The International Crisis Group (ICG) today releases a
briefing paper on the situation in Zimbabwe, three months after historic
elections almost brought down the government.
In the immediate
aftermath of the 24-25 June poll, many Zimbabweans were optimistic that a new
era of democratisation and economic reform was about to begin, after six
months of violence, intimidation, farm invasions, racist political rhetoric,
and erosion of the rule of law. Today, those hopes have been largely dashed.
The prevailing mood is one of uncertainty, frustration and anger. There is
no positive leadership: no one has a sense of where the country is headed
except down. While the new cabinet includes several new, competent ministers
in the economic area, there has been no discernible return to the rule of
law and good governance. The economy continues to spiral downwards. The
Government has announced its intention to compulsorily acquire over three
thousand commercial farms, has publicly identified over two thousand of them,
and has begun a "fast track" resettlement program that would move settlers on
to many hundreds of them before the rainy season begins in November. This
is not land reform; it is a politically driven land grab which
will devastate Zimbabwe's agriculturally based economy without immediately
benefiting those being resettled.
As before, the culprit for Zimbabwe's
continuing slide towards the abyss is President Robert Mugabe. He learned
nothing positive from the June elections. If anything he has become more
autocratic, determined to maintain personal control regardless of the costs
to the nation. He ignores constructive advice from within Zimbabwe
and from the international community.
In these grim circumstances, it
is imperative that the international community and regional neighbours
continue to provide wise counsel and bring whatever pressure they can to bear
on President Mugabe and his regime, along the lines recommended in ICG's July
report on Zimbabwe (reprinted below).
Recommendations (These
recommendations were part of ICG Africa Report No 22, "Zimbabwe: At The
Crossroads", 10 July 2000, which follows this report. They all remain
applicable.)
For the government of Zimbabwe
Restore the rule of
law. This would include enforcement of outstanding court orders with respect
to the farm invasions by the so-called war veterans, and the arrest and
prosecution of those responsible for the pre-election violence that claimed
the lives of over 30 Zimbabweans of all races. Do not victimise the MDC
opposition, and work cooperatively with it.
Address immediately the
ballooning budget deficit on the current account.
Re-engage
immediately with the World Bank, the IMF, and other potential sources of
outside assistance.
Take serious steps to establish a partnership with
the private sector to address the most serious economic and social issues
facing the country.
Address the land reform issue in a transparent,
non political manner that takes into account interests of all those involved,
perhaps through the establishment of an independent land
commission.
Withdraw the Zimbabwe armed forces deployed in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
For the international
community
Continue programs that promote democracy and human rights and
those that respond to genuine humanitarian needs.
If the new
government takes concrete steps to address the agenda of recommendations
described above, re-engage with it on a carefully calibrated basis,
responding to performance, not promises.
If the government continues
along previous lines, continuing to flout acceptable international norms and
ignoring the demonstrated will of the people as reflected in the election
results:
Limit or downgrade diplomatic relations: in the case of
the Commonwealth, by moving to suspend membership, and in the case of the
EU, by considering suspension of Zimbabwe's privileged
trade access.
Isolate senior government and ZANU (PF) leaders by
declining to receive them abroad; stop visa issuance to senior
officials.
Continue the near universal suspension of foreign
assistance programs.
Make it clear, both publicly and privately, that
until such time as Zimbabwe measures up to acceptable international standards
on the rule of law, human rights, and general good governance there will
be no return to "business as usual".
Read the full report ("Zimbabwe:
Three Months after the
Elections"; below).
ZIMBABWE:
THREE MONTHS AFTER THE ELECTIONS 26 September 2000
Summary
In
the immediate aftermath of Zimbabwe's 24-25 June 2000 Parliamentary
elections, many Zimbabweans optimistically expected that their country would
begin to return to normal -- leaving behind the six months of violence,
intimidation, farm invasions, racist political rhetoric, and erosion of the
rule of law. Three months later, their hopes have been largely dashed. As of
late September the prevailing mood is one of uncertainty, frustration and
anger. There is no positive leadership: no one has a sense of where
the country is headed except down. In the absence of some certainty
or sense of direction as to where President Robert Mugabe and the country
are headed, rumour and speculation are the kings of Harare.
While
President Mugabe's new government includes several new, competent ministers
in the economic area, there has been no discernible return to the rule of law
and good governance. None of the matters identified in ICG's 10 July
recommendations has been seriously addressed. The economy continues to spiral
downwards. The Government has announced its intention to compulsorily acquire
over three thousand commercial farms, has publicly identified over
two thousand of them, and has begun a "fast track" resettlement
program that would move settlers on to many hundreds of them before
the rainy season begins in November. This is not land reform; it is
a politically driven land grab which will devastate
Zimbabwe's agriculturally based economy without immediately benefiting
those being resettled.
As before, the culprit for Zimbabwe's
continuing slide towards the abyss is President Robert Mugabe. He learned
nothing positive from the June elections. He takes into account neither the
emergence of a popular and credible opposition, nor the distaste and
frustration evident throughout the country as a result of his intimidation
and manipulation of the election results. If anything he has become
more autocratic, determined to maintain personal control regardless of the
costs to the nation. He ignores constructive advice from within Zimbabwe,
from the leaders of important neighbouring countries, like President Thabo
Mbeki of South Africa and President Joachim Chissano of Mozambique, and from
the wider international community.
At the time this briefing was written,
there was a widespread feeling in Harare among well informed Zimbabweans of
all races that the current situation, politically and economically,
is unsustainable beyond the end of this year. There is a sense that some
event, some development will bring to a head the choices facing the country.
There is a broad belief that Mugabe is the root of all Zimbabwe's problems
and that it is time for him to go. And, there is a belief that if, and it is
a big if, he goes, the country could begin a turnaround within a matter of
days. Waiting for the constitutionally mandated presidential elections in
2002 is seen as too late by most observers, as by then the economy will be in
a shambles.
In these grim circumstances, it is imperative that the
international community and regional neighbours continue to provide wise
counsel and bring whatever pressure they can to bear on President Mugabe
and his regime, along the lines recommended in ICG's July
report (reprinted below). At the same time encouragement should be given
to the despairing rational elements in Zimbabwe, who are struggling
to return their country to a positive course.
Political
Developments
Zimbabweans, who hoped the results of the 24-25 June
2000 parliamentary elections would return their country to normalcy,
have had their expectations dashed. President Robert Mugabe, who must read
the election results as a humiliating rebuke by the electorate, has if
anything become more autocratic and seemingly determined to drive his country
to economic destruction. He has announced his intention to compulsorily
acquire over 3000 of the 4500 commercial farms, and as of early September
some 2100 have been formally designated for takeover. He has announced a
"fast track" program to resettle 150,000 peasant farmers on the farms before
the rainy season begins in November. He has refused to stop additional
land invasions by the "war vets", and enforce the rule of law. Members
of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party continue to
be victimised. Police carrying warrants to search for weapons raided the
headquarters and other branch offices of the MDC in Harare on 13 September.
In early August according to numerous sources, Mugabe rebuffed a suggestion
by elements of the ZANU/PF Central Committee that he announce that he will
not run in the 2002 Presidential election.
A broad spectrum of
well-informed observers, including senior members of ZANU/PF, the MDC, and
the private sector, currently describe the country as being in political
"transition". By this, they suggest that Mugabe is on his way out of power
and he knows but does not like it. As to scenarios and timing, they point to
a natural disaster, some unpredictable catalytic event such as an urban
uprising/strike triggered by fuel shortages, or an open revolt at the ZANU/PF
party congress scheduled for early December 2000. Others speculate that
Mugabe is plotting an exit strategy that has him bowing out at the Party
Congress after appointing two next generation Vice Presidents and ensuring
that the land issue is on an irreversible course of his choosing.
No
matter the scenario, it is increasingly clear that some senior ZANU/PF
figures want Mugabe to step down from the 2002 presidential elections and are
already repositioning themselves for a change of leadership. The weekly
'Financial Gazette', reported on 21 September that several ZANU-PF
Politburo's members, including parliamentarians, wanted Mugabe to retire but
could not agree on who should succeed him: "We are all in agreement that
Mugabe must go. That is no longer an issue," a member of ZANU PF's Politburo
-- the party's highest policy-making body - told the newspaper.
"The problem that we have at the moment is who should be
Mugabe's successor. We cannot agree on a candidate," the official said.
He added: "The biggest problem is to reach consensus on a successor
who has the support of the party's membership countrywide and the capacity
to win the 2002 election." According to multiple sources, this reflects a
serious generational split in the party; the younger generation favours
Mugabe going soon so that they can rebuild the party, with the "old guard"
favouring Mugabe staying on or a successor from their ranks to protect their
self interests including from personal prosecution.
Another notable
example of this was reported in the Financial Gazette and the Independent on
14 and 15 September respectively. They covered a remarkable 12 September
speech in Parliament by Edison Zvobgo, a long time ZANU/PF cabinet member and
now a back bench MP. Zvobgo distanced himself from Mugabe saying among
other things: "We have tainted what was a glorious revolution, reducing
it to some agrarian racist enterprise"; "We have behaved over the last few
years as if the world owes a living. It does not"; "We have blamed other
people for each and every ill that befell us"; and "As every peasant, worker,
businessman or woman now stares at the precipice of doom, let us wake up and
draw back. We must clear the slate, bury everything that has divided us and
begin again."
This in turn leads to further theorising about what is
driving Mugabe's current, post-election behaviour. One knowledgeable
and very credible source noted that it has been Mugabe's goal,
since before independence, to nationalise all the land and then parcel
it out as patronage much as a traditional chief would. Others
speculate that the current drive to acquire and resettle farms by November
is driven by Mugabe's understanding that his days in control are numbered
and his desire to leave behind an irreversible revolutionary legacy -- no
matter what the cost to the country. Senior members of ZANU/PF acknowledge
that Mugabe is angry at the whites and wants to "punish" them for supporting
the MDC. They also say he is truly bitter about the British Government's
"harsh and immature" public diplomacy on the land and rule of law
issues.
Whatever the truth, there is a widespread understanding that
Mugabe is at the root of all Zimbabwe's problems and must go. There
is, however, no clear sense of how this will take place, and there is
no indication that either his cabinet or the senior leaders of his party
presently have the will to effectively challenge him. Fear, paralysis, and
uncertainty best characterize the current political scene. For the moment, it
appears that Mugabe retains the support of the security organs of the state
and party, but several sources suggested that lower levels of the police and
army are disenchanted and might not be counted on to support his continued
rule in the event of civil unrest or a major strike in the urban
areas.
On the positive side of the otherwise dismal political ledger is
the change in Parliament resulting from the MDC's winning 57 seats in the
June election. Parliament is no longer a one note cheering section for
ZANU/PF. The opposition is giving harshly critical speeches and is asking
tough questions, highlighting corruption, mismanagement, and Zimbabwe's
misadventure in the Congo. Zimbabwe's independent press continues to focus on
these same issues and calls for an end to Mugabe's rule.
Without the
power to force change through Parliament, the MDC is focused on consolidating
and extending its year old party structure, refining policies, and developing
a legislative program. Depending on evolving events, the MDC has not ruled
out mass action protests in the urban areas where it has strong support.
Interestingly the leader of the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai, has publicly endorsed
a generous retirement package for Mugabe, including indemnity from future
prosecution. Tsvangirai confirmed to ICG that this is a serious offer as
Zimbabwe "can no longer afford" Mugabe's rule. Meanwhile, the MDC is
challenging the results of the June elections in 39 constituencies -- without
much hope of speedy action in the courts.
The Economy
The
gloomy economic picture painted in our 10 July 2000 report (reprinted below)
has not changed -- except for the worse. The key indicators cited in that
report -- unemployment, inflation, and interest rates -- all remain well over
50 per cent. The projected drop in year 2000 GDP is still over 10 per cent
and the budget deficit could be as high as 20 per cent. Government's domestic
debt has risen to about Z$118 billion as of early September. Tourism
is off 80 per cent for the year to date, and there is no new domestic or
foreign investment. Post election, international buyers returned to the
tobacco auction floors to buy the 1999-2000 crop. By the time the floors
close at the end of October, Zimbabwe Tobacco Association (ZTA) estimates the
crop (after value added processing) will earn Zimbabwe about US$400 million
in export value (equivalent to 30 per cent of total exports). Projections for
the 2000-2001 tobacco crop are for a drop of at least 15-20 per cent based on
seed and fertiliser sales. The drop could be much more severe depending
on how many tobacco farms are taken over by the government
for resettlement. In the meantime, banks are not providing crop finance to
owners of farms, which have been designated for acquisition. The result, to
cite the example of one large scale tobacco grower, follows: farm designated,
no bank finance, no crop planted, 1300 farm workers to be laid off, and US$4
million in exports to be lost. Zimbabwe's foreign exchange bureau has warned
that the country's hard currency crisis will worsen after the end of the
tobacco selling season in November.
The fuel and electricity
situations have become truly dire since the election. Petrol, diesel, and
paraffin (principal cooking fuel) are desperately short. Kilometre long fuel
lines are the daily norm -- when a shipment arrives. Zimbabwe's foreign
suppliers (to whom Zimbabwe is US$89 million in arrears) are now demanding
cash before delivery. Compounding the problem have been two government
mandated full price increases; 25 per cent at the end of July and
another 40-50 per cent on 1 September. This has added to
inflationary pressures throughout the economy and angered urban commuters who
are bearing the full brunt of the increases. This could well lead to civil
unrest in the weeks and months ahead. Several knowledgeable observers predict
that foreign exchange to buy fuel will run out absolutely by early November,
in the absence of new credit arrangements or highly unlikely IMF balance of
payments support.
The picture for electricity is much the same. Zimbabwe
is dependent on South Africa, Mozambique, and the DRC for 45 per cent of
its electricity because its own generating capacity is in disrepair
for reasons of poor maintenance and a lack of foreign exchange
for essential spare parts. Zimbabwe, which has very large overdue bills to
all three suppliers, has increased rates for consumers and suffers from both
scheduled and unscheduled load shedding. The result is devastating across the
whole economy.
Looking ahead, most economists believe Zimbabwe will not
face a food security crisis over the next twelve months because of a
bumper maize harvest for the 1999-2000 season. Luxury foods such as
wheat for bread and rice, however, will run way short of demand. And it
is an open question what the food situation will be a year from now. Much
will depend on whether government proceeds as announced with its land
acquisitions, the effects of farm invasions, and just how much is planted in
November when the rains begin.
On the positive side, President Mugabe
appointed to his new cabinet in July two, new, capable technocrats as
Ministers of Finance and Commerce and Industry. Whether he will allow them
the authority to do their jobs professionally remains to be seen. Dr Simba
Makoni, the new Finance Minister, did announce on 3 August a
long anticipated and necessary devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar from
38 to 50 to the U.S. dollar and pledged to bring discipline to the budget.
Meanwhile the "street" price for a U.S. dollar is in the 60-70 range and no
evidence has yet emerged that the budget deficit has been brought under
control.
Our consultant's visit at the end of August 2000 coincided with
that of an August-September IMF mission. The Government sought balance
of payments support, but by all accounts was unable to meet the
IMF's conditions, which are understood to have included action on
the budget deficit, rule of law, and land reform. The MDC and
private sector groups, which the IMF mission also met with, argued for
very strict conditionality particularly on the rule of law and land reform
issues. Indeed, the MDC was blunt in saying "no bailout", but be prepared to
help a successor government that pursues sound economic and social
policies.
The Land Issue
Post-election, as already indicated
previously in this report, the land issue has escalated dramatically. The
government has announced its intention to compulsorily acquire 3041
commercial farms. As of 8 September, 2102 had been formally gazetted. In
July, the government announced a "fast track" resettlement program with the
intent of placing 150,000 families on the designated farms before the
planting season begins in November. No serious plans have been made
to support those being resettled nor does the already broke
government have the resources to do so even if it had a well thought out
plan. The conclusion is inescapable that what is underway is
a Mugabe-driven politically motivated land grab, not an economically or
socially viable land reform program. As two extremely well informed sources
told ICG, Mugabe is "determined and can't be stopped" on land, a subject on
which he listens to "no one".
Meanwhile the number of farms invaded or
occupied by the so-called "war vets" continues to rise. Farming operations
are being impeded, trees are being cut and game is being poached on a large
scale. There is a spirit of lawlessness in the commercial farming
areas where the police are being ordered not to enforce the law.
Several good sources say that police, at the working level, are
increasingly unhappy about being politically impeded from doing their
job.
Sadly, as Mugabe pursues his land obsession, no thought is
being given by the Government to the hundreds of thousands of farm
workers and their families who will be displaced as new settlers are
moved onto the acquired farms. All told, according to CFU figures,
there are 350,000-400,000 workers on commercial farms who together
with their dependents make up well over 10 per cent of
Zimbabwe's population. It appears that government favours ZANU/PF party
members in allocating land and feels it owes nothing to the farm workers
who are regarded as MDC supporters. Many farm workers are also seen
as "foreigners", of Zambian, Malawian or Mozambique ancestry,
and therefore undeserving. The disastrous economic consequences of
a helter-skelter resettlement program are also being ignored. In
an economy that is directly and indirectly 60 per cent based
on agriculture, this is, in the words of the MDC leader, sheer
madness.
On the other side of the issue, the Commercial Farmers Union
(CFU) is severely embattled and under strain after nine months
of continuous crisis. They have continuing daily concerns about
the physical security of their members. They have tried to no avail
to negotiate a reasonable land reform package with the government.
For much of July and August, the CFU leadership vacillated over filing
a constitutional suit against the government over the land
acquisition issue. Whether to file or whether to continue fruitless
negotiations deeply divided the membership. In early September it was
finally decided to file suit while leaving the door open to
further negotiation. As a constitutional issue it will go to the
Supreme Court for decision. Given Mugabe's apparent legacy-driven
motivation on the land issue and his previously demonstrated willingness
to ignore court orders against the land invaders, many observers question
whether Mugabe would abide by an adverse Supreme Court finding. A major
constitutional crisis is a real possibility, and could be the catalytic event
those favouring a change of leadership are waiting for.
Clearly, the
next few months are likely to be decisive as far as the land issue is
concerned. There is much at stake for all concerned. It's not just about 3000
commercial farmers, or 350,000 farm workers and their families, or the
ancillary businesses around the country that are dependent on servicing the
farms and receiving their output; it's about the viability of the whole
country and the consequences of an economic failure of Zimbabwe on all of
Southern Africa.
Zimbabwe and the DRC
In August 1998,
President Mugabe sent a Zimbabwe army expeditionary force to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) to support the faltering regime of President
Kabila. This was done with little or no consultation with Parliament, the
cabinet or his party's central committee or with Zimbabwe's regional
partners, and until August 2000, the Zimbabwe public was provided little
information about the engagement -- including what it cost and casualties
incurred. There was, of course, much speculation about lucrative mineral
deals but no hard facts. One long-time observer claims plausibly that
Mugabe engaged out of ego, that the shift of the limelight from him
to Mandela-Mbeki led him to look north to the Congo to prove that
he remained a player on the wider African scene. There is no discernible
public support for the DRC engagement, and an unusually well-informed source
indicated to ICG that many in the army itself, which is one of the most
professional in Africa, are unhappy about the engagement and want to come
home. There is also a wide spread belief that the DRC misadventure is a major
contributor to Zimbabwe's current economic woes.
Finally, on 30 August
2000 in response to an opposition question in parliament, the new Minister of
Finance, Dr Simba Makoni, conceded that between August 1998 and June 2000 the
engagement had cost 10 billion Zimbabwe dollars (roughly US$200 million). He
also said "our economy cannot sustain expenditure of this magnitude for an
extended period, and that this is why government is committed to bring
our troops back home at the earliest opportunity". This disclosure
was welcome, but few observers believe that Makoni's cost figure
was accurate, with most educated guesses putting the true figure at
well over US $500 million. Mugabe has called several times for
more regional and international support for the Lusaka agreement,
which foresees the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC. But as
of yet there has been no movement on the return of the 13,000 Zimbabwean
forces from the DRC.
Conclusion
Three months after the June
elections, Zimbabwe is a dispirited country. Nothing is going right, everyone
knows what the problems are and who is responsible, and people feel powerless
to bring about the change that is so desperately needed. The mood is glum.
That said, underneath the current despair there seems to be
growing consensus that the current downward economic and political drift
is unsustainable, that something will happen that will allow the country
to regain its footing and get back on course. Zimbabwe is arguably the
best-educated country in sub-Saharan Africa; its people have seen better
times and have high expectations that their country can turn
around.
Visiting Zimbabwe today is a bit like watching warning puffs
of smoke coming out of a volcano -- it's going to blow, but how and when
no one knows. In the meantime, the international community should remain
focused on Zimbabwe, pushing the agenda of recommendations contained in ICG's
10 July report and reprinted below. On good authority, it is known that
Zimbabwe's neighbours, particularly South African and Mozambiquean Presidents
Mbeki and Chissano, have privately offered wise counsel to President
Mugabe. That they have been brushed off so far does not mean they
should cease their efforts. Indeed, they and the rest of the
concerned international community should increase their efforts to make
it clear to Mugabe that his present policies are pushing Zimbabwe toward
an abyss and even greater isolation. At the same time the international
community needs to continually signal privately and publicly that it cares
about Zimbabwe, and that, when Zimbabwe returns to the rule of law, pursues
sensible policies and good governance, and observes broadly accepted
international norms of behaviour, then the world will be willing to help on
the road back.
Recommendations (These recommendations were part of
ICG Africa Report No 22, "Zimbabwe:At the Crossroads", 10 July 2000. They all
remain applicable. This report follows below.)
For the government
of Zimbabwe
Restore the rule of law. This would include enforcement
of outstanding court orders with respect to the farm invasions by
the so-called war veterans, and the arrest and prosecution of
those responsible for the pre-election violence that claimed the lives
of over 30 Zimbabweans of all races. Do not victimise the MDC opposition,
and work cooperatively with it.
Address immediately the ballooning budget
deficit on the current account.
Re-engage immediately with the World
Bank, the IMF, and other potential sources of outside assistance.
Take
serious steps to establish a partnership with the private sector to address
the most serious economic and social issues facing the
country.
Address the land reform issue in a transparent, non political
manner that takes into account interests of all those involved,
perhaps through the establishment of an independent land
commission.
Withdraw the Zimbabwe armed forces deployed in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
For the international
community
Continue programs that promote democracy and human rights and
those that respond to genuine humanitarian needs.
If the new
government takes concrete steps to address the agenda of recommendations
described above, re-engage with it on a carefully calibrated basis,
responding to performance, not promises.
If the government continues
along previous lines, continuing to flout acceptable international norms and
ignoring the demonstrated will of the people as reflected in the election
results:
Limit or downgrade diplomatic relations: in the case of
the Commonwealth, by moving to suspend membership, and in the case of the
EU, by considering suspension of Zimbabwe's privileged
trade access.
Isolate senior government and ZANU (PF) leaders by
declining to receive them abroad; stop visa issuance to senior
officials.
Continue the near universal suspension of foreign
assistance programs.
Make it clear, both publicly and privately, that
until such time as Zimbabwe measures up to acceptable international standards
on the rule of law, human rights, and general good governance there will
be no return to "business as usual".
