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Zimbabwe's prices rise 900%, turning staples into luxuries


      By Michael Wines The New York Times

      TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2006




      HARARE, Zimbabwe- How bad is inflation in Zimbabwe? Well, consider
this: at a supermarket near the center of this tatterdemalion capital,
toilet paper costs $417.

      No, not per roll. Four hundred seventeen Zimbabwean dollars is the
value of a single two-ply sheet. A roll costs $145,750 - in American
currency, about 69 cents.

      The price of toilet paper, like everything else here, soars almost
daily, spawning jokes about an impending better use for Zimbabwe's $500
bill, now the smallest in circulation.

      But what is happening is no laughing matter. For untold numbers of
Zimbabweans, toilet paper - and bread, margarine, meat, even the once
ubiquitous morning cup of tea - have become unimaginable luxuries. All are
casualties of the hyperinflation that is roaring toward 1,000 percent a
year, a rate usually seen only in war zones.

      Zimbabwe has been tormented this entire decade by both deep recession
and high inflation, but in recent months the economy seems to have abandoned
whatever moorings it had left. The national budget for 2006 has already been
largely spent. Government services have started to crumble.

      The purity of Harare's drinking water, siphoned from a lake downstream
of its sewer outfall, has been unreliable for months, and dysentery and
cholera swept the city in December and January. The city suffers rolling
electrical blackouts. Mounds of uncollected garbage pile up on the streets
of the slums.

      Zimbabwe's inflation is hardly history's worst - in Weimar Germany in
1923, prices quadrupled each month, compared with doubling about once every
three or four months in Zimbabwe. That said, experts agree that Zimbabwe's
inflation is currently the world's highest, and has been for some time.

      Public-school fees and other ever-rising government surcharges have
begun to exceed the monthly incomes of many urban families lucky enough to
find work. The jobless - officially 70 percent of Zimbabwe's 4.2 million
workers, but widely placed at 80 percent when idle farmers are included -
furtively hawk tomatoes and baggies of ground corn from roadside tables, an
occupation banned by the police since last May.

      Those with spare cash put it not in banks, which pay a paltry 4 to 10
percent annual interest on savings, but in gilt-edged investments like bags
of corn meal and sugar, guaranteed not to lose their value.

      "There's a surrealism here that's hard to get across to people," Mike
Davies, the chairman of a civic-watchdog group called the Combined Harare
Residents Association, said in an interview. "If you need something and have
cash, you buy it. If you have cash you spend it today, because tomorrow it's
going to be worth 5 percent less.

      "Normal horizons don't exist here. People live hand to mouth."

      President Robert G. Mugabe has responded to the hardship in two ways.

      Although there is no credible threat to his 26-year rule, Zimbabwe's
political opposition is calling for mass protests against the economic
situation. So Mr. Mugabe has tightened his grip on power even further,
turning the economy over to a national security council of his closest
allies. In addition, he has seeded the government's civilian ministries this
year with loyal army and intelligence officers who now control key
functions, from food security to tax collection.

      At the same time, Mr. Mugabe's government has printed trillions of new
Zimbabwean dollars to keep ministries functioning and to shield the salaries
of key supporters - and potential enemies - against further erosion.
Supplemental spending proposed early in April would increase the 2006
spending limits approved last November by fully 40 percent, and more such
emergency spending measures are all but certain before the year ends.

      On Friday, the government said it would triple the salaries of 190,000
soldiers and teachers. But even those government workers still badly trail
inflation; the best of the raises, to as much as $33 million a month,
already are slightly below the latest poverty line for the average family of
five.

      This will only worsen inflation, for printing too many worthless
dollars is in part what got Zimbabwe into this mess to begin with. Zimbabwe
fell into hyperinflation after the government began seizing commercial farms
in about 2000. Foreign investors fled, manufacturing ground to a halt, goods
and foreign currency needed to buy imports fell into short supply and prices
shot up.

      Inflation, about 400 percent per year last November, edged over 600
percent in January, but began to soar after the government revealed that it
had paid the International Monetary Fund $221 million to cover an arrears
that threatened Zimbabwe's membership in the organization.

      In February, the government admitted that it had printed at least $21
trillion in currency - and probably much more, critics say - to buy the
American dollars with which the debt was paid.

      By March, inflation had touched 914 percent a year, at which rate
prices would rise more than tenfold in 12 months. Experts agree that
quadruple-digit inflation is now a certainty.

      In the midst of this craziness, some Harare enclaves seem
paradoxically normal. North of downtown, where diplomats and aid workers are
financed with American dollars, and generators and bottled water are the
norm, the cafes still serve cappuccino and the markets sell plump roasting
chickens, albeit $1 million chickens.

      Everywhere else, the hardship is inescapable.

      In Glen Norah, a dense suburb of thousands of tiny homes southwest of
the city, 58-year-old Ayina Musoni and her divorced daughter Regai, 26,
share their five-room house with Regai's two children and three lodgers. The
lodgers, two security guards and a teacher, pay monthly rent totaling $3
million, or about $14.25 in American money.

      Ms. Musoni's latest monthly bill for services from the Harare city
government was $2.4 million. The refrigerator in her closet-size kitchen is
empty except for a few bottles of boiled water. Christmas dinner was sadza,
or corn porridge, with hard-boiled eggs. For Easter, there was nothing.

      Mother and daughter make as much as $10 in American money each week by
selling vegetables, from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. daily. But the profits are being
consumed by rising costs at the farmers' market where they buy stock. "Like
potatoes," Regai said. "I went last week, and it was $500,000 for a packet.
And when I went this weekend, it was $700,000.

      Millions of Zimbabweans survive these days on the kindness of
outsiders - foreigners who donate food or medicine and, more important,
family members who have fled the nation for better lives abroad.

      As many as three million Zimbabweans now live elsewhere, usually in
Britain, South Africa or the United States. An economist here, John
Robertson, estimates that they remit as much as $50 million a month to their
families - the equivalent of one sixth of the gross domestic product.

      Ms. Musoni's is not a hard-luck story; in Harare, most people now live
this way, or worse. Indeed, life for many may be better in the nation's
impoverished rural areas, where subsistence farming is the only industry and
millions of people are guaranteed free monthly rations from the United
Nations and other donors. In the cities, little is free.

      Unity Motize, 64, lives with her 65-year-old husband, Simeon, in
Highfield, a middle-class suburb turned slum not far south of town. The
couple occupies one room of their three-room house. The second sleeps two
sons, their wives and their two infants, all left homeless last May after
riot police bulldozed the homes of hundreds of thousands of slum-dwellers. A
23-year-old son and an unemployed daughter sleep in the living room.

      Hyperinflation is a cradle-to-grave experience here. The government
recently announced that the price of childbirth, now $7 million, would rise
463 percent by October. Funeral costs are to double over the same period.

      In rural areas, said one official of a foreign-based charity who
declined to be named, fearing consequences from the government, even the
barest funeral costs at least $6 million, or about $28.50 - well beyond most
families' means. The dead are buried in open fields at night, she said.
Recently, she watched one family dismantle their home's cupboard to
construct a makeshift coffin.

      "I'll never forget that," she said. "The incredible sadness of it
all."

      Critics say that Zimbabwe's rulers are oblivious to such suffering -
last year, Mr. Mugabe completed his own 25-bedroom mansion in a gated suburb
north of town, close by the mansions of top ministers and military allies.

      But the government says it has a plan to revive the economy. That
plan, the latest of perhaps seven in 10 years, would quickly raise billions
of American dollars to end a chronic foreign currency shortage, cut the
inflation rate to double digits by year's end and an end to the recession
that has gripped Zimbabwe, halving its economic output, since 1999.

      Mr. Robertson, the economist, says that is unlikely. Zimbabweans can
and probably will endure greater hardship, he says. As a whole, the nation
has only now sunk to standards common elsewhere in Africa. But the
government may have reached the limit of its ability to do anything about
it. Cutting spending seems impossible, and raising taxes further is
unthinkable.

      That leaves one option: "much more inflation," he said. "Because this
government is always going to be printing its way out of its current
difficulty."



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Army and Security Forces Usurping Zimbabwe Central Bank Powers

VOA

By Blessing Zulu
      Washington
      01 May 2006



Military and security officials led by army commander General Constantine
Chiwenga have taken hold of a number of functions of the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe bearing on monetary policy, such as the determination of a viable
foreign exchange policy and managing the national money supply,
marginalizing RBZ Governor Gideon Gono.

Economic policy has in recent months come into the hands of the Zimbabwe
National Security Council, assigned overriding powers by President Robert
Mugabe under the recently launched National Economic Development Priority
Program which proposed to reverse economic decline so as to achieve positive
1-2% growth this year.

The National Security Council is dominated by officers from the army, the
air force, the police, and the feared Central Intelligence Organization. It
has set up nine task forces to manage all economic sectors and oversee
foreign exchange and monetary policy.

Gono sits on the foreign exchange and other task forces, but his influence
is said to be limited under the new dispensation of a military-led command
economy.

Central bank sources say General Chiwenga ordered Gono to disband among
other advisory bodies his foreign exchange policy advisory board of
economists, business executives and labor leaders. The sources aslo said
Chiwenga ordered the central bank to print Z$60 trillion to fund pay
increases to soldiers and civil servants.

Central bank sources, speaking on condition of anonymity, also expressed
concern at the domination of economic policy meetings by state security
agents, saying they feel intimidated and that their role in decisions has
been significantly diminished.

Chief Economist Prosper Chitambara of the Labor and Economic Development
Research Institute, who represented the labor interest on the central bank's
advisory board and its foreign exchange committee, told reporter Blessing
Zulu of VOA's Studio 7 for Zimbabwe that the advisory panel has effectively
been dissolved.

For insight on the constitutional implications of these changes in the
economic policy framework, reporter Zulu turned to National Constitutional
Assembly Chairman Lovemore Madhuku, a prominent Zimbabwean constitutional
scholar.


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Seven held after May Day rallies - Zim union

IOL


          May 02 2006 at 01:03AM

      Harare - At least seven people were arrested Monday as they marked
Workers' Day in the town of Chitungwiza, a spokesperson for the Zimbabwe
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) claimed.

      "There were seven of them ... They're being held at Makoni Police
Station (in Chitungwiza). The police allege they made derogatory statements
about the president," said ZCTU spokesperson Mlamleli Sibanda in an
interview. The ZCTU is Zimbabwe's main trade union body.

      Sibanda said those arrested included two members of the ZCTU General
Council namely Vukile Kupe and Lawrence Mangezi. It was not possible to get
independent confirmation of the arrests.



      The ZCTU held rallies in 20 towns and cities throughout the country on
Monday. Other rallies were due to be held by a rival body, the Zimbabwe
Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), which is closely aligned to President
Robert Mugabe's government.

      Workers are pushing for higher salaries and the stabilisation of
prices amid an economic crisis marked by inflation of nearly a thousand
percent, high unemployment and growing levels of poverty.

      The government is on edge following threats of street demonstrations.
In a speech to mark Independence Day last month Mugabe warned that the law
would "descend mercilessly" on anyone who dared to "go against the security
and stability of our country".

      Massive pay hikes were awarded to teachers, nurses and members of the
security forces last week in what critics say is a bid to placate restless
workers.

      Main opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai, to whose party the ZCTU is
closely allied, had vowed to lead mass action against the government within
the next few months.

      Promise Mkwananzi, the president of the Zimbabwe National Students
Union (ZINASU) confirmed in an interview Monday that an official from his
union, Marvelous Muroyi, was among those arrested in Chitungwiza.

      Mkwananzi, who addressed a ZCTU rally in Harare's Gwanzura stadium
earlier on Monday, accused the police of panicking.

      "The police are panicking. The mood at Gwanzura was revolutionary to
say the least," he said. -
      Sapa-dpa


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World Press Freedom Day - May 3rd


      Tuesday, 2 May 2006, 10:20 am
      Press Release: Amnesty International Aotearoa New Zealand
1 May 2006 ? FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

World Press Freedom Day - May 3rd

"On the eve of World Press Freedom Day, May 3rd, it is time to remember
journalists working beneath some of the world's more repressive regimes",
says Amnesty International New Zealand's Executive Director Ced Simpson.

World Press Freedom Day could pass unnoticed in New Zealand - a country
that, according to the international press freedom watch-dog Reporters
without Borders, enjoys 'an excellent record of press freedom.'
Unfortunately, 'freedom of the press' is a catchcry that is not assured in
many parts of the world.

In 2006 alone, New Zealand members of Amnesty International have directly
campaigned for the release of 15 representatives of the media ranging from
the Editor of the Independent in Gambia to the Director of Beehive radio
station in Cambodia. Seven of the 15 media workers have been released in the
weeks following letter writing actions by Amnesty International members.

"Freedom of expression is crucial in a democracy because open discussion
allows people to influence their government's choice of policies", says Ced
Simpson. "For those that ask whether a basic lack of press freedom equates
to a general absence of human rights the answer is a resounding 'yes'."

The countries with poor press freedom records - North Korea, Myanmar,
Eritrea, Zimbabwe and Turkmenistan - are also home to some of the most
repressive governments and lowest living standards in the world. In line
with the ever-decreasing access to freedom of expression, Zimbabwe also
suffers from hyper-inflation (now topping 900%) and, according to the United
Nations World Health Organisation, the lowest life expectancy anywhere in
the world (35.5 years).

The Zimbabwean government has launched a final assault on the country's
remaining independent press. Under the autocratic Presidency of Robert
Mugabe, fundamental rights, including freedom of assembly and expression,
the right to information and privacy, the right to property and the
prohibition against arbitrary detention have been removed.

In the last 5 years, Zimbabwe's government has enacted absolute control over
who may operate a media outlet and practice journalism. Laws, with titles
like The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act of 2002 and The
Broadcasting Services Act of 2001, force journalists to register with the
state-run Media and Information Commission or face up to two years in
prison. The Public Order and Security Act of 2002 criminalizes criticism of
the President (whether his person or his office) and prohibits public
gatherings without providing police four days' written notice.
Unfortunately, Zimbabwean reporters game enough to comment on the situation
face the revocation of their press licence and prison-time. In a few
instances, when police have not been able to capture an outspoken
independent journalist, friends and relatives of the journalist have been
detained until he or she surrenders to a police station.

And Zimbabwe is just one example says Ced Simpson: "Beyond the globally
recognised media agencies reside hundreds of thousands of media workers who
wonder everyday whether their latest story will land them in prison or earn
them a death sentence. World Press Freedom Day is an ideal time to look upon
the newspaper you hold in your hands, and consider the reality behind each
story before turning the page."

ENDS




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Uproar in Malawi about Mugabe road plan

IOL


          May 01 2006 at 11:29PM

      Blantyre - Malawi human rights and civil society groups criticised a
government plan to name a road after Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, who
is due to visit the country this week at President Bingu wa Mutharika's
invitation.

      Malawi said last week it would name a major highway linking the
country to Mozambique after the Zimbabwean leader. It said a large
population of Malawians found jobs on Zimbabwe farms and their nation had an
obligation to thank Zimbabwe in return.

      Desmond Kaunda, chairperson of the umbrella group Council for
Non-Governmental Organisations, which comprises more than 300 NGOs and
rights organisations in this southern African country, said honouring Mugabe
would send the wrong message about political governance on the continent.

       "The enjoyment of civil liberties in Zimbabwe is seriously eroded by
the existence of restrictive legislation... and the curtailment of civil
liberties," Kaunda said. "Malawi must not be seen to honour or be associated
with such a record."

      Mugabe, in power since independence in 1981, has clamped down on the
political opposition and the media. His critics say that his policy of
seizing white-owned farms to give to landless blacks is one of the main
reasons for an economic decline that has left millions vulnerable to hunger,
disease and poverty.

      Some rights groups plan to hold protest rallies during Mugabe's visit.
Last week President wa Mutharika pleaded with the groups to allow Mugabe a
peaceful 5-day visit that starts on Wednesday.


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The Failed States Index

 
By FOREIGN POLICY & the Fund for Peace
 
May/June 2006
Democracy may be spreading, but is the world more stable? In the second-annual Failed States Index, FOREIGN POLICY and the Fund for Peace track the countries on the edge of collapse.

Visit the Fund for Peace Website for more data and analysis.

 

Media Inquiries:
For a list of
available experts or to request an interview,
click here.

 

By most accounts, 2005 should have been a good year for many fragile and developing states around the world. A slew of countries—including many with limited democratic experience, such as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iraq, and Kazakhstan—held elections. The number of serious armed conflicts worldwide continued to fall. The world’s richest countries agreed to forgive billions in developing-country debt. Robust world trade aided China’s rise as an exporting powerhouse. And yet, trends that should have been boons for stability have often been busts.
There are few quick fixes on the path to stability. Elections might give voice to the disenfranchised, but they don’t necessarily translate into effective governance. High oil or commodity prices may fill government coffers, but they don’t build strong institutions. By contrast, steps that capture few headlines—the appointment of independent judges, the development of a competent civil service, and the implementation of anti-corruption campaigns—are often the key to improving a country’s foundations.
For all the talk about technology and globalization, basic governance remains a huge challenge for many states. International institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund can help, but large-scale state-building by outsiders is complex and costly. There have been successful U.N. peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Mozambique, Namibia, and Liberia, which recently elected Africa’s first female head of state. However, the continuing U.S. struggles in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan have highlighted the hazards of relying on armed intervention to promote stability.
Most states will be on their own, and they run the gamut from strong and secure to weak and vulnerable. Some, including giants such as Nigeria and Pakistan, remain acutely vulnerable to internal conflict and social disintegration. A larger number, including Egypt, Russia, and even China run a substantial risk of decay. Predicting exactly when and how the next episode of state failure will happen is a fool’s errand. But it is essential for policymakers to understand the vulnerabilities and weaknesses that create the conditions for state failure.
To paint a more precise picture of the phenomenon of state instability, the Fund for Peace, an independent research organization, and FOREIGN POLICY present the second-annual Failed States Index. Using 12 social, economic, political, and military indicators, we ranked 148 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal dysfunction. The 60 most vulnerable states are listed in the rankings, and full results are available at www.ForeignPolicy.com and www.fundforpeace.org.
The scores in the index are based on data from more than 11,000 publicly available sources collected from July to December 2005. The period used for data gathering means that some events, including Iraq’s tip toward sectarian strife in February, are not included. Other events, including the massive October earthquake in Pakistan, occurred in the middle of the analysis window and had a significant impact on the results. Inevitably, the index is an extended snapshot rather than a continuing analysis. For that reason, comparisons with last year’s results have been made whenever possible; future results will yield more long-term trends as the index tracks these countries year after year.
The category of “failed states” has become part of the strategic vernacular, and it has many definitions. For the purposes of this index, a failing state is one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force. A failing state may experience active violence or simply be vulnerable to violence. The great majority of the states listed in the index are not presently failed states. The index measures vulnerability to violent internal conflict. It is an index of country risk, not of countries that have already failed.
Last year offered several good illustrations of what might be termed “pockets of failure” within otherwise strong and stable states. In the United States, Hurricane Katrina exposed gaping holes in the country’s disaster preparedness. Viewers around the world watched in astonishment last August and September as the world’s superpower left thousands of its citizens stranded for days. Two months later, violent riots in France paralyzed swaths of the country and exposed deep fissures between Muslim immigrants and the rest of French society. Partially as a result of these events, the United States and France have a worse score than other rich, industrialized countries (Finland, Sweden, and Norway emerged as the most stable).
Symptoms of state failure can appear in any country in any region of the world, but there are several neighborhoods with concentrations of weak states. As in last year’s index, Africa produces the largest number of unstable states. This year, Sudan appears as the world’s most vulnerable country because of its poor ratings in the areas of group grievance and human rights. Sudan is followed closely by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ivory Coast, whose governments still do not control huge portions of their territory. Six of the 10 most vulnerable states and 11 of the top 20 are in Africa.
Yet the rankings also demonstrate the inadequacy of regional generalizations, even for countries in close proximity to each other. Zimbabwe, struggling under poor governance and endemic corruption, saw its stability ranking fall by 12 percent, whereas neighboring South Africa maintained its strong showing. Nigeria, despite its wealth in resources, continued to unravel even as nearby Ghana remained one of the most promising states in all of West Africa. Kenya managed to improve despite corruption scandals and a porous border with Somalia. In Southeast Asia, Burma tumbled, while neighboring Thailand, even with unrest in its own southern provinces, remained one of the most stable states in the region. Ultimately, it is clear that leadership, not location, matters most.
 

The columns highlight the 12 political, economic, military, and social indicators of instability. For each indicator, the higher scores (greater instability) are in black; lower scores (less instability) are in white.



People Pressure
 

Last year was not kind to several giants in the developing world. It’s no surprise that enormous states face serious challenges from demographic change, vast economic inequality, and religious and ethnic divides. But, as the index finds, equally important is how governments respond when trouble hits.

Pakistan, with a population of more than 160 million, dropped a full 13 points in the index. The October 2005 earthquake centered in Pakistan-administered Kashmir displaced tens of thousands and created a humanitarian disaster that the government struggled to address. It wasn’t just acts of God that slashed Pakistan’s score. Simmering ethnic tensions and the government’s inability to effectively police tribal areas near the Afghan border contributed as well.

Pakistan’s troubles are well chronicled. More surprising is China’s slide in the index. With its economy booming, few analysts would classify China as a vulnerable state, and yet its index score dropped 10 points from last year. Why? China witnessed more than 87,000 peasant strikes and protests over land seizures last year, as well as mounting corruption and unemployment. China’s cities have mushroomed in size, and those left behind have suffered as government services dry up and hungry developers grab land. Party officials must find new ways to mollify the masses while keeping the country’s economic engine in high gear.

Africa’s most populous state, Nigeria, also took a tumble. Despite some steps toward economic reform and improved human rights, the country’s regional and religious fissures keep it on the edge. The government estimates that 3 million people have been displaced since 1999. Tensions have erupted in the oil-rich Niger Delta. So explosive are questions of identity that the government delayed a long-overdue national census several times. Large-scale unrest would not only rattle world oil markets, it might also create a humanitarian nightmare beyond any government’s ability to respond.

There were some winners in this year’s index, particularly in the Western Hemisphere. Although President Hugo Chávez’s economic policies may not have benefited the majority of Venezuelans, his scalding anti-American rhetoric combined with high oil prices have helped him solidify power and stabilize the country, at least in the short term. Guatemala and the Dominican Republic also improved significantly over last year’s index. And, in the Balkans, the pull of the European Union helped speed Bosnia and Herzegovina on its path to recovery.

Paying the Piper

Venality and vulnerability usually travel together. This year’s index shows a strong correlation between Transparency International’s perception of corruption scores and a state’s instability. Eight of the 10 most stable countries also appear among the 10 least corrupt. Chile—widely recognized as the least corrupt country in Latin America—is also the most stable in the region. Paraguay, which has a large “gray” economy, is one of the few countries with a terrible corruption score that’s not on the brink of collapse.



Help Wanted

Iraq and Afghanistan may be rid of abusive regimes, but they are not on the path to stability—at least not yet. Both countries have had successful elections and both sport new constitutions. But they still rank among the world’s most vulnerable states, and their scores have worsened since last year’s index.

For Iraq, the index category that worsened most was human flight. The exodus of Iraq’s professional class has accelerated, leaving the country without the trained citizens it needs to staff important posts.

Afghanistan’s dilemma is different. The Taliban’s fall sparked a massive return of overwhelmingly poor Afghan refugees from Pakistan and Iran. But Afghan professionals, many settled in the United States and Europe, have been slower to return. The result is a capital city bursting at the seams but short of trained administrators.

This year’s index shows a few bright spots in Iraq: The country’s public services score increased marginally, and the country’s institutions appeared to have gained some legitimacy, perhaps as a result of national elections in which Sunnis participated in large numbers for the first time. Insurgents, however, are working hard to undo this progress, and many educated Iraqis have decided to watch from abroad.

In Afghanistan, the country’s successes—another round of elections, a slight improvement in public services, and a reduction in economic inequality—were offset by the continuing Taliban insurgency in the south and east. Tactics employed by seasoned Iraqi insurgents, including roadside bombs and suicide attacks, have migrated to Afghanistan. It’s hardly the kind of expertise the country needs.

Democracy Now?

When people in fragile states vote, it is usually greeted as good news. In 2005, more than 50 million people in politically vulnerable countries visited the ballot box. The results were decidedly mixed. Voting has many virtues, but promoting stability is not necessarily one of them.

Sometimes, balloting exacerbates dangerous religious and ethnic divides. Sri Lanka’s fragile peace was shaken after most Tamils boycotted last November’s vote. Plenty of other governments have used elections as a veneer to disguise old-fashioned authoritarianism, including Ethiopia, Iran, Tajikistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe. Opposition politicians in each country faced intimidation or violence as elections approached and prospects for stability now appear bleak. Zimbabwe, in particular, is on the brink.

In a few cases, to be sure, elections help lead to stable institutions. Indonesia, for example, underwent its first-ever presidential race in September 2004. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has received generally high marks, and several of the country’s political indicators improved in this year’s index. In Liberia, the dramatic victory in November 2005 by Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first elected female head of state in Africa, was a rare bright moment for that troubled country.

If elections rarely heal broken societies quickly—and may make things worse—is going through the democratic motions still worth it? In an ideal world, transitional societies might delay divisive elections until fundamental questions of religion, ethnicity, and identity have been solved.

In the real world, that’s all but impossible. The desire to cast votes is so great, and the international pressure to democratize so strong, that countries inevitably experiment with forms of democracy before they’ve mastered its substance.

Infernal Youth

Children may be the future, but young countries often have little going for them. The most vulnerable countries in the index all have extremely young populations, and most have a median age of fewer than 20 years. The world’s least stable country, Sudan, has a median age of 18 years. The most stable countries all have median ages greater than 33. The former communist world, however, has an aging population coupled with often weak institutions. Pension crises in those countries may become particularly severe, as fragile governments struggle to make ends meet.


Odd Couples

Maintaining good relations with neighboring states is tough in the best of circumstances. Boundary disputes, economic competition, smuggling, and ethnic tensions can fray even strong neighborhood ties. Sharing a border is all the more complex when your neighbor is a failed state.

A number of stable countries have teetering states on their doorsteps. South Africa, a regional powerhouse, shares a 140-mile-long border with Robert Mugabe’s shattered Zimbabwe, which fell 14 points in this year’s index. Mugabe’s political repression and disruptive land policies have sent 1,000 citizens streaming into South Africa every week. On the Arabian Peninsula, relatively prosperous and moderate Oman sits next to Yemen, which is beset by Islamic extremists and weak governance. Perhaps the most volatile and strategically important odd couple is in East Asia, where South Korea and North Korea glare at each other across the world’s most militarized border.

Crafting a strategy toward a neighbor in decline is a delicate process. One tempting approach is to batten down the hatches, secure the borders, and try to quarantine the state so its failure does not spill over. Oman, for example, has sealed its border with Yemen. But isolation rarely works. Even the most secure borders can leak refugees, criminals, weapons, and drugs (witness the U.S. experience with Mexico). Outright military action to replace a failing government next door with something more palatable has been tried, as when Tanzania invaded neighboring Uganda to unseat Idi Amin in 1979. But military intervention is a dangerous and often expensive option, with highly uncertain outcomes.

Often, the more stable neighbor tries to prop up the failing state in hopes that time will heal it. South Africa’s government, for example, has tried to shelter Mugabe’s regime from international sanctions, perhaps fearful that firmer measures would push the state over the edge. Similarly, Seoul has resisted U.S. pressure for a tougher stance against Pyongyang as it pursues nuclear weapons. Regime change may appeal to countries thousands of miles away, but it is rarely a popular choice for the country next door.

 
FAQ, Resources, and Methodology

Q: Why are only some countries included in the Failed States Index?

A: There are 148 states included in the 2006 index, about twice the number that appeared in the 2005 index. A handful of countries were not included because of a lack of data. The Fund for Peace (FfP) is working to improve data collection and analysis, and its principal information provider, Thomson Dialog, is constantly adding additional sources.

Q: What methodology was used for the ratings?

A: The Fund for Peace used its Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), an original methodology it has developed and tested over the last decade. CAST is a flexible model that has the capability to employ a four-step trend-line analysis, consisting of (1) rating 12 social, economic, and political/military indicators; (2) assessing the capabilities of five core state institutions considered essential for sustaining security; (3) identifying idiosyncratic factors and surprises; and (4) placing countries on a conflict map that shows the risk history of countries being analyzed.

For the Failed States Index, FfP focused solely on the first step, which provides snapshots of state vulnerability or risk of violence during a window in time. The CAST software indexed and scanned tens of thousands of open-source articles and reports using Boolean logic. The data are electronically gathered using Thomson Dialog, a powerful data-collection system that includes international and local media reports and other public documents, including U.S. State Department reports, independent studies, and even corporate financial filings. The data used in each index are collected from May to December of the preceding year. The software calculates the number of positive and negative “hits” for the 12 indicators. Internal and external experts then review the scores as well as the articles themselves, when necessary, to confirm the scores and ensure accuracy.

Q: What are the 12 indicators of state vulnerability?

A: Click here to obtain a full list of the 12 indicators.

Q: What do the colors in the index and on the map signify?

A: The rank order of the states is based on the total scores of the 12 indicators. For each indicator, the ratings are placed on a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest intensity (most stable) and 10 being the highest intensity (least stable). The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0–120.

In the article, the 60 countries in the index are divided into three equal parts for easy reference: Critical (red), In Danger (orange), and Borderline (yellow). On the index’s global map, additional countries that ranked higher than 60 are colored yellow. Countries with scores between 30 and 59.9 are considered Stable (dark grey). Countries that have scores lower than 30 are categorized as Most Stable (light grey).
This coloring scheme differs slightly from the original FfP methodology, which it still employs in its reports, such as theIraq Reports and Country Profiles. FfP’s original methodology breaks the countries into four colored zones based on their aggregate scores. A country in the “Alert” zone has an aggregate score between 90 and 120. A country that is colored orange, the “Warning” zone, scores between 60 and 89.9. A country colored yellow, the “Monitoring” zone, has an aggregate score between 30 and 59.9. A country colored green, the “Sustainable” zone, has an aggregate score of 29.9 or less.

It is important to note that these ratings do not necessarily forecast when states may experience violence or collapse. Rather, they measure vulnerability to collapse or conflict. All countries in the red, orange, or yellow categories display features that make significant parts of their societies and institutions vulnerable to failure. The pace and direction of change, either positive or negative, varies. Some in the yellow zone may be failing at a faster rate than those in the more dangerous orange or red zones, and therefore could experience violence sooner. Conversely, some in the red zone, though critical, may exhibit some positive signs of recovery or be deteriorating slowly, giving them time to adopt mitigating strategies. (Further insights will be available when the CAST methodology is applied over different time periods.)

Q: What does “state failure” mean?

A: A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of state failure risk elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay. States can fail at varying rates through explosion, implosion, erosion, or invasion over different time periods.

Q: How has the methodology been critically reviewed, and how has it been applied?

A: During the past decade, the CAST methodology has been peer reviewed in several different environments, including by independent scholars and experts as well as educational, government, and private-sector agencies and institutions that have evaluated it for alternative uses. In each application, CAST is refined and updated. Governments use it, among other things, for early warning and to design economic assistance strategies that can reduce the potential for conflict and promote development in fragile states. The military uses it to strengthen situational awareness, enhance readiness, and apply strategic metrics to evaluate success in peace and stability operations. The private sector uses it to calculate political risk for investment opportunities. Multinational organizations and a range of other entities find it useful for modeling and gaming, management of complex organizations, and for conflict-risk assessments. Educators use it to train students in analyzing war and peace issues by blending the techniques of information technology with social science. And the countries being rated use it for self-assessment to gauge their own stability and performance on objective criteria.

Q: Who created the Failed States Index?

A: It was a team effort. In addition to outside experts who helped FfP develop the methodology during its years of testing and validation, the core FfP team consists of Pauline H. Baker (president of the FfP), Shawn Rowley (senior software engineer), Krista Hendy, Jason Ladnier, and Patricia Taft (senior associates). The article on the index in FOREIGN POLICY was done in collaboration with its editors.

Q: What can be done to avert further weakening of states at risk and to stimulate recovery?

A: The Failed States Index presents a diagnosis of the problem, the first step in devising strategies for strengthening weak and failing states. The more reliably policymakers can anticipate, monitor, and measure problems, the more they can act to prevent violent breakdowns, protect civilians caught in the crossfire, and promote recovery. At the same time, policymakers must focus on building the institutional capacity of weak states, particularly the “core five” institutions: military, police, civil service, the system of justice, and leadership. Policies should be tailored to the needs of each state, monitored and evaluated intensively, and changed, as necessary, if recovery is not occurring as intended. Continuous monitoring of the measures, using the same assessment methodology, can inform decision making on strategies and programs.

Q: Are there examples of states that have pulled back from the brink of failure?

A: Yes. The most dramatic ones are those that did it without outside military or administrative intervention. In the 1970s, analysts predicted dire consequences, including mass famine and internal violence in India, citing rapid population growth, economic mismanagement, and extensive poverty and corruption. Today, India has turned itself around. It is the world’s largest democracy, with a competitive economy and a representative political system. Similarly, South Africa appeared headed for a violent race war in the 1980s, but it pulled back from the brink in a negotiated settlement that ushered in a new era of majority rule, a liberal constitution, and the destruction of its nuclear weapons program. In the past year, since the 2005 index, several countries that were teetering on the edge improved measurably. Indonesia, after experiencing years of internal crises, has made steady progress due in large part to President Susilo Bambamg Yudhoyono’s dedication to military and political reform. The Dominican Republic, which was devastated by a 2004 hurricane and tested by refugee flows from neighboring Haiti, also managed to make steady progress in 2005. Bosnia, which for years stagnated, has also begun to recover slowly, thanks in part to significant efforts by the European Union to stabilize the country and revive its economy.

Q: Some studies suggest that wars are winding down. Your index suggests that there are a lot of conflicts in the making. Which is correct?

A: Both are correct, in different senses. In essence, scholars agree that interstate wars are declining but that internal conflicts have been increasing since the end of the Cold War. The frequency, duration, and intensity of these conflicts vary. The 2005 “Peace and Conflict” report produced by the University of Maryland argues that there has been “a decline in the global magnitude of armed conflict,” but it also states “half of the world’s countries have serious weaknesses that call for international scrutiny and engagement.” The 2005 Human Security Report, published by Canada’s Human Security Centre at the University of British Columbia, calculated that there has been a decline in the number of wars, genocides, and human rights abuses over the past decade due to international peace efforts since the Cold War—citing U.N. and other diplomatic initiatives, economic sanctions, peacekeeping missions, and civil society activism. The important point is that weak and failing states represent a new class of conflict, not isolated events. Approximately 2 billion people live in countries that run a significant risk of collapse. These insecure and unstable states are breeding grounds for terrorism, organized crime, weapons proliferation, humanitarian emergencies, environmental degradation, and political extremism—threats that will affect everyone.

Q: Does the public have access to the data in this index?

A: The raw data are from millions of news articles and reports. As a practical matter, it is not readily transferable without the methodology and the software. However, the index values can be downloaded for free from the Web sites of FfP and FOREIGN POLICY.

Q: What is the Fund for Peace?

A: Founded in 1957 by investment banker Randolph Compton, FfP is an independent educational, research, and advocacy organization based in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to prevent war and alleviate the conditions that cause war. Since 1996, it has specialized primarily on reducing conflict stemming from weak and failing states. For more information,

Meet the Experts
For Media Inquiries and Interview Requests, Contact:
Jeff Marn, Media Relations Manager
ph: (202) 939-2242
e-mail: jmarn@CarnegieEndowment.org


Pauline H. Baker
President
The Fund for Peace
Pauline H. Baker, president of the Fund for Peace, pioneered the methodology that is the basis for the Failed States Index. In collaboration with the team at the Fund for Peace, she oversaw the production and analysis of the index. Baker is a political scientist with more than 40 years of experience working on issues concerning weak and failing states. She taught at the University of Lagos in Nigeria, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University. Baker was formerly staff director of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. She has published more than 80 articles, essays, and books. She received her doctorate from the University of California, Los Angeles, and her undergraduate degree from Douglass College, Rutgers University.

David L. Bosco
Senior Editor
FOREIGN POLICY
David Bosco joined FP in 2004 as a senior editor responsible for commissioning and editing reviews, feature articles, and essays. He has reported recently from Bosnia and Afghanistan on the peacekeeping missions in those countries. Prior to joining FP, he was an attorney at the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton with a focus on international arbitration, litigation, and antitrust matters. Previously, he researched judicial reform in Chile as a Fulbright Scholar. Between 1996 and 1998, he served as a political analyst and journalist in Bosnia and Herzegovina and as deputy director of a joint U.N.-NATO project on refugee repatriation in Sarajevo.

He has provided commentary for such news organizations as CNN, National Public Radio, and Voice of America and his writings have appeared in a variety of publications, including the Washington Post, Slate, the New York Times Book Review, the Los Angeles Times, the Christian Science Monitor, the Wall Street Journal-Europe, the American Prospect, Legal Affairs, and the Washington Quarterly. He received his law degree from Harvard Law School, a master’s degree in international relations from Cambridge University, and a bachelor’s degree in government from Harvard University.

Krista Hendry
Project Leader, Failed States Index
The Fund for Peace
Krista Hendry is the project leader of the early warning and conflict assessment team at the Fund for Peace, which produced the Failed States Index. During the index’s production, she oversaw the collection of data and coordinated the team’s analysis and verification procedures for the Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST) software. Hendry joined the fund in 2002 after earning her MBA at Georgetown University. Before undertaking her master’s program, she worked in Germany at the Frankfurt Economic Development GmbH as Asian director. Her focus was primarily on software and international trading companies, and her work sent her throughout Asia. Her undergraduate degree is from the University of Virginia, where she majored in German literature and foreign affairs.




 

Copyright 2006, The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. FOREIGN POLICY is a registered trademark owned by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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