The Zimbabwe Situation

Rival Imperialism and How the Zanu-PF/MDC Deal Ignored Civil SocietyThe tragedy which has beset the people of Zimbabwe, itself an indictment against the praxis of armed struggle controlled by a central political elite, is well-known. Zimbabweans waged a courageous guerilla war against colonialism only for the leader of that liberation movement, who has jealously guarded his presidency since Zimbabwe’s 1980 independence, to have turned out to be a despot equal to or rivaling the hated colonial ruler Ian Smith, who the people of Zimbabwe (then southern Rhodesia) fought so hard to rid themselves of. The Matabeleland massacres of the 1980s to root-out predominantly Ndebele opposition to Robert Mugabe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union (now Zanu-Patriotic Front) - the feared reprisals of which induce him, and high-ranking military officials close to him to this day to clench so strongly to power, for fear of being charged with crimes against humanity; the systematic abduction, torture and murder of political dissidents; the rigged elections and consequent campaigns of harassment and intimidation of opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) supporters in the wake of Mugabe’s first electoral defeat in 28 years; the shattered economy, with the world’s highest inflation-rate and the recent outbreak of cholera - which Mugabe blames on biological warfare being waged against Zimbabwe by the Western imperialist powers - are no secret, and need not be discussed in any detail here. That Zimbabwe is in a social-economic-political crisis, and has been dragged there by the ‘paranoid mismanagement’ of the Mugabe regime is widely acknowledged - outside of a small circle of confused so-called leftists, often, ironically, in the Western world, particularly the US, who see in Mugabe the same illusions of a hero who stood up to Western imperialism, of which they see Zimbabwe as the victim, as many see in Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and the now decrepit - if not secretly buried - Fidel Castro. Indeed, as noted by African scholar Horace Campbell, the Mugabe regime has been sure to capitalise on its victimhood status, and

‘The Zimbabwe government is very aware of the anti-imperialist and anti-racist sentiments among oppressed peoples and thus has deployed a range of propagandists inside and outside of the country in a bid to link every problem in Zimbabwe to international sanctions by the EU and USA. Anti-imperialists in the USA cite the Zimbabwe Reconstruction and Development Act (Zidera) – passed by the US Congress in 2001 – as being a source of economic woe for poor Zimbabweans.’

That Mugabe can count amongst his few supporters, then, some of those who naively swallow his pseudo-anti-imperialist rhetoric as they and others do that of Chávez and Castro is not surprising. What is also not surprising, albeit perhaps a bit contradictory on the surface, is that these people blindly accept Mugabe’s anti-imperialist rhetoric while he, at the same time as denouncing Western imperialism, happily accepts the support of other imperialist powers, namely that of Russia and China [1]. While it is true that both Russia and China (who shipped weapons to the Mugabe regime during the electoral crisis, when people were being abducted, tortured and killed at an alarming rate) vetoed the proposal put forward by the US and UK in the United Nations Security Council to impose multilateral arms, travel and financial sanctions on Zimbabwe - sanctions which would undoubtedly mean more poverty and which would hit the poor hardest, not the high cabinet officials supposed to be targeted - this must not be mistaken for an act of international solidarity or even humanitarianism.

China supplied weapons to the Mugabe regime at a time when it was violently cracking down on its opposition, the people of Zimbabwe, and it is clear to us that Mugabe would have used those weapons against them had their arrival not been delayed by the real working class solidarity of the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (Satawu), members of which refused to offload the weapons destined for the Butcher of Harare at Durban harbour [2]. China currently has the fastest growing economy in the world, estimated to have recently overtaken that of Germany, and it is a fast-growing imperialist power with interests across Africa. It must be clear then that imperialism, not humanitarianism, is its mission in Zimbabwe. To keep growing the Chinese economy needs cheap raw materials, and it is for this reason that China is extending its presence and influence across Africa, including Zimbabwe.

MDC - From Class Struggle to Neo-LiberalismThe Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), main opposition to Zanu-PF, emerged out of the trade union movement and the popular struggles of the 1990s as the political arm of the labour movement and an alternative to the ruling party. Its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai’s credentials thus lie, understandably, in his fairly heroic role as a trade union militant, and it is largely for this reason that he commands the support he does. Since the end of the last decade the MDC’s primary sphere of political engagement, however, has been in contesting elections, and it has all but forgotten its heritage in the tradition of working class militancy. Since turning its focus to elections the MDC has avoided or been unwilling to call for or support strikes and other mass actions, thus wasting important struggles, and failed to mobilise people on the streets in response to Zanu-PF election-rigging and consequent campaigns of terror. Despite having its roots in struggle, its leader himself coming from a struggle background, the MDC has consistently moved further and further away from the empowering tradition of mass struggles in its pursuit of power.

That the MDC won the March 29 elections, and has the support of the majority of the population - even if they were intimidated into either not voting, or voting for Zanu-PF - is not contested by anyone other than Mugabe and some other lunatics close to him. It is also not contested that Hamas was democratically elected in Gaza in 2005, but that does not mean that Hamas represents, or has at heart the best interests of the working class and poor Gazan majority. The number of ordinary Gazans who have been executed by Hamas for refusing to collaborate with them testifies to this. Neither does it mean that, because the ANC won an overwhelming electoral victory in 1994, it has the best interests of the South African popular classes in mind. In fact its policies since coming to power in 1994 have consistently shown that, far from caring for the masses and wishing to deliver to them, the ANC has sought only to enrich its own elite, the upper levels of its hierarchy, while at the same time making the ‘better life for all’ it promised, and which saw it to electoral victory, more and more inaccessible to the poor and working poor of South Africa and the region.

As is the case with Hamas, which wants political control of Palestine not to deliver the people from occupation, opening up channels for aid, development and the freedom of movement for Palestinians to seek jobs and opportunities elsewhere, but to impose its own fundamentalist ideology on the region; so too does the MDC seek political control of Zimbabwe in order to impose its neo-liberal, free-market fundamentalist ideology on the people of Zimbabwe, thus enriching its political elite, and businessmen and -women sympathetic to it, as has done the ANC. This is because the MDC’s neo-liberal ideology says that, if Zimbabwe can be made attractive to foreign investment - even if it means suppressing workers’ struggles for better wages - and the economy orientated towards competing on the global market - as opposed to meeting people’s needs - money will flow into the country at the top, to the corporate CEOs, land- and mine-owners etc., and, the more wealth is accumulated at the top, will eventually trickle down the class pyramid to those, wretchedly poor, at the bottom. This is the same ideology as adopted by the ANC and we can see that, despite a few blacks having become extremely rich and a new black elite having been created, the wealth gap in South Africa is in fact widening; the money accumulated at the top simply does not trickle down, or does so in such tiny trickles as to have no impact. This mistaken belief, held by the MDC, has led it to abandon its real supporters - the organised working class, and the tradition of struggle - and into all sorts of unholy alliances; such as that with the former colonial power, thus allowing Mugabe to play his MDC-sponosored-by-imperialism card. It is the weakness of the MDC’s politics which has led it away from its power-base and the tradition of mass struggles and worker militancy into the spectacle of party-political negotiations and unholy alliances, which have allowed Mugabe to play the only card that continues to win him support; in doing so, sowing its own demise.

Of course it has been said by the West - prior to the global economic downturn - that unprecedented sums of money would be opened up for aid and development in light of an opposition-led government in Zimbabwe, but this is secondary and by no means the driving motive behind MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s ambitions for presidency. If it were then he shouldn’t have a problem with cozying up to China, which also provides assistance to Zimbabwe - however dubious from the point of view of Zimbabwe’s indebtedness to that country (although the same applies concerning indebtedness to the West) - in the forms of grants, loans and humanitarian aid, such as cholera vaccines to the value of $500,000 after the outbreak late in 2008 [3]. The difference is that China refuses to join the chorus of other world leaders calling for Mugabe to stand down, threatening a withholding or reduction of aid to Zimbabwe if he does not. If both the West, particularly the UK, and China are both seemingly interested in developing the Zimbabwean economy and providing humanitarian assistance then why is it that Tsvangirai finds support in the West and Mugabe in the East?

The MDC has found support in the Western imperialist powers not because Tsvangirai too wants to open up channels for emergency aid and development packages to enter the country, although it is not suggested here that he doesn’t; but because he is willing to implement the neo-liberal ideology of the West. Thus opening up new markets and giving the West access to largely untapped natural resources and a labour force that is probably willing to work for next-to-nothing if it means being able to withdraw that measly amount from an ATM and using it to buy bread without having to queue for hours only to find, on reaching the front of the queue, that inflation has devalued the amount you withdrew to the point that you can no loner afford the bread for which it was withdrawn. Before the global financial crisis the West, particularly the former colonial power, was very wiling to send aid into Zimbabwe, and to lend it money to develop its economy. But once again this is not about helping poor Zimbabweans, it is about developing the Zimbabwean economy so that it can once again become profitable, and the aid packages would have strings attached by the World Bank, IMF and perhaps to a lesser extent the African Development Bank. In the wake of the global economic crisis, an economically viable Zimbabwe could be helpful in alleviating the profit-pinch the capitalist class are feeling, but few countries would now have the money available for the long-term investments in infrastructure, health and education necessary for this.

The possibility of investment in Zimbabwe, credit loans and development packages, not to mention a cheap labour force, the movement of which has been all but crushed under Mugabe, and the natural resources Zimbabwe has to offer are very attractive to global investors. Anglo-American, for example, has, despite external pressure from the British government, indicated a willingness to ‘invest an additional US$400 million to continue its control of platinum mines in Zimbabwe’ [4]. Despite its anti-imperialist rhetoric the Zimbabwean government has been very accommodating of foreign capitalists, and has severely weakened workers’ rights and struggles in the mining and other sectors in order to attract their investment. This has proven attractive to Chinese capitalists too as, amongst other things, being a large producer and exporter of motor cars, the Chinese economy needs access to cheap platinum, which is used as a catalytic converter in car engines. In 2008 the Chinese government said it was keen to invest in Zimbabwe’s gold and platinum mining sectors [5].

China, in turn, supports Mugabe and Zanu-PF not because it is ‘anti-imperialist’ and does not want the West to have access to the hidden treasures of Zimbabwe, as well as to those of other African countries to which Zimbabwe could provide a gateway, nor because of a common Maoist background, but because China, itself, is imperialist in its own right and already has access to some of these minerals and markets - for example that of weapons - and, rather than lose or share this access, wants to expand it. Trade between Africa and China increased 35% between the years 2004 and 2005, for example, and China is heavily dependent on oil and other natural resource supplies from Africa. The Congo, for example, is one of China’s top suppliers of copper, cobalt and coltan, and the links that Robert Mugabe and his cronies have maintained in the Congo since Zimbabwe’s military involvement there in 1998 - when DRC President Kabila and Mugabe signed mining contracts, worth millions of US dollars, for corporations owned by Mugabe and his family - make it possible to believe that there is another reason why China is cozying up to Mugabe; because it wants to have strategic access to the mineral-rich DRC. Another such link is arms dealer John Bredenkamp, British Aerospace’s (BAE) Southern African agent who ‘has had a controversial career, ranging from supplying goods to the Zimbabwe military regime to mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo’ [6]. Incidentally, it is also these links, between the ANC, Zanu-PF and the South African and Zimbabwean ruling class and arms dealers like Bredenkamp and Fana Hlongwane, alleged former advisor to late defence minister Joe Modise, and their links to the controversial arms deal in South Africa, that kept former President Thabo Mbeki from speaking out against Mugabe during his years of ‘quiet diplomacy’ as SADC-appointed mediator between Tsvangirai and Mugabe.

Power-Sharing or Power Hungry?Stop-start power-sharing talks between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, mediated by Thabo Mbeki, began on 24 July 2008, and on 15 September an agreement on forming a national unity government comprising of Mugabe, Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, leader of the MDC breakaway faction, was signed. The agreement was to allow for the sharing out of executive powers between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, but soon reached deadlock once again, this time over who would hold executive power and control of key ministries such as those of defence, police and so-called correctional services. It fast became clear that Mugabe and his cronies are not willing to accept a genuine power sharing deal, nor was Morgan Tsvangirai and the MDC willing to accept a junior position in a Zanu-PF controlled administration in which they would be unable to unlock the corridors to much-needed aid, economic and social reforms and investment, consequently opening the country up to the neo-liberal world economy by accepting World Bank and IMF loans to rebuild the economy that would, ultimately, plunge Zimbabwe into being a heavily indebted country.

Although we anarchists would argue that no solution negotiated between bourgeois politicians could ever truly benefit the poor of Zimbabwe in the long run, there is a claim, put forward by the International Crisis Group, that there ‘is a possible negotiated way forward that could avoid Zimbabwe’s complete collapse’ but that it would require ‘a radical shift in negotiating objectives by the country’s leaders and regional states’. The ‘core idea’ being, it says, ‘to establish a transitional administration, run by non-partisan experts, in which neither Mugabe nor Tsvangirai would have any position. It would be mandated to implement fundamental political and economic reforms to stabilise the economy and prepare new presidential elections in eighteen months’ [7].

Clearly a power-sharing deal in which Mugabe retains the presidency and Tsvangirai occupies the seat of prime minister is incapable of producing an outcome favourable to the Zimbabwean people, and any alternative that could get rid of Mugabe and save Zimbabwe from complete collapse is favourable. As has been demonstrated, however, both sides party to the negotiations are more concerned with how the outcome will effect themselves and, in the case of both MDCs, their political careers than they are with how they could influence the negotiations to the benefit of the people, and this is why they have resisted proposals such as that put forward by the Crisis Group. Mugabe and his allies in the upper echelons of state and, particularly military power, are concerned with what will be their fate should they be dethroned; whether they will be called to answer for the crimes against humanity of which they are guilty. Tsvangirai is concerned with how he can take power, implement some needed reforms and unlock the Western aid and humanitarian intervention earmarked for a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, thus further establishing himself as the good guy who saved Zimbabwe while, at the same time, making sure that the poor and working poor of Zimbabwe do not become in any way empowered by the transition from dictatorship to bourgeois democracy to the extent that they may begin to make demands of him and his administration that are not within the spectrum of his plans for neo-liberalising the Zimbabwean economy.

Nowhere is this more evident than the manner in which both factions of the MDC consistently side-lined or ignored Zimbabwean civil society in the negotiations towards a power-sharing deal and the drafting of a new Constitution. Mugabe obviously is not interested in democracy and popular participation, so it should come as no surprise that he and Zanu-PF would not consult trade unions and civil society on the process of power-sharing. But Tsvangirai, on the other hand, makes all the pretenses towards caring about the popular will and democracy, but has done little to nothing to involve civil society and the trade unions in the negotiations. This is because he does not want them to get a taste of what it is like to control one’s own destiny, to have a say in the way that society is run because, were this to happen, civil society and the trade unions would undoubtedly want to be increasingly involved in the policy-making and running of a post-Mugabe Zimbabwe, and this is clearly unacceptable to someone with an anti-worker, anti-poor neo-liberal agenda. It is better that they remain accustomed to sitting back helplessly while the government sets policy and makes decisions as to the future of the country. Such concerns were raised by the Zimbabwean Congress of Trade Unions [8] that,

‘there has not been openness and wider consultation on the drafting of the MoU [Memorandum of Unity]. On behalf of labour, the MoU has not been availed to us for scrutiny or comment. The only time we have had a feel of the MoU, has been through the media, where we are told that MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had at one time refused to sign it. Nothing more has been said about the document. The process seems to have been left to the three antagonizing parties, that is, the MDC – T, the MDC – M and Zanu-PF’.

Similarly, as was noted in a SADC Civil Society Statement on Zimbabwe on the Memorandum of Unity, ‘the process lacks inclusivity, [is] insensitive to gender equity and balance, [is] undermined by continued militarisation of the country, lacks transparency and accountability processes’. "Operation Zimbabwe Freedom?"In light of this apparent impossibility for a negotiated way out of the crisis, where the only thing the antagonising parties can agree on is that the Zimbabwean people must not be empowered by the process, some people, including Zimbabweans, have called for military intervention to oust Mugabe. While it seems to many that there may be little alternative, the detrimental effects of military intervention were correctly noted by a group of African scholars, stating that:

‘Military interventions exacerbate political and socio-economic crises and internal differences with profoundly detrimental and destructive regional implications. We recognise that threats of military intervention come from imperialist powers, and also through their African proxies.’ [9]

Zimbabweans who are desperate for change might hope for Western or African Union military intervention, but we know that any invaders would not only attack Zanu-PF, but that many civilians would be caught-up in the crossfire, as has happened in Iraq and elsewhere, and that military intervention would be used only to establish a puppet regime sympathetic to Western capitalism, and not to liberate ordinary Zimbabweans and give them control of their lives. Anti-imperialists and anarchists should therefore oppose any military intervention by imperialist powers, but it is important that this not be confused with support for the crass anti-imperialism of the Robert Mugabe regime, and that they continue to staunchly oppose and criticise him and his allies.

As noted by Horace Campbell:

‘Instead of oversimplifying imperialist threats in Zimbabwe, those who want to see the demilitarisation of Africa must aggressively support the exposure of the arms deals that have linked Bredenkamp and Fana Hlongwane [...] across the politics of repression in South Africa and Zimbabwe. The British arms manufacturer British Aerospace (BAe) has been involved with Bredenkamp and Hlongwane in Africa, along with corrupt elements in the Middle East. There have been calls for BAe to be prosecuted under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of the USA. Such an investigation would have potentially seismic consequences for military contractors and arms manufacturers and would provide another means of opposing Western militarism in Africa.’

He goes on to say that if activists and others were,

‘to expose the linkages between Zanu-PF arms dealers John Bredenkamp and Fana Hlongwane along with the wider linkages to international capital, then it would be clear that it is quite an oversimplification to argue that Zidera is at the centre of Zimbabwe’s problems. Bredenkamp had been schooled from the Smith era to blame everything on sanctions while beating the sanctions with the help of apartheid South Africa. In the present period Bredenkamp is an ally of the ANC, Zanu-PF and British imperialist arms manufacturers like BAe all at the same time.’

The Struggle Aborted - Towards a Libertarian Communist AlternativeDisregarding the possibility of foreign military intervention, then, the problem with what the Crisis Group and SADC civil society argue for with the notion of the transitional authority, which they say should be an ‘impartial party [...] headed by an individual who is not a member of Zanu-PF or MDC’ [10] is that it still promotes the idea of one-man political leadership, the worst manifestation of which, dictatorship, is exactly what Zimbabwe is trying to rid itself of. Although they do say that ‘a broad sector of Zimbabwean society should be incorporated into the transitional authority, including representatives from labour, women’s and children’s rights groups, churches, and other interest groups’ their conception of the transitional authority is still rooted in the hierarchical, top-down political structures of bourgeois democracy, and does little to nothing to ensure the maximum participation of working class and poor people and foster a real culture of direct democracy and participation. Rather than experimenting with new methods of collective self-governance, the transitional authority is to ‘govern the country until the newly elected government is installed’. What is needed in Zimbabwe is not a ‘civilian authority’ that can lead the country to free and fair elections - as much as that would be preferable to what exists now - but genuine and permanent people’s self-governance, through the federation of popular assemblies and workers’ councils.

The ruling class in South Africa and Zimbabwe, on both sides of the political divide, is keen to find a solution to the current impasse in order to stabilise the situation so that the exploitation of the Zimbabwean working people can continue unabated, no longer under the spotlight of world media and NGOs. The popular classes of Zimbabwe must take advantage of the current situation, where there is a focus on Zimbabwe in light of the cholera outbreak and the so-called breakthrough in the power-sharing negotiations, to immediately establish organs for popular participation in policy-making and the drafting of constitutional amendments such as neighbourhood or popular assemblies, workers’ councils and students’, women’s and youth organisations that can collectively discuss what they want for Zimbabwe and organise to put pressure on the Unity Government to have their demands met.

In the last analysis, the MDC has not taken office in the way in which the ANC, or for that matter Hamas did. Tsvangirai and company have been co-opted into an unchanged regime in the same way in which Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (Zapu) was co-opted by Zanu-PF before being swallowed whole. Tsvangirai’s entrance into a Mugabe-led administration is like Nelson Mandela accepting a post in PW Botha’s cabinet - a farce, foolish to the extreme and bound to end very badly indeed for Mandela. This is not the usually disappointing outcome of a pro-democracy movement - a victory over a very authoritarian regime, but a new ruling party unable or unwilling to make fundamental social and economic changes or to accommodate more democracy than the ballot - but an aborted pro-democracy struggle. The spin-off of this is that, as was the case in South Africa after Nelson Mandela rose to power in 1994, and as will probably be the case when Jacob Zuma assumes the presidency later this year, there will be a honeymoon period in Zimbabwe in the wake of the power-sharing deal. This period may well be characterised by a general decline in workers’ militancy and popular struggles as people, feeling that they now have a ‘comrade on the inside’, sit back and wait for change from above. After a few years, however, as it becomes increasingly clear to the people that Tsvangirai is unable to effect change from within a Mugabe-led administration, and the pro-capitalist policies of Tsvangirai’s MDC - or whomsoever assumes the reigns of capitalist rule after the Unity Government - are unable to deliver, new movements will emerge, as they did in South Africa, to put pressure on the new government to make good on its promises. The establishment of popular assemblies and workers’ councils now could provide the foundation for these new social movements, most likely centered around issues of service delivery and the immediate material needs of the popular classes, and could determine the character they take; the more people get accustomed to popular democracy and participation now, the more likely will the social movements of the future embody the libertarian and horizontal spirit vital for the successful overthrow of the capitalist system of which both the dictatorship of Mugabe and the bourgeois democracy of the MDC and ANC are a symptom.

The difference between South Africa and Zimbabwe, however, lies in the fact that there has not been a transition to democracy in the latter, that the struggle for democracy has been aborted by its leader, who has now been co-opted into the regime he fought against. The challenge for revolutionaries and the popular classes in Zimbabwe, then, is to keep the democratic struggle alive and to link it with the struggles for service delivery, development and the demilitarisation of society.

Notes:

1. See FdCA article on Chinese and Russian Imperialism
2. See ZACF statement on Chinese weapons shipment to Zimbabwe
3. China Considers Humanitarian Aid for Zimbabwe
4. How Britain put the finger on Hlongwane, Published: Nov 30, 2008, The Times
5. Chinese keen to invest in Zimbabwe gold, platinum mining
6. Horace Campbell (2008-12-18), Mamdani, Mugabe and the African scholarly community - The Africanisation of exploitation, (Campbell is Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University).
7. A Way Forward for Zimbabwe – International Crisis Group
8. ZCTU press release, 21 July 2008, W.T Chibebe, Secretary-General
9. Horace Campbell (2008-12-18), Mamdani, Mugabe and the African scholarly community - The Africanisation of exploitation
10. A Way Forward for Zimbabwe – International Crisis Group

BILL WATCH 13/2009

[5th April 2009]

Both Houses of Parliament have adjourned until Tuesday 12th May

Update on Legislation

The Finance Bill, the Appropriation (2009) Bill and the Appropriation (2008) (Additional) Bill await signature by the President and subsequent gazetting as Acts. They will not have the force of law until gazetted. No significant statutory instruments were gazetted.

There are no new Bills in the pipeline. The adjournment of Parliament for nearly six weeks suggests that the Government is not nearly ready with the Bills it has promised to give effect to its "democratisation agenda". It is hoped that when Parliament sits again, the relevant Ministries will have prepared legislation in the areas of media freedom, freedom of association and the rule of law ready to be presented to Parliament.

Last Week in Parliament

House of Assembly

Tuesday

· the Speaker announced the members of the Parliamentary Legal Committee [PLC] [See note on Committees below.]

· the Additional Estimates of Expenditure for 2008 were introduced with a brief explanation by the Minister of Finance and approved without debate or questions. The Minister pointed out that the funds had already been irretrievably spent, but MPs could have raised queries about how the money was spent – there were some obvious discrepancies between the total expenditure in 2008 [ZWD 51 quintillion] and the much larger amount of revenue collected in 2008 [nearly ZWD 15 000 quintillion].

Wednesday

· the Appropriation (2008) (Additional) Bill [to give legal effect to the Additional Estimates] was cleared by the PLC, fast tracked through all its stages in a few minutes without debate or questions and transmitted to the Senate.

· Question Time [see below for notes on Questions]

· the Speaker announced the appointment of the Public Accounts Committee and Portfolio Committees [See note on Committees below.]

Senate

Tuesday – there were further contributions to the debate on the President’s speech.

Wednesday – the Appropriation (2008) (Additional) Bill was fast tracked through all stages without debate or questions.

To fast track the Appropriation Bill through both Houses, Standing Orders were suspended, although there was no deadline to be met [other than Parliament’s desire to adjourn]. The fact that no questions were raised is another example of Parliament rubber-stamping what the executive places before it. It is not too late, however, for a Parliamentary Committee to make enquiries on behalf of tax payers.

Committees

Parliament's Committee on Standing Rules and Orders [CSRO] met on Monday and appointed the Parliamentary Legal Committee [PLC], the Public Accounts Committee [PAC] and Portfolio Committees [PCs].

House of Assembly Portfolio Committees

· There are nineteen Committees to shadow thirty-two Ministries. Some Committees will shadow two or more Ministries [e.g. one PC will shadow Home Affairs and Defence; another, Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare].

· Unlike the last Parliament's Portfolio Committees, which were joint committees made up of both MPs and Senators, the new Portfolio Committees are House of Assembly Committees only.

Senate Committees not yet appointed

It is understood that the Senate will have its own "thematic committees" – yet to be announced – which will concentrate on themes, such as HIV/AIDS, as opposed to "shadowing" a particular Ministry or Ministries in the manner of Portfolio Committees.

[A Bill Watch Special, to be distributed soon, will be devoted to the Committees, their membership and functions.]

Select Committee of Parliament to Prepare the New Constitution

Under the Interparty Political Agreement [IPA] a Select Committee of Parliament to draft a new Constitution must be set up by the 13th April [two months after the inception of the new government]. Select Committee members are appointed by the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders. Unofficial reports say the three political parties have agreed that the Select Committee should consist of 25 members of Parliament co-chaired by a member from each of the parties. [A suggestion that the chairperson should be a retired judge from outside Parliament has apparently been abandoned for being against Parliamentary Standing Orders.]

Constitutional Subcommittees Under the IPA the Select Committee must set up subcommittees to assist it in its work. Subcommittees must be chaired by members of Parliament and be composed of members of Parliament and representatives of civil society.

Nomination of Members of Independent Commissions

According to Constitution as now amended by the terms of the IPA, the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders must be consulted by the President before he appoints the chairpersons of the four Independent Commissions:

· Zimbabwe Electoral Commission

· Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission

· Zimbabwe Media Commission

· Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission.

The CSRO also nominates candidates for appointment as members of these Commissions, with the President being confined to choosing appointees from the lists provided by the CSRO. Unofficial reports say these Commissions will be constituted or, in the cases of ZEC and the Anti-Corruption Commission, re-constituted by the end of April.

Replies to Questions

Some of the more significant replies were as follows:

Minister Mutsekwa [Home Affairs] explained that his Ministry was still looking into why the UN Convention on Torture had not been ratified. On the use of torture to extract confessions, he said the Ministry does not approve of this, and pointed out that such confessions are not admissible in court. This fell short of outright condemnation of torture as conduct totally unacceptable in principle. In response to a supplementary question about police failures to investigate complaints of torture, he pointed to the difficulty of proving such cases. On long-standing failure by the police to prosecute persons accused of crimes, including murder, committed against MDC members during the election campaign, he gave an assurance that everyone would be brought to book.

Minister Kasukuwere [Youth Development] denied that any youths had been employed by the Government for election campaigning in 2008, and stated that the Ministry employs “youth co-ordinating officers” throughout the country at ward level, co-ordinating projects to empower youth. The Ministry is conducting a Human Resources Audit to ascertain how many are actually working. Hansard records of the follow-up questions and the Minister’s answers were “not recorded due to a technical fault”. [Note: press reports claim that up to 29 000 youths are still being paid by government. With monthly allowances for civil servants pegged at US$100, that means nearly US$ 3 million is being spent monthly on paying youths whose mandate has not been fully accounted for. Parliamentarians need to pursue this and if necessary launch a Portfolio Committee enquiry into how these youth are deployed.]

Next Question Time

The next Question Time will be on Wednesday 13th May. Key questions carried forward include renewed queries on the Chiadzwa diamond fields [deaths of panners, environmental issues, resettlement of displaced villagers]; Government policy for dealing with politically partisan conduct by traditional leaders; the audit of the Reserve Bank's distribution of farm mechanisation and agricultural inputs; the issuing of firearms to retired army personnel and war veterans in the period leading up to the presidential election run-off last year; and the fact that the Estimates of Expenditure for 2009 contain no separate provision to fund the Prime Minister's Office.

Prisons

While Parliament is adjourned, the newly-formed Portfolio Committee on Justice, Legal Affairs, Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs could usefully launch an urgent inquiry into the state of affairs in the country’s prisons following Minister Chinamasa’s replies to questions during March 25th Question Time and the shocking revelations in a documentary film since screened on South African television. Although Minister Chinamasa and the Commissioner of Prisons have challenged the claims made in the film and the authenticity of footage said to have been shot inside Zimbabwean prisons, the true picture needs to be independently established and reported to Parliament and the people of Zimbabwe.

Ministerial Retreat – 3rd to 5th April

The Ministerial Retreat has gone ahead at the Victoria Falls. It was preceded by consultative meetings between the Government and various sectors – civil society, business, labour, etc. The main purpose of the retreat is for Ministries to work on agendas for the implementation of the IPA and STERP and on a 100-day plan to start delivering on expectations. It is also hoped that the retreat will produce a clear delineation of the functions of the various Ministries and the announcement of a definite programme for the urgent legislative reforms that the country and the international community are waiting for. President Mugabe launched the proceedings on Friday, followed by a speech by the Prime Minister [Electronic versions of both speeches available.] Note the Prime Minister said in his speech that outstanding inclusive government issues – the apportionment of provincial governorships, the appointment of ambassadors and permanent secretaries, land disputes, and the appointments of the Reserve Bank Governor and the Attorney-General – would not be discussed at the Retreat, but would be settled by the three party principals in the coming week.

SADC Summit

The SADC Summit met in Swaziland on Monday to consider an economic aid package of US$10 billion for Zimbabwe. The Summit urged SADC member States to give Zimbabwe financial support and to mount an international diplomatic campaign for the lifting of sanctions and the mobilisation of support for the economic recovery programme from Europe, Asia and America and the major financial institutions. So far only South Africa has pledged US $30 million. [Electronic version of Summit communiqué available on request.] The communiqué might have been more helpful to Zimbabwe’s case internationally if it had stressed the importance of coming up with a definite timetable for the urgent enactment of reforming legislation on the rule of law, freedom of expression and freedom of association.

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