As a result of the government’s fast-track land reform programme, spearheaded by veterans of the country’s Liberation War, the plight of the white farmers in Zimbabwe became international headline news. Images of white farmers who were beaten, killed, exiled and driven from their homes became stock material for any coverage on the land invasions and their dramatic consequences. Such events and acts of eviction became commonly referred to as jambanja[i] as more and more farmers suffered violent confrontations on their farms. In turn, white farmers were portrayed in direct opposition to the government that they believed had sanctioned the invasions and evictions. However, this blanket portrayal of opposition is one that hides a number of more complicated dimensions to the way farmers, and in particular the Commercial Farmers’ Union of Zimbabwe (CFU), engaged with the government and tried to find solutions to the situation facing them.[ii] This paper looks at how the Union reacted to the land reforms after 2000 in order to question some of the more simplistic assumptions about white farmers’ political engagements after 2000 and how they responded to the traumas of jambanja.


While relations between white farmers and the government benefited from a partnership of convenience in the 1980s[iii], it has been well documented elsewhere that during the 1990s such relations began to cool dramatically. This was partly due to the expiration of the Lancaster House constitution and ZANU-PF’s initiatives to effect compulsory acquisition of commercial farmland. In addition, after the first decade of independence white farmers felt much more confident of their position in Zimbabwe and were willing to challenge government in ways they had not during the 1980s. However, the increasing hostility of ZANU-PF in the late 1990s, which was exacerbated by the rising popularity of the MDC, both in urban areas as well with many rural black farm workers, meant that white farming communities entered the new millennium in a cautions manner. Unsure of how the land issue would play out, many farmers became active participants in the political upheavals around them. Central to this was their active lobbying for a No vote against ZANU-PF’s constitutional proposals in the constitutional referendum of 2000.[iv] The ruling party saw this defeat as a direct affront to their continued rule and feared the repercussions this would have for the general elections due to be held later that year. ZANU-PF and Mugabe were not prepared to chance another electoral setback so began a campaign of violence and terror to ensure victory.[v]

Due to their effort in this regard, ZANU-PF focused much of their hostility on white farmers. Mugabe and other party leaders ‘blamed the defeat on the white minority and … promised retaliation in volatile political language’.[vi] While in the urban areas there was a massive crackdown on the MDC and other opposition movements, in the countryside, widespread and coordinated land occupations began within a matter of weeks of the constitutional referendum. The sequence of events since the constitutional referendum, and the basic story of the land occupations will be familiar to most readers. I will not repeat those events in detail here. Rather I will supply a very cursory overview of the processes of jambanja, which will be followed by a brief discussion of the political engagement of white farmers since 2000.

In the last week of February 2000, the first occupations were reported in Masvingo. From there occupations spread to Mashonaland and Manicaland and ‘involved not just veterans but also people from communal areas, chiefs and urban residents. Mashonaland rapidly came to the fore … and thereafter the region dominated in terms of numbers of occupations and violence. Matabeleland only later entered the fray’.[vii] It must be remembered that approximately 60% of commercial farmers operated in Mashonaland. At the forefront of these land occupations were veterans of the Liberation War. However, as Nelson Marongwe pointed out, it was very rare for the occupiers to consist entirely of war veterans. By his estimates, war veterans were only 15-20% of land occupiers and they were supported by numerous other populations, such as those from communal lands, rural and urban landless, other ZANU-PF supporters and various opportunists.[viii] Nevertheless, war veterans became the figureheads of the movements onto white land. Many of the occupations were peaceful, but some were highly confrontational and violent.

The word, apparently popularised by a chart topping song ‘jambanja Pahotera’ about two couples caught in extra-martial affairs, became synonymous with the land invasions.[ix] With no precise definition, the word was, and still is, used to encompass a range of violent and angry confrontations on the land, which varied in degree, severity and manner. The journalist Tagwirei Bango summarised the zeitgeist of the word in the Daily News newspaper:

For new words to get accepted into a language, they must reflect the mood of the time, fill in a vacuum in the standard lexicon and be accepted as an appropriate form of expression. Thus, the word jambanja which became part of our vocabulary in the past two years, helped people to accept their confusion with an executive order directing the police to ignore crimes classified as political. jambanja means state-sponsored lawlessness. The police are not expected to intervene or arrest anyone in a jambanja scene because those taking part will have prior state blessing and approval. But, only one interest group, war veterans and ZANU(PF) supporters, is allowed to engage in a jambanja.[x]

From these early jambanjas and land occupations, there was substantial evidence that many were supported and coordinated by government and state officials. Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor found that many of the war veterans occupying farms ‘consistently maintained that they had received direction from the national level of their association regarding which farms to occupy’. Government officials supplied lists of farms.[xi] In addition, army personnel, members of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) and police were directly involved in some occupations, while local politicians and their employees were often seen assisting “settlers” to remain on the land with food handouts and cash payments.[xii] “Settler” is a highly charged word in Zimbabwe because of its colonial legacies and was deliberately employed by ZANU-PF to describe those whose land was occupied as part of the fast-track land reforms. Its use by ZANU-PF and the war veterans undermined the white farmers claims to a settler heritage and past.

Since 2000 the countryside has remained a contested space. The vast majority of white farmers and landowners have been evicted from their homes and farms, yet while it is estimated that fewer than 300 white commercial farmers remain on their land (down from nearly 5,000 at the turn of the millennium), evictions and violent confrontations on such properties have been a constant reality over the last decade and continue to take place. The recent documentary films Mugabe and the White African and House of Justice show that even after a SADC Tribunal ruling in November 2008, ordering the government of Zimbabwe to protect the applicants (in total 78 commercial farmers) rights to occupy and use their farm, white farmers continue to face the threat of violence and eviction.[xiii] At every election in Zimbabwe since independence, but particularly after 2000, land has been a key focal point for ZANU-PF. With the possibility of fresh elections to be held in 2011, it is likely that land, and its control and ownership, will once again be used as a powerful election tool by ZANU-PF.

Ramifications of jambanja

Despite the scale of destruction wrought on the white farming community, numerous institutional structures survive that claim to represent white farmers. The Commercial Farmers’ Union of Zimbabwe (CFU), which was founded in 1942, (originally the Rhodesian National Farmers’ Union) and overwhelmingly represented the interests of white commercial farmers, continues to exist, although in a much depleted capacity. The tribulations of the land occupations caused massive fissures in the farming community as a range of different responses to the fast-track land reforms and jambanja emerged. As a result, other bodies have materialised since 2000 that have sought to represent white farmers in ways that the CFU has not. These are the Southern African Commercial Farmers’ Association (SACFA, which was formed by white farmers in Matabeleland to represent their interests after the land occupations in 2000), Justice for Agriculture (JAG, which was established in 2002 to advocate and lobby for white farmers who had been adversely affected by the fast-track land reforms) and Agric Africa (which was established in 2004 to pursue the compensation claims of white farmers).

Numerous factors were responsible for this fragmentation of the white farming community. Firstly, the invasions had far exceeded what farmers had expected was likely to happen. By the end of June 2000, the CFU reported that 1525 farms (or 28% of farms owned by its members) had been occupied.[xiv] Many in the farming community thought that these land occupations would be resolved once the parliamentary elections of 2000 were resolved. Richard Tate (the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association President) reportedly stated in 2000, ‘the sooner the elections are over and ZANU is back in power, the sooner we can get back to the business of farming’.[xv] However, the land occupations did not stop and continued to escalate. jambanja turned into a battle of attrition for many farmers as occupiers settled on farms and constantly sought to interfere with farming operations. Secondly, the ensuing invasions were highly uneven processes, differing in nature from district to district, province to province and dependent on the individuals involved.[xvi] The murder of several farmers heightened the anxieties, and prompted a number of farmers to ask for more action and protection from the CFU for members affected by the land occupations.

Understandably, 2000 was a very chaotic time for the CFU to make sense of what was unfolding and in deciding what the best strategy for confronting the issues were. Initially the CFU was very active in documenting the land occupations and regularly published situation reports of happenings on farms.[xvii] In addition it pursued several legal challenges against the fast-track land reforms. But it soon became clear that the CFU was intent on taking up a much more conciliatory approach to government and the war veterans. Essentially the CFU decided that it would be best for the farming community to revert back to its pre-referendum stance and stay out of politics. Legal challenges were aborted and alternative arrangements made. The Farmer magazine, which had been a part of the Union since 1943, was shut down in 2002 because it was felt that the reportage in The Farmer was too explicit and politically involved. The CFU feared that this would jeopardise any chance it had in negotiating with government. In 2001, the Zimbabwe Joint Resettlement Initiative (ZJRI), led by ex-CFU president Nick Swanepoel counselled that compromise was the only way to resolve the land issues and proposed to offer government a million hectares of land for resettlement. The proposal had some merit, but when it came to light that the controversial figure of John Bredenkamp was involved, many farmers refused to support the initiative. This proposal never really took of the ground, but the CFU maintained its placatory stance. In 2006 the CFU officially announced that it would reengage with ZANU-PF, ‘but warned that it would only represent members willing to recognise the government’.[xviii]

Large numbers of farmers openly disagreed with the CFU’s decision to keep talking to government and the war veterans to find a solution, even when it seemed obvious that neither of those parties respected any promises or arrangements made. The government’s disregard of the Abuja Agreement and the recommendations of the ZJRI confirmed such suspicions. As a result organisations such as JAG and SACFA emerged to represent farmers who had been evicted and who wished to continue pursuing legal and other challenges. JAG in particular came to largely represent evicted farmers as it strove to expose the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the land occupations. However, these bodies have suffered their own internal divisions and organisational difficulties and the future of JAG is a matter of much debate at the moment as it seeks to resolve debilitating leadership issues. Individual farmers have also continued to pursue their own legal challenges. At the forefront of these was the appeal taken to the SADC Tribunal by Mike Campbell in 2008. The resultant victory there offered many farmers a glimmer of hope of resolution, but the subsequent disregard of this ruling by ZANU-PF, in spite of a contempt of court ruling by the SADC Tribunal in June 2009, once again squashed any remaining optimism.

Despite the fragmentation of the farming community and the multiple approaches taken to confront the crises in the countryside, there has been one consistency in their approach. This has been to remain apolitical. The backlash of the constitutional referendum and the obvious targeting of farmers supportive of the MDC saw many farmers retreat from the political arena. While certain individual farmers have remained politically active and advocate political solutions, such as Iain Kay, Roy Bennett and Ben Freeth, the institutional approaches of the CFU have been remarkably different. Even JAG’s constitution dictated that it remained apolitical, despite the nature of the work it claimed to undertake. For these institutions, and large numbers of farmers, the land was the single origin of the crises affecting Zimbabwe after 2000, and their failure to realize the multiple origins of the crisis further alienated them from much of society.[xix]

There were and are numerous civic and political organizations engaged with opposing Mugabe and ZANU-PF. These groups have often sought to forge alliances with institutions like the CFU and JAG, but all of these advances have been refused. In accordance with this approach, the CFU has recently started to publish a new farming magazine, titled AgriZim, dedicated to ‘farming matters’ only.[xx] The lack of critical reflection of the situation in Zimbabwe or any political commentary in this magazine has already attracted criticism from evicted farmers such as Ben Freeth. In a recent letter to the JAG Open Letter Forum, Freeth commented that, ‘Anyone reading the magazine who didn’t know, would be reassured that farming is all now fine in Zimbabwe now that we are under a GNU [Government of National Unity]. The ZANU PF … leadership must be rubbing their hands in glee at this “official publication of the Commercial Farmers Union”’.[xxi]

This apparent apoliticism is not a new feature of white farming politics, but has been a part of the political identity of this group throughout independent Zimbabwe. This is illustrated by the wholesale withdrawal of farmers from active party politics during the first two decades of independence. This withdrawal was contradicted by the CFU’s blanket endorsement of ZANU after independence, regardless of the government’s abuses that made themselves increasingly obvious as the 1980s progressed. Aligning themselves with the government was not seen by the CFU as a political move and can be regarded as a survival tactic employed by an insecure and threatened white minority. Even though the CFU claimed to be apolitical, many of the decisions it took during the 1980s where politically calculated. For instance, the CFU actively defended the government’s actions in Matabeleland. During the years of Gukurahundi, the CFU praised government in its efforts to restore ‘order’ and ‘security’ in the region.[xxii] The CFU, and white farmers in general, steadfastly refused to question or criticise government’s political motives for the crackdown in Matabeleland in order to preserve their own fragile partnership with ZANU and Mugabe. White farmers were willing to remain “apolitical” as long as their futures and livelihoods were not jeopardised. When Mugabe and ZANU-PF began to target white owned land in the 1990s, white farmers rediscovered their political voice. The problem with the CFU’s apoliticism was that it essentially boiled down to ‘support for the government in return for continuing privileges [which] really amounted to political advocacy for the ruling party and was certainly a conscious strategy’.[xxiii]

By defining themselves as apolitical, white farmers assumed a position and a citizenship (right to be Zimbabwean) that they felt was uncontested and accepted by all, particularly the ruling government. However, when this was questioned and directly attacked by government in the 1990s, as Raftopoulos has shown, white farmers had to become “political” again to proclaim their right of position.[xxiv] This is most clearly illustrated with their initial support of the MDC. However, this invited such a harsh backlash from government that farmers retreated yet again and sought solace in being uninvolved in party politics. For Engin Fahri Isin:

becoming political should be seen neither as wide as encompassing all way of being (conflating being political with being social), nor as narrow as restricting it to being a citizen (conflating polity and politics). The moment the dominated, stigmatized, oppressed, marginalized, and disfranchised agents expose the arbitrary, they realize themselves as groups and constitute themselves as political.[xxv]

Claiming citizenship cannot be done without being political, yet doing so created severe problems for the farming community and their Union. In all white farmers have failed to find a way to resolve the conflict between their claimed citizenship and the belonging denied them by Mugabe and ZANU-PF. Instead, white farmers have found themselves trapped in a position where they are trying to claim the rights of citizenship and place in Zimbabwe, whilst at the same trying to remain apolitical in a political crisis, a major part of which has seen the ruling party mobilise significant resources to bring about the obliteration of the white farming community.


Having given up on political involvement and having shunned any official support for the MDC, the CFU turned against dissenting voices within its own establishment in a bid to further safeguard itself. The decision to shut down The Farmer and stifle voices of dissent was a continuation of CFU policy towards dissenting voices rather than a fundamental shift. As a result of the CFU’s handling of the land invasions, it lost the support of many farmers. The CFU only concerned itself with those farmers still on the land, because to pursue justice for those already evicted would mean confrontation with the government. Its bias towards only those farmers still on the land meant it alienated those farmers who had already been evicted. With that number growing all the time, sympathy for them and fear among the remaining farmers created anger against the CFU and its policy of “quiet diplomacy” in dealing with government. Yet the CFU remained committed to such a policy and distanced itself from all political opposition to protect whatever relationship it still believed it had with the government. As a result CFU has survived, despite the destruction of the white/commercial farming community, but this has caused a number of massive fissures in the community that are unlikely to be easily resolved.

What this short paper has illustrated is that white farmers, and in particular the CFU, have not fundamentally opposed government at every turn during the last decade. Rather, they have often tried to placate ZANU-PF, as they have felt this was the best way to try and secure some future, regardless of how detrimental that has been for relations between those farmers who have been evicted and those who have remained on the land. White farmers and their representatives have followed similar tactics at other times in Zimbabwe’s history, most notably during the violence of Gukurahundi in the 1980s, a point that has been lost on most commentators on the fortunes of white farmers in Zimbabwe since 2000.


i. This paper is a condensed summary of some of the findings of my recently completed PhD thesis, ‘The Unbearable Whiteness of Being: White Farming Voices in Zimbabwe and Their Narration of the Recent Past, c. 1970-2004′ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2010). The thesis is due to be published as a book in 2011.

ii. For scholarly simplifications of white farmers and white farming interests see Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (London, 1989); Sam Moyo, The Land Question in Zimbabwe (Harare, 1995); Sam Moyo, Land Reform Under Structural Adjustment in Zimbabwe (Uppsala, 2000). For journalistic accounts that have also presented simplified representations of white farmers see David Caute, Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia (Harmondsworth, 1983); Geoff Hill, Battle for Zimbabwe: The Final Countdown (Cape Town, 2003); Martin Meredith, Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe (New York, 2003); Martin Meredith, Mugabe: Power, Plunder and the Struggle for Zimbabwe (London, 2007); Andrew Norman, Robert Mugabe and the Betrayal of Zimbabwe (Jefferson, 2004); Andrew Meldrum, Where We Have Hope: A Memoir of Zimbabwe (New York, 2005); Christina Lamb, House of Stone: The True Story of a Family Divided in War-torn Zimbabwe (London, 2006).

iii. Angus Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the State: Interest Group Politics and Land Reform in Zimbabwe’, (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2006), chapters 4 and 5.

iv. Brian Raftopolous, ‘The Crisis in Zimbabwe’, in Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo (eds.), Becoming Zimbabwe (Harare, 2009), p. 210.

v. See The Justice for Agriculture (JAG) Trust and the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), Destruction of Zimbabwe’s Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power: A Qualitative Report on Events in Zimbabwe’s Commercial Farming Sector Since the Year 2000 (Harare, 2008); General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), If Something is Wrong: The Invisible Suffering of Farmworkers due to “Land Reform” (Harare, 2010).

vi. Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Current Politics in Zimbabwe: Confronting the Crisis’, in David Harold-Barry (ed.), The Past is the Future. (Harare, 2004), p. 13.

vii. Jocelyn Alexander, The Unsettled Land (Harare, 2006), p. 186.

viii. Nelson Marongwe, ‘Farm Occupations and Occupiers in the New Politics of Land in Zimbabwe’, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis (Harare, 2003), p. 179-182.

ix. Joseph Chaumba, Ian Scoones and William Wolmer, ‘From Jambanja to Planning: The Reassertion for Technocracy in Land Reform in South-eastern Zimbabwe’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 4 (2003), p. 540.

x. From the Daily News newspaper, 27 November, 2001, quoted in Chaumba, Scoones and Wolmer, ‘From Jambanja to Planning’, p. 540.

xi. Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, ‘Elections, Land and the Politics of Opposition in Matabeleland’, Journal of Agrarian Change, 1, 4 (2001), p. 511 and footnote 2.

xii. Jocelyn Alexander, ‘”Squatters”, Veterans and the State in Zimbabwe’, in Brian Raftopoulos, Amanda Hammar and Stig Jensen (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis (Harare, 2003), p. 100. Marongwe also talks about war veterans paying people to occupy land, but not where that money came from. Marongwe ‘Farm Occupations and Occupiers’, p. 169.

xiii. Simon de Swardt (dir.), House of Justice (Harare, 2009); Andrew Thompson and Lucy Bailey (dirs.), Mugabe and the White African (Stoud, 2009).

xiv. Anon., ‘Chronology’, in David Harold-Barry, (ed.), The Past is the Future (Harare, 2004), p. 269.

xv. Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the State’, p. 312.

xvi. Catherine Buckle, African Tears: The Zimbabwe Land Invasions (Johannesburg, 2001); Catherine Buckle, Beyond Tears: Zimbabwe’s Tragedy (Johannesburg, 2002), Lloyd Sachikonye, ‘The Promised Land: From Expropriation to Reconciliation and Jambanja’, in Brian Raftopoulos and Tyrone Savage (eds.), Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation (Harare, 2005), pp. 1-18; Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the State’, chapter 6.

xvii. All CFU situation reports used to be online on the CFU’s website. However, that website has been terminated and the information no longer shared publically. The CFU has a new website (, but this no longer carries the situation reports. Many of the situation reports were reproduced on the online news service,

xviii. Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the State’, p. 313.

xix. Amanda Hammar and Brian Raftopoulos, ‘Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation’, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation in the Context of Crisis (Harare, 2003), pp. 4-9.

xx. Deon Theron, President of the CFU stated in the forward of the magazine, ‘The newspapers, internet, news bulletins etc are full of stories of conflict, corruption, despair and death. Anything controversial that will sell. This magazine should be for farmers, and concentrate on farming issues. Sure – I see members discussing land reform and compensation as it affects us all, but the focus – as a farming magazine – should be on farming issues and the way forward’. Deon Theron, ‘Message From the President’, AgriZim, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010, p. 3.

xxi. Ben Freeth, ‘The New CFU Magazine [letter]‘, in JAG Open Letter Forum, No. 724, 5 November 2010.

xxii. There are numerous examples of this support for the government in The Farmer magazine. For example see, Anon., ‘Our Farmers Aid Farmers in Times of Trial’, The Farmer, 25 April, 1983, p. 5; Anon., ‘Farmers Must be Vigilant’, The Farmer, 3 September, 1987, p. 7; Myfanwy van Hoffen, ‘Welcome End of a Ruthless Menace’, The Farmer, November 26, 1987, p. 1.

xxiii. Selby, ‘Commercial Farmers and the State’, p. 177.

xxiv. Brian Raftopoulos, ‘The State in Crisis: Authoritarian Nationalism, Selective Citizenship and Distortions of Democracy in Zimbabwe’, in Amanda Hammar, Brian Raftopoulos and Stig Jensen, (eds.), Zimbabwe’s Unfinished Business: Rethinking Land, State and Nation (Harare, 2003), pp. 226-36.

xxv. Engin Fahri Isin, Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship (Minneapolis, 2002), p. 276.


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Zim to have New National Corporate Governance Code in March

Written by Ngoni Chanakira
Friday, 24 December 2010 12:48

HARARE - ZIMBABWE will have a new National Code on Corporate Governance in
March next year, says Edward Siwela, Executive Director of the Institute of
Directors (IOD).
In an exclusive interview, Siwela said this would govern the operation of
business enterprises in Zimbabwe as well as guide managers on how to run
their companies.
"Many Chief Executives of  firms listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE)
need training on corporate governance issues," Siwela said.
"The new National Code on Corporate Governace, which will be released in
March, next year, will help solve this problem."
He said government was taking the issue of corporate governance seriously as
evidenced by the fact that Parastatal bosses were now being paid according
to performance and not turnover.
"This year will go down in history as government recognized the critical
role played by Corporate Governance for the success of its own operations by
launching the Coporate Governance Framework for State Owned
Enterprises,"Siwela said.
"The major challenge facing the new Code, however, is crafting project
funding. We appeal to business to help us in this respect. Any amount is
very welcome. Contributions will be recognised at the launch of the National
Code on Corporate Governance sometimes in March, 2011."
Siwela said various structures had already been firmly put into place by
These included a Board of directors, Steering Committee, 10 Thematic
Committees, a Research Unit and a Secretariat based in Harare.

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Public Service Audit Findings Expected In January

25/12/2010 09:08:00

Harare, December 24, 2010 - The Zimbabwean government says it has completed
a crucial public service audit meant to flush out ghost workers in
government service.

The Minister Public Service, Eliphas Mukonoweshuro told Radio VOP Thursday
that his ministry which was tasked to carry out the audit had completed its
work and had filed its findings with the cabinet office.

“We have completed the audit and submitted it to cabinet which is looking at
the report,” said Mukonoweshuro in an interview.

Asked to shed light on the highlights of the findings the former University
of Zimbabwe Professor said he is bound by cabinet procedures and would not
be in a position to divulge any findings.

“As you and me know we are bound by the Official Secrets Act (OSA), I will
not be in a position to do that but all I can say is that I will have an
extensive debate with you at an appropriate time after the cabinet has
deliberated on the report and when i will have made a ministerial
presentation in parliament,” said Mukonoweshuro.

He said he expects the report to be made public sometime in January after
the holidays.

The government launched a public service audit early this year to flush out
thousands of ghost workers who are believed to be in government employment.

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US$490m remitted annually to Zimbabwe, says IFAD

Written by Ngoni Chanakira
Friday, 24 December 2010 12:35

HARARE  - AT least US$490 million is remitted to Zimbabwe by citizens living
in the diaspora, the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)
has said.
IFAD is the agriculture arm of the Washington-based World Bank.
"Both official and informal remittances could be between US$360 million and
US$490 million every year in Zimbabwe," IFAD said in a statement made
available to us.
It said comparative statistics showed that on SADC member states Zimbabwe
ranks fourth in terms of volume of remittances received - after South
Africa, Angola and Mozambique - and third in terms of share of the GDP
(Gross Domestic Product), after Lesotho and Mozambique.
"The vast majority of Zimbabwean migrants regularly send back remittances,"
IFAD said.
"Three quarters of them sent cash to households, companies and rentals.
"While there is no doubt that Zimbabwe receives a considerable amount of
remittances, it must be outlined that accurate information is difficult to
obtain as the vast majority of remittances are currently transferred through
informal channels.
"Therefore, estimates on remittance flows to Zimbabwe have to be considered
with great caution."
The World Bank's IFAD, on the other hand, said offial remittances to
Zimbabwe stood at US$17 million  in 1980, US$28 million in 1981 and US$33
million in 1982.
"After this official remittance flows decreased until 1994 when they were
estimated at US$44 million," IFAD said in its report.

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Securities Commission hikes firm adequacy requirements

Written by Ngoni Chanakira
Friday, 24 December 2010 12:39

HARARE  - THE Securities Commission of Zimbabwe has increased preliminary
capital adequacy requirements for firms from about US$10 000 to US$1
The highest payment will be US$1 million for Securities Exchanges, while the
lowest will be US$10 000 for Securities Dealers operating in Zimbabwe.
"Preliminary capital adequacy figures for 2011 have been revised," said
Augustine Chirume, Chief Executive, in an exclusive interview.
"The country's capital adequacy requirements shall be based on the minimum
net worth values."
He said Securities Exchanges would now cost US$1 million, Securities
Custodians (US$500 000), Securities Transfer Secretaries (US$150 000),
Securities Investment Advisor Corporate (US$150 000), and Securities Dealing
Firms (US$100 000).
Chirume said in addition, liquid capital requirements for firms would also
be hiked next year.
He said by March 31, 2011, firms would be required to have four weeks
operational cover and by June 30, this would be increased to a minimum of
US$150 000.
He said Securities Individual Investment Advisers would need US$10 000
together with Securities Dealers in Zimbabwe.
"All market players shall comply with the registration and licensing
requirements in terms of the Securities Act (Chapter 24:25) and the
Securities (Registration, Licensing and Corporate Governance) Rules,
Statutory Instrument 100 of 2010 by December 31," Chirume said.
"The deadline for submission of application is December 31,2010."
He said after December 31, 2010, it would be "illegal to continue trading
without being registered or licensed by the Securities Commission of
While not revealing the fine, Chirume said hefty penalties would be slapped
on culprits flouting the new stringent regulations.

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