Mugabe refugees pour into SA by the millions November 21 2004
at 03:53PM
By Caroline Hooper-Box
At least 1,2 million Zimbabweans
have fled to South Africa during the past three years; yet the department of
home affairs says there is no refugee crisis.
Historically there have
always been about 500 000 Zimbabweans who have come to South Africa to work.
But an additional 1,2 million have arrived here in the past 36 months,
bringing the total Zimbabwean population in South Africa to close to two
million.
In addition, the vast majority of Zimbabweans in South Africa
have no papers, making information collection difficult and making the
refugees illegal fugitives. Some estimates of the number of "undocumented
migrants" from Zimbabwe are closer to three million.
He cited three
major reasons for the exodus These figures were released in a report in
Johannesburg on Friday by the Solidarity Peace Trust, a southern African
faith-based organisation. Pius Ncube, the Archbishop of Bulawayo, is
chairperson of the trust.
The intention of the report is to raise
awareness and understanding of difficulties faced by Zimbabweans who are
pouring into South Africa and the region "in their millions".
The
trust hopes that governments and NGOs will start developing policies to deal
with the influx.
"The only official strategy at this stage seems to be an
endless revolving door of deportations at huge expense to the South African
public, that in any case barely scratches the surface of the number of
Zimbabweans in South Africa."
In an October interview, the Solidarity
Peace Trust report quotes Barry Gilder, home affairs director-general, as
saying that there has been no large-scale influx of Zimbabweans into South
Africa, as had been expected after the past Zimbabwean election.
But
the Trust says that "South Africans need to brace themselves for ever
greater numbers of Zimbabweans unless a lasting political solution is found
to the current [Zimbabwean] crisis."
The Zimbabwean government's own
analysis puts the number of Zimbabweans who have left the country in the
past three years at 3,4 million - 25 to 30 percent of the entire population.
This means that 60 to 70 percent of Zimbabwe's productive adult population
is now outside the country.
An estimated 400 000 Zimbabweans live in
Mozambique, 200 000 are in Botswana and 300 000 in England. Economic reasons
had forced Zimbabweans to leave, but there was also political motivation for
these conditions, Bishop Kevin Dowling of the Catholic Commission for
Justice and Peace said on Friday.
There weren't piles of bodies and
rivers of blood in Zimbabwe, Dowling pointed out, but there was "nonetheless
a war".
He cited three major reasons for the exodus: the breakdown of law
and order including torture with impunity; the collapse of the economy; and
the shortage and "political abuse" of food.
"Commentators fear the
probability of food becoming a political weapon ahead of the 2005 elections
is even more likely in a situation where the ruling party effectively
controls all food in the country," the trust's report said.
Dowling
said he expected a huge increase in the number of Zimbabweans fleeing to
South Africa around the time of the Zimbabwe election in March next year.
The passing of Zimbabwe's Non-Government Organisation Bill would also be a
contributing factor.
The bill states that no foreign NGO can be
registered if its "principal objectives involve issues of
governance".
The bill defines "issues of governance" as including "the
promotion and protection of human rights". Sapa reports that the Bill is set
to be passed by parliament as early as next week.
To date only
approximately 20 Zimbabweans have been granted refugee status in South
Africa. About 5 000 have been given asylum-seeker status, which indicates
that the person is in the process of being considered for refugee status.
The permit is valid for one month at a time.
South Africa's reluctance to
give political refugee status to Zimbabweans needed to be tested in a South
African court, Dowling said.
"People can no longer be denied refugee
status when there is political motivation for economic crisis."
He
called on the African Union, the Southern African Development Community and
South Africa, in particular, to take a "more principled stand with the
people" of Zimbabwe. "They must move beyond solidarity with government and
political leaders to solidarity with African people."
According to
the trust's report, numerous would-be Zimbabwean asylum-seekers have been
told by home affairs officials that they have no right to asylum in South
Africa as "there is no war in Zimbabwe".
Zimbabweans are allowed to apply
for asylum only on Tuesdays, along with people from countries in the "Horn
of Africa". Fewer than 10 Zimbabweans are processed at the Johannesburg
refugee reception office each week.
Many queue outside every week for
months before making it into the office. Steve Paradza of the Zimbabwe
Political Victims' Association said his organisation had appealed to
government to increase this number to 15 a week.
Over the past three
years an average of 45 000 Zimbabweans have been deported from South Africa
a year, more than the total deported between 1994 and 2000.
More
Zimbabweans than any other nationality are deported. Zimbabweans are now the
second largest group of foreign Africans in South Africa, the largest being
Malawians.
Deportees are held at Lindela detention centre and are then
deported on a weekly or fortnightly train, at a cost to South Africa of R720
million a year. Many of these deportees return within hours or
days.
Nkosana Sibuyi, home affairs spokesperson, said his department was
not able to make a statement on the trust's report, but would "study the
report and formulate an informed opinion" on the matter.
"The
department will go through the report in its entirety."
This article
was originally published on page 3 of Sunday Independent on November 21,
2004
Hillbrow horror: 31 blind people in one room November 21
2004 at 03:53PM
Among the Zimbabweans in South Africa is a group of
31 blind people, ranging from two to more than 60 years of age, who live in
a one-room Hillbrow flat.
Cooking is done on one double hot
plate on the floor, and ablutions are in a communal bathroom down the
passage. Each day they are accompanied by a few sighted children who lead
them out into Johannesburg to beg. They make around R10 a day.
One blind man said that back home he had bought sugar in August 2002, which
was scarce at that time, and was selling it at a small mark-up on a corner
street. He was attacked by youth militia who accused him of being an MDC
member, stole his sugar and handed him to the police.
He
was detained in jail until January last year. On his release, he fled to
South Africa.
The money paid to this group by social services in
Zimbabwe for their disabilities is the equivalent of about two loaves of
bread a month. Most of them are in South Africa as undocumented
migrants.
From a report released on Friday by the
Solidarity Peace Trust, "No war in Zimbabwe - an account of the exodus of a
nation's people"
This article was originally published on page
3 of Sunday Independent on November 21, 2004
The Solidarity Peace Trust launched today a heart
wrenching television documentary about the plight of Zimbabwean refugees in
South Africa. The documentary and a report which is called "No War in
Zimbabwe," is an account of the exodus of a nation's people. The author
of the reports is The Solidarity Peace Trust which is an NGO committed to
human rights, freedom and democracy in the region. The Trustees of the Trust
are church leaders of Southern Africa. Zimbabweans are now the second biggest
group of foreign Africans in South Africa. Yet there is little formal
information available on their situation. Very few are being officially
recorded as political refugees. Many Zimbabweans say that it is hard to
access asylum seeker status. It was the intention of the authors to
investigate these allegations, as well as to detail other problems and
issues of relevance to Zimbabweans in South Africa. The report says that
South Africa needs to brace itself for ever-greater numbers of Zimbabweans
unless a lasting political solution is found to the current crisis. At both
government and NGO level, there is a need to devise policies to deal
humanely with the influx, and particularly to provide services on the
ground. For this, more information is needed. We got the details of the
report which was launched in Johannesburg today from Selvan Chetty, the
South African representative of the Solidarity Peace Trust Picture
gallery Front Cover: Razor wire on the border between Zimbabwe and South
Africa
Photo 3: Man brutally assaulted by army in Zimbabwe during the
mass stay away called by the MDC in March 2003
Photo 4: Tonderai
Machiridza, an MDC activist tortured in the custody of Zimbabwean police. He
died of his injuries the day after this picture was taken, on Independence
Day, 18 April 2003. Nobody has ever been held accountable for his
murder
Photo 7: Samuel Khumalo, a trade unionist, seeks medical
assistance after being tortured in police custody, in November 2003. This
same unionist was arrested again in October 2004
Photo 9: Minutes
after the previous picture was taken, Home Affairs guards started an
unprovoked attack on the Zimbabweans, whipping them with sjamboks
Photo
10: October 2004 - a year later in Rosettenville: the RRO is now accessed
down an un-signposted alley. The same long queues of Zimbabweans are there,
still mostly failing to access the office
Photo 11: Zimbabweans join
other vagrants on the streets of Johannesburg in the bitter cold of a
winter's night. Here a woman is roused for a cup of soup from the Methodist
church, July 2004
Photo 12: A Zimbabwean exile with two children receives
food aid from the Methodist church in Johannesburg: July 2004
Photo
13: A Zimbabwean deportee escapes from the shadow of the deportation train
that he has just leapt from: destination for him is now no longer
Beitbridge, but Johannesburg
Photo 14: a blind Zimbabwean child feels
the face of Archbishop Pius Ncube of Bulawayo
Photo 15: This
Zimbabwean was one of four who died after being detained in Lindela in
October this year
Photo 16: Zimbabwean deportees are herded on to a
deportation train in Johannesburg, September 2003
Photo 17:
Zimbabwean deportees are herded on to a deportation train in Johannesburg,
September 2003
Back Cover: Zimbabweans wait to be deported at
Lindela
"NO WAR IN ZIMBABWE" An account of the exodus of a nation's
people Solidarity Peace Trust - November 2004
"Any democracy is
only as strong as its weakest link. Refugees are South Africa's weakest link
and if we collude on impunity of our own officials, and allow corruption,
and deny refugees their rights, then South Africa is not a country to be
proud of." [Abeda Bhamjee, Lawyer, Wits Law Clinic, October 2003] "The
Zimbabwean situation of starvation and malnutrition, wilful political
violence and intimidation, and the immoral use of food aid by the Zimbabwean
government demands stronger and transparent intervention by African
governments through the AU. With more than three million people displaced as
a result of the crisis in Zimbabwe, a generation of exiles and refugees has
been created. This situation cannot be allowed to continue. The Government
of Zimbabwe must care for its own people." [South African Catholic
Bishops Conference, August 2004] "We would be better off with only six
million people, with our own people who support the liberation struggle. We
don't want all these extra people". [Didymus Mutasa: Zanu-PF Organising
Secretary, August 2002] "60% to 70% of Zimbabwean adults who should
constitute the productive population are living abroad." [Herbert Nkala,
Publicity Committee Chairman for Zimbabwe Reserve Bank's "Homelink",
September 2004] There is no civil war in Zimbabwe, so there is no reason to
apply [for asylum]. [Home Affairs official, Johannesburg Refugee
Reception Office, July 2004] Executive Summary Background Zimbabweans
are now the second biggest group of foreign Africans in South Africa. Yet
there is little formal information available on their situation. Very few
are being officially recorded as political refugees. Some Zimbabweans claim
that it is hard to access asylum seeker status. It was the intention of the
authors to investigate these allegations, as well as to establish other
problems and issues of relevance to Zimbabweans in South Africa. South
Africa needs to brace itself for ever-greater numbers of Zimbabweans unless
a lasting political solution is found to the current crisis. At both
government and NGO level, there is a need to devise policies to deal
humanely with the influx, and particularly to provide services on the
ground. For this, more information is needed. Method: data
sources Data for this report was collected between September 2003 and October
2004. Sources of data included: a desk study of media, human rights reports
and refugee laws; more than two hundred interviews with Zimbabweans in South
Africa; 7 field visits to the Johannesburg RRO; 10 field visits to places of
residence; two surveys involving a further 211 Zimbabweans; interviews with
key informants; 4 field visits to Musina; 3 field visits to
Beitbridge.
PART ONE: Zimbabwe's biggest export: its people Part One
of the report looks at: the crisis of governance in Zimbabwe; the
humanitarian crisis; the economic crisis. It examines numbers of Zimbabweans
in the diaspora and the implications of this. 1. The breakdown of law and
order: torture with impunity Human rights organisations estimate that a
minimum of 300,000 people have been victims of human rights violations of
various kinds over the last four years. Such violations include torture,
destruction of homesteads, massive displacement of persons fleeing political
persecution or farm invasions, and the denial of food to those perceived to
support the opposition. Around 300 have been murdered for political reasons.
The cumulative impact on life in Zimbabwe is harrowing. Recording and
publicising the problem is close to impossible because of laws restricting
freedom of association, expression and movement. Government agents have
impunity and very few cases of violation result in charges being laid
against perpetrators. Two hundred and fifty thousand school leavers each year
have little or no prospect of formal training or employment; further
training and jobs in the civil service now require youth to undergo the
politically biased and brutalising national youth service training. Some
youths flee Zimbabwe to avoid militia training. None has doubted the need
for land redistribution, including civil society and the political
opposition, but the well orchestrated abuse of a much needed programme by
the government has resulted in new injustices. 2. The Humanitarian
crisis The land invasions have resulted in a dramatic drop in Zimbabwe's
capacity to feed itself. The government has at times in the last three
years, used the food deficit situation to politically manipulate access to
food, denying opposition supporters the right to buy it from GMB. AI has
documented that Zimbabwe is in contravention of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which enshrines the right
to food, and to which Zimbabwe is signatory. The government has consistently
throughout 2004, claimed a bumper harvest, and has informed WFP that they do
not need food aid during 2004/5. Yet UN agents predict a 50% food deficit.
The GMB reports having purchased from farmers only 288,000 tonnes of maize,
a shortfall of 2,000,000 tonnes. Commentators fear the probability of food
becoming a political weapon ahead of the 2005 elections is great, in a
situation where the ruling party now effectively controls all food in the
country. Some Zimbabweans who have fled the country fear political
victimisation resulting in being denied the right to food. There is a need
to recognise this group of persons, which may become quite sizeable in the
year ahead. 3. Collapse of social services and the economy Social
indicators in Zimbabwe have fallen dramatically over the last four years.
There is 70% unemployment, 80% below the poverty datum line, 27% of adults
HIV positive. As a result of political decisions, around a million farm
workers and their families have been deliberately deprived of their
livelihoods, homes and infrastructure. Health, education and delivery of
services in municipal areas are collapsing under economic and skills
constraints. Economic collapse is the result of poor governance. The
government orchestrated farm invasions have led to the collapse of
commercial agriculture, which has had a knock on effect for other
industries. Key industries have contracted by between 40% and 60% in the
last three years. The mining industry has been destabilised by recent plans
by government to indigenise 50% of this sector. 4. Zimbabwe's biggest
export: its people An estimated 25% to 30% of Zimbabwe's population has left
the nation. Government's own analysts put the number at 3,4 million. Out of
a population of 12 million, around half is under the age of 15, and out of
the remaining 6 million adults, 1 million is retired. Out of 5 million
potentially productive adults, 3,4 million are outside Zimbabwe. This is a
staggering 60% to 70% of productive adults. The current exodus is not
part of the long established cross border movement between Matabeleland and
South Africa. Around 500,000 are estimated to have regularly migrated to
South Africa for work, but there is an estimate of an additional 1,200,000
now in South Africa. The loss of skills has impacted on health and education
in Zimbabwe. Many Zimbabwean have left their professions, either to go into
more lucrative careers, for example in the black market in Zimbabwe, or for
higher salaries abroad. Many professionals such as teachers, nurses,
policemen, artisans, have been driven out by political events and are living
like vagrants in South Africa. The government's "Homelink" scheme is
official acknowledgement that our biggest export is our people. Around US$
300 million is returned monthly to Zimbabwe from nationals in the diaspora,
98% of this via black market channels. "Homelink" attempts to increase the
return of foreign earnings via the Reserve Bank. With possibly 50% of
voting age adults outside Zimbabwe, the implications for democracy are dire.
Half the population will be deprived of its vote in next year's
election.
PART TWO: Destination - South Africa: Legal, administrative and social
issues involving refugees Part Two is an overview of South Africa's legal
obligations to refugees, together with the authors' own findings relating to
the Johannesburg RRO. Issues of quiet diplomacy and xenophobia are briefly
raised. 1. "Asylum seekers" and "refugees": South Africa's legal
obligations South Africa is signatory to various international conventions
and has had a Refugee Act since 1998. In terms of the Act, asylum seekers
need to approach a Refugee Reception Office and receive an asylum seeker's
permit. This should entitle them to work and study, but not all RROs are
ensuring this. ASPs have to be renewed monthly. If applicants get refugee
status, it entitles them to remain in South Africa for two years and to have
improved access to social services. The decision of refugee status is
future based. It is an assessment of whether returning to your home country
is likely to result in persecution. The authors suggest there is a need for
a test case in South Africa to establish whether being denied food on
political grounds is a "threat to physical safety", and whether Zimbabweans
fleeing politically induced famine or outright discrimination of access to
food should be given asylum. 2. The Battle for Zimbabwean refugee
rights It is only since June 2002, when the Wits Law Clinic prepared a test
case involving 5 Zimbabwean exiles for the Courts, that the Department of
Home Affairs conceded that any Zimbabwean had a right to asylum. The
attitude before then - and very often since - is that "there is no war in
Zimbabwe" and therefore no right to asylum for its people. However,
Zimbabweans who entered South Africa prior to the test case ruling are still
on occasion being denied the right to seek asylum, although June 2002 is not
the time at which human rights violations began. Victimisation is a
repeated experience in Zimbabwe. This is significant in terms of eligibility
for asylum, and also as Zimbabwe heads into another election phase. Those
persecuted before may well be persecuted again and may flee to South
Africa. 3. Attitude to Zimbabweans within Home Affairs RROs Refugees
International found that Zimbabweans do face more barriers than other asylum
seekers, in spite of denials by Home Affairs. A study by Themba Lesizwe
reported that only 4 out of 34 tortured Zimbabweans who had tried to access
asylum seeker status had managed to do so. RI noted that Home Affairs
officials, when interviewed, said that "there is no civil war in Zimbabwe,
so there is no reason to apply [for asylum]".
4. Refugee Reception
Office, Johannesburg: Observations of current authors Most Zimbabweans apply
for asylum through the Johannesburg RRO. We therefore observed events at
this RRO on 7 occasions and two different locations in the last year. We
noted many irregularities that indicate that Zimbabweans have serious
problems acquiring ASPs. Corruption, assaults by guards at the RRO, and
fewer than 10 Zimbabweans a week being processed were a few observations we
made. We noted that would be asylum seekers from the "Horn of Africa" who
queue on the same day had fewer problems in accessing the RRO. We further
noted that all asylum claims are being processed very slowly. In terms of
the Regulations to the Refugee Act, they are supposed to be finalised within
6 months. However, ASPs from any country frequently take longer than 3
years. Even so, Zimbabwean claims seem to take longer still, with only 1% of
claims having been finalised positively in the last two and a half
years. RROs have problems with capacity. The Director General assured us that
this will improve shortly, with 69 more refugee determination officers
entering the system. It was suggested by human rights lawyers that asylum
seekers are a "cash cow", and that it suits Home Affairs officials to
obstruct access to the RROs; desperate people are then prepared to pay
bribes to get an ASP. However, as some people still get ASPs through the
normal route, it is hard to prove bribery and inefficiency. Many potential
asylum seekers do not attempt to gain ASPs because they know they do not
have the money to bribe. Home Affairs Director General acknowledged the
system was full of corruption, and said there was a new "Counter corruption
and security" department now being set up. 5. Attitude of UNHCR to
Zimbabweans RI observed that the UNHCR showed a lack of commitment to
protecting Zimbabwean asylum seekers in South Africa. They made "appallingly
cynical" comments to RI about Zimbabweans, and had failed to visit the
border area for one year, or the Johannesburg RRO for 8 months. Human rights
lawyers noted that UNHCR is very reluctant to facilitate resettlement of
Zimbabweans outside of southern Africa. 6. Quiet diplomacy: at odds with
acknowledging political refugees? SADC nations including South Africa have
been reluctant to condemn human rights abuses in Zimbabwe and have accepted,
publicly at least, ZANU PF's claim that abuses are all linked to land reform
and to the need to resist "recolonisation" by British agents. There is a
clash between the policy of "quiet diplomacy" which plays down the crisis of
governance and simultaneously acknowledging that citizens of Zimbabwe have
genuine reasons to fear persecution and to run away in their
thousands. 7. Perceptions of Zimbabweans: "Makwerekwere" It is common for
refugees anywhere to attract negative perceptions and this is true in South
Africa as well. South Africa has 42% unemployment and migrants compete with
South Africans for unskilled work. This drives down wages and causes
resentment. Xenophobic attacks on Zimbabweans and other foreigners occur
regularly. There is a perception that Zimbabweans are involved in criminal
activities. There is some evidence in the media for this, although precise
figures could not be sourced from officials. Zimbabweans report criminal
acts against them, including rape, assaults, theft and having to bribe
police in order not to be deported. They have no right of redress as they
fear reporting these incidents. 8. South Africans: a history of
exile South Africa was hosted in the sub region during their own struggle for
freedom. Zimbabwean exiles have expressed disappointment that their own
struggle for democracy is not being recognised as legitimate.
PART THREE: The revolving door Part Three covers the experiences of
Zimbabweans themselves and the process of going into exile. This includes:
crossing the border; life in South Africa; access to health care;
deportation; repatriation. It also raises the issue of Zimbabwean deaths in
South Africa. 1. Crossing the border Zimbabweans face the hazards of the
Limpopo in flood, crocodiles and human predators such as the "Maguma guma"
and SANDF when entering South Africa illegally. Nonetheless hundreds do so
every week. 2. Life in the big cities: Johannesburg and Durban This
section describes the every day lives of: 26 political exiles living in one
two-bedroomed apartment: a group of 31 blind Zimbabweans who live in one
room; cross border traders in Durban. The very hard living conditions, lack
of privacy and lack of security is apparent. It is astonishing that such
lives are considered preferable to life in Zimbabwe, an indicator of both
how afraid and how deprived people in Zimbabwe now are. 3. Musina: life
in a small border town Most Zimbabweans pass quickly through Musina to other
places. Those who remain are usually farm workers or unaccompanied minors.
Some migrant workers have been working in this area for generations, but are
now joined by politically displaced farm workers from parts of Zimbabwe that
have not traditionally had farm labourers going to Musina Children aged 12
to 17 have formed informal groups here. They are hard to access, and very
prone to deportation and wage exploitation. Many girls this age and older
end up as sex workers. Girls also commonly report having to offer regular
free sex to police and army in order not to be deported. 4. Access to
health care A survey of 111 Zimbabweans conducted in August 2004 found that
out of 55 who reported having needed public health care since they arrived
in South Africa: 29 had accessed the public health care system 26 had
not accessed it Out of the 26 who had not, 17 had been denied health care by
a clinic or hospital, and 7 had reported they were too afraid of deportation
to even approach a health centre; 2 had reported they were too poor to
afford fees. Johannesburg hospital was the most likely to turn people away,
and receptionists were the category of employee most likely to turn people
away, for not having acceptable ID. 3 people reported verbal abuse from
nursing staff, being called a "makwerekwere". Although the sample was
small, these findings coincide to a large degree with the findings of a
larger refugee report released in November 2003. Additional anecdotal
evidence supports the survey findings that some Zimbabweans have problems
accessing health services, including torture victims.
5.
Deportation Around 45,000 Zimbabweans a year are deported. Deportees are held
at Lindela detention centre and are then deported on a once-weekly or
fortnightly train. Deporting Zimbabweans costs South Africa approximately R
720,000,000 a year. Most deportees are back in South Africa within a few
hours or days of deportation. Police and Home Affairs are not issuing 15
day permits to people picked up without papers who ask at that point for
asylum, and is rather going ahead and deporting them. This is illegal, and
also in defiance of the principle of "non refoulenent": people at risk of
torture are being returned to Zimbabwe. They are being deported without ever
seeing an immigration officer and having the chance to claim refuge.
Considering how hard it is to get an ASP, this puts political exiles at risk
of deportation. Corruption is a problem. Police commonly bribe Zimbabweans
R200 in order not to send them for deportation. Home Affairs officials
charge R800 to release people from Lindela before deportation. People who
are very ill are also being picked up, held in Lindela and deported. This is
in contravention of Lindela's stated policy and basic humanitarian law, yet
in one week in October this year, 11 deportees died in Lindela. Others have
died on the deportation train, or soon after arrival back in
Beitbridge. In Musina, there is no RRO, and all Zimbabweans are deported
without the opportunity to claim ASPs. Police do not have the resources to
cope with the numbers of detainees and are holding them in poor conditions.
They report deporting the same people three times in one week. In the
opinion of the police in Musina, this cycle of deportations is not
constructive. Unaccompanied minors have been regularly deported and this is
illegal. There was a test case ruling in September of this year confirming
this, and saying foreign children have the same rights as South African
children in terms of the Child Care Act. From time to time, parents get
deported without their children, who remain in South Africa until the
parents come back. 6. Back in Zimbabwe: the deportees on arrival Police in
Beitbridge do not have the capacity to hold detainees, and so release them
within minutes of repatriation. The authors witnessed that within an hour of
being dismissed by the police, most deportees are on their way back in the
direction of the border, by taxi or on foot. 7. Problems of the repatriated
in Beitbridge While most deportees head south again, some end up stranded
without money or too ill to continue their journey. Neither the police nor
NGOs here provide bus passes or any other support for deportees. Deportees
reportedly die on a weekly basis in Beitbridge hospital. We were shown
orphans whose mothers had died in this hospital, leaving small children
stranded far away from families. Human remains washed up on the banks of the
Limpopo also end up in mass paupers' graves here. Human remains, which are
assumed to be of border jumpers, are picked up fairly regularly in the bush
around the border area. There is a risk of being picked up by the Zimbabwean
police and tortured again, in the case of political deportees. 8. The
dead: a problem for the future? Zimbabweans are dying in South Africa,
possibly in large numbers, and not all of the dead are being repatriated for
a variety of reasons. They end up in paupers' graves, either in South Africa
or in Beitbridge, depending where they die. These dead are undocumented and
do not have death certificates in their names. This may cause practical
problems for their Zimbabwean families in the years ahead. Single parents
sometimes die and leave stateless, undocumented orphans, who may have
relatives in Zimbabwe, but who these may be and how to reach them is not
known. Families also need to know the fate of their loved ones abroad, yet
the dead are sometimes becoming "disappeared persons", without death
certificates or known places of burial. This may cause emotional problems
for families, who are left with unanswered questions about the fate of their
relatives. There is a need to address this problem and find ways of ensuring
that trusted persons or NGOs have ways of contacting relatives in Zimbabwe
in such situations. 9. Conclusion Zimbabweans are fleeing their nation
in their millions. There is no indication that this is going to change in
the near future. Three major reasons for the exodus have been identified:
the breakdown of law and order, including torture with impunity; the
humanitarian crisis, including political abuse of food; the collapse of the
economy. Going into exile is a difficult choice: living as a "makwerekwe" in
South Africa involves living with a very real threat of xenophobia, of
having to bribe police in order not to be deported, or of being deported. It
means being vulnerable to crime and exploitation without redress. It means
living in appallingly overcrowded and unsafe conditions, and not always
having access to basic facilities including health. It means that productive
people who once held respectable jobs have to adjust to being
beggars. That so many opt nonetheless to live a hard life in exile, is an
indicator of the severity of life in Zimbabwe; however tough things are in
South Africa, it is better and safer than being in Zimbabwe. For this
reason, would-be asylum seekers are prepared to spend weeks and months in
fruitless queues in the hope of ASPs. For this reason, young men are
prepared to leap out of deportation trains - risking death on the tracks is
better than being forced to go home. Zimbabweans in exile appear to face
a lack of political will in South Africa. While the laws to protect their
rights are in place, these are being undermined by the "politics of denial"
practised by government officials in relation to the nature of the crisis in
Zimbabwe; this results in victimisation at many levels. Zimbabwean exiles
have become a "cash cow" - the very government they have fled is trying to
harvest returns from them, and corrupt Army, Police and Home Affairs
officials in South Africa take bribes from them and other refugees in
exchange for another precarious day of not being deported. It is apparent
that the current inefficiency in the Home Affairs system plays into the
hands of corrupt officials, who are making significant sums of money from
bribes. It is not in their interests for the system to become
efficient. The needs of Zimbabweans in exile are those of refugees everywhere
- they need recognition and acceptance, and access to essential services. In
addition, Zimbabweans need greater understanding of why they have left their
nation, particularly from South African officials. The nature of Zimbabwe's
struggle for democracy and of the persecution of democratic forces in
Zimbabwe needs to be discussed and acknowledged, particularly among
government officials and departments. Zimbabweans need practical assistance.
They need greater access to health care, to ASPs, to education and skills
training for their exiled youth. Those who are very ill and those who are
dead need to have this information reliably conveyed to their relatives back
home, through secure and confidential channels.
Recommendations There have been several studies of general refugee issues in
South Africa in recent years. CASE has produced two major reports, one in
2001 and one in 2003. Both of these reports were accompanied by extensive
recommendations that were very thorough and consultative. There is little to
be gained by yet again reframing the good work that others have done in this
regard. The National Refugee Baseline Survey: Final Report, released a year
ago in November 2003 made recommendations to the South African Government,
the National Departments of Home Affairs, Health and Education; also to the
UNHCR and Service Providers, including NGOs and churches. Their
recommendations are attached as Appendix Four to this report. The
Solidarity Peace Trust would reinforce certain of the CASE recommendations,
2003, summarised here: To the Department of Home Affairs: . They should
investigate bribery within the department. . They should issue ASPs that are
valid for six months instead of one month . ASPs should be more formal and
should be laminated with anti forgery marks to make their recognition by
various service providers more likely. . Such changes should be combined with
a massive campaign to promote recognition of the documents in government
departments and with other service providers. In addition the Trust
recommends that: . There is a need to promote greater awareness and debate in
South Africa, including at the level of service providers, of the nature of
the crisis in Zimbabwe, the scale and type of human rights abuses that are
taking place, and the policies that are needed in South Africa to deal with
the numbers of Zimbabweans in their nation. Refugee reception
offices . The Department of Home Affairs should take action to issue greater
numbers of Zimbabweans and others with ASPs each week, as the backlog is
causing real hardship to many, among them victims of torture who are at real
risk if they are deported. . The Police need to be reminded of their
legal obligation to give 15 day permits to any person they pick up for
deportation who states that they want to apply for asylum, particularly
bearing in mind the fact that gaining an ASP can be so problematic. .
Civil society should be monitoring access to RROs on a systematic basis.
Personnel should stand incognito outside RROs and observe whether: o Home
Affairs officials are giving out helpful information to those waiting o Home
Affairs officials are illegally insisting on passports o There is brutality
towards those waiting o Bribery is taking place They should further note
how many people from which nations are being issued ASPs each day, and what
proportion this represents of those waiting each day. Health care .
Further investigations into how best to provide health care to Zimbabweans
who may not be accessing the public health services must be addressed. Some
are not accessing it because they do not have ASPs. If the above
recommendations are acted upon, then much of this problem will resolve
itself. . Until national service providers including the Ministry of
Health consistently recognise the rights of asylum seekers, refugees and
their documentation, as they are required to by local and international law,
there is a need to build a network of support via civil society to ensure
that asylum seekers and refugees, in particular those with torture related
injuries, have safe access to medical care. . Civil society should
monitor access to medical care, particularly at hospitals, and document
instances of denial of the right to services for further action. Denial
of the right to food . There is a need for a test case resolving the issue of
whether denial of the right to food on political grounds constitutes a
"threat to physical safety". Any civil society group that knows of
Zimbabweans in South Africa that have reported political abuse of food,
should consider taking the issue to Court. Deportations . The endless
cycle of deportations should be reconsidered: this is an expensive and not
very effective policy. In particular, urgently: o Very ill foreigners should
not be detained for deportation o Independent health professionals should do
an assessment of health conditions at Lindela and on the deportation trains,
to facilitate formation of a policy that will prevent communication of
diseases, protect the rights of the ill, and monitor deaths of deportees in
state custody. . The UNHCR should be playing a more active role to ensure
that minors, and political asylum seekers who may not have ASPs, are not
being deported. . There should be opportunity for deportees at Lindela to put
on record crimes against themselves including bribery by South African
Police, SANDF, and Home Affairs officials paid for both in cash and in sex.
Civil society would be in the best position to document such claims and lay
charges. Repatriation . There is a need to protect the rights of deportees
on the Zimbabwean side of the border. Among those currently deported, are
unaccompanied minors, victims of sexual exploitation, the very ill, and
those who have no resources to return to their homes in Zimbabwe and who end
up stranded. Also among those deported, may be political asylum seekers who
fled Zimbabwe in the first instance for reasons of persecution. . In view
of the fact that the Zimbabwe government is about to force through
Parliament an Act that will undermine activities of human rights NGOs and
churches, it is not obvious who is supposed to deal with this sensitive
issue, and protect the rights of these groups of deportees once they are
back in Zimbabwe. . If there was better screening of deportees on the
South African side, these problems would be reduced in the first
place. The dead . Zimbabweans are dying in South Africa and are ending up
as undocumented deaths in mass paupers' graves. This may create problems in
the future as relatives back in Zimbabwe do not know where their dead are
buried, and do not have death certificates. There is a need to facilitate
ways of keeping safe, confidential records of how to contact relatives back
in Zimbabwe, in the event of exiles becoming very ill or
dying.
Background The Solidarity Peace Trust has as part of its
mission, the role of providing assistance to Zimbabwean victims of torture
and human rights abuses. The Trust has documented the torture of many
Zimbabweans who have fled to South Africa as a result of persecution. It has
an interest in how these and other Zimbabwean torture victims are faring in
their country of refuge - in particular whether tortured political exiles
are receiving refugee status and access to health care. We are concerned
about their living conditions in South Africa, and their experiences at the
hands of South African officials. It is clear that Zimbabweans in South
Africa are not readily perceived as having a legitimate right to seek asylum
there: the assumption is that there is "no war in Zimbabwe", and that
therefore all migrants from Zimbabwe to South Africa are there for economic
reasons, and should be deported. The intention of this report is to raise
awareness of why Zimbabweans are pouring into South Africa and the region in
their millions, and of the difficulties they are facing, both formal and
informal, in the hope that groups including government, non governmental
organisations (NGOs) and churches will start developing more coherent
policies to deal with the needs and problems of this influx. The only
official strategy at this stage seems to be an endless revolving door of
deportations at huge expense to the South African public that in any case
barely scratches the surface of the numbers of Zimbabweans in South Africa.
Support to Zimbabwean exiles is small scale and ad hoc, consisting of a
handful of NGOs and churches who are trying to offer basic resources to a
few hundred individuals or families. This report does not claim to cover the
issue of Zimbabwe's exiles in exhaustive scientific detail. By their very
definition, Zimbabweans exiled in South Africa are fugitives. The vast
majority are illegal, without status or papers, subject to deportation. It
is difficult to access people who spend much of their time trying to avoid
detection, trying to be invisible. Over the last year, the authors of this
report have managed to interact with several hundred Zimbabweans in South
Africa and their stories of torture and persecution have provided a tragic
background against which other sources of information, including previous
refugee studies and media reports, have been situated. Exiles have been
visited in their places of abode, observed in the streets, and interviewed
in the context of church feeding programmes. To build trust has taken months
of work and all those who have come forward with their stories are kept
anonymous to protect them, unless they have specifically agreed to having
their identities revealed, for example in photographs. Even those who
would be considered to be in South Africa for primarily economic reasons by
officials, view their decision to leave as political. In their own eyes, the
collapse of the economy and the loss of livelihoods in Zimbabwe is the
result of political mismanagement; with good governance in Zimbabwe, they
would not be in South Africa. While this will not win them refugee status
with officials in terms of international criteria for what makes a refugee,
it should be noted that individuals do see it this way - political decisions
made in the last four years in Zimbabwe are what have driven them over the
border to take up tough lives in a foreign land. The Trust wishes to draw
attention to the fact that lack of access to food by any Zimbabwean may not
be a simple matter of poverty and/or crop failure. The current Zimbabwe
government has in the last four years used food as a political weapon; the
government controls access to maize, particularly in rural areas, and has
been documented refusing to allow those perceived to support the political
opposition from purchasing maize. The government and its agents have also at
times in the last four years interfered with donor feeding programmes for
political reasons, often before or after elections of one kind or another.
There is an urgent need for greater awareness among South African
authorities of this reality, and possibly for a court ruling on whether
political denial of access to food constitutes a "threat to physical safety"
and is grounds for asylum. The authors acknowledge that many groups apart
from Zimbabweans are claiming refuge in South Africa: since 1994, there has
been a steady influx of people from all over Africa, including Rwanda,
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Burundi, Uganda,
Cameroon, Sudan and elsewhere. Many of the problems raised as affecting
Zimbabweans in this report are common to all refugees. In the opinion of
the authors, there are good reasons for focusing exclusively on Zimbabweans
in this report. . Going by the number of deportees, Zimbabweans are now the
second biggest group of foreign Africans in South Africa. Yet there is
little formal information available on their situation. For example, the
most recent and major study of asylum seekers and refugees released in
November 2003, excluded Zimbabweans altogether. Their exclusion from this
report and others is a consequence of how recently and rapidly the influx of
Zimbabweans has occurred; since 2000, they have gone from being a negligible
group to a formidable presence in South Africa. There have been cross border
traders from Zimbabwe for the last twenty years, but their visibility was
close to nil. . While numbers of Zimbabwean have escalated, very few are
being officially recorded as political refugees. The Department of Home
Affairs (Home Affairs) claim that very few Zimbabweans apply for asylum
seeker status, using this as evidence that the vast majority of Zimbabweans
are here for economic reasons and do not consider themselves as having left
for political reasons. Others have claimed that Zimbabweans are finding it
hard to access asylum seeker status and that Home Affairs' assessment of the
numbers of asylum seekers is therefore unrealistically low. It was the
intention of the authors to investigate these allegations and
counter-allegations for ourselves. . Finally, it is the perception of the
Solidarity Peace Trust that South Africa needs to brace itself for
ever-greater numbers of Zimbabweans in their midst unless a lasting
political solution is found to the current crisis in Zimbabwe. -The
government of South Africa therefore needs to devise new policies to deal
with the problems, which could include greater efforts to mediate in
Zimbabwe itself to promote a return to peace, prosperity and human rights,
as well as more humane and comprehensive policies on how to treat the mass
of Zimbabweans in their nation. - While there is growing awareness of the
plight of Zimbabweans among churches and the NGO sector in South Africa,
there is a need for more developed services and support to be put in place
for exiles from all nations, including improved access to health care. While
many organizations seem to be involved in raising awareness around the
Zimbabwean crisis through workshops, papers and research, there is an urgent
need to supplement this with services on the ground to help those on the
receiving end of the crisis.
Method of compiling the report: data
sources Data collection: relevant issues The vast majority of Zimbabweans
who have arrived in South Africa in the last four years are considered
illegal immigrants. Very few have any official status. Working with a
community that is both hugely diverse and living underground, limits the
nature of the investigations that are possible. For example, it is not easy
in such a situation to work with randomized samples of people in order to
arrive at statistically sound conclusions based on structured
questionnaires. Zimbabweans in South Africa have an unknown demographic
profile and are of an unknown number. It is our experience that this group
is very mobile. Individuals mostly have no fixed address for any length of
time, which makes follow up interviews difficult, and the circumstances in
which people find themselves change rapidly. Issues of confidentiality are of
particular importance when dealing with persons who feel insecure and at
risk of deportation. There are also ethical issues in working with a very
underprivileged group that has limited access to essential services such as
health. It is problematic to identify people who need rehabilitative
services and merely to note the problem. Some individuals who came forward
to be interviewed are living in situations of severe deprivation and even
under threat. Wherever possible, individuals with specific needs have been
passed on to local NGOs and health professionals. The information in this
report has been compiled over the course of one year from: . A desk study
of media and human rights reports on the causes of the mass exodus of
Zimbabweans since 2000, including available information on the number of
Zimbabweans in the diaspora, and the impact of this mass emigration both in
Zimbabwe and in the region. . A review of the laws and international
obligations in relation to refugees in South Africa. . More than two
hundred interviews by the authors with Zimbabwean refugees, mainly in
Johannesburg but also in Durban and Musina. We interviewed a range of
Zimbabweans who claim to have left for political reasons; political abuses
including torture, forced conscription into the youth militia, property
destruction, displacement. In some cases, individuals were followed up over
time. . Six field visits to observe the refugee reception offices in
Braamfontein, Johannesburg, during late 2003 and then one visit to
Rosettenville, Johannesburg, in October 2004, in order to assess on site the
access of Zimbabweans to the offices granting asylum seeker status, and
general treatment by South African officials. . Ten field visits to
apartments/rooms/spaces where refugees reside in Johannesburg, Durban and
Musina to raise our awareness of living conditions. . Key informant
interviews with two South African Home Affairs officials, and with South
African human rights lawyers, church leaders and personnel in NGOs that have
been working with Zimbabwean refugees. . Two surveys of Zimbabwean refugees,
which are in addition to the 200 hundred interviews mentioned
previously; o A survey conducted in October 2003, of 100 Zimbabweans who were
among those in the queue outside Home Affairs in Johannesburg on the same
morning in October 2003, trying to access the building for asylum seeker
status. o A survey conducted in August 2004, of 111 Zimbabweans who are
informally registered with two different NGO refugee organizations in
Johannesburg. This involved in-depth structured interviews with each
interviewee, of around one hour each, and focused on reasons for leaving
Zimbabwe, access to asylum seeker permits and access to health care. .
Interviews with lawyers and refugees, and a desk study to establish the
process of deportation, including conditions in Lindela detention centre, on
the deportation train, and on arrival at Beitbridge in Zimbabwe. The
deportation of unaccompanied minors was of particular interest. . Four
field visits and key informant interviews with NGOs operating in the Musina
area to investigate conditions of Zimbabweans arriving there, in particular
unaccompanied minors; interviews on holding and deportation conditions in
Musina. . Three field visits and interviews with health personnel and police
in Beitbridge, Zimbabwe, to gain insight into what happens to migrants
forcibly returned from South Africa.
PART ONE Zimbabwe's
biggest export: its people
1. The breakdown of law and order: torture
with impunity Zimbabweans ordinarily live in fear, it is what I would call a
normal state of life in Zimbabwe today.it progresses into being captured.
Once you are captured, it transforms itself into terror. [Gabriel Shumba,
Human Rights Lawyer] The crisis in Zimbabwe has not produced rivers of blood
and mountains of dead. In global terms, events there cannot compete with the
horrors of Iraq, Palestine or Dafur in Sudan. Yet, the precipitous decline
of Zimbabwe on political, legal, social and economic fronts in the last five
years has created a problem that has spilled across neighbouring southern
African nations, as an estimated 25% of its population has fled the
political and humanitarian crisis at home. Zimbabwe's democratic space has
closed in the face of an upsurge in state organised political violence, the
implementation of repressive laws and the collapse of the judiciary.
Whenever there is a threat that people may exercise their democratic rights,
there is a flare up of state orchestrated violence. The crisis of governance
has impacted socially, as Zimbabwe's economy has become the fastest
contracting economy in the world. The crisis in Zimbabwe has been
referred to as a crisis of governance, which has arisen out of a profound
intolerance for political diversity. It is no coincidence that land
invasions began within weeks of ZANU PF's first ever defeat at the polls in
February 2000, in a referendum in which the government's revised
constitution, which would have entrenched the powers of the President, was
rejected by Zimbabweans. The referendum defeat was the result of campaigning
by the first national opposition political party of any standing in the last
24 years, the MDC, together with civil society forces. It is the MDC and
those perceived to support the MDC, including civil society movements such
as trade unions, which have borne the brunt of human rights violations and
state oppression since 2000 till the present. Zimbabweans live in a state of
oppression in which they have been forced to flee their homes for fear of
persecution, in a country where the police and army can detain, torture and
even murder perceived government opponents with total impunity. While the
death toll due to political violence remains small, at around 300, there
have been thousands of other human casualties of the situation. Human rights
organisations in Zimbabwe have estimated that around 300,000 people have
been victims of human rights violations of various kinds over the last four
years. Torture, destruction of homesteads, massive displacement of persons
fleeing political persecution, and the denial of food to those perceived to
support the opposition are among the violations that have been widespread,
systematic and well documented.
Not many of the individual incidents of abuse are headline catching in world
terms, and the vast majority go entirely unrecorded, but the cumulative
impact on life in Zimbabwe is harrowing. Recording and publicising the
problem has been made close to impossible because of draconian laws that
have shut down the only independent daily newspaper and thrown all foreign
correspondents out of the country. Yet the scars being left by state
sponsored violence are undeniable. Youth militia Three hundred
thousand school leavers each year have little or no prospect of formal
training or employment, and this problem is exacerbated for children who are
not prepared to undergo the politically biased and brutalising national
youth service training; youth militia training is now a prerequisite for
entering employment in the civil service, among the biggest employers left
in Zimbabwe. Many youths, both male and female, who have entered the youth
militia programme since its inception in 2001 have emerged traumatised and
have fled the country. Those whose training has coincided with election
periods have been used by the ruling party to conduct a brutal campaign. In
some rural areas, youths who refuse to volunteer for the training are
victimised; young people have fled to avoid both the training and the
persecution/lack of opportunities that accompany not having completed
it. Elinor Sisulu of the Crisis in Zimbabwe office in Johannesburg made the
following comment on the prospects for Zimbabwe's youth: Zimbabwe is not
a place for young people at this time. It really is not, whether they are
MDC or whether they are ZANU PF. If they are MDC, then they are victims of
violence, if they are ZANU PF they are in the "Green Bombers" [youth
militia] and they are victims because they are forced to become perpetrators
of violence. This needs recognition and there must be concrete programmes
for young people [in South Africa]. The "land revolution" The Zimbabwe
government has portrayed the repressive clamp down in Zimbabwe as being part
of a legitimate "land revolution", and all human rights violations as
somehow linked to white farmers; the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), a
grassroots trade unionist-led opposition party has been portrayed as
"British sponsored", and the repression of the ordinary people of Zimbabwe
is portrayed as a noble revolution against recolonisation. None has doubted
or disagreed that there has been a need for land redistribution, including
the MDC, but the well orchestrated abuse of a much needed programme by the
government has resulted in new injustices. The fact that most of the
international media attention has focused on the issue of farm invasions,
has fed the misperception that the state violence is part of a black-white
struggle for land ownership. Without doubt, many human rights violations
have occurred and are still occurring in the context of the land invasions:
but very few of these violations involve white farmers, with poor rural
Zimbabweans being the victims in more than 95% of cases. The government's
own land audit recently revealed huge failings in the process. The
government originally claimed around 350,000 families had been resettled. In
fact, around 70% of families of farm labourers were displaced, representing
more than a million people, with only 140,000 families nationwide benefiting
from resettlement, most of them not from the displaced farm labourer
group. During late 2004, there has been a new phase in the land resettlement
- that of throwing off some of the newly resettled farms, those who have
been on them since the farm invasions. Thousands of the newly resettled have
been tear-gassed and burnt out of their homes by police, resulting in some
instances in deaths. In 2004, with the land redistribution programme
officially over, Zimbabweans still live under draconian laws that control
the media, prevent any form of civilian gathering, and most recently, laws
aimed at shutting down non governmental organisations, in particular those
that document human rights abuses and centre their activities on civic
education and issues of governance. The majority of human rights violations
continue to take place not in or near commercial farms, but in rural or
urban areas where support for the opposition MDC is strongest. Where the
ruling party is strongest, the MDC population is virtually under siege; in
some districts, people are only allowed to get past ZANU PF activists if
they know the secret password.Torture, harassment and state control at every
level continue.
2. The Humanitarian crisis "Why do I get the
impression that I have to beg you to feed your people?" Tony Hall, the
special US Ambassador to the World Food Program stated that he had asked
July Moyo, the Minister responsible for the food aid program in Zimbabwe,
this question in mid-October 2002. The deliberate destruction of the
agricultural sector has contributed to three consecutive years of famine.
Once more in 2004/5, despite earlier assurances by government, the nation
has an estimated 50% maize shortfall, which seems certain at this stage to
result in widespread hunger. Political abuse of food Amnesty International
(AI) released a substantial report on food abuse in Zimbabwe in October
2004, which illustrates systematic manipulation of access to food by the
government, and patterns of food abuse linked to elections. This report
points out that the Zimbabwean government is in serious contravention of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
which enshrines the right to food, and to which Zimbabwe is signatory. In
terms of the ICESCR, States must ensure availability and accessibility of
adequate food. Any discrimination in access to food on political grounds is
a violation of the Covenant. The Zimbabwe government has decreed that it is
almost the sole distributor and marketer of maize, through its parastatal
the Grain Marketing Board (GMB); all maize producers are obliged to sell
only to the GMB. During the last five years there has been repeated concern
raised and some well-documented incidents of ZANU PF using GMB maize as a
political weapon, denying the basic right to food to those who support the
opposition party, the MDC. Sales through the GMB have been reduced during
the last two years; the nation has produced less than half the maize needed
to feed itself. The WFP has run a massive feeding programme throughout the
country, which has kept the threat of starvation at bay. This has meant the
majority of very vulnerable people have had access to food through the
politically neutral WFP. At times, the government has interfered with
donor food distribution, although donors have made every effort to prevent
this and have taken action when this has been brought to their attention. A
few examples of abuse of donor food and of GMB sales follow: . In
mid-October 2002, the WFP had to suspend its feeding programme in the rural
district of Insiza, citing political interference with WFP food ahead of a
parliamentary by-election. The WFP reported that ZANU PF activists had
seized 3 tonnes of maize being distributed by the Organisation of Rural
Associations for Progress (ORAP) and had distributed it solely to ZANU PF
supporters, "in an unauthorised manner". . In October 2002, in the rural
district of Binga that had just voted strongly for MDC in the Rural District
Council elections, the government suspended all donor food to starving
school children. Officials were quoted as saying this was to punish the
region for its strong MDC vote. The Catholic Church was ordered to stop its
feeding, as were "Save the Children" and "Oxfam Great Britain". Feeding
programmes were effectively prevented for around 2 months, and it was 40,000
school children who suffered. . In Lupane in April 2004, in the context of a
parliamentary by-election, government officials used sales of GMB food to
manipulate voters. GMB sold maize at a reduced rate - on days that coincided
with opposition party rallies so that people had to choose between getting a
scarce and essential commodity, or attending the rally. These sales were
accompanied by threats that there would be no more food in this impoverished
and starving area if people did not vote for ZANU PF. The government's
political abuse of GMB sales in Lupane is typical of their "carrot and
stick" approach to food and elections. Maize and election 2005 Concern has
escalated during 2004, as it is apparent that the government is blurring the
issue of food security in Zimbabwe. The government indicated early in the
year that it would not be applying to the WFP to source any donor food for
distribution during the 2004/2005 season. The government is determined to
portray the land resettlement programme as a productive success, hence its
claims that Zimbabwe will grow enough food to feed itself. President Mugabe
said in a television interview in May that Zimbabwe was expecting a "bumper
harvest" and that they did not want to "choke" on too much food, so they
would not be extending WFP's programme into 2005. However, UN and other
sources were in April 2004 predicting a lower yield than that of the 2003/4
season, in which 5 million people had required food aid. In September
this year, the GMB itself admitted to a parliamentary committee that it had
only received 288,000 tonnes of maize deliveries from farmers, a massive
shortfall on the 2,4 million tonnes that the nation needs, and that
government predicted would be harvested locally. The government nonetheless
continues to obfuscate, and to deny a looming food shortage. As recently as
10 October 2004, Mugabe stated in Maputo that there was no need for donor
food this year. During 2004, the WFP has been forced by the Zimbabwe
government to scale down dramatically its operations, so that it is now
feeding around 500,000 recipients, mainly children. Previously, WFP was
feeding 5,000,000 people. Members of government including the President,
have insisted that government would not be purchasing and importing any food
this year. But it has in the meantime secretly been importing food while
denying it is doing so, with another 300,000 tonnes having allegedly been
brought in recently. Fears are, that the reason the government is shutting
the WFP out of some of the most vulnerable areas in need of food, and
importing food rather than accepting donor support, is so that it can have
total control of all food in the country. Then it can manipulate a hungry
populace in a food deficit situation, ahead of the 2005 election. At the
very least: The Zimbabwean government's lack of transparency on grain
availability in the country could jeopardise access to food for millions of
Zimbabweans in the coming months... [the government] is gambling with its
citizens' rights to food. The time of greatest hunger in Zimbabwe is in
the first few months of any year: by then those households that may have
produced some food in the previous season are likely to have run out, and
the next harvest is due only from April onwards. The government has
scheduled next year's election for March - the height of the hungry
time. The food situation looks set to continue being a cause for deep
concern. The latest reports indicate a serious shortage of both seed and
fertiliser ahead of the 2004/5 growing season, and only 32% of arable land
has been tilled ready for planting, with less than a month to go before
farmers should plant next year's crops. The food deficit will clearly
continue for the foreseeable future - as will the corresponding opportunity
to manipulate supplies. Some Zimbabweans who have fled the country have
done so as they fear political victimisation resulting in their being
denied the right to food. There is a need to recognise this group of
persons, which may become quite sizeable in the year ahead. These people
fleeing hunger do not fit the usual refugee profile, and are easily
dismissed as so called economic migrants. There is a need for countries
where Zimbabweans flee to be aware that the hunger of some would be asylum
seekers at least, is the product of politicians denying them food because of
their presumed support for the MDC.
3. Collapse of social services and
economy "The longer the problems of Zimbabwe remain unresolved, the more
entrenched poverty will become. The longer this persists, the greater will
be the degree of social instability, as the poor try to respond to the pains
of hunger. The more protracted this instability, the greater will be the
degree of polarisation and generalised social and political conflict. To
respond to this, the state will inevitably have to emphasise issues of law
and order, even as it has ever fewer means to address the needs of the
people. As it responds in this manner, the less will it have the possibility
to address anything else other than the issue of law and order. The more it
does this, the greater will be the degree of the absence of order and
stability." [President Thabo Mbeki: ANC letter, May 2003] Apart from
political persecution and related hardship, there is untold human misery
among the citizens of Zimbabwe, 70% of whom are formally unemployed, 80% of
whom live below the poverty datum line, and 50% of whom end 2004 without
assured access to food. Social services are collapsing as city councils
cannot keep up with inflation and loss of expertise. In Harare, water
shortages are now a daily occurrence, and breakdowns in the sewerage system
are becoming a serious health risk in overcrowded suburbs. Inflation rates
of over 400% have reduced people to a daily battle for basic survival.
Zimbabwe has one of the world's highest HIV infection levels, with an
estimated 27% of adults being HIV+. Simultaneously, the health system is
collapsing under the loss of human and financial resources; Zimbabweans have
the lowest access to anti-retroviral drugs in southern Africa. Life
expectancy in Zimbabwe has sunk from 52 years in 1980, to 35 years. One in
twelve Zimbabweans is an Aids orphan. The economic collapse is the
product of poor governance. The government orchestrated farm invasions led
to the almost total destruction of the commercial agricultural sector, which
used to be directly responsible for 18% of Zimbabwe's GDP. The indirect
downstream contribution of agriculture in the form of spending of
agricultural profits and wages amounted to a further 18% of
GDP. Information released from Zimbabwe's Central Statistical Office (CSO) in
June 2004 has revealed the calamitous decline not only of farming, but of
industry in Zimbabwe in the last four years. From 1990 to 1998, the
industrial sector showed a small but steady growth; however, there has been
a precipitous collapse since then, particularly in the last two
years: Transport industry has shrunk by 62% Textiles industry has shrunk
by 59% Non-metals industry has shrunk by 52% Wood industry has shrunk by
52% Drink and tobacco industry by 44% Chemicals industry has shrunk by
43% Food industry has shrunk by 42% Clothing industry has shrunk by
9% This collapse of industry has been a knock-on effect of the collapse of
agriculture: as agriculture diminished, so did consumer spending on
industrial outputs; as some industries consequently produced less, the
demand by these industries on others diminished. Run away inflation combined
with unviable price controls, poor fiscal policies and an artificial foreign
exchange rate have also crippled industry. Government statements of
intention to seize industries and a few ad hoc "invasions" of companies have
reduced confidence of potential investors. The IMF closed its Harare
office in September 2004, after releasing a report that noted that the fall
in Zimbabwe's GDP of 30% in the last five years, with a further fall of 4,5%
forecast for 2004, was the result of "inadequate economic policies". It
noted that "disorderly implementation" of the land reform programme has
"sharply reduced" agricultural production. According to the IMF, the
economic decline has had "dire social consequences"; unemployment is high
and increasing, social indicators have deteriorated and the HIV/Aids
pandemic remains "largely unchecked". "Severe food shortages" have caused a
"vicious cycle of malnourishment and disease". The IMF cites issues of
governance, the rule of law, human rights and property rights that have
"severely damaged confidence, discouraged investment and promoted capital
flight and emigration". Citing the "disruptive effects" of land reform, the
IMF quotes an official report that found that actual resettlement of 134 452
families and 6,4m ha fell far short of government's claimed 350 000 families
and 11m ha. Independent reports estimate unemployed farm workers and their
families at more than 1m people, or about 9% of the population. The
government has recently expressed an intention to indigenise 50% of all
mining ventures, sending insecurity through this sector. The President of
the Mining Association has warned that statements from government are
jeopardising six projects that would involve substantial investment and job
creation. Aquarius Platinum, a major investor in Zimbabwe has warned
shareholders of the intended government grab. It is unlikely that major
companies will continue with investment in new projects, in the wake of the
land invasions, and in the face of looming nationalisation or forced giving
of shares to indigenous Zimbabweans. The government intends to force
through parliament before the end of 2004, an NGO Act that will force all
NGOs to register with a government council. This Act bans foreign funding
for NGOs involved in human rights and governance, and forbids NGOs with any
foreigner on their Board from registering. Apart from the serious
implications of this for democracy, around 10,000 jobs in the NGO sector
hang in the balance. It is usual in the definition of who should be given
refugee status, to exclude those considered "economic refugees". ZANU PF
blames the economic collapse on Tony Blair and external forces, yet this is
a position that does not stand up to scrutiny. It is ZANU PF's economic
choices in the last five years that are primarily responsible for the
dramatic demise of Zimbabwe's economy. The economic crisis in Zimbabwe is
interlinked with the crisis of governance. As such, clear cut distinctions
between economic and political motives for fleeing Zimbabwe are not
possible. This is discussed more later in this report in the context of who
should be eligible for asylum. 4. Zimbabwe's biggest export: its
people "The time has come for African leaders to stand up and express their
concern over the deteriorating human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. If human
rights abuses continue to worsen, the political and economic crisis in
Zimbabwe will be difficult to heal.. The Zimbabwe crisis has affected the
entire Southern Africa region and there is need for African leaders to find
quick solutions." [Archbishop Desmond Tutu, October 2003]
From the regional perspective, the most obvious outcome of the deepening
humanitarian and human rights crisis in Zimbabwe has been the mass migration
of its citizens. There are no clear figures on how many Zimbabweans have
left in the last three to four years, but estimates are that between 25% and
30% of Zimbabweans are now outside their nation. President Thabo Mbeki has
said that around 3 million Zimbabweans are in South Africa; estimates by
Zimbabwean business analysts put the figure who have left for South Africa
in the last four years at around 1,2 million, but there may be in addition
around half a million Zimbabweans who have lived in or commuted to South
Africa for more than a decade. Mozambique allegedly has 400,000 Zimbabweans
and Botswana around 200,000. An additional 300,000 are estimated to be in
England, with a further scattering of hundreds of thousands around the
globe. All in all, an estimated 3,4 million Zimbabweans out of a total
population of 12 million are generally assumed to have left their homeland
in the last three years. These figures become more significant when it is
taken into account that of Zimbabwe's estimated population of 12 million,
more than 50% is under the age of 15, and around a million is over
retirement age. As those who have left the country are predominantly young
adults, this means that out of the potentially productive population of
around 5 million adults, 3,4 million or approximately 68% are now outside
Zimbabwe. . A Government analyst speaking on behalf of the Zimbabwe Reserve
Bank's "Homelink" scheme in September 2004, estimated that: "60% to 70%
of Zimbabwean adults who should constitute the productive population are
living abroad."
Pre-existing cross border movement When is a Zimbabwe
immigrant a refugee, when we have a long history of economic immigrants from
Zimbabwe? [Barry Gilder, Director General, Dept of Home Affairs: Interview,
October 2004 ] The point needs to be made that this exodus since 2000 is
different from the long-standing cross border movement of Zimbabweans,
particularly from Matabeleland, which borders South Africa. There are strong
historical and cultural ties between the Ndebele of Zimbabwe and the Zulu in
South Africa. Their languages are nearly identical and they have a common
cultural ancestry. There were also strong political ties between ZAPU, a
Zimbabwean liberation political party that existed until 1987 and the ANC of
South Africa. During the 1980s massacres in Matabeleland, when an
estimated 20,000 Ndebele were murdered and thousands more tortured and
persecuted by the current Zimbabwean government, there was a large wave of
refugees who fled to South Africa from Matabeleland. Many of these never
returned; they now have permanent residence and are fully integrated in
South Africa. There has also always been a large group of migrant workers
from Matabeleland working as gardeners and in other jobs where their status
may not have been regularised, but who have nonetheless made homes in South
Africa. Zimbabweans who were well established provided a network and a
safety net for others coming and going for shorter periods of time.
SiNdebele-speaking Zimbabweans are very hard to distinguish from South
Africans and until the more recent influx of Zimbabweans, who now for the
first time include many Shona-speakers, not much attention was paid to
Zimbabweans by the authorities. The old safety nets are however now no
longer enough as the influx has soared, and many of those fleeing to South
Africa now, are not from parts of the country that have produced migrants in
the past, but are from all corners of Zimbabwe. The old extended cross
border family system cannot cope, or is entirely non existent for many
exiles, which is why thousands of Zimbabweans now arrive in South Africa
with nowhere to go. There are no clear figures on how large the group of
naturalised and semi-naturalised Zimbabweans might be, but some key
informants have put the number at possibly half a million. This 500,000 is
not taken into consideration in the estimate of 3,4 million who have left in
the past four years, or the 1,2 million estimated to have newly arrived in
South Africa. Internal loss of professional skills Within Zimbabwe, many
of the few highly qualified people who remain in the country have left their
formal professions for the informal sector, as salaries fail to keep pace
with soaring inflation. It is possible to make more money buying and selling
black market commodities than to earn a salary as a teacher, nurse, lawyer
or engineer. Furthermore, many rural teachers and nurses left their
professions and headed into the towns to take other jobs after political
persecution linked to elections.
Impact on essential
services Essential services in Zimbabwe have been severely hit by this
external and internal exodus of skills. Teachers and nurses in rural areas
were among the most targeted groups ahead of elections 2000 and 2002; they
were accused of being pro-MDC and hundreds of rural schools were forced to
close by war veterans. Teachers were beaten and threatened by state agents,
and many fled into exile at this time. Political attacks against health
personnel were also documented during 2002, mainly against rural nurses, but
also against doctors. More than 80% of doctors, nurses and therapists who
have trained since 1980 have left. The country has fewer than half the
doctors needed to staff its hospitals; the University of Zimbabwe has so few
qualified lecturers that is has reduced its yearly intake of medical
students from 120 to 70. President Mugabe has accused Britain and other
western nations of "stealing" Zimbabwean skills, but those who leave cite
political persecution, poor salaries and appalling conditions in hospitals,
which are without resources including essential drugs. During the
compilation of this report, the authors spoke to dozens of highly qualified
Zimbabweans who have left their nation as the result of political
persecution. They have left well-paid professional jobs, and find themselves
"living like rats" in Johannesburg, without asylum status and without formal
employment. "Harvesting" the exiles: Homelink The Zimbabwe government
itself has poured enormous publicity into launching an international
programme called "Homelink" that aims to persuade Zimbabweans abroad to send
home their foreign earnings through official banking channels, as opposed to
selling them on the black market; by so doing it has acknowledged that
Zimbabwe's greatest expanding export at this time is its skilled personnel.
With the agricultural and tourist sectors reduced to a fraction of their
previous foreign exchange potential, it is from the hard lives of
Zimbabweans in exile that the government now actively seeks to get a
return. In September 2004, it was possible to sell US$ 1 for around Z$ 5,600
in a Zimbabwean bank, but on the "black" market, the US$ was selling for Z$
7,700. This means it is more attractive for foreign earnings coming back to
Zimbabwe to change hands illegally. The Homelink policy has clearly not done
as well as government projected: Zimbabweans abroad are estimated to send
home in excess of US$ 300 million per month. Yet the Reserve Bank announced
in September that their total returns via Homelink between 1 January and 1
September 2004 were US$ 36 million. Most of this was returned in the early
months of the system, when Zimbabweans received their overseas payments in
foreign exchange; they are now paid in Z$ at the controlled rate. Returns
via Homelink equal 1,5% of the estimated monthly foreign returns from
exiles, indicating a reluctance by Zimbabweans in the diaspora to use this
system.
Implication of the exodus for democracy The absence from
Zimbabwe of possibly 50% of its adult population has dire implications for
democracy and the outcome of elections in Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans in exile are
denied the right to postal ballots, yet it can be assumed that many of the
most politically alienated and dissatisfied Zimbabweans are those who have
made the choice to leave the country. By denying this half of the population
the right to vote, ZANU PF is entrenching its own position. Zimbabweans in
England, USA and South Africa were recently canvassed by Zimbabwean
government officials to send their money home via official channels, yet
many have refused to support the Homelink scheme, stating that they objected
to the government wanting their money, but not their vote. Although it
remains embroiled in this seemingly interminable humanitarian and political
crisis, Zimbabwe is constitutionally bound to have general parliamentary
elections during 2005. Without the participation of that half of the adult
population that is now abroad, any election will not be a true reflection of
the will of the Zimbabwean people. Yet the vast majority of those we spoke
to long to return to their homeland, if only political and humanitarian
conditions there would allow them to do so. Summary Zimbabweans are
leaving their nation in their millions for a variety of reasons: .
Political persecution including torture, destruction of property, and
harassment . The humanitarian crisis and food deficit: hunger in Zimbabwe
is not a simple socio-economic issue, but a political one. The government
has a proven history in the last few year of manipulating access to food on
party political lines . The politically driven economic collapse has
driven thousands into the diaspora, seeking jobs.
PART TWO -
Destination South Africa: Legal, administrative and social issues involving
refugees
1. "Asylum seekers" and "Refugees": South Africa's legal
obligations All nations have the right to control the movement of people
across the borders. All governments have to protect the rights of their own
citizens and tax-payers, and to ensure that people entering the nation have
bona fide reasons for doing so, and means of supporting themselves in legal
ways. At the same time, most nations acknowledge a responsibility for
protecting the rights of those people who flee persecution in their home
country, and the need to recognise refugees. For this reason, there are
various international conventions protecting the rights of refugees, and
many nations also have their own refugee acts. South Africa is signatory
to the: . Convention Relating to Status of Refugees (UN, 1951) . Protocol
Relating to Status of Refugees (UN, 1967) . Organisation of African Unity
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa
(OAU, 1969) . Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) In December
1998, the Refugees Act of South Africa became law. The South African Refugees
Act of 1998 prohibits Home Affairs officials from deporting persons in
certain circumstances. In 2000, the Regulations or implementing procedures
relevant to this Act were published. Procedure by Home Affairs in
implementing the Act has to be in accordance with the Regulations. In
terms of the South African Refugees Act, somebody has the right to claim
refugee status if, on return to the country of origin - a) he or she may
be subjected to persecution on account of his or her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social
group b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on
account of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other
events seriously disturbing or disrupting public order in either part or the
whole of that country. [authors' emphasis] "Asylum seekers" In
terms of the South African Refugees Act of 1998, persons entering the
country and wishing to apply for political asylum, have to present
themselves at a Home Affairs Refugee Reception Office (RRO) in the country.
RROs are currently located in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town, Durban and
Port Elizabeth. There are plans to open a reception office in Musina, near
the border with Zimbabwe but this has not yet happened. Persons should
then have a preliminary interview to assess whether they might be eligible
for asylum, and if they are, then they are issued with an asylum seeker
permit (ASP). This is NOT refugee status, but indicates that the person is
in the process of being considered for refugee status. An ASP entitles the
holder to remain in South Africa while their application for asylum is
processed. However, the permit is only valid for one month at a time,
meaning that asylum seekers have to return to the reception office once a
month for a renewal stamp. The asylum seeker also has to return to the
office of issue, meaning that it is impossible to relocate within South
Africa while the application is in process. Work and study
Prior
to December 2002, ASP holders did not have the right to work or study
although they could apply for this after six months of waiting to be
processed. In December 2002, the Legal Resources Centre in Cape Town won a
challenge in the High Court stating that withholding the right of asylum
seekers to work and study was in violation of the South African
constitution. However, RROs have not always applied this ruling; the
Johannesburg office still allegedly issues ASPs that state that study and
work are prohibited, and other offices are reportedly still applying the six
month rule, and are not informing asylum seekers of their right to have the
prohibition clause lifted. "Refugees" Once an application has been
processed and asylum granted, the person is officially a refugee. A refugee
permit is issued for two years, and refugees have many of the same rights as
full South African citizens, including the right to employment, and to
access health care and education. A refugee may also have a UN Convention
Travel Document issued by the Government of South Africa and may leave the
country without jeopardizing their refugee status. Asylum seekers may not
leave the country without being deemed to have given up their claim to
asylum. After two years, if the review process deems that the person is
likely to remain a refugee indefinitely, he/she may apply for South African
citizenship. Refugee status - a future based decision To qualify as a
refugee, it is not necessary to prove personal experience of persecution
prior to having fled your nation, only that events of public disorder are
taking place in your home country and that if you are forcibly returned,
your "physical safety or freedom may be threatened". The decision as to
whether a person is granted asylum or not, is a future based decision, an
assessment of whether the home country is safe to return to, rather than
whether you were tortured before you left. However, in the opinion of human
rights lawyers in South Africa, in the case of those tortured before
fleeing, the case for asylum should be unambiguous. South African
officials maintain that only a very few Zimbabweans are eligible for asylum.
There is not a general official cknowledgement that "events of public
disorder" are taking place on a consistent basis in Zimbabwe. Barry Gilder,
Director General of Home Affairs, in October 2004, was asked why he thought
so many millions of Zimbabweans were leaving their nation: .I would
imagine a large number of them are [leaving] for economic reasons. It is a
well known fact that the Zimbabwe economy has not been healthy of late. It's
as straightforward as that.
An absence of acknowledging there are
legitimate political reasons for leaving Zimbabwe is a cause for concern;
the same ambivalence is experienced by Zimbabweans when dealing with Home
Affairs officers. Gilder consistently told us that RROs are under strict
instructions to give ASPs to Zimbabweans, but he himself seems reluctant to
acknowledge there are more than a very few genuinely deserving of
them. Paradoxically, the South African government's stance that there is no
public disorder is facilitated by the almost total shut down of the
independent press and civil society activities, which has meant that there
is ever less news in the international forum drawing attention to state
repression, including torture and organised violence, in
Zimbabwe. However, there is a very qualified acceptance that some Zimbabweans
are deserving of refugee status, although even this limited space has been
hard-won through the courts by South African human rights lawyers acting on
behalf of Zimbabweans. The general assumption is that the vast majority of
Zimbabweans in South Africa are illegal economic migrants, who have not
suffered political victimisation and who should be rounded up and
deported. In the words of Barry Gilder, "the UN Convention and our own laws
do not allow for economic refuge". While there are unquestionably many
economic migrants, the scale of the political problem and the number of
politically displaced persons seems to be underestimated by Home Affairs.
Furthermore, the destruction of the economy has been wilful and avoidable
and done for the political gain of the ruling party. This, too, makes
today's economic migrant different to yesterday's - whether or not the laws
are capable of distinguishing this. Political denial of food - a threat
to physical safety? It seems there is an opening for a test case in the South
African courts to determine whether or not being denied the right to
purchase food because of your presumed political affiliation constitutes a
"threat to physical safety". Home Affairs officials seem not to be aware of
the fact that at times who has access to food - and who does not - is a
highly politicised business in Zimbabwe and not a simple case of poverty and
economic collapse. As discussed earlier in this report, the Zimbabwe
government is in violation of the ICESCR by having failed to protect food
availability and access for its citizens, regardless of their political
affiliation. It appears the government has knowingly misrepresented food
stocks currently in the country to UN bodies, and has placed its people at
risk as a result. Food deficit situations have been repeatedly abused by
government on party political lines in the last four years. The collapse of
the economy and food security in Zimbabwe cannot be separated from issues of
governance: people who flee for so-called economic reasons often see their
decision as politically motivated; the arena is blurred. The South African
Refugee Act has only been in effect since 2000: there is scope for the
Courts and current experiences of political displacement in the region to
define how it should be applied, and to consider, for example, whether it is
ethical to forcibly return to Zimbabwe, those who have been actively denied
food by their government.
2. The battle for Zimbabwean refugee
rights The situation seems to be the same. There is not a significant
increase in Zimbabwean applications for asylum. [Barry Gilder,
Interview] To admit the scale of the crisis, of the refugee situation here,
would be to admit the gravity of the situation in Zimbabwe - I feel there is
a resistance to admitting just how bad things are. [Elinor Sisulu, Crisis
in Zimbabwe, Johannesburg, October 2003] The perception that Zimbabweans are
given ASPs only with the greatest reluctance, and are given full refugee
status with even greater reluctance, was confirmed by human rights lawyers
from both the Johannesburg office of Lawyers for Human Rights and the Wits
Law Clinic, both of whom have represented Zimbabwean refugees in the
Courts. For some years after human rights abuses began escalating in
Zimbabwe, the South African Home Affairs refused to grant any ASPs to
Zimbabweans. Although since April 2000 both Zimbabwean and international
NGOs have been documenting politically motivated torture, murder, massive
internal displacement and property destruction, predominantly at the hands
of the Zimbabwean State and its agents, it was only in June 2002 that South
African authorities began to recognise that Zimbabweans might flee for
reasons of political persecution. Home Affairs only agreed to begin
recognising Zimbabweans as asylum seekers after the Wits Law Clinic prepared
a test case in June 2002, representing five Zimbabweans who had fled to
South Africa. One asylum seeker was a woman who had been displaced from a
commercial flower farm as a result of farm invasions, and four were school
teachers who had been badly assaulted by war veterans in rural schools; all
had been accused of being supporters of the MDC. On the eve of the urgent
application being brought before the Court, demanding Home Affairs issue
ASPs, Home Affairs settled out of court by agreeing that the five were
entitled to seek asylum. This set a legal precedent, and since June 2002,
around 5,000 Zimbabweans have been granted ASPs; approximately 20 have been
granted full refugee status. The landmark decision by Home Affairs in June
2002 that Zimbabweans have a right to asylum is one reason that immigration
officers in Refugee Reception Offices ask to see passports; lawyers
confirmed that if those in line have passports showing they entered South
Africa prior to June 2002, they are being automatically denied the right to
claim ASPs, and are considered illegal immigrants subject to deportation. It
is only those who entered South Africa after the Home Affairs ruling in June
2002 that are even considered for asylum seeker status. In spite of the
Court ruling, and in spite of "strict instructions" from the Director
General of Home Affairs to grant asylum to Zimbabweans, the authors were
given numerous accounts of these papers being refused, and of would-be
Zimbabwean asylum seekers being told by Home Affairs officials that they had
no right to asylum, as "there is no civil war in Zimbabwe". Police who pick
Zimbabweans up from the streets reportedly say the same thing - "there is no
war in Zimbabwe." Victimisation: a repeated experience in Zimbabwe The
experience of the authors and of others documenting the pattern of human
rights violations over the last four years, shows that there is a high
likelihood of the same individuals or families being victimised repeatedly,
with assaults, torture, property loss and threats, every time an election
looms. It is the same individuals who are likely, on political grounds, to
be denied access to food and other resources, including at times health
care, schooling for their children and borehole water. A report produced for
the Zimbabwe Institute in June 2004 summarises the human rights violations
suffered by sitting opposition Members of Parliament since 2000. It provides
a shocking listing of multiple incidences of violations against persons who
in most countries would be offered the full protection of the law, by virtue
of their position in parliament. If even MPs are treated in the manner
documented, surviving multiple assassination attempts, destruction of
property, even torture in police cells, with no police action being taken
against perpetrators, then it should come as no surprise that ordinary
members of civil society or the MDC are also abused multiple times with
impunity. Cases in the current report confirm that threats and assaults
against people and families are repeated. Photograph 5 is of a victim who
had his house burnt down in 2000 - and then had his barely reconstructed
house burnt down again in 2002, as well as being tortured himself on both
occasions. In January 2002, he and his wife were pulled out of bed in the
middle of the night, stripped naked and tortured in front of their minor
children, who then had to watch their house burning, while their parents lay
unconscious. This victim lay outside his local clinic without treatment for
24 hours, because he was an MDC supporter. He eventually accessed private
treatment provided by a human rights organisation.
Photographs 5 and
6: Supporters of MDC assaulted with knives, screw drivers and barbed wire on
17 January 2002, ahead of the Presidential election. Photograph 7: Samuel
Khumalo, a trade unionist, seeks medical assistance after being tortured in
police custody, in November 2003. This same unionist was arrested again in
October 2004. The person in photograph 6 was stripped naked and whipped with
barbed wire on the same night by the same perpetrators as the previous case.
He had one eye poked out with a screwdriver, leaving him blind in this eye.
It seems common for the same perpetrators to operate with impunity in a
particular area, attacking people again and again without being
apprehended. In a 2003 report, Themba Lesizwe found that among 48 victims of
torture who had fled to South Africa and whom they interviewed, the average
number of separate experiences of torture was three per person, again
indicative of a pattern of the same individuals being targeted on multiple
occasions. As Zimbabwe heads into yet another pre-election phase, with
general elections looming in 2005, it is predictable that once more human
rights violations of various types will escalate, and that in many
instances, those targeted before, will be targeted again - by the same
perpetrators. Many of these will no doubt flee as persecution mounts, but
will they receive asylum seeker status?
3. Attitude to Zimbabweans
within Home Affairs Refugee Reception Offices (RROs) There have been
repeated claims in the last year that the Home Affairs RRO in Johannesburg
has an implicit policy of making it difficult for Zimbabweans to gain asylum
seeker status. Home Affairs consistently states that very few Zimbabweans
are trying to apply for asylum seeker status, referring to the fact that on
their records, Zimbabweans do not even make the top ten nationalities
seeking refugee status in South Africa. However, others claim that the
reason so few Zimbabweans show up on the computer database as asylum
seekers, is that they are being denied access to the reception offices and
therefore do not enter the official statistics. Refugees International (RI)
observed in July 2004 that Zimbabweans do face more barriers than other
nationalities, in spite of denials from Home Affairs that this is the case.
In their report, they cite their own observation that Zimbabweans start
queueing more than 24 hours before the offices open to Zimbabweans every
Tuesday, and that on the day RI were there, the person who was second in
line failed to access the offices, as Home Affairs only allowed in one
Zimbabwean that week. In the 2003 survey conducted by Themba Lesizwe, 34 out
of 48 Zimbabwean exiles who gave detailed interviews claimed to have tried
to get asylum seeker permits, and only 4 had actually succeeded in obtaining
one. In the assessment of Themba Lesizwe, all 48 qualify as political asylum
seekers, having all been tortured in Zimbabwe prior to fleeing their
country. RI comment that there is some official resistance in Home Affairs to
the idea that Zimbabweans have any right at all to qualify as refugees, the
court ruling notwithstanding. When RI personnel interviewed staff in the RRO
in Johannesburg, they informed RI that Zimbabweans were not a priority when
issuing ASPs, because "there is no civil war in Zimbabwe, so there is no
reason to apply. we do not put them at the top of the list". If this is the
attitude of the very individuals in whose hands the fate of Zimbabweans
lie, then it is no surprise that Zimbabweans face an almost insurmountable
task in getting asylum seeker permits.
4. Refugee Reception Office,
Johannesburg: Observations of current authors "There is no instruction, no
policy to disadvantage Zimbabweans" [Barry Gilder, interview] As the vast
majority of Zimbabweans are in the greater Johannesburg area, and have to
apply via the Johannesburg RRO for asylum, we have centred our own
observations at two different Johannesburg RRO locations over one year. We
have found that there is a dramatic lack of capacity in the Johannesburg
Home Affairs office to cope with the numbers of refugees from any and all
nations, and a clearly discernable lack of good will towards Zimbabwean
refugees in particular. This statement is made based on the following
personal observations, key informant interviews, and on comments received
from those in the queues. . The Johannesburg RRO office has had no fewer
than 4 venues in the last 12 months, and for long periods of time, there has
been no functioning office at all during the last year. Not only Zimbabweans
but asylum seekers of all nationalities have been sorely tested to keep up
with the RRO moves in the last year. . The RRO now in Rosettenville, is
not sign-posted in any way, and is accessed down a narrow side passage
littered with garbage. It took our team 40 minutes of searching in a motor
vehicle and on foot before we found the office. . Zimbabweans are allowed
to apply for asylum only on Tuesdays, along with countries from the "Horn of
Africa". They start queuing on Sunday or Monday for Tuesday's chance to be
processed for asylum seeker papers ie. Zimbabweans queue for up to 24 hours
ahead of the office opening to them on Tuesdays. This was also observed by
RI. . On the six Tuesdays of observation in Braamfontein in 2003, the
Zimbabwean queue was consistently between five and ten times longer than the
"Horn of Africa" queue. Yet the other queue moved extremely quickly into the
building while the Zimbabweans were kept waiting on the pavement, with a
reported average of between 5 and 10 Zimbabweans being accepted a week into
the RRO. The queue of Zimbabweans numbered hundreds every week - between 300
and 500 on weeks of observation. . To summarise - despite queuing for 24
hours or more, around 2% of Zimbabweans accessed the office on any Tuesday
on the 6 days we observed. On the same days, most or all people in the Horn
of Africa queue accessed the office. . On being questioned why the two
queues moved at such different paces, with Horn of Africa countries getting
preference over Zimbabweans on entering the RRO, the Head of Immigration in
the Braamfontein office said they process Zimbabweans more slowly because
"their queue is disorderly". It was not our observation that the queue was
disorderly, although it was considerably longer than the Horn of Africa
queue; however by late morning when people who had been queuing for two days
could observe the other queue moving in steadily and their own standing
absolutely still, they tended to start asking questions of officials, and
the queue at this time widened to fill most of the pavement. . Among
those interviewed, it is common to find individuals who have queued in
excess of 15 weeks running, and who have nonetheless failed to even enter
the RRO. Some individuals have been in the country for more than a year and
return from time to time to try to access the RRO and fail. . We spoke to
individuals who had made it into the building as far as the first desk, only
to be then thrown out altogether for not having a valid passport or ID on
them, although this is clearly in contravention of South African refugee
law. . South African officials were personally witnessed going down the queue
asking for those who had a valid passport with visa and South African entry
stamp, to give them preference in accessing asylum seeker permits. This
again is illegal. . This process of checking passports is also used to
identify those who entered South Africa before the June 2002 decision on
asylum seeker status for Zimbabweans- see previous section. Such individuals
are thrown out of the queue and are in danger of deportation. . The Home
Affairs guards were captured by our team on video beating Zimbabweans with
sjamboks (whips) in the queues outside the Braamfontein RRO, in the last
week of October 2003. This supports unequivocally the many claims we
received from asylum seekers of being assaulted by guards outside this
RRO. . Our video camera person was told to move away from the Braamfontein
office in October 2003, by touts who said no more Zimbabweans would be
allowed into the RRO until she was gone. We were later informed that as soon
as the camera was gone, people who had not been in the queue were led into
the RRO by touts. Those in the queue assumed that this group were among the
many who bribe to get papers, and the touts had not wanted them caught on
camera entering the building without queuing. . Those in the queue
indicated to us those who they knew to be touts, "selling" asylum seeker
permits. . Asylum seekers queuing and human rights lawyers also noted to us
that when observers of one sort or another - people with cameras, human
rights officials - are outside the RRO, then more people are allowed off the
pavement and into the waiting area inside, but we were also informed that
this does not mean more people are actually processed on these days. Rather,
people can sit inside the building instead of on the pavement for hours, and
then be ejected without processing at the end of the day. We could not
independently verify this by speaking to somebody that had been through
this, but heard it from multiple sources including South African
lawyers. . At the Rosettenville RRO in October 2004, we were informed by
those in line that for the previous three weeks running, no new claims for
ASPs had been issued, with the reason being given that the "computers were
down." By 10.30 am on the day we were there, not a single new ASP had been
processed, and the rumour in the queue was that the computers were down
again, for the fourth week running, although no Home Affairs official had
bothered to clarify this situation by mid morning. . Human rights lawyers
confirmed that the "computers are down" is a constant excuse for not
processing ASPs. One lawyer told us that during 2003 there had been several
consecutive months when not a single ASP had been issued on Tuesdays, when
Zimbabweans are there. Excuses had included the computers being down, and
the person with the keys to the safe being out of the office, week after
week. Identification papers In order to be given an ASP, refugees do not
have to produce formal identification. The Refugee Act accepts that if a
person is being persecuted and has to flee in adverse conditions, it is not
always possible to cross borders with a passport or other form of
identification to hand. Nationality and precise identity are subject to
confirmation through a process of interviewing by Home Affairs. Of course it
simplifies the process of identification if the asylum seeker can produce
photo identity of a credible nature, but it is illegal to deny persons the
right to even proceed with their claim if they cannot do so. Yet we were
informed by dozens of would-be asylum seekers that they had been turned away
from queues outside the reception office in Johannesburg because they could
not produce a passport. This is clearly in violation of South Africa's
Refugee Act. The Head of Immigration in Braamfontein denied in an interview
in October 2003 that his employees insisted on passports from Zimbabwean
refugees, saying they only needed some form of ID, but to insist on ID is
also not legal. In spite of this official denial, when the authors were
themselves outside reception offices in Johannesburg, Home Affairs officials
came down the line saying they were only looking for people with
passports. Photograph 8: an estimated 500 Zimbabweans wait outside the
Johannesburg refugee reception office on a Tuesday in October 2003, hoping
for asylum seeker papers. Only 5 accessed the office on this Tuesday: this
is a fairly normal weekly intake of Zimbabweans. Photograph 9: minutes
after the previous picture was taken, Home Affairs guards started an
unprovoked attack on the Zimbabweans, whipping them with
sjamboks.
Photograph 10: October 2004 - a year later in
Rosettenville: the RRO is now accessed down an un-signposted alley. The same
long queues of Zimbabweans are there, still mostly failing to access the
office.
The 2003 National Refugee Base Line Survey, which deals with
refugees from other nations excluding Zimbabwe, noted around 49% of their
respondents faced barriers in gaining an ASP. In relation to the
Johannesburg/Braamfontein office this study found: 35% of those who
reported barriers, claimed problems in accessing the RRO 35% " " reported
paying bribes While our own observations are not statistically validated, our
assessment based on several hundred interviews, 200 questionnaires and 7
mornings of observation at the RRO, have left us with the impression that
almost no Zimbabwean accesses an ASP without encountering barriers. It is
possible to eventually receive an ASP, but the process is invariably
problematic. It is interesting to note that the 2003 National Refugee
Baseline Survey found that asylum seekers from obviously "refugee producing"
countries - ie countries where there is/was a war, such as Angola, Rwanda
and DRC - were the least likely to experience problems accessing RROs, and
asylum seekers from Uganda, Ethiopia, Somalia were most likely to experience
barriers getting access to RROs, because the officers do not see these
countries as genuinely "refugee producing". This report also noted that the
Braamfontein office was the worst in this regard. This finding of the CASE
study is consistent with the experience of Zimbabweans, who consistently
reported being told - "there is no war in Zimbabwe." There is an urgent
need to educate officers in these RROs, including the guards at the doors,
that it is not their prerogative to decide which countries are refugee
producing. There is a war in Zimbabwe. It is "not a bloody war: our war is
different; it's a silent, but it's a cunning war," - and it is sending
thousands of people fleeing into the region. It is miraculous that hundreds
of Zimbabweans and other asylum seekers still turn up every week to queue
when this is the quality of service they receive. But when the outcome of
being caught without an asylum seeker permit is deportation, people are left
with no real options at all but to queue week after week in the face of
official obstruction and poor - or no - delivery of service. Time taken
for processing of asylum seeker claims It is quite clear that the time being
taken to process claims by any asylum seeker is far in excess of a
reasonable limit. In terms of the Regulations for the Refugees Act, gazetted
in 2000, reasonable time limits are recommended. Schedule 3 states
that: . applications for asylum will generally be adjudicated by the
Department of Home Affairs within 180 days of filing a completed asylum
application with a Refugee Reception Officer. . an interview before a
Refugee Status Determination Officer should take place on a date specified
on the asylum seeker permit, normally within 30 days of the asylum
application being completed. While these time limits are not legally binding,
it is quite apparent that Home Affairs is both under resourced and
inefficient, as around only 20% of applications from asylum seekers from any
nation are being processed in the stipulated six months. CASE report that
since the 1998 Act came into effect in April 2000, approximately 71% of
asylum seekers who have applied, are still awaiting an outcome on their
applications. 38% of these have been waiting up to 2 years, and another 33%
have been waiting two years or more. Out of approximately 5,000 ASP holders
of Zimbabwean nationality who have applied since June 2002, approximately 20
have been granted asylum ; even in the context of the delays experienced by
other asylum seekers, this suggests an abnormally slow process: 0,4 % of
asylum claims from Zimbabweans have been positively finalised in the last 2
and a half years! This would suggest that Zimbabwean applications are being
kept on the bottom of the pile. Lack of capacity in RROs In an
interview in October 2003, the Head of Immigration of the Braamfontein
office indicated that he was dramatically under-staffed. There were only 4
members of staff in his office qualified to finalise asylum applications and
grant or deny asylum. This included himself, and he had many other duties as
Head of Immigration. He stated that his aim was to increase finalisations of
applications to 8 per qualified staff member per week. This would mean the
Braamfontein office could hopefully in the future finalise 32 applications
per week. However, with a backlog in South Africa of around 80,000 asylum
seeker cases in total, for the largest office in the country to finalise
less than 2,000 cases per year would do little to clear the backlog. In
October 2003, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, then Minister of Home Affairs, stated
that there were 1,500 vacancies in his ministry, and no money in the
treasury to finance these jobs. In such a situation there is clearly
insufficient capacity to deal with the workload, and this creates a
situation that is then wide open to corruption and bribes. In October
2004, Barry Gilder, Director General of Home Affairs, indicated to the
authors that since he came into office a year ago, he has organised the
training of a large group of officers who will be capable of processing and
finalising asylum claims. He said that before the end of 2004, an additional
staff of 69 refugee determination officers will be deployed in RROs. In
Gilder's own words: This department is way back in the 19th century
somewhere.turning it around, it's a bit like trying to turn around the
Titanic, perhaps after it's hit the iceberg. Gilder is planning to
introduce more personnel with better training, and better information
technology to improve the department, but says this will take time. In the
meantime, we would point out that it is the refugees who have to deal with
the fact that there are not enough life-boats, that only those who can bribe
will get a life jacket, and the rest will sink without trace in the hostile
waters of Johannesburg. Length of permits: renewal stamps The fact that
asylum seeker permits are usually only valid for one month, means that the
approximately 80,000 ASP holders of all nationalities nationwide all have to
return once a month to RROs for a renewal stamp. The process of simply
keeping existing ASP holders in the system is therefore hugely time and
resource consuming. As neither the Act nor the Regulations state a time span
for how long an ASP stamp should be valid, a simple way to reduce the
backlog and free up staff time to process new asylum applications and
finalise old ones, would be to extend the validity of the ASP to six months
or one year in the first instance; in reality no ASPs are being assessed and
finalised in less than this time period. Increasing the length of validity
of the ASP would reduce the number of asylum seeker visits to RROs
dramatically Asylum seekers - a cash cow The department has indicated its
commitment to stamp out corruption.. These things take time to make happen..
You need to bear in mind that the Department of Home Affairs is eminently
corruptible. We provide a service people need desperately.. [Barry
Gilder, interview] Asylum seeker permits are free of charge. Yet the authors
were informed that there is a thriving black market in ASPs. The going rate
for an ASP is between R300 and R400. We were further informed by human
rights lawyers that renewal stamps can also be given without queuing, for a
fee of R100 per month. The National Refugee Base Line Survey documents
bribery both in relation to receiving ASPs and in receiving renewal stamps.
Around 18% of their respondents reported paying bribes for ASPs and 17%
bribed for renewal stamps. The Johannesburg office was the worst, with
around 33% paying bribes. In a survey conducted by the authors in August
2004, out of 51 Zimbabwean exiles who had ASPs, 15 claimed to have paid
bribes in order to get them. One person claimed he paid a bribe of R400
after more than 20 visits to Home Affairs failed to result in him even
accessing the office. Human rights lawyers and other informants suggested
that one reason for the reluctance to issue ASPs through the "front door",
and also to finalise asylum seeker applications, is in order not to "kill
the cash cow". If a reasonable proportion of asylum seekers are routinely
sufficiently frustrated by the near-impossibility of getting a "legal" ASP,
then there will be a steady income from those prepared to pay bribes.
Similarly, by insisting that every ASP holder returns every month for an
extension, instead of lengthening the validity of the stamp, there will be a
steady monthly "return" from those who do not want to queue, or who are
employed and cannot take off a day a month to queue. One lawyer estimated
that in the region of R20 million could be being paid to corrupt touts
and/or Home Affairs officials by asylum seekers each year. If the system
were to become more efficient, the income from bribes would seriously
diminish. The irony is that among Zimbabweans in South Africa, it is likely
to be those who come to South Africa with goods to vend, or who get
employment, that can afford the bribes, while the genuine political asylum
seekers are left standing in endless queues of frustration, end up with no
permits, and are therefore more subject to deportation. Many Zimbabweans
know about the bribery system, but cannot afford to "buy" permits. Political
asylum seekers indicated that they knew about the bribery system, but the
few who could afford it, were not prepared to be pragmatic and pay. They
were aware of their rights, being highly politicised, and resented being
forced to resort to corrupt means to get something they knew was their legal
right. Home Affairs - impunity in the system A lawyer commented to us that
there was impunity for officials in the way the system operates. Evidence
points overwhelmingly to corruption, inefficiency, and to an unofficial
policy of being particularly obstructive towards Zimbabweans. However, it is
very difficult to prove male fides, because some Zimbabweans do undeniably
get ASPs through the front door - even if this is only a handful a week. The
endless claims of computers being down and the keys to the safe being
unavailable are also very hard to prove or disprove week after week. By
keeping the flow of applications to a trickle and by claiming "technical
faults" in the system, the number of ASPs is kept to a minimum while at the
same time making it impossible for critics to say categorically that
Zimbabweans or others are being denied asylum, or that officers are on a
permanent "go slow". It is no defence for the department to lay the blame for
corruption back on the public, who tempt officials with money because they
desperately need the permits. Any act of bribery involves power relations;
officials clearly are the ones with the greater power, and to frame would be
asylum seekers as the initiators of corruption is to feed into negative
images and xenophobia. Response of Home Affairs on corruption and
capacity Barry Gilder informed the authors that a new department of Counter
Corruption and Security has been set up within Home Affairs, as of the end
of October 2004, and a Chief Director has begun work in this capacity
already. This underlined the intention of Home Affairs to deal with corrupt
officials. Gilder pointed out that huge crime syndicates with plenty of
money have infiltrated Home Affairs with people in their pay - they are
prepared to spend vast amounts of money to get the documents they need for
criminal purposes; to get rid of corruption in Home Affairs, it is also
necessary to deal with organised crime syndicates, otherwise one corrupt
official will be replaced with another equally vulnerable to being bought.
Gilder was very willing to admit to, and condemn, corruption in his
department. Gilder repeatedly denied any prejudice against Zimbabweans by
his officials. Yet he himself made statements that indicated that he does
not believe there has been an increase in political refugees from Zimbabwe.
When we suggested to him that he was making this assessment based on Home
Affairs computer figures which reflect a handful of Zimbabweans a week, and
not on the reality of Zimbabweans on the pavement failing to access his
offices and enter the system, he repeatedly commented that he had not seen
this for himself. While admitting the system in general does not cope, he
then stated - "the influx of Zimbabwean asylum seekers is something we can
cope with in the system". The evidence to the contrary is out there on the
pavement every Tuesday. In summary, there is ample evidence from multiple
sources that many Zimbabweans who wish to have asylum claims processed are
failing to access the system through no fault of their own. Inefficiency,
corruption and a lack of good will on the part of South African RROs are
contributing factors. The official South African figures of how many
Zimbabweans consider themselves to have fled for political reasons must
therefore be deemed far too low, and should be considered to represent a
rather small proportion of those who would have asylum seeker status if they
could access it.
5. Attitude of United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) to Zimbabweans The reluctance to recognise Zimbabweans
as having a legitimate claim to refugee status is also found within the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in Johannesburg. RI
reported in August 2004 that their office was unable to give a clear answer
on whether Zimbabweans qualified as refugees or not, saying they were still
waiting for clarification from Geneva, themselves. In RI's opinion, the
UNHCR office is playing down the political crisis in Zimbabwe, and does not
consider that Zimbabweans have a legitimate claim to asylum. RI accuses the
UNHCR of having "lost sight of its mission", and of making "appallingly
cynical comments" about Zimbabweans in South Africa. For example, UNHCR
personnel questioned whether the political situation in Zimbabwe was really
so bad when Zimbabwean activist groups in South Africa felt able to speak
out, saying, "why would so-called refugees seek publicity when they are
afraid?" In the current authors' experience, most Zimbabweans are too afraid
to speak out, and it is only a handful of the most hardened activists who
are prepared to draw attention to themselves by attending protests in
Johannesburg, risking deportation or persecution by Zimbabwe government
agents active in South Africa by so doing. But if persecuted people are
brave enough to speak out, does this disprove or diminish their persecution?
Such reasoning ignores, for example, the huge anti-apartheid movement that
continued worldwide for decades, including in countries neighbouring South
Africa; those who protested against apartheid expected to be recognised as
persecuted and to be given asylum - which they were. Ahead of the
Presidential election in March 2002, the UNHCR and the South African
Department of Home Affairs prepared for a potentially large influx of
Zimbabweans as a result of political persecution, and identified sites for
camps in the border area. When the influx did not happen, it seems there was
an assumption that claims of persecution had been exaggerated and that the
'genuine refugee moment' was over. The UNHCR has failed to visit the
Zimbabwean border area for more than one year, or to visit the Johannesburg
RRO for eight months, which in the opinion of RI, epitomizes "the lack of
commitment of UNHCR to protecting Zimbabwean asylum seekers in South
Africa." The authors of the current report would suggest that a massive
influx of political refugees has occurred and continues to occur, but in
nightly flows of a few hundred people, who for political/economic reasons,
cross the border illegally and do not remain in the border area but head
largely in the direction of Johannesburg, where they are absorbed into an
ever-expanding underground community of Zimbabweans. UNHCR and issues of
resettlement: are Zimbabweans safe in South Africa? Some Zimbabwean exiles
repeatedly expressed a fear to us that they are not secure in South Africa.
Zimbabwean Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agents have been reported
from multiple sources as being active in the Johannesburg and Pretoria
region in particular. Exiles are concerned that their families are insecure
in Zimbabwe and are at risk of being tortured if those in exile make claims
against the Zimbabwean government or expose their own ill
treatment. During 2002, there was an incident involving the CIO that was well
publicised in the media. Three Zimbabwean women were allegedly abducted in
Johannesburg by CIO operatives. They were bound and gagged in the back of a
car, and were allegedly sexually abused. A border patrol near the South
African border searched the car and discovered the women. They insisted the
women were released, but allowed their kidnappers to proceed to Zimbabwe
without arrest! The UNHCR says that protection is an issue for the South
African Police. The Police have made it clear that they would not welcome
the CIO being active in their nation, but say they do not have the resources
to give local protection to Zimbabweans who feel at risk. At most, they have
offered for Zimbabweans to come and sleep at police stations if they are
afraid of abduction. But as most Zimbabweans spend most of their time
avoiding the police because they do not have asylum seeker permits, this is
not an attractive option. Both the Wits Law Clinic and Lawyers for Human
Rights state that they have been approached by Zimbabweans afraid of the
CIO, asking for resettlement out of South Africa. However, according to
human rights lawyers, it has proved close to impossible to get Zimbabweans
resettled overseas - the international world is quick to make political
statements on Zimbabwe and slow to accommodate their refugees. What makes it
harder for Zimbabweans is the very small number that has formal refugee
status at this stage. The UNHCR expects those requesting to be resettled to
have already been determined to be genuine refugees by South African Home
Affairs. Zimbabweans also have a problem with police clearance; particularly
in the post September 11th world, people are concerned about world terrorism
and it is hard to resettle any refugees from anywhere. Many Zimbabweans from
MDC structures have multiple arrests for spurious crimes on their police
records, as arrests on false charges have been a deliberate government
strategy over the last five years. This has impacted negatively on their
likelihood of being resettled. Over the last few years, The Wits law office
has forwarded to the Johannesburg UNHCR office, ten requests for
resettlement of Zimbabweans outside of southern Africa that they judged to
be strong cases. By October 2003, two of these Zimbabweans have been
accepted for resettlement processing. The Lawyers for Human Rights office
reported no success in the applications they had forwarded to the UNHCR for
resettlement. A lawyer there commented, in October 2003: "Every one of them
has been rejected for resettlement. I have seen the reasons, but I cannot
understand why they have been rejected by the UNHCR."
6. Quiet
diplomacy: at odds with acknowledging political refugees? The ZANU PF
justification that the violence in Zimbabwe should be understood as part of
a land revolution has not been publicly contradicted by other Southern
African Development Community (SADC) nations; while they may be uneasy about
the accompanying torture and oppression, there has been a reluctance to
condemn a process as important and necessary as land redistribution. The
reality is that the vast majority of human rights violations have not
occurred in the context of land redistribution, but in those urban and rural
areas where support for the MDC is greatest. The South African government has
adopted a policy of "quiet diplomacy" towards Zimbabwe, refusing to publicly
condemn actions by the Zimbabwe government. This is impacting on the
official response to Zimbabweans in South Africa. South African officials
have portrayed the political reality in Zimbabwe as "normalising", and their
elections as "legitimate". The sudden economic collapse in Zimbabwe and
three years of food deficits are acknowledged, but are not openly linked by
other countries in the SADC region to poor governance within Zimbabwe.
Against this background, it would be contradictory for the South African
goverment to laud the correction of colonial imbalances in Zimbabwe, and at
the same time to officially acknowledge that citizens of Zimbabwe have
genuine reasons to run away in their thousands, and to fear persecution at
the hands of the Zimbabwe government and its agents. Yet Zimbabweans have
run away in their thousands, in particular to South
Africa.
Photograph 11: Zimbabweans join other vagrants on the streets of
Johannesburg in the bitter cold of a winter's night. Here a woman is roused
for a cup of soup from the Methodist church, July 2004. Photograph 12: a
Zimbabwean exile with two children receives food aid from the Methodist
church in Johannesburg: July 2004.
7. Perceptions of Zimbabweans:
"Makwerekwere" If the predominant perception of Zimbabweans is not that of
torture victims and genuine refugees, then how are they perceived? There is
a general pejorative term in South Africa for all black foreigners, namely
"Makwerekwere". The word has no literal translation, apparently being rather
an onomatopoeic description of the sound of foreign African languages to a
South African ear. It is not unusual for nationals in any country to see
refugees in a negative light, as a financial and practical burden, as cheap
labour undermining local employment opportunities, as criminals, as a
foreign culture threatening to swamp local cultural norms. The growing
xenophobia in South Africa directed towards all foreign Africans, has been
explained as stemming in part from the fact that prior to 1994, very few
Africans headed for apartheid-ruled South Africa for refuge. However, once
democracy was achieved in South Africa, this changed very rapidly, and from
having had very little exposure to other Africans, South Africans now have
to cope with an influx of foreigners from all over the continent, fleeing
wars and hardship. In spite of its comparative wealth in the region,
South Africa is a country that still faces enormous issues of unemployment
and poverty within its own borders. Hundreds of thousands of South African
citizens need housing, education and jobs. Unemployment among South Africans
is at around 42%, with one in two black South Africans needing work.
Migrants are therefore seen as taking away work and resources from poor
South Africans, and of driving down payment for part time work. As
"illegals", Zimbabweans and other migrants are prepared to work for a few
rand a day, as they have no option but to be exploited. South Africans
competing for the same jobs resent this. Zimbabweans are allegedly the most
resented refugee group, because of the sudden increase in their numbers.
There are regular xenophobic attacks on non-South Africans; seven foreign
Africans have reportedly been killed after being pushed from moving commuter
trains, and other foreign nationals have had acid thrown in their faces,
have been shot dead and targeted in various others ways. Zimbabweans and
Crime Both the South African and the Botswana authorities have commented on
the role of Zimbabweans in crime, both organised and petty, in their
respective nations. At one level, virtually all Zimbabweans in South Africa
are breaking one law or another. An estimated one million-plus Zimbabweans
are in South Africa illegally in the first instance. These Zimbabweans are
in a tough position. They cannot find legal work, so are reduced to working
illegally. Many young girls and women resort to prostitution. Men and women
of all ages vend goods in markets and on the side of the road, without
trading licences. Others work for exploitative wages on farms, in back
gardens, in restaurants and elsewhere, hiding from authorities and expecting
deportation any day. Interestingly, on 30 October 2004, Mr Maziduma, the
Divisional Commander for North Francistown Police, told the BBC that
Zimbabweans were not responsible for an increase in crime even though this
was a common perception among ordinary Botswanans: "We are not experiencing
a difference in the crime rate.. Statistics will not say that, we talk from
facts". We were not able to get any figures on Zimbabweans and crime from
South African police In interviews with us, Zimbabweans have commented that
if people are officially illegal and living below the visibility line for
fear of deportation, they are more likely to resort to illegal ways of
surviving; if they are treated as illegals, they will behave like illegals.
They also acknowledge that many Zimbabwean refugees are in their teens or
twenties and away from the controlling guidance of the extended family; the
normal social inhibitors are not there, and there is nobody to report back
to the family if they get involved in activities that they would not
consider doing at home. Some Zimbabweans are undoubtedly involved in
serious crime, including armed robbery and arms smuggling. Exact figures
could not be established from Home Affairs; there are, however, references
from time to time in the media. In March this year, 138 illegal immigrants
were arrested in a police sweep of Hillbrow in Johannesburg. The police
reported they were looking for around 100 Zimbabweans who were suspected to
be in organised crime gangs operating across the borders. Of those arrested,
30 were criminals wanted for crimes including murder, rape and armed
robbery. In the news item covering this raid, the provincial deputy
commissioner in Johannesburg is quoted as saying that Zimbabweans were
behind a tide of armed cash-in-transit heists and bank robberies: they are
referred to as having had "military training", which would suggest those
involved are defected soldiers from the Zimbabwean army. There are also
press reports describing cross border gun smuggling. Again, a police
spokesperson said the arms sellers were defected Zimbabwean soldiers
desperate for money, who had run away with their weapons and who sold them
to raise money for families back home. A further indication of organised
crime along the border was given by the president of the Cross-Border
Association of Zimbabwe in January 2004, when he threatened to name top
Zimbabwean officials involved in shady deals on the country's borders.
Killer Zivhu, who is also a ZANU PF councillor for Masvingo, indicated there
were crime syndicates involving Zimbabwean government officials operating
with impunity. While it is certainly a minority of Zimbabweans who are
involved in violent crime or gun trading, media reports on these issues have
fed into a perception that all Zimbabweans are likely to be criminals, which
has fuelled the xenophobia. Zimbabweans: victims of crime On the other
side of the coin, illegal immigrants are vulnerable to being victimised
without redress. Zimbabweans are at risk on a daily basis of having to pay
bribes to South African Police and Home Affairs touts and officials in order
to avoid deportation, and of being forced to work at extortionist
wages. Far more serious crimes are also perpetrated against this group, with
impunity. Interviewees related incidents of xenophobic assaults, murders,
theft, and of rape. One 16 year old girl told of being forcibly held captive
for two weeks by a taxi tout who does the Johannesburg-Musina run. She and
four other girls were forced to have sex on demand with this man, until he
left to collect another taxi load of girls from the border; at this point,
they ran away. None of these crimes are ever reported or acted on; the
victims would rather suffer in silence than be deported back to
Zimbabwe.
8. South Africans: a history of exile "My dear brothers,
remember when you were fighting in the ANC, you were in Zimbabwe. The MKs -
I myself was made to make room for an MK soldier - so I slept down so that
the MK could sleep in my bed. We did not ask even a permit, even an ID, only
an MK card would do. There is a [Zimbabwean] man sitting there - his father
was cooking for the President of this country - and there was no harassment
[of South African exiles] - but why are these people doing this to
us? [Head of MDC Security, in exile in South Africa, talking at a church
service in Braamfontein, March 2004] Key informants in South Africa have
pointed out that South Africa is a nation that fought its own liberation
struggle on the basis of their exiles being hosted in nations in the
sub-region, where they were accommodated and resourced. Many who now sit in
government are among those who had access to housing, education and other
training facilities in African nations, including Zimbabwe. Zimbabwean
refugees and South African NGO commentators have mentioned the disappointing
lack of recognition of the legitimacy of the current Zimbabwean struggle
against oppression, and a general lack of solidarity among South Africans
with the plight of political activists from Zimbabwe. On the other hand,
many South Africans have become involved in the plight of Zimbabweans,
particularly church leaders who have acted to set up feeding programmes,
provide shelter, clothing, blankets and over-the-counter medications. Some
NGOs are involving themselves in advocacy and research, and provide
counselling. A few South African lawyers have taken up the cause of
Zimbabweans and represented them in the courts. Ordinary South Africans too,
have shown compassion and opened their doors to Zimbabweans, sharing meagre
resources and protecting them from deportation.
PART THREE - The
revolving door Photograph 13: a Zimbabwean deportee escapes from the shadow
of the deportation train that he has just leapt from: destination for him is
now no longer Beitbridge, but Johannesburg.
1. Crossing the
border The South African border with Zimbabwe runs through a virtual desert
region; it is epitomised by thorn scrub and baked earth, and a series of
high barbed wire fences and row upon row of razor wire. The border itself is
demarcated by the Limpopo River, which for much of the year is not much more
than sand and puddles, but which can become a fierce torrent during the
rains. The river is home to hundreds of crocodiles, and also traverses game
reserves in the border area, where lions and elephants live. Apart from the
river itself, there are few sources of water and few settlements in the
greater area. Crossing the border into South Africa is not an obviously
easy thing to do, yet with at least a million Zimbabweans illegally in South
Africa and tens of thousands crossing to and from several times a year, this
formidable barrier is proving to leak people like a
sieve. Numbers Some Zimbabweans cross the border legally: cross border
traders in particular have passports and apply for visas. The South African
Embassy receives around 20,000 visa applications a month, and traders enter
the country for 21 days at a time, before leaving and applying for another
visa. These tens of thousands of Zimbabweans are not part of the illegal
immigrant statistics: while many may be violating visa conditions by
trading, there is official record and sanction of their entry. If around
100,000 people enter on visas per year, and many of these are the same
individuals being issued multiple visas in a year, and if estimates of more
than a million Zimbabweans in South Africa are correct, this indicates the
vast majority of Zimbabweans are entering or are resident in the country
illegally. The numbers of people crossing the border at "undesignated entry
points" are impossible to establish, although some indication is given by
the numbers intercepted. During 2002, the South African National Defence
Force (SANDF) intercepted 50,852 immigrants on South Africa's national
borders, although this includes illegal border crossers from Mozambique,
Swaziland and Botswana. It does not include those intercepted by police in
South Africa's heartland. Altogether, South Africa deports around 150,000
immigrants a year. The number of illegal immigrants deported to Zimbabwe
each year is now around 45,000 or not far below a 1,000 per week. In spite
of this seemingly endless process of deportations, possibly hundreds of
Zimbabweans cross illegally every night. Indications of this come from
border crossers themselves; it is common for Zimbabweans to report being
part of groups of around 70 or more people crossing simultaneously on one
night. Whether there are several such groups per night, or several per week,
is not clear. Many other Zimbabweans cross in smaller groups or even
alone. The river - crocodiles and floods For much of the year, the Limpopo
is a benign river that can be walked through with little problem. However,
in the rainy season, which coincides with Christmas and year-end holidays
for migrant workers and an accompanying upsurge in border crossings, the
river can become a torrent at short notice. The river can flow strongly
until May, depending on the rains. Every year, Zimbabweans drown attempting
to swim the river when it is in flood. In April this year, SABC reported the
deaths of five men attempting to cross the river. Their bodies were
retrieved badly eaten by crocodiles. Police had to fire shots to scare off
the crocodiles. One 18-year old interviewee sobbed as she described to the
authors, crossing the Limpopo in the middle of the night in January this
year. She was one of 73 who crossed together on this night, and she said it
was the most terrifying experience of her life. She said the water was up to
her armpits, and as this huge crowd stirred up the water, crocodiles closed
in. The last person to cross was seized by a crocodile as she approached the
shore, and others had to go back and drag her from the water, at which point
the crocodile let go and swam off, leaving the victim injured but
alive. Human predators: "maguma guma" and the SANDF The border area is
alive with touts: smuggling people has become a permanent livelihood for
many. There are two ways to cross - by taxi or bus through the designated
border post at Beitbridge, or through the riverbed. For a price, both are
possible without papers. Girls are able to cross the border in trucks, in
return for sex with the driver. They hide in the truck drivers' beds and
cross in this way. To cross the river without a passport costs from R300 to
R500, if you rely on a tout. However, some of these touts entrap Zimbabweans
by leading them to isolated spots and then robbing them of all their money
and possessions. These men are referred to as "maguma guma", which means "to
get something the easy way" in Shona. Interviewees reported assaults or rape
at the hands of these men. The easiest way to enter South Africa once across
the river, is at places where there are gates in the border fence for South
African farmers to access the water for farming purposes. These gates are
manned by SANDF, and for a fee, they will turn a blind eye and let the
Zimbabweans walk by. However, female immigrants are frequently forced to
"pay" this fee in sex; some young girl's first experience on arrival in
South Africa is rape by soldiers in exchange for not being deported.
Interviewees told this to us, as did human rights lawyers, and this has been
documented by NGOs working with children in the Musina area. In August
this year, five members of the SANDF were arrested on multiple charges of
rape and theft. They are accused of systematically ambushing Zimbabweans in
the border area, and stripping them of all belongings. Among the claims are
that they raped a number of Zimbabwean women before forcing them to swim
naked back across the Limpopo River. A storage container of stolen goods was
recovered in the vicinity of Madimbo Military Base near the border in South
Africa. Lawyers for Human Rights gives training in refugee rights and law to
members of the police and army operating in the Zimbabwe border area.
However, they comment that the SANDF turns over most of its personnel there
every three months, meaning that there are always soldiers with not much
background in the rights of undocumented migrants in charge of finding them.
LHR said that apart from reports of soldiers raping asylum seekers, soldiers
make other demands of them, including making them do their washing, ironing
and polishing in return for not being deported. Other groups working with
refugees report that in the Musina area, Zimbabwean girls who are semi
resident there, are routinely expected to give sexual favours to police and
army in return for not being deported.
2. Life in the Big Cities:
Johannesburg and Durban In the course of this report, there has already been
repeated mention of some of the issues that make life difficult for
Zimbabweans in South Africa. The section following will therefore take the
format of describing a cross section of what we observed for ourselves on
field visits to apartments or places where refugees live. Life for
illegal immigrants in South Africa is predictably hard. Living conditions
are crowded and often unsafe. Large numbers of Zimbabweans live in Hillbrow
and Yeoville in Johannesburg, where the rent is low and the crime rates
high. The groups we visited were in some instances obviously all political
refugees, and in other cases, all would fit the description of cross border
trader, or economic migrant. In other cases, the division was not so
clear-cut, with a mixture of "purely" political and economic exiles sharing
a space. Economic migrants are the Zimbabweans most subject to deportation,
and their large numbers mask and undermine the claims of political asylum
seekers. For these reasons, the authors made a point of identifying and
interacting with a few small cross border communities in both Johannesburg
and Durban. Johannesburg: political exiles We visited a two-bedroomed
apartment in which 26 young political exiles lived. All were activists who
had fled after torture and harassment. Several are on the records of NGOs in
Zimbabwe as having been tortured and given medical assistance in the last
few years, prior to fleeing. Most had multiple stories of arrest and abuse.
Only four had asylum seeker papers, although all had tried to access them.
Those without ASPs lived in dread of deportation, and in the course of
researching this report, one of them was picked up by the police and
transferred to Lindela detention centre pending deportation. He was an
individual whom we had witnessed for ourselves queuing outside Home Affairs
all night, trying in vain to access the office to apply for asylum. He
managed to get a message out to a lawyer, who went to Lindela and secured
his release. But in terms of the Regulations to the Refugee Act, no person
who indicates to the police his intention to seek asylum can be deported -
he should not have been taken into detention. In the course of researching
this report, several others who live in this apartment had to bribe police
in order not to get sent to Lindela. This group of talented, angry youngsters
are very aware that they are wasting the prime of their lives without access
to skills training or jobs, and miss their families and homes very much.
However, they are unable to return because of the high risk to themselves of
being tortured again - and in any case, back in Zimbabwe they would still
have no access to skills training or jobs. Even though their lives in
Johannesburg are tough, they see no alternative to exile. Johannesburg: a
community of the blind
Photograph 14: a blind Zimbabwean child feels the face of Archbishop Pius
Ncube of Bulawayo: he was paying a pastoral visit to some of his
parishioners who are now in exile in Johannesburg: July 2004. Among the
Zimbabwean communities is a group of 31 blind people, ranging in age from 2
years old to 60+. This group of very vulnerable people, accompanied by a few
sighted children who lead them out into Johannesburg to beg each day, is
living in appalling conditions in Hillbrow. The whole group lives in one
room, without a kitchen or bathroom. Cooking is done on one double hot plate
on the floor, and ablutions are in a communal bathroom down the passage,
shared not only by them, but by other tenants. The bathroom was awash with
water and urine during our visits. They explained that the money paid to them
from social services in Zimbabwe for their disabilities is the equivalent of
about two loaves of bread a month, because of inflation. They cannot survive
in Zimbabwe. They have therefore moved to Johannesburg to live by begging on
the streets, where they make around R10 a day each. Political
refuge We did not get full statements from all of them, but one blind man
indicated that he had fled Zimbabwe as a result of political persecution. He
had bought sugar in August 2002, which was scarce at that time, and was
selling it at a small mark up on a street corner. He was attacked by youth
militia who accused him of being MDC, stole his sugar and handed him to the
police. He was detained in jail until January 2003, and on release, he fled
to South Africa. These are people trying to live with dignity in an
appalling situation not of their own making. Many of them have skills and
used to knit, crochet, make candles back in Zimbabwe when they had the
resources. Several play musical instruments. All would rather be gainfully
employed in some kind of enterprise than begging. The majority of blind in
this group would be considered undocumented migrants and would be deported
if authorities were drawn in. Durban: Cross border traders Being a
Zimbabwean in South Africa is by and large a joyless existence; many of the
traders we met in Durban were from Harare and travel over 3,000 km return on
a monthly basis, often crossing the border illegally, using public transport
and dealing with harassment from officials, in order to make a living. They
spend most of their lives separated from their spouses and children. Even
those who would be considered to be in South Africa for primarily economic
reasons by officials, view their decision to leave as political. In their
own eyes, the collapse of the economy and the loss of livelihoods in
Zimbabwe is the result of political mismanagement; with good governance in
Zimbabwe, they would not be in South Africa. While this will not win them
refugee status with officials in terms of international criteria for what
makes a refugee, it should be noted that individuals do see it this way -
political decisions made in the last four years in Zimbabwe are what have
driven them over the border to take up tough lives in a foreign
land. Cross border traders are neither eligible for asylum seeker status, nor
are many interested in acquiring it. The fact that they regularly re-cross
the border indicates that they are not on the run and do not consider
themselves likely to come to harm in Zimbabwe. Although this group is not
part of the main refugee focus of this report, they are a sizeable
community, and it seems relevant to comment briefly on their
existence. Some cross border traders enter South Africa with passports and
one-month or three-month visas. They conduct their informal trading and then
return to Zimbabwe to acquire further visas. However, while some have
business visas, and declare their goods for resale at customs in South
Africa, many of them do not have visas allowing them to conduct business, so
they are violating visa conditions by vending, and are therefore subject to
deportation. Many have no visa or passport. Obtaining a passport is an
arduous procedure in Zimbabwe that can take a year or more, and most
Zimbabweans do not have passports. Receiving a visa is also problematic,
with the South African Embassy predictably swamped with applications and
processing around 20,000 a month. Visa conditions have been made tougher,
with any prospective visitor having to include R 1,000 in travellers cheques
with their visa application, as well as name and ID number of a South
African and other supporting documentation. Many visas are still
refused. Cross border traders have formed informal, semi permanent groups in
South Africa. They often travel together and live together, in very tough
conditions. The authors visited several such groups. The groupings we saw
have informal leaders, who oversee rent and at times apply rules to living
conditions. For example, one group of around 40 female traders in Durban
living in three large rooms, does not allow any men onto their premises, and
has a lock-up time for the front door of around 9 pm. Conditions are
makeshift and harsh, with people sleeping head to toe without mattresses and
using small paraffin stoves for cooking. Privacy is nil. As little as
possible is spent on rent and food in South Africa, as the main intention of
these migrants is to save money to take back to Zimbabwe for their extended
families. As few possessions as possible are kept with them, for ease of
packing up and moving back to Zimbabwe every few weeks to acquire more
crafts for reselling, and in the case of those with passports, new
visas. There is a high level of fear and suspicion of strangers in all of
these groups, who keep a low profile and try to stay out of trouble with
officials in order to avoid deportation, or being blacklisted for visas in
future. Members of one of these groups of informal traders were sure they
were infiltrated by CIO, and would become silent whenever these suspected
individuals made an appearance on passages nearby. Nobody we spoke to
would live in South Africa or make the long journeys to and fro, if they saw
any alternative. It said something profound to us to realise that tough
though people's lives in South Africa are, they nonetheless see this as
preferable to life in Zimbabwe
3. Musina: life in a small border
town The authors made several trips to Musina, which is 20 km from the
border, to establish living conditions there for Zimbabweans, and also to
inquire about official and NGO policy towards Zimbabweans in this small
town, where the number of Zimbabweans may be proportionally among the
largest in South Africa. Most adults arriving in Musina use it as a short
term stepping stone to move on to Johannesburg or elsewhere, and pass very
quickly through the area; although on any day there may be hundreds of
Zimbabweans, from day to day the faces change. Those who tend to stay longer
than a day or two are migrant farm workers, and unaccompanied
minors. Farm workers Migrant Zimbabweans are employed in the farms in the
Musina area, and in some cases, Zimbabwean families have been migrant
workers on certain farms for generations. However, RI reported that when
they interviewed Zimbabweans working on farms near Musina, it was clear that
this group now includes farm workers who have been displaced through farm
invasions, who report political abuse, assaults and harassment by ZANU PF as
their reasons for leaving Zimbabwe. This group is very afraid of being
deported and does not fit the previous seasonal workers' mould, being
clearly eligible for asylum seeker status. However, the nearest RRO is in
Pretoria, around 450 km away. Unaccompanied minors Small communities of
Zimbabwean unaccompanied minors have been identified in this area. Children
aged between 12 and 18 who make it from Zimbabwe as far as Musina often make
it no further. They realise they do not have the resources to get as far as
Johannesburg, and may be afraid of life in such a big city. Some arrive in
Musina and think this is Johannesburg! A study by the Centre for Positive
Care (CPC) in Musina, an NGO that has a reception office for unaccompanied
children of all nationalities, describes in detail different aspects of the
lives of unaccompanied Zimbabwean children identified in Musina. The CPC
study interviewed a group of 28 children in Musina. All 17 boys were
Zimbabwean, and out of 11 girls, all but three were from Zimbabwe. The boys
were living either in the lockers that the taxi drivers use at the taxi
ranks, or near the municipal rubbish dump. Some stayed with farm workers.
Most of the children were aged between 14 and 16. They came from all over
Zimbabwe, from as far afield as Chiredzi, Mucheke, Masvingo and Gokwe. None
of these towns are within the traditional border crossing areas. Sixteen of
them had lost either one or both parents, and all reported crossing the
border to earn money in South Africa. The living conditions of these
children are described as "horrible": "I have been doing research work with
children for about two years and we work with many poor children, but I have
never seen such bad conditions for people to live in." The Zimbabwean girl
minors were living with a much larger group of older girls, who included
South Africans, many of them sex workers, and many of them single mothers
raising children in these appalling conditions. The researcher's field notes
for the boys describe conditions in this way: Some boys live near the dump.
They do not have water to drink or wash in. They sleep in the bushes where
they have put down paper.. They eat what they find thrown away.. They are
too frightened to ever go into town as they are so dirty they say the police
will know they are Zimbabweans and arrest and deport them.
The CPC
offers basic facilities to these children at their drop in centre, including
access to bathing and a place to wash clothes. However, they do not offer
food of any description, and food is clearly a need among this group. When
asked to list what it is they needed, children in this study mentioned the
need for water to wash and drink, food, and jobs so that they could send
money home. When the authors visited the CPC drop in centre on different
occasions, we came across no girls from Zimbabwe at all, and a small group
of boys aged between 17 and 18. They only came to the drop in centre when
their search for piece work was not successful, and spent much of the day
looking for jobs. We believe our failure to make more contacts with
Zimbabwean children was in part due to the brief nature of our visits there.
One visit was for a week, but even this was insufficient time to build trust
and contacts with children in the area. While finding adults who are secure
enough to admit they are illegals and who are prepared to talk frankly can
also be problematic, it is clearly more so with children. The fact that
Zimbabwean girls rarely use the centre is indicative of their greater
likelihood of finding work. Girls sometimes find a "boyfriend" who is South
African and who provides shelter, or they become domestic workers, or sex
workers. None of these options exist for the boys, who often end up washing
taxis or carrying groceries. Occupations available to boys are less likely
to result in any kind of accommodation, so their need to come to the CPC to
shower and wash is also likely to be greater. Sex workers In August 2004,
the authors of this report interviewed 7 Zimbabwean girls working as sex
workers in Musina. None of these girls were minors, being aged between 18
and 25 years. All of them claimed to have left their homes because they
could not make a living there any longer. Only one was previously a sex
worker; the other six had never imagined they would have to resort to this
means of earning a living, but had realised they had no options. Their
living conditions were very poor and none earned enough money to send home.
However, they were all convinced that they were nonetheless better off
living such a life in Musina than they would be back in Zimbabwe.
4.
Access to health services A major concern of the authors is whether
Zimbabweans in South Africa are able to access health services, in
particular whether torture victims with health complications are able to do
so. However, we are aware that Zimbabweans from all backgrounds, including
unaccompanied minors, need access to health care in South Africa. A
selection of anecdotal experiences relating to health care is given here,
followed by a summary of findings based on a health
questionnaire. Johannesburg: access to health care based on anecdotal
evidence Asylum seekers in Hillbrow The group of 26 political exiles we
visited in their apartment had as one of their main concerns, lack of access
to medical support. Several had had falanga in prison in Zimbabwe (beatings
to the soles of the feet) and had feet that ached as a result. Falanga
typically leaves injuries to the connective tissue of feet and lower legs,
and permanent pain. Some complained of pain from other torture related
injuries. All should be receiving regular physiotherapy and have access to
painkillers, at the very least. This group recounted an occasion on which
they had been donated used cooking oil and had all become very ill with food
poisoning as a result of cooking with it. All 25 of them had had
simultaneous diarrhoea and vomiting, without access to medication of any
kind, in a tiny apartment with one toilet. As most of them are illegal, and
as none of them had any money, they had not been able to go to a clinic for
medical attention. At one stage they took quinine because it was the only
medication in the apartment and they were so desperate. Community of the
blind The same blind man who told us he had been imprisoned for selling "MDC
sugar", told us that when his wife was ill recently, he went with her to a
local clinic, where he said he was Zimbabwean and asked for help for his
wife. The nurse shouted at them, saying that "Mugabe's people" should go
back to Mugabe's country and not ask her for help. He later managed to get
medical help from another clinic for his wife. When these anecdotes and
many others were summarised, they indicated the following general categories
of experience in relation to health care, in Johannesburg in
particular. . It is not always possible for a Zimbabwean, or any other
foreigner, to walk into a clinic and be given health care. Potential
patients are invariably asked for ID of some kind, and many asylum seekers
do not have ID, and at this point, some have reported being denied health
care. A few reported being called "makwerekwere" and ejected from clinics
for producing Zimbabwean ID, or for saying they were Zimbabwean to explain
why they did not have ID. . A further barrier for some refugees is money.
Some have reported receiving free medical care, and others have paid small -
or large - sums for it. Others have reported failing to access health care
because they cannot afford to pay for it, especially for specialist
treatment. However, this is much the same in Zimbabwe: many Zimbabweans now
fail to access health care for financial reasons. . Some Zimbabweans
avoid the public health system, because they are worried about the issue of
being deported. . Some have been fortunate enough to use private
practitioners, either because they have relatives who pay for them, or
through NGOs referring them. . The Methodist Church in downtown
Johannesburg provides an itinerant health care programme for vagrants living
on the streets, some of whom are refugees from Zimbabwe and elsewhere. Every
Wednesday night, as well as providing a hot meal at various feeding points
in the city, this church also hands out small packs of over-the-counter
medicines to those reporting general aches and pains. Anyone who appears
seriously ill or in need of a proper medical consultation, is given a letter
of referral on a letterhead, to general practitioner/s who are prepared to
offer this service. Musina: access to health care based on anecdotal
evidence Unaccompanied minors in Musina reported to CPC that they had formed
their own support networks in order to avoid deportation. They mentioned
that they do not go to the clinic for fear that the nurse will report them
to the police: instead, they club together and buy medicine when one of them
is ill. In other words, they are not accessing appropriate medical
care. Among the sex workers we interviewed there, one reported that her child
aged two was not getting immunisations because she was afraid to take her to
the clinic in case she was deported, but two others with children were
taking them to the local baby clinic without problems. Attitude of health
authorities in Musina At a recent one day open seminar on health issues
hosted by the Musina municipality, health workers raised the issue of
Zimbabweans. The general policy at Musina hospital seems to be that
Zimbabweans should get health care, but that because they are not South
African tax payers, they should pay more. Zimbabweans are charged R75
instead of the R25 that South Africans pay. However, the clinic is free,
including to Zimbabweans. Nurses mentioned a concern about pregnant girls
from Zimbabwe, who do not come to the health providers until their situation
is desperate. Zimbabwean women in labour with complications suddenly appear
at the hospital at the last minute, with no known medical history, and this
means having to deal with an emergency situation. The nurses also mentioned
the problem of Zimbabweans defaulting on their tuberculosis treatment,
either because they move on and then reappear months later, or because they
get deported in the middle of their treatment. In general, the Musina
health care system appears sympathetic to and accommodating of Zimbabweans.
We did not receive accounts of Zimbabweans being denied health care here,
although they did report being afraid to go to a clinic without ID, or not
having money to pay for what was needed.
Summary of findings of
health questionnaire
In the light of anecdotal evidence, a questionnaire
was devised and 111 Zimbabweans were interviewed via two refugee support
organisations. In our own analysis, based on lengthy interviews, this group
consisted of 48 "political" asylum seekers and 63 primarily "economic"
refugees. This is not a statistically significant sample, considering the
numbers of Zimbabweans in Johannesburg, but gives some further insight into
this important issue. Out of a total of 111 interviews: 39 reported they
were not ill and had not tried to access health care in RSA 17 went to
private doctors and had never used public primary health care systems Out
of a total of 55 who were ill and could not access private primary health
care: 29 received treatment in either a hospital or clinic 17 were refused
treatment in either a hospital or clinic 7 reported they were too scared to
seek health care 2 reported they could not afford health care and had not had
any Out of a total of 55 who needed primary health care through the public
health system: 29 accessed primary health care 26 did not access
primary health care
- mainly because it was denied, but also at times
because respondents felt too afraid or too poor to approach a health care
centre. The most common institution to refuse health care was Johannesburg
Hospital. 10 people reported being refused health care at Johannesburg
Hospital 6 people reported accessing health care at Johannesburg
Hospital The receptionist was the most likely person within a health
institution to turn away a Zimbabwean; this was usually who turned refugees
away at Johannesburg hospital, and this was also reported at two clinics
that denied health care. Staff insults Most commonly, people reported
being turned away on a technicality, like not having ID or being foreign and
therefore not eligible. However, a few people reported overt racism by
health staff. One woman reported being allowed to deliver her baby in
Coronation Hospital when she arrived there in full labour, but of having to
put up with continuous verbal abuse and accusations of being a
"makwerekwere" throughout her delivery. Three others who were refused access
to health institutions reported similar abuse by health care staff. Out
of the group of 48 "political" refugees 23 reported they were not ill and had
not tried to access health care in RSA 6 went to private doctors and had
never used public primary health care systems Out of the 19 who needed
primary health care through the public health system: 8 received
treatment in a hospital or clinic 4 were refused treatment in a hospital or
clinic 7 reported they were too scared to seek health care Out of 19
respondents who had a history of persecution, and who needed health care
through the public health system, only 8 had accessed health care. Fewer
than half accessed health care. They were twice as likely to be too afraid to
look for health care, as to be actually turned away. They were also less
likely than "economics" to seek private care. Summary While this is
not a large enough sample to draw any conclusions from, the findings of this
survey support the anecdotal evidence that it is not easy for Zimbabweans to
access health care. It is interesting to note that lack of money was seldom
given as the main reason. Being denied access to a health institution was
more commonly given as a reason. For political refugees, fear of
deportation was the most common reason for failing to access health
care. Political refugees were less likely to go to private doctors than
economic refugees. It is also interesting to note that it is not usually
the health staff that turned people away - although 5 people reported nurses
turning them away - it was far more likely to be the receptionist who turned
people away, on a technicality. The findings of the CASE survey of
refugees in 2003 are in accordance with our own findings: they found that
lack of access to health care affected their respondents who were asylum
seekers or refugees from many different nations. CASE report that 17% of
asylum seekers failed to access emergency medical care. They further report
that it was usually administrative staff who turned foreigners away. 91%
of respondents in their study were able to access primary health care, as
opposed to emergency medical care. Our small sample found a much higher
number of Zimbabweans turned away from primary health care than their
finding of 9%: around 31% of Zimbabweans who had tried to access primary
health care had been turned away. However, our sample was of a statistically
insignificant group and our findings are merely indicators of issues that
need further examination. This survey, together with anecdotal evidence,
indicates that Zimbabweans are almost as likely not to get health care as
they are to get it. This is cause for concern, particularly considering that
among those refused access to health care, were torture victims with related
injuries. 5. Deportation Around 45,000 Zimbabweans are deported from South
Africa each year now, more than the total deported between 1994 and 2000 put
together. The most common route to deportation is via Lindela, a detention
centre in Krugersdorp near Johannesburg. People without documents picked up
off the streets by police anywhere in South Africa are transported to this
centre, and once every few weeks they are deported, in the case of
Zimbabweans, via train. The cost to South Africa of each deportation is in
the region of R16,000. This means deporting Zimbabweans may cost South
Africa around R720,000,000 per year. Considering the fact that many, or
even most, Zimbabwean deportees are back in South Africa within hours or
days of deportation, this seems like an enormous tax burden for very little
benefit. While South Africa has the same right as any other nation to
protect its borders from a huge influx of undocumented migrants, the current
strategy does not appear to be achieving this, and at the same time, it is
very expensive. Asylum seekers According to the Regulations to the Refugee
Act, an asylum seeker must at all times be in possession of their original
permit as proof of their legal status should such proof be required. An
asylum seeker in possession of a valid ASP may not be deported, or detained
for deportation. The Regulations further make it clear that: . if a person
is detained by police as an alien, they have the right to indicate their
intention to apply for asylum if they have not already done so and are not
already in possession of an ASP. . In such an instance, the person. "shall be
issued with an appropriate permit valid for 14 days within which they must
approach an RRO to complete an asylum application". In other words, any
non-South African picked up on the streets has the right to tell the police
that they wish to apply for asylum, and thereafter this person may not be
deported, but should rather have a temporary permit immediately issued by
the police to facilitate them getting a formal ASP. However, neither the
police nor Home Affairs officers abide by this Regulation; Zimbabweans
picked up on the streets of Johannesburg are sent to Lindela deportation
centre and are deported in their thousands every month, without being given
the opportunity to explain that they may want asylum in South Africa. This
is of particular significance bearing in mind the fact discussed previously,
that it is extremely difficult to access ASPs, and hundreds of people have
queued for them without success. The ASP is a simple sheet of A4, and is not
durable. A further problem for asylum seekers is that having to fold the ASP
and carry it in a pocket at all times means that it quickly develops folds
and tears and important parts of it can become illegible. The ASP may be
needed for years on end considering the slow pace of claims being processed.
But it is not possible to have a worn ASP replaced. Police on occasion
detain for deportation those with old and illegible ASPs. Even worse, there
are reported incidents of the police tearing up ASPs and then sending the
person for deportation. Barry Gilder, Director General of Home Affairs, told
the authors in October 2004 that Lindela will soon be a fully fledged RRO,
so that in the future deportees will be able to apply for asylum seeker
permits here, in order not to be deported - a promise that cannot put right
illegal acts committed by Home Affairs authorities against Lindela inmates,
in the past and present. Bribes Bribing of police officers in order not to
get detained and deported is a regular occurrence. We had the experience of
Zimbabweans whom we had arranged to interview, arriving late because they
had been pulled off a taxi and found to be without papers. They had to
negotiate a "fee" in order to continue with their journey. RI refer to a
Zimbabwean they interviewed having to pay a R200 bribe to a policeman who
stopped him on a pavement and told him to pay up, or be deported. Such
reports are commonplace, and occasionally are reported in the media. Home
Affairs itself acknowledges this situation which it sees as very serious.
They are attempting to crack down, but in the face of understaffing and an
overload of work, corruption thrives. There are semi-formal tariffs linked
to bribes: R200 to the police on the street to avoid being taken to Lindela,
R800 to be released from Lindela, and a sliding scale downwards from this to
be allowed to leap from the deportation train en route for
Zimbabwe. Conditions in Lindela The problem with Lindela is it has been
plagued by corruption, it is under-resourced.. Lindela has been a big
headache. [Barry Gilder, Dir Gen Home Affairs] Lindela is a privately run
detention centre, paid by the Department of Home Affairs to house detainees
ahead of deportation. It is their responsibility to provide accommodation
and food, and it is up to Home Affairs to screen detainees prior to
deportation. Once in detention, those who currently get the right to
explanation and appeal are few. Refugees International observed that most
deportees are repatriated without ever seeing an immigration official. In a
centre that can hold up to 5,000 deportees at one time, "on any given day
there may be between two and zero" immigration officers. Those Zimbabweans
who know their rights and are able to access a phone to phone a human rights
lawyer may be fortunate enough to avoid deportation, but the vast majority
are deported without appeal or any contact with anyone. At times, conditions
in Lindela are overcrowded, with up to 5,000 people in a facility designed
for 3,000. Detainees end up sharing beds at these times. It has been pointed
out by key informants that it is in the financial interest of Lindela to
have high numbers of deportees housed there, as they are paid per
head. Those who have been deported via Lindela report a very high incidence
of illness among inmates, particularly of respiratory disorders, and many
have commented that nobody comes out of Lindela without being ill and
coughing. Respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis, will flourish in an
overcrowded situation such as this. Photograph 14: this Zimbabwean was
one of four who died after being detained in Lindela in October this year.
He had relatives in Johannesburg who knew he had been detained; he was one
of the fortunate few who was repatriated to Zimbabwe for
burial.
Deaths in Lindela - detaining of the very ill Deportees not
infrequently die in Lindela; in just one week in October 2004, eleven
deportees died, four of them from Zimbabwe. The question needs to be asked
why people this ill are being arrested by the police and taken to a
detention centre in the first place. According to Lawyers for Human Rights,
Lindela and Home Affairs have undertaken not to arrest for deportation, or
to keep in detention people who are very ill. It is inhumane and not in
accordance with international obligations towards refugees to detain and
deport people who are extremely ill and likely to die during this process.
This situation also clearly exacerbates the already obvious problem of
people contracting illnesses while in detention. LHR reported to us that
Lindela has in the past failed to inform the appropriate consulate of these
deaths, and has failed to give names and details of the dead to LHR, meaning
that bodies remain unclaimed and eventually end up in paupers' graves at the
hospital near Lindela. A further complicating factor is that people who are
detained, especially if they are political refugees, frequently give false
names for fear of being on a list that goes to Zimbabwean authorities. To
trace who is in Lindela, or who has died there, is not straightforward as a
result. The deportation train Once a week or fortnight, depending on
numbers in detention, a deportation train runs from Johannesburg to Musina
500km away on the Zimbabwe border. This train leaves Johannesburg with
around 1,000 to 2,000 deportees on board, and arrives at Musina with several
hundreds less. Deportees bribe guards on the train in order to be allowed to
jump out of the windows en route - the closer to Johannesburg, the shorter
the walk back and the higher the bribe required. Some jump to their deaths
or end up with serious injuries, again an indicator of the desperation with
which people will try to avoid having to return to Zimbabwe. We
interviewed some deported Zimbabweans on their return to Beitbridge. They
reported that the police on the train assaulted the boys and men. Some
female detainees reported that the boys had been punched, kicked and
generally pushed around by the police en route for the border. Once more,
the issue of deporting the very ill must be raised. Deportees from time to
time die in this train in the process of deportation. Again, Lindela and
Home Affairs have given lawyers assurances that this will not happen, but
the ill continue to be deported. While carriages are set aside for the very
ill to travel under less crowded conditions, there is no doctor or medical
care on these trains. While Barry Gilder, Director General of Home Affairs
stated in a television interview in 2003 that he would take measures to
ensure medical support on this train, to date this has not in fact occurred.
Some arrive back in Beitbridge barely alive and are admitted to hospital
there. Deportation from Musina - holding conditions Around 300 Zimbabweans
are picked up weekly in the border area and are held at Musina Police
Station and deported. Police officials there explained that they feel in a
difficult position. According to them, it is not the responsibility of the
police to take on the role of processing undocumented migrants. They do not
have the capacity to issue ASPs and it is not supposed to be solely their
responsibility to oversee deportation. These roles are supposed to be taken
by the Department of Home Affairs. However, there is so far no RRO in
Musina. The nearest one is Pretoria 450 km away - which seems astonishing
given the fact that Home Affairs told us repeatedly that there have been
migrants from Zimbabwe crossing at this very point for generations. An RRO
is apparently to open in this area soon, but in the meantime the police have
to shoulder the problem. Zimbabweans are currently being deported without
the opportunity to apply for asylum. The police should in terms of the law
be issuing 15 day permits to those who ask for asylum, but this is never
done.
Photographs 15 and 16: Zimbabwean deportees are herded on to a
deportation train in Johannesburg, September 2003.
The police report
that it is the role of the army and not the police to patrol the border and
prevent people entering through undesignated points, but the army is also
under resourced which means that there is very little to prevent Zimbabweans
walking in to South Africa in their thousands every month.
The police
in Musina do not have the resources to deal with the hundreds of Zimbabweans
they pick up for deportation every week. Zimbabwean deportees are held in an
area by the police station, fenced with chicken wire. This "cage" has no
toilets or tap within its perimeter, and deportees are held there in very
hot weather: the temperatures in Musina are above 35 degrees for much of the
year. The fence is not an impenetrable barrier, and particularly if
deportees are held there overnight or over the weekend, then they can escape
by scaling the fence. Zimbabweans may be deported the same day, or they may
be held for up to seven days. It was reported to us that the police only
register those in "the cage" just before they are deported. This prevents
them having to explain the missing ones who escaped. But if you are not
registered, then you are not provided with food, so that over the weekend,
deportees can end up not being fed for days and not having adequate access
to water, because they are not registered. The police in Musina
apparently know full well that their holding conditions do not meet the
minimum criteria that deportees are entitled to in terms of the law.
However, they have been made responsible for deportees when it should be
Home Affairs resourcing this. Police there reported that they have raised
the issue of needing more resources with their Headquarters in Johannesburg,
so that they could improve holding conditions and cover the costs of feeding
deportees properly. However, they have not received any increase in their
budgets so far, which leaves them with no option but to continue to hold
Zimbabweans in illegal conditions. It is to be hoped that the Musina RRO
opens within the shortest possible time. Police approach to deportees in
Musina On 20 October 2004, there was a one-day health summit in Musina, in
which interested parties could raise any health issue of concern to them.
The Commissioner of Police raised the issue of deportations. He told
participants that they deport around 4 truck loads of Zimbabweans a week. He
felt that this was a pointless process, because those that are deported are
back in Musina within a few hours. He said that some weeks they deport the
same individuals three times. He commented that those who are deported know
how to get back quickly, and what is more, they therefore bring with them a
whole new group of Zimbabweans each time, showing them the holes in the
fence! Senior police seemed to have an empathetic approach to Zimbabweans
in Musina, which must be applauded. The approach was that the border is a
comparatively recent historical event, and it has ruled out the Limpopo
River as an effective resource for both countries. The police would be in
favour of a more pragmatic approach to the problem, of acknowledging in
informal or formal ways that Zimbabweans are suffering and need to be shown
neighbourliness at this time of great hardship. Senior police had the
attitude that they were deporting people because this was their instruction,
but they would be willing to support a policy which allowed for some degree
of integration of Zimbabweans in their area. It must be added that while at
the senior level this was the police position given, deportees from Musina
reported systematic exploitation by police and army who arrest them. This
included having all their money taken as a bribe not to be deported, or in
the case of girls, being forced to have sex in order not to be deported -
often unprotected sex . Deportees seem to be as much of a cash cow here as
in Johannesburg according to varied sources, and this raises the question of
whether it would really be that easy to get the Musina police to relinquish
their part of the "revolving door" process. Deportation of unaccompanied
minors According to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,
it is illegal to deport any unaccompanied migrant under the age of 18,
without first conducting exhaustive inquiries to ensure that there is a
suitable receiving agency in the country of origin. However, Home Affairs
has reportedly been deporting children on a regular basis, despite the fact
that South Africa is signatory to this Convention. In March 2004, human
rights lawyers making a routine visit to Lindela identified around 100
persons who claimed to be aged under 18 in detention on that day. The
Lawyers for Human Rights decided to take Home Affairs to Court and to get a
Court ruling on the rights of foreign children in South Africa. This test
case took many months, and resulted in a landmark ruling in September
2004. The Court ruled that all children, including unaccompanied foreign
children, have full rights in terms of the South African Child Care Act. The
Court further ruled that it is illegal to deport unaccompanied minors
without first ensuring a safe environment and suitable adult care in their
country of origin. The precise fates of the children involved in this test
case are currently being decided on a case by case basis by the
Court. The numbers of children involved in this case have dwindled over time:
many who had claimed to be under 18 were established to be over 18 once
inquiries were undertaken. The remainder were held in State care while the
case progressed. The girls involved all absconded; their place of safety
allowed them to walk in and out as they wished, and they all disappeared
over time. The boys have been kept under more restricted conditions,
although in a reasonable environment; the remaining number of children is
about 14, of which 7 are from Zimbabwe. Individual assessments will be made
by the Court, and if it is established that any of the children are orphans
with no surviving responsible adults in their families, they may be fostered
in South Africa. Otherwise they will be repatriated directly to their
relatives. It is not only Lindela that has been regularly deporting
minors. The police in Musina do not register children or unaccompanied
minors, and they deport them on a regular basis. Knowing such deportations
are illegal may be why the police do not incriminate themselves by recording
minors. This means that the scale of the problem of unaccompanied minors
being deported from Musina cannot be properly assessed. The CPC research
into children in Musina reported that deportation was a constant threat for
Zimbabwean minors, especially for the boys, and many of the children
interviewed in their study had been deported at least once in the recent
past. . Several of the children reported working for extortionist rates, and
then being threatened with deportation by employers on pay day, so that they
had to flee without pay. We also interviewed four boys aged 17 who had been
deported from Musina and had returned within hours. All the descriptions of
deportation from these minors were consistent; in the process they were
stripped of all their possessions either by those who arrested them or by
adult detainees being deported in the same overcrowded trucks, which may
have had up to 80 people on one truck. The deportation conditions were so
crowded, the children reported fear of suffocation. The girls reported being
deported less often, because they were able to pay soldiers and police in
sex in order to stay. These stories of deportations all ended in the same way
- the children were back across the border and in Musina within hours of
being delivered in Beitbridge. The deportation process was thus a very
costly one in material and personal terms for the children, causing anxiety
and distress - but the one thing it did not prevent was the immediate return
of the deportee to South Africa, usually within the same day. Deportation
of parents without their children The director of a child care centre in down
town Johannesburg told the authors that she has a large number of Zimbabwean
children in her care. From time to time, she will find herself with
unclaimed children at the end of the day, and will then hear that the
parent/s have been picked up and are in Lindela. She is then left literally
"holding the baby" until the parent/s have been deported and have made it
back to Johannesburg, a period in her experience of around two weeks to a
month, depending on how long they are held in Lindela prior to
deportation.
6. Back in Zimbabwe: the deportees on arrival Zimbabwe
police The authors went to Beitbridge to witness the process of repatriation
for themselves. The police in Beitbridge do not have the resources to cope
with thousands of deportees a month. The biggest influx of deportees is that
associated with the deportation train once a week or fortnight, which
arrives at the border on Thursday mornings. A thousand detainees or more can
arrive at one time, ferried across the border in South African police
trucks. On the day we observed, in August 2004, the Zimbabwean police
dealt with the deportees one truckload at a time and gave a short speech, in
which they appealed to them not to re-cross the border, before dismissing
them. We observed that the detainees did not even enter the police station,
but were dismissed from the driveway, and remained in police "custody" for
around 5 minutes. At one time the police did fine deportees, but in
recent years, since the weekly deportations have become so huge, they simply
cannot do so; if somebody is fined and cannot pay the fine, then they have
to be detained until the fine is paid, and the police clearly do not have
the resources to detain thousands of people. To process such a huge number
of people every week in a way that would involve paperwork and record
keeping would be logistically impossible, given the small manpower and
resources of this police station. This means that any information about
deportees is essentially undocumented by the Zimbabwean police. By
immediately discharging them, the police do not have to provide food or any
other resources for deportees. On inquiry, the police reported that they
are aware that minors are among those deported, and are aware that many of
the girls being returned have been victims of sexual abuse. They do not have
resources at this point to do anything about this, but have expressed a
concern about the issue. The revolving door The authors observed the speed
with which deportees dispersed. Taxi drivers and maguma guma hang around in
the vicinity of the police station, and within half an hour of being
dismissed by the police, some deportees were witnessed already in taxis and
heading back across the border. However, to re-cross the border takes
resources. It is possible if you know where the holes in the fence are, to
walk the river and get as far as Musina without resources, but if you need
to catch a taxi back to Johannesburg, then funds are needed. Zimbabweans we
spoke to in Johannesburg told us that many Zimbabweans lay plans that come
into effect when they are deported. They form a relationship with the taxi
drivers that ply the Johannesburg-Musina route, and some taxi drivers have
registers of Zimbabwean they deal with. On being picked up and taken to
Lindela, Zimbabweans in this network can phone their taxi driver, and give
him the date on which they should be collected in Musina and brought back to
Johannesburg - which is the day after their deportation train is due to
arrive at the border. In this way, they minimise the number of days they
spend away from any job they may have in Johannesburg, because one of the
greatest fears Zimbabweans face is losing their jobs - or possessions - when
they are deported. On this system, it is not necessary to have the R500 up
front for the fare back, as long as somebody else is waiting with it on
arrival in Johannesburg.
7. Problems of the repatriated in
Beitbridge While it is the majority of deportees who visibly head straight
back to South Africa, there are those who remain for some time in the
Beitbridge area. The police are not in a position to provide bus permits or
any transport money to deportees, nor does any NGO in the area of
Beitbridge. Deportees are commonly without money by the time they arrive
back, and some are left stranded in Beitbridge trying to raise the money
either to get to their homes in Zimbabwe, or back to South Africa.
Informants in the Beitbridge area told us that from time to time people are
deported to Zimbabwe who are not Zimbabwean; they cannot speak any local
language including English. Sometimes South Africans are deported to
Zimbabwe! Such individuals can face particular problems getting back to
South Africa, as they cannot speak to anyone locally. The ill Those
who are deported in a very ill state are admitted directly to the Beitbridge
hospital. We were informed that deportees die in hospital on a weekly basis.
Two detainees had died the day before we arrived and had been sent to the
morgue. There were ill detainees in the hospital, including a man who had
been shot and left paralysed, who had been deported in this condition. In
the paediatric ward, there were orphaned children. One 4 year old boy had
been left orphaned when his mother was deported very ill and died. A brother
and sister aged 7 and 3 years old had been orphaned, also after their mother
was deported ill and died. The hospital did not know how to contact
relatives of these children. The mothers had been given paupers'
funerals. Deaths A tragic case was brought to our attention towards the
end of 2003. A deportee was reported to have died of starvation while trying
to walk the 300 km through virtual desert to get to Bulawayo. On
investigation, it was established that this young man had indeed died in the
vicinity of a rural school about 40 km out of Beitbridge. Teachers at the
school reported finding him lying by the side of a small stream, moaning
that he was hungry. They put him on a donkey cart, but by the time they got
him to hospital, he had died. It was established by the authors that he
had his ID on him, but the hospital morgue would not delay his burial to
allow for efforts to locate his family. The hospital has facilities to store
6 bodies at a time, and on this day there were over 20 unclaimed bodies,
more than a dozen of which were deportees who had died in the hospital. Most
of them were without any form of identity. In the morgue on this same
day, there was a severed human head, still complete with skin and features,
but no lower jaw. This remains of a crocodile's dinner had been picked up on
the shores of the Limpopo and delivered to the morgue by the police. The
identity of the person was unknown. This human head, together with the dead
deportees, was buried in a paupers' grave in Beitbridge the same day. The
police were asked about these cases, of the person picked up in the school
grounds and the human head: they confirmed that it is not unusual to find
human remains in the greater vicinity of Beitbridge, both on the banks of
the Limpopo and in the bush. The police report this happens every few weeks,
and they assume these are deportees or border jumpers, who have no relatives
in the area to notice they are missing. Such remains may lie for unknown
periods in the open until they are discovered, scavenged and dessicated.
They end up in paupers' graves. People in the vicinity of the hospital burial
ground complained to us that the paupers' graves are not deep enough. They
told us that 39 people had been buried the week before, and that the smell
from the corpses was still noticeable. Political exiles: risks on
deportation We have several cases on file of individuals who, on deportation,
decided to go home instead of ducking straight back under the fence to South
Africa, and who were then picked up again and re-brutalised by police. We
have other cases on file of people who had been wanted by the police for
their political activism, and who decided of their own accord that it was
possibly safe enough to go home; they were picked up and
tortured. Gabriel Shumba, whose affidavit is in Appendix One, is one good
example. He had at one stage fled to South Africa, after 11 arrests and
several assaults, and was persuaded by friends and colleagues that it was
safe for him to return to Zimbabwe. It was after this return that the
torture in his affidavit took place. Another exiled activist who has led
anti-Zimbabwe demonstrations in South Africa in the last few years, returned
recently to Zimbabwe of his own accord. In spite of keeping a very low
profile, in October of 2004, he was picked up, tortured, and has now been
formally charged with "subversive activities" for his protests while in
South Africa. He is currently on bail. This case is an indication that
activities of known activists are monitored in Johannesburg by the CIO, and
this information is relayed back to Zimbabwe. In conclusion, it is not
safe for a political asylum seeker to be deported or to return to Zimbabwe;
to deport an activist, is to place that person at a high risk of
persecution.
8. The dead: a problem for the future? In the course of
researching this report, the authors on several occasions came across the
phenomenon of Zimbabweans who have died either in South Africa, or in
Beitbridge on deportation, and who have ended up in a paupers' grave,
without documentation of who they are and without death certificates in
their names. The Chief Executive Officer at Musina Hospital has also raised
the issue that their morgue is over full because of unclaimed corpses of
Zimbabweans. In Zimbabwe itself, HIV related deaths number approximately
4,800 per week. Probably the vast majority of migrants and exiles in South
Africa are in the high risk age group for HIV and Aids. Considering the very
congested living conditions of Zimbabweans in South Africa, and what we were
told about women who end up as sex workers to survive, the prevalence of HIV
infection could be imagined to be very high in this group. In the longer
run, the death rate could be assumed to be correspondingly high. Possibly
hundreds or even thousands of Zimbabweans may be dying every month in South
Africa. While some of the dead are being repatriated, others are ending up
in paupers' graves. Many exiles and border jumpers have no formal identity
documents on them; many arrive and fall outside of supportive social
networks, or find themselves forming groups of equally impoverished youths.
These groups are very fluid, with individuals coming and going. People may
use false names at work and where they live, and some have false documents.
People in the support systems of somebody who may die are themselves illegal
and trying to avoid official attention. How do they claim a corpse without
getting deported themselves? Who looks out for those who become very ill? Who
notices when they die? Who knows how to reach family members back in Zimbabwe
to inform them of what has happened? How many families in Zimbabwe can
afford to repatriate a corpse - very often of the very breadwinner they
hoped to bring money home to them? How many families can afford to send
somebody on a return trip of two thousand kilometres to witness a funeral at
short notice? How many families have passports and visas to travel to a
funeral? What is happening to Zimbabwe's dead in the diaspora? In any
culture in the world, attending the funeral of a loved one is an essential
part of dealing with mourning and closure. It is the deep concern of the
authors that there are families in Zimbabwe right now who may not even know
that their husband/son/daughter/mother/father is already dead and buried in
South Africa, or that their human remains are lying on the bottom of the
Limpopo or in the open bush. How long does a family wait to hear from
somebody who is in fact dead, before starting to wonder why they are so
silent? How does a son/daughter/wife sitting in Zimbabwe begin to try to
find out the fate of a person who has become silent in a foreign
land? Zimbabweans are not just dying - they are becoming "disappeared
persons", without death certificates, without known places of burial. They
are becoming aggrieved spirits who were not buried honourably, and who are
now lost and wandering in a foreign place. Apart from the problems of
lack of closure for families, there may be practical problems linked to
these foreign deaths in the years ahead, particularly linked to the lack of
death certificates. Without death certificates, widows and widowers cannot
remarry. Without death certificates, heirs will have problems inheriting
whatever little property there may be, or getting birth certificates for
children. Orphans in a foreign land A further problem drawn to the
attention of the authors is that of Zimbabwean children who may find
themselves stranded in South Africa when their sole parent dies there. One
woman who is a Zimbabwean with a permanent residence permit in South Africa,
told us that she has informally adopted a two year old Zimbabwean child,
whose mother died in South Africa in 2003. This child was originally looked
after by the day care centre that she was attending when her mother died,
but this was not a permanent solution. This child has no documentation and
no contact address for relatives in Zimbabwe. She is a stateless child. She
is somebody's grandchild or cousin, but has now fallen out of her Zimbabwean
family system altogether. She is fortunate in that she has a good home:
other Zimbabwean orphans in South Africa may not all be as
fortunate. Help for the dying and the dead There would appear to be a need
to help not only the living exiles, but also the dying and the dead. More
research needs to be done into all the implications of Zimbabweans dying
anonymous deaths abroad. In Zimbabwe, many people now belong to burial
societies and pay a monthly premium towards funeral expenses. However, there
are many reasons why this system would not work smoothly in the cross-border
situation, including issues pointed to before. These include the fact people
are very mobile, often use false names, and are vulnerable to unscrupulous
schemes, where South Africans might take the money and then threaten
deportation when time comes for them to pay up. Many Zimbabweans are in any
case the sole member of their family in South Africa; once they die, who is
to insist on behalf of the dead that the promised assistance is now paid
for? More Zimbabweans in South Africa need to be able to link in to formal or
informal refugee structures, perhaps through NGOs or churches, who could
have on file contact addresses for relatives in Zimbabwe. There would be
vital issues of trust and confidentiality linked to such lists, considering
people's fears of deportation and political persecution of relatives back
home. While there are no simple solutions, there is the need for some sort
of "buddy system" to ensure that our nation's people are not going
un-mourned into mass graves in foreign lands.
9.
Conclusion Zimbabweans are fleeing their nation in their millions. There is
no indication that this is going to change in the near future. Three major
reasons for the exodus have been identified: the breakdown of law and order,
including torture with impunity; the humanitarian crisis, including
political abuse of food; the collapse of the economy. Going into exile is a
difficult choice: living as a "makwerekwe" in South Africa involves living
with a very real threat of xenophobia, of having to bribe police in order
not to be deported, or of being deported. It means being vulnerable to crime
and exploitation without redress. It means living in appallingly overcrowded
and unsafe conditions, and not always having access to basic facilities
including health. It means that productive people who once held respectable
jobs have to adjust to being beggars. That so many opt nonetheless to
live a hard life in exile, is an indicator of the severity of life in
Zimbabwe; however tough things are in South Africa, it is better and safer
than being in Zimbabwe. For this reason, would-be asylum seekers are
prepared to spend weeks and months in fruitless queues in the hope of ASPs.
For this reason, young men are prepared to leap out of deportation trains -
risking death on the tracks is better than being forced to go
home. Zimbabweans in exile appear to face a lack of political will in South
Africa. While the laws to protect their rights are in place, these are being
undermined by the "politics of denial" practised by government officials in
relation to the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe; this results in
victimisation at many levels. Zimbabwean exiles have become a "cash cow" -
the very government they have fled is trying to harvest returns from them,
and corrupt Army, Police and Home Affairs officials in South Africa take
bribes from them and other refugees in exchange for another precarious day
of not being deported. It is apparent that the current inefficiency in the
Home Affairs system plays into the hands of corrupt officials, who are
making significant sums of money from bribes. It is not in their interests
for the system to become efficient. The needs of Zimbabweans in exile are
those of refugees everywhere - they need recognition and acceptance, and
access to essential services. In addition, Zimbabweans need greater
understanding of why they have left their nation, particularly from South
African officials. The nature of Zimbabwe's struggle for democracy and of
the persecution of democratic forces in Zimbabwe needs to be discussed and
acknowledged, particularly among government officials and departments.
Zimbabweans need practical assistance. They need greater access to health
care, to ASPs, to education and skills training for their exiled youth.
Those who are very ill and those who are dead need to have this information
reliably conveyed to their relatives back home, through secure and
confidential channels. 10. Recommendations There have been several studies
of general refugee issues in South Africa in recent years. CASE has produced
two major reports, one in 2001 and one in 2003. Both of these reports were
accompanied by extensive recommendations that were very thorough and
consultative. There is little to be gained by yet again reframing the good
work that others have done in this regard. The National Refugee Baseline
Survey: Final Report, released a year ago in November 2003 made
recommendations to the South African Government, the National Departments of
Home Affairs, Health and Education; also to the UNHCR and Service Providers,
including NGOs and churches. Their recommendations are attached as Appendix
Five to this report. The Solidarity Peace Trust would reinforce certain of
the CASE recommendations, 2003, summarised here: To the Department of
Home Affairs: . They should investigate bribery within the department. .
They should issue ASPs that are valid for six months instead of one month .
ASPs should be more formal and should be laminated with anti forgery marks
to make their recognition by various service providers more likely. .
Such changes should be combined with a massive campaign to promote
recognition of the documents in government departments and with other
service providers. In addition the Trust recommends that: . There is a
need to promote greater awareness and debate in South Africa, including at
the level of service providers, of the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe, the
scale and type of human rights abuses that are taking place, and the
policies that are needed in South Africa to deal with the numbers of
Zimbabweans in their nation. Refugee reception offices . The
Department of Home Affairs should take action to issue greater numbers of
Zimbabweans and others with ASPs each week, as the backlog is causing real
hardship to many, among them victims of torture who are at real risk if they
are deported. . The Police need to be reminded of their legal obligation to
give 15 day permits to any person they pick up for deportation who states
that they want to apply for asylum, particularly bearing in mind the fact
that gaining an ASP can be so problematic. . Civil society should be
monitoring access to RROs on a systematic basis. Personnel should stand
incognito outside RROs and observe whether: o Home Affairs officials are
giving out helpful information to those waiting o Home Affairs officials are
illegally insisting on passports o There is brutality towards those
waiting o Bribery is taking place They should further note how many people
from which nations are being issued ASPs each day, and what proportion this
represents of those waiting each day. Health care . Further
investigations into how best to provide health care to Zimbabweans who may
not be accessing the public health services must be addressed. Some are not
accessing it because they do not have ASPs. If the above recommendations are
acted upon, then much of this problem will resolve itself. . Until
national service providers including the Ministry of Health consistently
recognise the rights of asylum seekers, refugees and their documentation, as
they are required to by local and international law, there is a need to
build a network of support via civil society to ensure that asylum seekers
and refugees, in particular those with torture related injuries, have safe
access to medical care. . Civil society should monitor access to medical
care, particularly at hospitals, and document instances of denial of the
right to services for further action. Denial of the right to food .
There is a need for a test case resolving the issue of whether denial of the
right to food on political grounds constitutes a "threat to physical
safety". Any civil society group that knows of Zimbabweans in South Africa
that have reported political abuse of food, should consider taking the issue
to Court. Deportations . The endless cycle of deportations should be
reconsidered: this is an expensive and not very effective policy. In
particular, urgently: o Very ill foreigners should not be detained for
deportation o Independent health professionals should do an assessment of
health conditions at Lindela and on the deportation trains, to facilitate
formation of a policy that will prevent communication of diseases, protect
the rights of the ill, and monitor deaths of deportees in state
custody. . The UNHCR should be playing a more active role to ensure that
minors, and political asylum seekers who may not have ASPs, are not being
deported. . There should be opportunity for deportees at Lindela to put on
record crimes against themselves including bribery by South African Police,
SANDF, and Home Affairs officials paid for both in cash and in sex. Civil
society would be in the best position to document such claims and lay
charges. Repatriation . There is a need to protect the rights of deportees
on the Zimbabwean side of the border. Among those currently deported, are
unaccompanied minors, victims of sexual exploitation, the very ill, and
those who have no resources to return to their homes in Zimbabwe and who end
up stranded. Also among those deported, may be political asylum seekers who
fled Zimbabwe in the first instance for reasons of persecution. . In view
of the fact that the Zimbabwe government is about to force through
Parliament an Act that will undermine activities of human rights NGOs and
churches, it is not obvious who is supposed to deal with this sensitive
issue, and protect the rights of these groups of deportees once they are
back in Zimbabwe. . If there was better screening of deportees on the
South African side, these problems would be reduced in the first
place. The dead . Zimbabweans are dying in South Africa and are ending up
as undocumented deaths in mass paupers' graves. This may create problems in
the future as relatives back in Zimbabwe do not know where their dead are
buried, and do not have death certificates. There is a need to facilitate
ways of keeping safe, confidential records of how to contact relatives back
in Zimbabwe, in the event of exiles becoming very ill or
dying.
ACRONYMS AI Amnesty International ANC African National
Congress ASP Asylum Seeker Permit CASE: Community Agency for Social
Enquiry CIO Central Intelligence Organisation (Zimbabwe) CPC Centre for
Positive Care GMB Grain Marketing Board Home Affairs Department of Home
Affairs ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights LHR Lawyers for Human Rights, Johannesburg MDC Movement for
Democratic Change MK MKhontu we sizwe NGO non governmental
organisation PHR-DK Physicians for Human Rights, Denmark RI Refugees
International RRO Refugee Reception Office SADC Southern African
Development Community SANDF South African National Defence Force UN United
Nations UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees WFP World Food
Programme SAWIMA Southern African Women in Migratory Affairs ZANU PF
Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front ZAPU Zimbabwe African
People's Union ZHRNGO Forum Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
Forum APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE: Case examples of Zimbabweans in
South Africa A few detailed case histories have been chosen for this section,
to illustrate different aspects of life in Zimbabwe and what drives people
to leave, and to illustrate the problems faced in South Africa by
Zimbabweans. One case is in the form of an affidavit, the others are based
on first hand interviews by the authors. Not all cases chosen are of
political refugees, to acknowledge the existence of economic migrants, and
the problems faced by them (cases 5 to 7). Apart from Gabriel Shumba, all
names have been changed to protect informants.
Case One:
"Thoko" Interviewee: Eighteen year old girl from Matabeleland South, who
was abducted and raped in a youth militia camp. She was a sixteen year old
school girl at the time of the incident she related. She had never been to
South Africa prior to January 2004. Comment from interviewer: Thoko
had been in South Africa for around a month at the time of the interview in
March 2004. She was in hiding in her aunt's house some distance from
Johannesburg, and was reported to be in a very bad emotional state. Her aunt
knew she had been raped, but she was not prepared to talk about it in the
family, and the aunt had asked for help. Thoko took around three hours to
relate her story, and for long periods of time, she cried uncontrollably and
could not talk. She had not talked about these events before, although they
had happened more than a year earlier. She presented as suicidally
depressed, and said repeatedly that she wished she was dead. She had a
suicide plan - she was thinking of hanging herself from a tree. She was
agoraphobic and could not leave the house without her aunt. She was afraid
of walking to the shops nearby in case she was picked up and deported. She
was afraid of travelling in public transport because she was afraid of men.
She was incapable of doing basic household chores. Thoko's story: Thoko,
together with two friends, was walking home from school in her rural
district in Matabeleland, during October 2002. There was an election planned
for around that time, and the area was overrun with youth militia and war
veterans, campaigning for ZANU PF. The girls had to pass near the camp set
up by the youth militia, and as they approached, the 3 of them were seized
by a group of 8 youth militia, who abducted them into the camp. The three
girls were taken to the tent shared by these 8 boys. They were stripped
naked, had their hands tied behind their backs, and were repeatedly raped.
All three were raped together, then one at a time so that the other girls
were forced to watch what happened to their friends. They were raped by one
militia at a time and were also gang raped. They were left naked and mostly
tied up for three days, and were repeatedly raped during this time. They had
no food and no water for three days. Their mouths were cracked and aching
from screaming. The girls were eventually released when their fathers came to
the camp and demanded to know if they were there. They were taken to
hospital and treated for their injuries. They were lacerated from the
repeated rapes and also bruised and sore from several days of being
manhandled and tied up. The police refused to investigate the rape cases,
saying they were "political". After leaving hospital, Thoko was terrified of
remaining in her home area because the youth militia camp was still there.
She immediately ran away. She went to the Midlands in Zimbabwe where she had
a girlfriend who was one of a group of female gold panners. Within two weeks
of her arrival there, she heard that her mother had died. Her mother had
been an invalid and Thoko had been very close to her. She heard that her
mother had died of a broken heart because of what had happened to Thoko. She
was too scared to go to her mother's funeral, because of the youth militia,
and still feels very bad about that, and somehow guilty that her rape caused
her mother to die. Thoko remained with the gold panners for a year, trying to
earn enough money to buy Rands to get to South Africa. She felt very unsafe
all of this time, and avoided men. She felt she would be unsafe as long as
she was in Zimbabwe, because youth militia were everywhere. When she had
enough money to leave, by early 2004, she went to Beitbridge with friends
who intended to cross the border. She was one of 73 who crossed the river
one night in January 2004. The river was very full, and she was terrified.
Crocodiles closed in on them and she said it was the worst experience of her
life. She cried a great deal talking about this night. Thoko and her
friends took a taxi to Johannesburg. She had her aunt's address, which is
near the main road between Pretoria and Johannesburg, so the taxi driver
took her straight there and her aunt took her in. On arrival, Thoko went
into emotional decline and became very depressed. Thoko's aunt is also a
political refugee, having been in MDC structures and having been harassed.
Her brother (Thoko's uncle) was beaten to death during the same election
period in which Thoko was raped. Neither the aunt nor Thoko has an ASP, to
date (October 2004). One of the other girls who was raped at the same time
as Thoko has since died. Thoko has had psychological support through the NGO
network in Johannesburg and her condition is much improved. However, if she
was ever deported back to Zimbabwe, there is a strong likelihood of her
becoming suicidally depressed again. She is convinced that if she went back,
the youth militia would seize her and rape her again.
Case Two:
"James" Interviewee: James is around 40 years old, an MDC middle ranking
official from Mashonaland Central. He is married with children and was
harassed by war veterans on several occasions ahead of the presidential
elections in March 2002. James is a car mechanic by profession and worked in
a garage prior to fleeing Zimbabwe. He had never been to South Africa prior
to 2001. Comment from interviewer: James was interviewed in Durban in
March 2004. He presented as somebody in a deep state of existential despair.
At one point during the interview, when he talked about missing his family,
he put his head down on his arms and cried for quite some time. He
apologised afterwards for having cried. On repeated occasions, he said "What
can I do? What must I do?" The questions were rhetorical. He feels entirely
trapped in his current life and sees no way out as long as things stay as
they are in Zimbabwe.
James' story: James was in the MDC structures in
a district in Mashonaland Central. This is a part of Zimbabwe that is very
strongly ZANU PF, and where there have been many farm invasions. He related
that things had been very tough in his area for MDC activists, with multiple
incidents of assaults, houses being burnt and even deaths. He decided
nonetheless to campaign for Morgan Tsvangirai ahead of the election in March
2002. Things became very rough in November 2001, and he was manhandled by war
veterans on several occasions, who threatened to kill him, harm his family
and burn his house. He felt the threats were very serious, as they had
indeed done those things to other MDC activists he knew. He heard via an
informer that they were coming to abduct him to a base on a particular
night, so he fled first to Harare to get a visa in his passport, which took
two days, and then to South Africa, in November 2001. At the time he
left, he thought he would be gone only a few months, because his expectation
was that Tsvangirai would win the election. However, he did not, and James
has therefore been in exile for almost three years, which was not what he
had thought would happen. At the time he left home, his wife was pregnant
with their third child: she gave birth to a little boy, who is now more than
two years old, and has never seen his father. James cried for a long time
when he said this. When he arrived in Johannesburg, James was completely
disoriented. He speaks Shona and not Ndebele, so was unable to understand
any of the South African languages. He lived as a vagrant on the streets,
sleeping on cardboard, competing with South African vagrants for space in
storm drains at night, being called a "makwerekwere". Eventually he
connected with a few Zimbabweans who agreed to help him get out of
Johannesburg to Kwazulu Natal, where it is easier to survive. He made his
way from Durban down the South Coast, and eventually a white farmer took him
onto his cane farm. He does occasional work for this man, for extortionist
wages, but is grateful to have a roof over his head. He barely earns enough
to survive, and not enough to send money home, which he feels very bad
about. Somebody told him about his right to seek asylum, so with the help of
a local NGO, in April 2004, he went to the Refugee Reception Office in
Durban. On presenting there for an ASP, he was asked if he had a passport.
When he presented his passport, the official said that as he had entered the
country prior to June 2002, he was not eligible for asylum. He was told that
his visa was long expired, he was illegally in the country and he should be
deported. He literally ran away from the office at hearing this, and has not
been back. James had heard the day before our interview that his brother
in Zimbabwe had died. It was his brother that owned the garage that James
had worked in, and he was very close to him. He was very upset both that his
brother was dead, and that he would not be able to go to his funeral. He had
no plans except to try to avoid deportation until there was political change
and he could go back to his wife and family.
Case Three: Affidavit of
Gabriel Shumba I, Gabriel Shumba, born on 10 November 1973: National Identity
Number: 12-046647F12, Passport number: ZE130844 and of Centre for Human
Rights, University of Pretoria, Pretoria 0002, South Africa, do hereby
solemnly swear as follows: 1. I am a citizen of Zimbabwe. I am also a
holder of a Master's Degree in Human Rights Law, and a Human Rights Lawyer,
duly sworn and practising as such in Zimbabwe. 2. Pursuant to the call of
my profession, on the 14th of January 2003 I consented to represent one Job
Sikhala, the opposition Member of Parliament for Saint Mary's. He had
engaged me to represent him in a matter in which he alleged political
harassment by members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP). At that moment
in time, Job Sikhala was hiding from the police. 3. My young brother, Bishop
Shumba accompanied me to the Saint Mary's Hotel where Mr Sikhala was booked.
I found Mr Sikhala in the company of one Taurai Magaya and Charles Mutama. I
then proceeded to take instructions and confer with Mr Sikhala. However, at
or about 23:00 hrs on the said day, riot police accompanied by plain-clothes
policemen and personnel who I later discovered were from the Central
Intelligence Organisation (CIO), the spy agency of the government, stormed
the room. 4. I identified myself as a lawyer and enquired as to the nature
and purpose of the police actions. Thereupon, one of the officers
confiscated my lawyers practising certificate and informed me that there was
no place for human rights lawyers in Zimbabwe. Others grabbed my diary as
well as files and documents. All of us were prodded with guns in the back
and bundled into a police defender vehicle. Several acts of assault and
violence were perpetrated upon my person. In particular, I was slapped
several times and kicked with booted-feet by amongst others, a certain
detective inspector Mbedzi, the officer in charge of Saint Mary's Police
Station. 5. Moments later, we were driven to Saint Mary's Police Station but
no charges were preferred. We were denied access to legal representation and
were abused and insulted for allegedly working cahoots with 'western powers'
in an attempt to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Our cell
phones were also confiscated, and we were denied contact with our lawyers,
relatives and friends.
6. Around 01:00 am, we were driven to Matapi
Police Station where Mr Sikhala and Bishop were booked into the holding
cells. I was taken to Mbare Police Holding Cells, whilst, as I subsequently
discovered, Mr Magaya and Mr Mutama were deposited at Harare Central Police
Station. 7. I was only booked into the cells at around 03:00 am. I was denied
blankets and had to sleep on a concrete floor. The cell that was about 3m X
4m housed over 20 inmates. I had to spend the whole night squatting in a
pool of urine and human waste. All night long, I had to endure the torment
of lice and bed-bugs bites. 8. My constant pleas for legal
representation, food and water were in vain. Around 12:00 pm on the next
day, personnel from the CID (law and order section) of the Harare Central
Police Station booked me out of Mbare. Again at this juncture, I had not
been informed of the nature of the charges preferred against me. The police
were under the charge-ship of one Detective Inspector Garnet Sikhova. I was
taken to a yellow mini-bus whose registration numbers I was not allowed to
see. 9. The mini-bus had no seats inside. It, however, had black curtains and
a black carpet lining the windows and the floor. In the extreme end of the
vehicle was a raised platform whereupon some of the Police Officers sat. I
was nonetheless ordered to sit on the floor facing the back of the vehicle.
A black hood was then slipped over my head. It was made of nylon and did not
have any breathing-holes in it. In a short while I became claustrophobic,
sweated heavily and had difficulties breathing. My requests that part of the
hood be pulled slightly over my nose to allow me to breathe were rudely
denied. Instead I was asked to use "the mouth that you use to defend the MDC
to breathe". 10. After what appeared like an hour's drive, the vehicle
pulled over and my hands were handcuffed behind my back. I was bundled out
of the car to find myself in a tunnel of some sorts, judging by the echoes
that our foot-steps made. I was advised that I was now a blind man and had
to act as such. After several twists and turns, in what appeared a labyrinth
of some sort, we descended to about 3 floors of stairs underground. 11.
Off to the right, I could hear the sounds of horrible screaming. I was
thrown against the wall and the hood was then removed. I was stripped
utterly naked, then had my hands and feet handcuffed and bound so that I was
in a foetal position. A plank was thrust in-between my legs and my
hands. 12. The room was lined with planks and the light was dim. In a corner
to my right side there was a pool of what my tormentors told me was acid,
into which I could be dissolved without a trace. In the middle were a small
table and a chair. About 15 or so interrogators stood over me and some of
them began assaulting me with booted-feet and clenched hands all over the
body. I was then given the option of either "telling the truth or dying a
slow and painful death". 13. Several questions were asked about my
background as a student activist, my allegiance to the MDC, the political
affiliation of judges, my scholarship to pursue the Master's Degree in South
Africa, my alleged involvement in the burning of a government bus, my
political ambitions, as well as the arms caches that the MDC was alleged to
have had. 14. Running concurrently with the other assaults and ongoing
interrogation, various electrical shocks were introduced onto my body. A
black contraption resembling a telephone was placed on the small table. It
had several electric cables emanating from it. One cable was tied to the
middle toe of my right foot, whilst another was tied to the second toe of
the left foot. Another copper wire was wrapped tightly around my genitals.
Yet another one was put into my mouth. Still in the foetal position, I was
ordered to hold a metallic receiver in my bound right hand and I then forced
to place this next to my right ear. A blast of electric shocks was then
administered to my body for about eight (8) hours. 15. On several
occasions, I lost consciousness only to be revived to face the same ordeal.
A chemical substance was applied to my body. I also lost control of my
bladder, vomited blood and was forced to drink my urine and lick my vomit.
Whilst the interrogation was in process, several photographs were taken of
me cringing and writhing in pain and in nakedness. 16. At the end of this
ordeal, and around 19:00 pm, I was unbound and then forced to write several
documents under my torturers' dictation. In the documents, I incriminated
myself as well as senior MDC personnel in several subversive activities.
Under pain of death I was also forced to agree to work for the Central
Intelligence Organisation. In addition, I was compelled to swear allegiance
to President Robert Mugabe, as well as to promise that I would not disclose
my ordeal, either to the independent press or the courts. 17. Around 19:30
pm, I was blindfolded and taken to Harare Central Police Station, where I
was booked into a horrendously inhumane holding cell. On the third day of my
arrest, my lawyers, who had at that point obtained a High Court injunction
ordering my release to court were allowed access to me. I had not had food
nor water throughout the period of my detention. I had also not been
formally notified of the nature of the charge against me. Subsequently,
however, I was charged under Section 5 of the Public Order and Security Act,
which deals with organising, planning or conspiring to overthrow the
government through unconstitutional means. These charges were dismissed in a
court of law. 18. At present, I have fled the country in fear for my life,
having been threatened with death by some of those who tortured me. In spite
of psychiatric and other medical treatment, I however continue to experience
physical pain, nightmares, as well suffer depression. I am told and verily
believe that what the State of Zimbabwe did to me, not only contravenes
international law, but also offends against its obligations thereunder. In
particular, I believe that torture constitutes a crime against humanity and
as such, the authorities in Zimbabwe, under the leadership of President
Robert Mugabe, should be held accountable. 19. It is my sincere belief
that my torture and ill treatment was authorised and condoned at the highest
level of the Zimbabwe state. It is inconceivable that President Mugabe is
unaware that his police, army and intelligence officials are using torture.
The President has been aware that torture is being used against human rights
activists and those suspected to be linked to the MDC, as is exemplified by
the case of Mark Chavhunduka and Ray Choto. Nevertheless, he is taking no
discernible steps to either condemn or stop the use of torture. 20. I
lodged a report of what transpired with the police, but up to now no action
has been taken. I have also instructed my lawyer institute civil
proceedings, but am not hopeful as I the judicial system has been largely
subverted by the executive. Furthermore, the police are notorious for
defying court orders. 21. I make the above believing same to be true to
the best of my recollection. Wherefore, I pray: A) that the Government
of Zimbabwe be ordered to respect and abide by its international
obligations; B) that the Government of Zimbabwe be ordered to pay damages
occasioned as a result of the arrest and torture and C) that individuals
responsible, including President Robert Mugabe, in his official capacity,
the Minister of Home Affairs, Kembo Mohadi, the Minster of State Security,
Nicholas Goche and the Commissioner of Police, Augustine Chihuri , be
brought to account for torture and other crimes against humanity. Signed
on this .....day of September 2003. ...................... Gabriel
Shumba Before Me................ Commissioner of Oaths
Case Four:
"Kenneth" Interviewee: Male, aged 47, father of four. MDC official in
rural district in Matabeleland South (confirmed). He had never been to South
Africa prior to 2003. He was interviewed in October 2003, in
Johannesburg. Kenneth was forced to leave Zimbabwe as a result of political
persecution. He was hunted by war veterans on several occasions, who
ransacked his home and were looking for him to kill him. They came to his
home on four occasions and on each occasion he managed to run away before he
was abducted. His wife was sacked from her job as a civil servant because of
his links to the opposition, and his four children were deprived of access
to donor food for political reasons (confirmed independently back in
Zimbabwe). In February 2003, Kenneth ran away to South Africa. He walked
across the border on his own and followed the railway line by walking
alongside it at night. It took him 10 days to reach Polokwane. There, he was
arrested and kept in a cell with 15 others, as an illegal immigrant. He was
deported back to Zimbabwe after 7 days. In terms of South African law, this
deportation was illegal, as this man clearly has the right to claim
asylum. The very same day that he arrived back in Beitbridge, Kenneth crossed
the border again and walked again towards Johannesburg. This time he walked
for 21 days until he reached Johannesburg, on 4th April 2003. There he met a
South African on the streets who warned him that he would be deported and
who took pity on him and took him home. This kind man looked after him from
then until the present. He was too afraid to leave the man's home for fear
of deportation. Eventually, the South African gave him the R350 needed to
buy asylum seeker papers, some time in August. He went to the Home Affairs
queue in Braamfontein and bribed somebody to get him the papers. However,
when he returned every week after this asking for the papers, he kept being
told to come back the next week. After six weeks of this, he grabbed the
tout and threatened to beat him up, after which he did receive the asylum
seeker papers. He is very relieved because now he can look for work,
although he has to return every few weeks to the queue to get a renewal
stamp for his paper, which will restrict his work options. He is very
concerned about his family back home, and the need to send them money. His
children at home have all been out of school this year as there is no money
for fees.
Three "economic" migrants Case Five:
"Susan" Interviewee: Susan is a 16 year old schoolgirl, from Bulawayo, who
ran away to South Africa in August 2003. Her mother could no longer pay her
school fees. She was interviewed in October 2003. Susan was taken across
the border by a tout who transported 8 of them that night, 4 of them girls,
from Musina to Johannesburg. They travelled by taxi, and when they arrived
in Johannesburg, the four girls were held hostage in the taxi driver's
apartment for 9 days. He had sex with them whenever he chose for this period
of time. He then left to collect another consignment of Zimbabweans, and
they ran away. According to the neighbours of this man, this is his regular
routine - he brings new girls back to his apartment every fortnight or so.
This young girl appears to be surviving now by prostitution although she did
not say so.
Case Six: "Rachel" Interviewee: Rachel is a 19 year-old
girl from Bulawayo who left because "things were impossible at home". She
was interviewed in Johannesburg in October 2003. Rachel crossed the border in
January this year by taxi. When she first arrived, she was living with her
older sister who supported her financially. Then her sister was arrested for
shop lifting and sentenced to a year in jail. The sister is still in jail,
near Sun City. When this happened, Rachel was thrown out of her sister's
apartment by the others sharing it, because she could not pay a share of the
rent. After having no place at all for a few days, she was taken in by a
South African man. This is not a love relationship, but he expects her to
provide sex on demand. He rapes her daily -or beats her and then rapes her,
if she tries to resist or say no. She cannot leave him because she has no
legal status or papers and nowhere to go. This man brings other women home
almost daily and buys them food, but not her. She makes around R150 a month
doing washing for the neighbours, and this is what she uses to buy food for
herself. If she could get out of the situation, she would, but as far as she
can see, she has no options. She is small and thin and very
depressed.
Case Seven: "Mavis" Interviewee: Mavis is a 21 year old
Zimbabwean now working as a sex worker in Musina. Mavis comes from Kwekwe
and is the single mother of a 3 year old. In July 2003 she left Zimbabwe to
look for work in South Africa. She has no passport, and crossed the Limpopo
river in the company of ten other border jumpers in the middle of the
night. After crossing the river, they came across RSA soldiers who beat them
up and handed them to Chumutumbu police station. They were locked up in a
fenced cage. She and some others climbed out of the cage during the night.
They continued their journey further south, about a 100 km away, looked for
jobs but could not find any. She therefore returned to Musina to look for a
job there, but could not get one there either. The hardships of life made
her go into commercial sex work. She earns less than R 1,000 a month and has
never sent money home because her income is not enough for her. South
African sex workers threaten to report her to the police and get her
deported if they think she is taking their clients. Soldiers and to a lesser
extent police officers demand sex from foreigners like her in return for not
deporting them. She has on several occasions had to have sex with soldiers
in order not to be deported.
APPENDIX TWO Botswana and the
Zimbabweans Xenophobia Botswana has a relatively small population, of
around 1,7 million, and this has allegedly been swelled by an estimated
200,000 illegal Zimbabweans. This is a dramatic influx for any nation to
absorb; one-in-ten persons in Botswana are now illegal Zimbabwean
immigrants, if estimates are correct. It is hardly surprising that this is
resented by the Batswana. There is a general perception in Botswana that
Zimbabweans are increasing prostitution and fraud, and "have become a public
nuisance for loitering scavenging, begging and sleeping in public places."
Throughout 2004, Zimbabwean media have made running attacks on the Botswana
government, accusing it of xenophobia and cruel treatment of Zimbabweans. An
electric fence that was recently erected, allegedly as a livestock control
mechanism by the Botswana government has also been attacked as an attempt to
"electrocute Zimbabweans". The Botswana government has officially been at
pains to try to deal with the Zimbabwean issue, and has no official
anti-Zimbabwean policy. They have issued formal statements saying
Zimbabweans are welcome in Botswana and reminding the Zimbabwe government
that around ten thousand Zimbabweans have work permits or exemption
certificates in Botswana, showing that there is no official prejudice. At
the same time, they exercise their right to deport thousands of illegal
immigrants a month, mostly cross border traders from nearby
Bulawayo. Botswana and Zimbabwean crime In April 2004, the Botswana
authorities released figures linked to Zimbabweans and crime in their
country; this statement said: "There is a clear correlation between the
increase of crime in Botswana with the presence of illegal immigrants, most
of whom are from Zimbabwe." The same statement says that during 2002, the
number of crimes involving Zimbabweans was 26,214. It further states that as
at March 25th 2004, there were 681 Zimbabweans held in Botswana
prisons. There has been outrage expressed by the Zimbabwean government about
the fact that Zimbabweans arrested for crimes are being subjected to
flogging in Botswana jails. However, the Botswana government has justified
this as a normal part of the Botswana process of punishment; convicted
persons can opt for strokes with a cane as an option to jail or a fine.
Authorities there have commented that Zimbabweans opt for strokes rather
than pay a fine.
APPENDIX THREE: Surveys The two survey forms used
for giving the authors background to the report are attached in this
appendix. They do not provide a big enough statistical sample to present
formal findings, and they have therefore not been formally analysed. This
survey provided extra background and insight for the authors, by giving us
access to the opinions of larger numbers of Zimbabweans than we could
otherwise have consulted. However, the sample, especially the second one,
remains more qualitative than quantitative. Survey of Zimbabweans in
Johannesburg The first survey, in the form of one double sided sheet, was
filled in by 100 Zimbabweans outside the Refugee Reception Office in
Johannesburg. All applicants filled it in on the same morning in October
2003. 100 people represented around 20% of would-be asylum seekers there on
that morning. Interviewees filled it in themselves, rather than being
asked the questions by interviewers, for reasons of time. They could ask
questions for intentions of clarification of how to fill in the form if they
wished. The responses to the questionnaire gave us some idea of how would-be
asylum seekers might present a case to the RRO. There is no way of
independently verifying claims as interviewees were anonymous. Responses
also gave some indication of geographical spread in terms of where people
originated from in Zimbabwe, and how they rated priorities and difficulties
of life in South Africa. Health questionnaire In August 2004, two
trained counsellors, who are fully conversant with Zimbabwean events over
the last five years, and who can speak both of Zimbabwe's vernacular
languages, spent 8 working days interviewing 111 Zimbabweans individually in
Johannesburg. Each interview took approximately one hour. Interviewers
filled in the questionnaires based on responses from
interviewees. Interviewees were sourced through two different refugee
support NGOs in Braamfontein, namely Southern African Women in Migratory
Affairs (SAWIMA) and Zimbabwe Political Victims Association (ZIMPOVA). Their
understanding was that we were trying to find out more about the problems
faced in South Africa by Zimbabweans, for purposes of the current report. It
was made clear that there would be no material benefit to those interviewed,
either at the time of the interview, or in the future. We were offering only
the opportunity for Zimbabweans to talk to somebody. Before conducting
these interviews, it was agreed that if in the course of interviewing, the
interviewers felt that any person needed specific follow up such as
counselling or medical attention, referrals to NGOs or private practitioners
would be organised. The focus of this questionnaire was once more on why
people were in South Africa, their living conditions, their access to basic
services, in particular health. Whether they had ASPs or not and if not, why
not, was a further focus. The section of the 5-page questionnaire relevant
to health issues is reproduced here, as this is the section referred to in
the body of this report.
SURVEY OF ZIMBABWEANS IN
JOHANNESBURG This survey is to try and find out why you want refugee status
in South Africa. We guarantee that the information given here will be kept
anonymous to protect you, and is for research purposes only. This form will
not be given to any official. YOU NEED NOT TELL US YOUR NAME. AGE:
........... MALE / FEMALE (circle one) In Zimbabwe, what district or town do
you think of as home? ............... Which year and month did you most
recently arrive in South Africa? ......... Have you travelled to South Africa
before this time? YES/NO If yes, how many times in the last 5 years?
....... How did you arrive in South Africa? Tick one of the
following. Through Beitbridge border post in a car or taxi / on foot (circle
type of transport) I crossed the river and walked over the border at
Beitbridge Through Plumtree border post in a car or taxi / on foot (circle
type of transport) I crossed the border not at the border post into
Botswana Did you have work or a source of income in Zimbabwe before you left?
YES/ NO If YES, choose one of the following by circling it Rural farmer
(name district)............ Teacher Nurse Other civil servant (say type of
job).......... Job in industry: what type .......................... Job
in commercial farming sector: what type.................. Self employed as
vendor: what type ..................... Other type of work
............................ Why did you leave Zimbabwe? 1. You cannot
make enough money to survive in Zimbabwe YES / NO 2. You were politically
persecuted in Zimbabwe YES/NO 3. You believed your career prospects were
better in South Africa YES/ NO 4. You did not want to train as a youth
militia YES / NO 5. You want to study in South Africa YES / NO 6. You have
relatives in South Africa YES / NO 7. You want to travel overseas from South
Africa YES / NO 8. Other reason: describe........................ Which of
the above reasons is the most important reason: choose a number from 1 to 8
.. If politically persecuted: what political party do you support in
Zimbabwe?........ Did you hold office in that party? YES / NO if yes, say
what.............. Did your persecution include any of the following: put
year, month and day if you can remember. You were beaten or tortured YES
/NO on what date/s .......... If more than once, give all dates:
.................... You lost property YES / NO on what
date/s....... .................................. You /your family were
seriously threatened YES / NO On what
date/s............................. Describe in a few sentences the worst
thing that happened to you, giving place and the people responsible (eg MDC,
war veterans, youth militia, CIO
etc)............. ..................................... ....................................... ...................................... ....................................... Do
you currently have health problems? YES / NO if yes,
describe......... ..................................... ..................................... Is
your health problem linked to your experiences in Zimbabwe? YES/ NO Do you
have nightmares or trouble sleeping? YES / NO Are you afraid when you walk on
the streets? YES / NO What are your biggest fears? Choose three and rank them
1 to 3 being deported having no money getting ill The South African police
having no place to stay the CIO in JHB What is most important to you now?
Choose three and rank them 1 to 3. A safe place to stay Work, or a way of
earning money Access to health care (medical support) Some one to talk to
about your problems (psychological support) Access to education Other:
.................................
HEALTH QUESTIONNAIRE 1. Do you have
health problems? Name
them. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2.
If you feel sick, what do you
do? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.
Where do you go for health care? Name the
place/s ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 4.
Do you attend now? Yes/no 5. Do you pay? Yes/no How much (per visit?)
R------ 6. Do the Staff at the clinic/health center ask you
for? 1.Documents Yes/No 2.Proof of Status Yes/No 3.Others (state)
------------------ 4. Bribes Yes/No
7. Have you been refused treatment
from any health center? Yes/no Name the place/s ---------------------------
By whom? (Name if possible) --------- ------------------ 8. Have you been
threatened by clinic staff? Yes/no Have you been insulted by clinic staff?
Yes/no Brief
statement --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9.
Do you have your own (South African) medical records? Yes/no 10. Do you have
your own (Zimbabwean) medical records? Yes/no 11. Where do you get your
medicines? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Are
you given free? Yes/no Do you pay one amount for all? Yes/no How much?
R------ For each item Yes/no Do you have to buy your own medicines at a
private chemist/pharmacy? Yes/no Are you told which one? Yes/no Name the
chemist/pharmacy --------------------------- Women and children 12. How
many children are with you? --------------------------- Ages and sex
--------------------------- --------------------------- --------------------------- 13.
Are they immunized? Yes/no Fully Yes/no 14. Do you know where to go for
baby clinic? Yes/no Name of baby clinic ------------------
15. Are
you pregnant? Yes/no How many months ------------------ 16. Are you
getting antenatal care? Yes/no Name of clinic ------------------ If no,
why not? --------- ------------------ 17. Do you need Family Planning?
Yes/no 18. If yes, do you know where to go? Yes/no Name of clinic
------------------ 19. Have you had problems with getting help with women and
children's health care? Yes/no Comment by
interviewer --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX
FOUR
Recommendations: CASE National Refugee Baseline Survey: Final
Report, November 2003. The recommendations emanate from the findings of the
study and are grouped by relevant entities to facilitate possible future
interventions. South African Government . The South African government
should recognise the valuable contribution that the majority of asylum
seekers and refugees can make to the South African economy and refrain
from assuming that refugees are unskilled people or people who come to
South Africa in search of better work opportunities. Government officials
should publicly debunk some of the myths about asylum seekers and
refugees and speak positively about the contribution that asylum seekers
and refugees can make to the country. . The South African government must
recognise its international law and constitutional obligations towards
asylum seekers and refugees in the country and make efforts to facilitate
the provision of basic services such as health, education and
documentation to asylum seekers and refugees currently in South Africa.
The government should recognise that while the UNHCR and civil society
organisations currently assist asylum seekers and refugees with emergency
assistance, it is the South African government that bears ultimate
responsibility for the welfare of asylum seekers and refugees residing in
South Africa. National Department of Home Affairs . The Department of Home
Affairs needs to recognise the problems of shortage of staff within its
RROs and make active attempts to train and appoint more staff to its
RROs. It should recognise that the issuing of appointment letters and of
asylum permits that are valid for longer than the period prescribed in
the regulations to the Refugees Act to finalise an asylum claim, besides
being unlawful, will not resolve the current problem with the backlog of
cases. . The Department of Home Affairs must also, in the spirit of Batho
Pele ("Putting People First"), make a firm commitment to investigate and
take action on the problems of bribery encountered at its RROs. . With
regard to the issuing of documentation, the Department of Home Affairs
should consider issuing asylum permits for a period of six months. Extending
the validity of the asylum permits could lead to a reduction in the
workload of the understaffed RROs. If the permits expire without the
Department having made a decision on applications, asylum seekers should be
issued with shorter permits thereafter. . In addition to extending the
validity of the asylum permits, the Department should formalise these
forms of identification, by laminating them and putting
anti-forgery marks, so that they can be more easily accepted by different
entities. The permits' current form as multiply-folded pieces of paper
with a number of stamps does not facilitate asylum seekers' and refugees'
access to a number of basic social and financial services as these
documents are often perceived to be fake. . Upon determination of refugee
status, the Department of Home Affairs must immediately issue all recognised
refugees with formal maroon identity documents. The lack of formal ID
documents that are issued to refugees serves as an added barrier towards
further negotiation on issues such as access to government grants,
bank accounts and employment. . Upon formalisation of the different
forms of documentation (for asylum seekers and refugees), the Department,
in conjunction with UNHCR and entities such as the Roll Back Xenophobia
campaign, Lawyers for Human Rights, NCRA and Wits Law Clinic must engage in a
massive awareness campaign with government officials within
key departments such as Health, Education, Labour and Social Development
to make officials and administrative personnel working under these
departments aware of what the different forms of identification issued to
asylum seekers and refugees look like. . The Department, with the
assistance of the UNHCR, must engage in an awareness campaign with the
Banking Council and individual banks, as well as employers to inform them
that asylum seekers and refugees have the legal right to work while
they are in the country and that their permits are valid forms of
documentation. These entities must be shown prototypes of the documents
issued by the Department of Home Affairs in order to facilitate their
familiarisation with these documents. National Department of Health .
Issue a circular or communiqué to all health officials, health professionals
and administrative personnel, at both primary health care and hospital level,
that explicitly indicates the difference between asylum seekers and
refugees and the right of both to have access to health care in emergency
situations, based on national legislation and international
conventions. . Issue a circular or communiqué to all health officials, health
professionals and administrative personnel at hospital level that makes
explicit the fact that asylum seekers and refugees are protected by the
Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution and therefore are not
required to pay to receive emergency assistance. . Issue a circular or
communiqué to all health officials, health professionals
and administrative personnel at hospital level, which seeks to make them
aware of the different types of identification issued to asylum seekers
and refugees, including the new maroon and silver identity documents for
recognised refugees to ensure that asylum seekers and refugees are not
turned away on the basis of improper documentation. The Department should
liaise with the Department of Home Affairs to obtain the above-mentioned
prototypes. . Institute a monitoring system to assess the practices and
attitudes of health personnel at hospital facilities towards clients,
including asylum seekers and refugees. National Department of
Education . Undertake an information campaign amongst education officials,
principals, teachers and administrative personnel to make them aware of
the right of asylum seeker and refugee children to access education. The
Gauteng Department of Education has already taken the lead by organising
a workshop on education of asylum seekers and refugees where principals
and district officials, amongst others, were informed about asylum
seekers and refugees, their rights, as well as special language and
counselling needs that they might have. Provincial departments in the
Western Cape and Kwa- Zulu Natal should follow on this initiative. .
Issue a circular or communiqué to all education officials, principals and
administrative personnel at school level, which seeks to make them aware of
the different types of identification issued to asylum seekers and refugees,
including the new maroon and silver identity documents for recognised
refugees to ensure that asylum seeker and refugee children are not turned
away from schools on the basis of improper documentation. The Department
should liase with the Department of Home Affairs to obtain the
above-mentioned prototypes. UNHCR . Since the majority of asylum
seekers lack information about where to stay upon arrival but rely
instead on refugee 'friends' and people who they do not know to
assist them, referral information on shelter/housing and food assistance
needs to be more readily available to asylum seekers upon arrival. The
UNHCR, in partnership with all its implementing partners, JICA and NCRA,
should produce A3 laminated posters, in English, French and Portuguese,
that outline the different service providers, as well as shelters, in
each of the cities of study, with their contact details, that can be posted
at the RROs. This will serve to inform newcomers as they go to the RROs about
where they can go for assistance in a comprehensive way, as well as
understand the limitations and criteria for provision of assistance. .
UNHCR, jointly with its implementing partners, the NCRA, JICA and the Roll
Back Xenophobia Campaign, should undertake awareness campaigns with
asylum seekers and refugees, as well as refugee organisations to
encourage asylum seekers and refugees to lodge complaints against
incidents of bribery and corruption or to seek assistance from legal
NGOs, such as Lawyers for Human Rights, UCT Legal Aid Clinic and Wits Law
Clinic, on how to engage in this process. Asylum seekers and refugees are
likely to feel quite vulnerable or afraid that their names will be
made known to the Department in this process and therefore are likely to
require support from legal NGOs to engage in this process. . Taking
into account that documentation has been identified by applicants as a
key element not only to access employment and ensure survival, but also to
access basic social and financial services, the UNHCR should strengthen
its focus on working closely with the Department of Home Affairs on the
formalisation of identity documents to asylum seekers and refugees, as well
as on their being issued in a timely fashion. . The UNHCR, jointly
with JICA and the Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign, should undertake awareness
campaigns that allow South Africans, and asylum seekers and refugees to
exchange views and experiences about one another since stereotypes
are being reproduced about each other from both sides. These campaigns should
take the form of community meetings, road shows, and discussions at
schools, as well as at government level. . The UNHCR, jointly with its
implementing partners, JICA and the South African Human Rights Commission
should produce information sheets and conduct awareness and education
campaigns with asylum seekers and refugees, as well as their representative
organisations to inform them of their rights to have access to
public health and education services, of their responsibility to inform the
South African Human Rights Commission of any infringements of their
rights, and of any other institutions that they should approach to lodge
such complaints. This information should preferably be conveyed soon
after asylum seekers arrive in the country and should be communicated by
all implementing service providers, regardless of whether they focus
directly on access to services such as education and healthcare. In
addition, the UNHCR should make use of the survival guide compiled by Lawyers
for Human Rights to convey this information. . Simultaneously, the
UNHCR should work closely with JICA, the Roll Back Xenophobia Campaign, the
NCRA and the SAHRC to conduct awareness and education campaigns with
national, provincial and local government officials in the Departments of
Health and Education on the distinction between asylum seekers
and refugees, as well as their respective rights to have access to health and
education services. . Considering that education for asylum seekers
and refugees was raised as a main priority by asylum seekers and refugees
in our survey, the UNHCR should explore, together with the National
Department of Education and partners such as JICA, the possibility of
instituting a system of bursaries for tertiary level education for
asylum seekers and refugees. Service Providers . Keeping in mind the
influence of language on employment, and the fact that female applicants
are more likely than male applicants to be unemployed, applicants,
but particularly female applicants, should be given the opportunity to learn
English. Fluency in English could also have the added benefit of
enhancing applicants' ability to communicate with school and health
authorities. . Service providers in each of the cities of study should
conduct information campaigns, possibly in the form of public meetings,
to inform asylum seekers and refugees about the services that they
provide and the criteria that they use to extend that assistance. These
information campaigns could also serve to communicate to asylum seekers
and refugees that their main priority is to enable the extension of services
currently provided by the South African government to include asylum
seekers and refugees, while material assistance is meant to assist in
emergency situations. Service providers within each of the cities of study
should strengthen their coordination of assistance provision in order to
limit the duplication of services and enable a larger number of asylum
seekers and refugees to be assisted. . Legal service providers, together with
the assistance of JICA and NCRA, should compile a pamphlet for asylum
seekers and refugees that includes the main laws that protect employees
in the workplace, avenues and procedures for settling disputes, as well
as entities that can be contacted if problems with employers arise. .
Similarly, legal service providers, together with the assistance of JICA and
NCRA should compile a pamphlet for asylum seekers and refugees that includes
people's rights and obligations as tenants, as well as existing avenues
for dealing with landlord problems, such as the Housing Tribunal. .
Applicants' high level of participation in religious organisations within
their communities should be taken into account in undertaking awareness
campaigns. Working closely with religious organisations might allow service
providers to reach a large number of asylum seekers and refugees within a
setting that they feel safe and comfortable with. . While issues of
integration and community involvement were not analysed in detail in this
report, the findings point to the need to conduct more in-depth research to
be able to understand why applicants do not generally participate in
community organisations, as well as how the negative perceptions are
created and sustained despite the level of contact that exists between
asylum seekers and refugees and local South Africans. Asylum Seekers and
Refugees . As information is disseminated to asylum seekers and refugees,
asylum seekers and refugees also have a responsibility to be informed of
their rights, as contained in the South African Constitution, the
Refugees Act of 1998, as well as specific pieces of legislation that
govern specific aspects, such as health and education. In this
regard, asylum seeker and refugee parents should attempt to play an active
role in their children's education, by participating in school governing
bodies and communicating with principals if problems
arise.
APPENDIX FIVE Bibliography
Amnesty International: AI
has produced regular statements and Urgent Actions, expressing their deep
concern about the continued abuse of human rights in Zimbabwe, and the
repression of human rights activists and civil society. Their most recent
major report is: Zimbabwe: power and hunger - violations of the right to
food, October 2004. www.web.amnesty.org/library/eng-zwe/index. Community
Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE): National Refugee Baseline Survey: Final
Report, November 2003, researched for Japan International Cooperation
Agency, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Realising Rights: the
development of health and welfare policies for asylum seekers and refugees
in South Africa, researched for the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, May 2001. Reports available on: www.case.org.za Human Rights Watch:
Briefing paper on Zimbabwe, 12 August 2004 www.hrw.org/doc?t=africa&c=zimbab. International
Crisis Group: Zimbabwe: In search of a new strategy. 19 April 2004, Harare
and Brussels. www.icg.org/home/index.cfm International
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Survivors (IRCT): this is an independent,
international health professional organization, which promotes and supports
the rehabilitation of torture victims and works for the prevention of
torture worldwide. They have produced their objective findings in two
reports, in May 2000 and in June 2001. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
New York, Independent lawyers and judges targeted in Zimbabwe, statement 22
August 2002. Legal Resources Foundation, The Catholic Commission for Justice
and Peace in Zimbabwe, Breaking the Silence, Building True Peace: A Report
on the Disturbances in Matabeleland and the Midlands 1980 to 1988; Harare,
Zimbabwe, February 1997, reprinted October 2001. Physicians for Human
Rights, Denmark. The Presidential Election: 44 days to go, January 2002,
Johannesburg; We'll Make Them Run, May 2002, Copenhagen; Vote Zanu-PF or
Starve, November 2002, Johannesburg. All reports available on www.solidaritypeacetrust.org.za Refugees
International, Zimbabweans in South Africa: denied access to political
asylum, 14 July 2004; South Africa: UNHCR inattention places Zimbabweans in
jeopardy, 11 August 2004 www.refugeesinternational.org Rehabilitation
and Research Centre for Torture Victims: an independent international
organization based in Denmark, with 17 years' experience in treatment of
torture survivors. In February 2001, they released a report on election
violence linked to a by-election in Zimbabwe in January 2001. Solidarity
Peace Trust, National youth service training - 'shaping youths in a truly
Zimbabwean manner:' An overview of youth militia training and activities in
Zimbabwe, October 2000 - August 2003, September 5, 2003. Disturbing the
Peace, July 2004. Reports available on: www.solidaritypeacetrust.org.za Zimbabwe
Elections Support Network, 2000 Parliamentary Report: Rural District Council
September 2002 Report on Local Authority Elections. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
Forum, Who is responsible? A preliminary analysis of pre-election violence
in Zimbabwe, July, 2001. Are They Accountable? An analysis of violence linked
to the Presidential election in Zimbabwe, July 2002. Monthly political
violence summaries, available on website: www.hrforumzim.com Zimbabwe Institute,
Playing with Fire, June 2004. www.solidaritypeacetrust.org.za
On Monday 15 November at about 4 p.m. a mother with two young
children in her car was returning to her home at Borrowdale. As she
approached the entrance to State House a motor cyclist from the presidential
motorcade, which was travelling from Borrowdale to State house turned right
in front of her and signalled her to stop. She did so immediately and so did
the traffic in the left hand lane and the vehicle behind her. Without
warning a soldier in a yellow beret appeared at her window and started
berating her for not having stopped sooner and for being too close to the
motorcade. He accused her of "playing games" and then punched her twice in
the face drawing substantial amounts of blood from her nose. "The next time I
will shoot you" he shouted before moving away. A police officer from one of
the vehicles in the Presidential motorcade then got out of his car and
announced that the lady was under arrest and was to proceed to Harare Central
police station whilst he would follow in the police car. By this time the
lady was considerably upset and the children were hysterical. En route to the
police station the little girl managed to telephone her father who drove to
the police station to meet the family. They were told by the arresting
officer that they were to pay a fine of $100 000. The father demanded that a
charge first be laid. There followed a period of consultation and reference
to various documents in an endeavour to find a crime befitting a $100 000
fine. Eventually the woman was fined $25000 for not pulling over far enough
to the left, an action which was quite impossible since there
was traffic in the left lane. When the father stated that he wished to lay
a charge against the soldier he was told not to waste his time on what the
policeman termed a regrettable incident.
Three weeks ago at exactly
the same place in identical circumstances the writer suffered a similar
experience. On this occasion the soldier merely beat on the car but the motor
cyclist stabbed his gloved forefinger on my forehead and threatened me.
People are warned about this unpleasant situation outside state house and
urged to exercise extreme caution.
Antony Barnett and Martin
Bright Sunday November 21, 2004 The Observer
The government
investigated the possibility that British firms were involved in a plot to
overthrow the president of Equatorial Guinea several weeks before last
March's attempted putsch. Foreign Office officials and diplomats in the
region took the coup threat so seriously that they rewrote contingency plans
to evacuate British nationals from the oil-rich central African state.
However, the government failed to alert its Equatorial Guinean counterpart
of the threat.
Last August, the Foreign Office issued a 'categorical'
denial that it had any prior knowledge of the coup, but has now confirmed
that officials received information at the end of January about the threat
as a result of 'confidential diplomatic exchanges'.
The admissions by
Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, revealed in a parliamentary answer, will
raise questions about why the Foreign Office did not act to avert the coup,
as is its duty under international law.
On 7 March, a group of
mercenaries allegedly linked to Sir Mark Thatcher, the son of the former
Prime Minister, was arrested in Zimbabwe on charges of plan ning a coup
against President Teodoro Obiang.
At the time, Zimbabwe's President
Robert Mugabe accused Britain, the US and Spain of being behind the coup in
an attempt to gain control of the country's oil interests.
Last week,
The Observer revealed that Straw had been informed of the alleged coup in
late January. Now it has emerged that not only did the government know about
the plot, but that it also took steps to establish whether British firms and
nationals were involved. Straw has refused to reveal who provided the
information and what that infor mation was. He said: 'We do not provide
details of confidential diplomatic exchanges.'
Sources claim the South
African intelligence service had detailed information on those behind the
coup that intended to replace Obiang with Severo Moto. This is alleged to
include information on one of the ringleaders, Simon Mann, an Old Etonian
and former SAS officer. In a written parliamentary answer to shadow Foreign
Secretary Michael Ancram, Straw said the Foreign Office was aware of reports
circulating in the Spanish media in January.
'At the same time,
similar alle gations were contained in confidential information received by
the government,' he added. 'We were sceptical about the reports, as there
had been a number of coup rumours in the media, including October
2003.
'Insofar as we could, we attempted to establish whether there was
any more truth to this particular allegation. We took action to try to
establish whether any UK companies were involved and to underline our
opposition to involvement by any company in such activities.'
Straw
added that officials could find no 'definitive' evidence of the plot and
therefore did not warn the government of Equatorial Guinea.
However, the
Foreign Secretary confirmed that the Foreign Office did review and update
its civil contingency plans. Britain does not have an embassy in Equatorial
Guinea, but its interests are represented via Cameroon.
Ancram claims
that Straw's parliamentary replies 'raise more questions than they answer'.
He has demanded to know why, if the Foreign Office did not believe the
allegations of a potential coup, it needed to change the civil contingency
plans.
Ancram's office has also questioned how thorough the Foreign
Office investigations were, given that several of the alleged plotters were
either British citizens or lived in Britain.
Mann's company, Logo
Logistics, was registered in Guernsey and he was well known to the circle of
former British military men who run private security firms.
In
addition, Mann is alleged to have meetings in Chelsea with millionaire oil
trader Ely Calil. Both men deny involvement in the plot. On Friday, Thatcher
will face trial in South Africa over allegations that he helped to
mastermind the coup, which he denies.
Players' dilemma harder
than the one I faced, says Mike Gatting
Sunday November 21, 2004 The
Observer
If I were an England player it would be difficult for me to get
on that plane to Zimbabwe this week. There has to be a very serious dilemma
about representing your country on the cricket field in a land where people
are suffering so much at the hands of their government and I have every
sympathy with those such as Steve Harmison who have made themselves
unavailable on moral grounds. This one-day international series should not
be taking place. That may sound hypocritical coming from someone who led a
tour to South Africa in 1990, at the end of the apartheid era, but the
circumstances then were very different. When I signed up for that 'rebel
tour' it was in the knowledge that change was already under way in South
Africa. We were told that laws enforcing discrimination were coming off the
statute books and that Nelson Mandela would soon be released.
The
press presented the tour - and those backing it - as supporting the old
South African regime and its apartheid policies, but that wasn't the case at
all. President FW de Klerk, the leading reformer, was happy to speak to us
and reassure us that he was not opposed to the planned tour. I'm not going
to pretend that knowing changes were afoot was the main motivation for
going, but it did help to persuade me and I'm sure it was a major factor in
influencing the two black England players who signed up.
And
everything we were told was going to happen did happen, including the
release of Mandela while we were still in the country.
Another big
difference between my situation and that of present captain Michael Vaughan
is that he has the full backing of the England and Wales Cricket Board
(ECB). Vaughan has made it clear that he will be a reluctant tourist in
Zimbabwe and his undertaking of a task he doesn't want will be appreciated
by his bosses, who themselves are under extreme pressure from the
International Cricket Council to make sure that the tour takes place, or
face a crippling financial penalty. The ECB don't want the tour either,
but once it was decided that it would go ahead there was no choice but for
Vaughan to lead it. At a pinch, Marcus Trescothick could have done the job -
but it would have been asking far too much of one of the less experienced
players such as Andrew Strauss to step in. Vaughan's aim now will be to get
in there, play the matches - which, by the way, won't be very competitive
without the senior Zimbabwe players - and get out.
These days
everyone in the England camp is pulling in the same direction, which was not
the case in the late 1980s. 'In turmoil' is probably the best way to
describe the state of English cricket in the two years after my tiff with
umpire Shakoor Rana in Pakistan in 1987. I was sacked the following June
over tabloid allegations and succeeded by three different captains that
summer alone. A tour to India was cancelled and when Ted Dexter was
appointed selection supremo at the start of the 1989 Ashes series, with
supposedly no restrictions on his powers, his first big decision - to
reappoint me as captain - was vetoed by the Test and County Cricket Board
(TCCB, as the ECB was then).
It was then that I learnt of the planned
tour to South Africa. When the news of it broke, the TCCB did make an
alternative offer. After a meeting at the Oval between Dexter, Micky
Stewart, the coach, and Raman Subba Row, of the cricket committee, I was
asked to captain England in the West Indies that winter and I readily
agreed, given the one very small proviso that, out of courtesy, I be allowed
to inform the tour organisers before anything was announced. Hours later our
agreement was all over the newspapers. One of the three even had the cheek
to suggest that it might have been my wife, Elaine, who had tipped off the
press.
It was in that environment of mistrust that I decided to lead the
rebel tour. In hindsight, it may seem as if I was cutting off my nose to
spite my face, but I just couldn't see any future with the official England
set-up and the people who were running it. Do I regret going to South
Africa? I would readily have swapped it for the chance to play three more
years of Test cricket. At the time that did not seem to be an
option.
In the event, our tour was cut short when the organisers reached
an agreement with the ANC that, in return for its cancellation, the
political representatives of the black majority would help to fast-track the
process of South Africa's readmission to official international sport. I
can't see anything positive like that coming from this week in
Zimbabwe.
Harvest of lies as Mugabe bans
food aid A special correspondent, Bulawayo
WHEN Zimbabwe's president,
Robert Mugabe, announced that his country had enjoyed a "bumper harvest",
Alice Gela was sending her children to school without breakfast yet again.
Some days, the family does not eat at all. While Gela stared into her bare
cupboards, 40,000 tons of food from the Catholic Relief Services was lying
unused not far away, according to Pius Ncube, the Archbishop of
Bulawayo.
Mugabe has banned all foreign food aid, even the UN World Food
Programme. Although his own countrymen have begun starving to death, he
accuses the West of trying to "choke" his country with food and tells them
to send it elsewhere in Africa. "The government is shouting that there is
plenty of food, but where is it then?" asked Angilacala Ndlovu, deputy mayor
of the southern city of Bulawayo, where government records show that 160
people have recently died of malnutrition. Last week a parliamentary
committee flatly contradicted Mugabe's claim of a bumper crop and warned
that the country was facing serious food shortages. Mugabe responded by
directing Zimbabwean television to show endless film of silos full of grain
which critics claim is library footage. Even weather forecasts now have to
be approved by his office so there can be no talk of drought. Under
Gela's corrugated iron roof on Friday there was no food. No cooking oil, no
flour, none of the staple maize. The idea of milk or meat raised laughter.
Infected by HIV, Gela's wasted body lies on a dirty blanket, tended by her
eldest daughter Sandra, who has two children of her own. Gela watches
dull-eyed and powerless as her five-year-old son complains that his belly is
empty. Twelve family members live in the three-roomed house, one of which is
let to a lodger. On the wall is a framed 20-year service award in Zimbabwe
Post and Telecom for her husband, Wilford. After he lost his job and joined
the 70% of Zimbabweans unemployed, he left for Botswana to try to earn some
money. The family have heard nothing from him for months. All of this is
just a few miles south of the lush Queens Club where the England cricket
team will play two matches in their controversial tour of Zimbabwe, which
starts this Friday. On their journey between the Holiday Inn and the pitch,
the cricketers might be surprised by the air of normality in a country that
is on its knees. Zimbabweans are stoical people, battered into submission by
Mugabe's henchmen and youth militia. The traffic lights still work, the
bougainvillea is flowering deepest pink and at first sight all seems well,
apart from the mile-long queues at petrol stations and banks. But enter
any one of the neat bungalows in Emganwini township, where Gela lives, and
one encounters similar stories of struggle and hardship. A few streets
along, five-year-old Dudza plays with an armless doll, the only toy in a
room that serves as bedroom, living room and kitchen for him and his two
elder sisters. Their mother is dying of Aids and too weak to walk so has gone
to live with relatives, leaving her children in the room with a sagging
mattress, some packing cases and a two-ring stove. What will happen to them,
nobody knows. The 80-year-old president would rather watch his own people
starve - and welcome cricket tours - than admit to a problem. With
parliamentary elections due next March, critics say he plans to use
government control of food to starve out those who oppose him. "Food is a
powerful weapon," said David Coltart, legal affairs spokesman of the
opposition Movement for Democratic Change. "The banning of foreign feeding
programmes mean the government controls all food and the clear message is:
either you vote the right way or you and your children will
starve."
Widespread malnutrition, combined with the high level of HIV
infection, means that Zimbabwe now has one of the world's lowest life
expectancies - 38. "Politicisation of food is the most evil thing a
government can do," said Ncube, one of Mugabe's most outspoken critics.
Ncube has faced endless threats, even to his 88-year-old mother, and cannot
hold prayer meetings without police permission. But he insists: "As long as
babies are dying of malnutrition and elderly of starvation, I will not be
silenced." For Zimbabweans to face starvation is an astonishing turnaround in
a country that used to be known as the breadbasket of Africa. The collapse
in agricultural production is a clear result of Mugabe's "fast-track"
redistribution of 5,000 white-owned farms, which began in February 2000 with
violent land seizures. Last year half Zimbabwe's population of 12m needed
food aid.
Mugabe has responded to criticism with a bill that will
stop non-governmental agencies taking part in activities such as human
rights and voter education. The bill will join newly passed legislation
under which journalists not registered with the government face two years in
jail. "These are the desperate acts of a dying regime," said Coltart, one of
the handful of MPs opposing the measures. Opponents say Mugabe has kept
his supporters happy by asset-stripping - taking over farms, mines and
factories and selling the crops and machinery - so that they can afford to
drive a Mercedes, drink Scotch and send their children abroad to
study. The tractor fleet has shrunk from 45,000 to 10,000. The beef and dairy
herd has been so depleted that the government has banned the slaughter of
cows and there is no seed to plant for next year. "We're just getting into a
worse and worse situation," Ncube said. He, like many Zimbabweans, is
horrified by the decision of the England cricket team to travel to the
country. "While they are playing, thousands of children are going to school
with empty bellies all because of one man's obsession with power," he
said.
Our reporter cannot be identified because of the regime's draconian
reporting restrictions.
JOHANNESBURG, JOHANNESBURG (IPS) - A routine visit to a village
in the northern South African province of Limpopo brought Stephen McFarlane
face-to-face with the reality of a child-headed family.
But, the
members of this household were not, as one might suspect, AIDS orphans.
Their parents were very much alive - but living in a mountainous area some
20 kilometres away. Drought in the area had obliged the parents to move to a
region where there were still small quantities of water to cultivate
crops.
"The problem here (in Limpopo) is water. There has always been a
need for water," says McFarlane, who works for a global charity - World
Vision.
This week (Nov. 18) international scientists joined hands with
non-governmental organisations such as World Vision to launch a five-million
dollar research initiative to improve the lives of millions of poor farmers
living in and around the Limpopo river basin. The launch took place in South
Africa's commercial capital, Johannesburg.
The 'Challenge Programme
on Water and Food' (CPWF) will tackle water scarcity in the basin, which
extends through Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa.
In
particular, the initiative will address one of the most pressing issues of
the 21st century: how to grow more food with less water, while safeguarding
the environment.
All in all, the 'Challenge Programme on Water and Food'
is focussing on nine rivers around the world, including two others in Africa
- the Nile, and the Volta in West Africa.
"The Limpopo was selected
because of the combination of high poverty levels, chronic water scarcity
and widespread food insecurity," explains Adriaan Louw of the South African
Agricultural Research Council, who is the Challenge Programme coordinator
for the Limpopo.
"About one million people in the Limpopo currently rely
upon food aid (and) deaths from starvation and malnutrition are commonplace,
particularly in times of drought. In the next few years we expect to see
about 10 percent of the population abandoning their homes and migrating
south," he added.
Almost 14 million people live in the Limpopo river
basin, which has a catchment area of 413,000 square kilometres - including
rivers and tributaries flowing through Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe,
Mozambique and South Africa. However, the area is arid or semi-desert with
most rivers only able to provide water for short periods of time each
year.
In dry years, large stretches of the Limpopo and many of its
tributaries contain flowing water flow for just 40 days, or
less.
Despite these uneven water flows, the Limpopo has been settled by
smallholder farming communities which rely on seasonal rains to irrigate
their crops. Agriculture in this region tends to be characterised by low
productivity and vulnerability to erratic climatic conditions that bring
frequent droughts and floods.
According to CPWF documents, farmers in
the region have begun to look at crop production in wetlands in a bid to
secure their livelihoods. In light of this, researchers will study how best
to pursue agricultural and fisheries projects in swamps, and develop tools
to guide wetland use and conservation. This research will take place over a
five-year period.
The CPWF will also investigate the use of small
multi-purpose reservoirs and large dams, to determine which are best suited
to meet the water storage and provision needs of local
communities.
"The research agenda of the challenge programme is intended
to be very broad," says Jonathan Woolley, coordinator of Challenge
Programme, who is based is Sri Lanka.
"Most research projects involve
multiple partners and are spread across a number of different river basins.
They aim to capture experiences from different countries and build a
knowledge base that will help us find solutions to various problems related
to land and water management around the world," he adds.
"The end
result will be a range of tools and policy options that will have a
practical application for farmers, water managers and
governments."
Barbara Van Koppen of the International Water Management
Institute in South Africa's capital, Pretoria, told IPS Thursday: "Water can
be a trigger for development among the poorest of the poor. But you need to
capture it first, through cheaper technology. In rural areas, you can
capture it through cheaper tools like simple taps, small dams, and water
tanks."
"There is a lot of water in Africa, which should be captured,
developed and harnessed and the method should be replicated in all the
villages," she added. "We don't want a success story in one village, while
the other villages live in a sea of poverty."
The straight-talking
Koppen said the governments of Mozambique and Zimbabwe were doing well in
capturing and harnessing water compared to their neighbour, South
Africa.
"The governments there understand that their economies rely on
agriculture," she said. "In Tanzania, people, automatically, know how to
capture water."
Van Koppen urged Southern African governments to
integrate their water institutions to avoid management and policy
problems.
"To a woman in a village, water is water. She doesn't care
whether it is from the department of irrigation, agriculture or forestry,"
she said. (END/2004
How Mugabe man's suitcase
full of dollars fuelled buying spree
Edwin
Lombard
Zimbabwe's Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono personally
facilitated the deal which saw the country's former Finance Minister Chris
Kuruneri buy a multimillion-rand mansion in Llandudno, Cape Town, with a
suitcase full of cash. Lorenzo Bruttomesso, Kuruneri's lawyer in South
Africa, who handled the transaction, told a Cape Town court this week that
his client had arranged the payment through the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe,
and dealt directly with Gono, the bank's chief executive at the time.
Bruttomesso said Gono assured him that the funds were legitimate. Kuruneri
told Bruttomesso that he earned the money by doing consultation work
overseas. Kuruneri was arrested after the Sunday Times exposed his purchase
of the Llandudno house. Zimbabwe wants to prosecute him for illegally
syphoning foreign currency out of the cash-strapped country. Once one of
President Robert Mugabe's favourites, Kuruneri has been languishing in a
Harare jail for seven months, his bail applications denied, and no trial
date yet set. While he is in jail, the Mercedes-Benz he never managed to
collect gathers dust in a Claremont showroom, and weeds overrun the site of
one of his properties.
Some of Kuruneri's business associates gave
evidence to a Cape Town magistrate this week after Zimbabwean authorities
asked the South African government to help with their investigation against
him. The Cape Town Magistrate's Court heard how Kuruneri spent money freely,
buying: a R548 000 Mercedes-Benz; a R5.2-million palatial mansion in
Llandudno, on which he spent a further R1-million renovating; another
R2.7-million house in Llandudno which he had demolished to build a
three-storey mansion costing R7.8-million; and a R2.5-million flat in Sea
Point. One of the key people to testify this week was Chris Hayman, a Cape
Town property developer who acted as a go-between in Kuruneri's business
deals. Hayman said he did not find it strange that his client carried a
suitcase stuffed with cash. The court heard that Kuruneri had so much cash
he had been forced to install a safe so big that it had to be hoisted by a
crane into one of the properties he bought.
Hayman said he met
Kuruneri in 2001 after being told by a client that the Zimbabwean was
interested in buying 17 Apostle Road, Llandudno, a large home with sea
views. Hayman recalled that he met Kuruneri, who was holding a suitcase
containing about R5-million in US dollars, at the President Hotel in Sea
Point in 2001. Kuruneri wanted to buy another two properties, one at 38
Sunset Road, Llandudno and a Sea Point flat belonging to businessman Neil
Bernstein. Hayman arranged for Kuruneri to pay the money into a bank
account. Bernstein said he thought Kuruneri was a "gentleman of questionable
integrity" and contacted the Scorpions. Hayman, however, said he researched
Kuruneri on the Internet and found nothing suspicious. He is still acting as
the jailed politician's agent and managing his properties.
The opposition Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) MP for Mkoba, Bethel Makwembere died on the spot after a head
-on collision with another vehicle on Friday night. The party's spokesperson
Paul Themba-Nyathi yesterday said Makwembere said yesterday the accident
happened at about 10 pm while driving from Harare to his home in Gweru.
Themba-Nyathi said while the details of the accident were still sketchy, it
is believed that the legislator was alone when he bumped into a heavy truck
that did not have a headlight and the its full width was not easily
discernible. Makwembere is survived by his wife, Belta, and six children.
"We mourn the sad passing away of yet another gallant hero of democracy.
While it is difficult to accept the reality of his death, we are inspired by
his dedication and bravery," Themba-Nyathi said. Meanwhile, the government
of Botswana, long suspected of having strained diplomatic ties with
Zimbabwe, has urged the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to participate
in next year's general elections. Botswana President Festus Mogae recently
met MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai and reportedly told him that the political
and economic challenges in the country could only be resolved through
dialogue and compromise. "It is my hope that you (MDC) will continue to
participate in the electoral process and that any outstanding political
differences among Zimbabweans would be resolved peacefully through dialogue
and compromise," Mogae was quoted saying. Tsvangirai, who is on n African
tour meant to mobilise pressure on President Robert Mugabe to fully
implement the SADC protocol on free and fair elections, visited Mogae to
brief him on the situation in the country. MDC spokesperson Paul
Themba-Nyathi however insisted they would boycott the elections if the SADC
protocol were not fully implemented. "The communiqué by President Mogae is
not expressing anything new. We said we will suspend participating in
elections until the principles of the Mauritius (SADC) protocol are
addressed in full," he said.
Zanu PF members revolt
against Mugabe's heir apparent
The battle to succeed Zimbabwean
President Robert Mugabe this week culminated in a dramatic palace coup
against his heir apparent, Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa, secretary of the
ruling Zanu PF and Speaker of Parliament, was effectively knocked out of the
race when party members passed a resolution stating that one of Mugabe's two
vice-presidents must be a woman. The post had been vacant following the
death of Simon Muzenda. Mnangagwa was up against Joyce Mujuru, a senior
politburo member and Cabinet minister, and Didymus Mutasa, also a Cabinet
minister. Joseph Msika - who is set to retire after Zanu PF's important
December congress - occupies the second vice-presidency. Whoever is
appointed to the post is likely to take over from Mugabe when he leaves
office.
Mnangagwa was effectively ousted at an emergency meeting on
Thursday when a faction led by influential General Solomon Mujuru - Joyce
Mujuru's husband - bulldozed through a resolution on Thursday that stated a
woman had to fill one of the vice-presidency positions. Mnangagwa appeared
to have garnered the majority of provincial support ahead of the meeting by
securing the backing of six out of 10 Zanu PF provincial votes. But most of
the senior politicians in the provinces were opposed to his appointment. He
further damaged his candidacy in a newspaper interview last week in which he
ridiculed women's bid for power. This led to the Zanu PF Women's League and
politicians from the Matabeleland region joining ranks to block Mnangagwa.
Zanu PF chairman John Nkomo is now better positioned to succeed
Mugabe.
Meanwhile, the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC) has embarked on a whirlwind tour of Africa to drum up support. Leader
Morgan Tsvangirai has visited West Africa (Nigeria, Burkina Faso and Ghana)
and Southern Africa in the past two weeks to discuss Zimbabwe's political
and economic crisis and the general elections in March. The MDC wants
African leaders to pressure Mugabe into ensuring the elections are free and
fair by adopting the Southern African Development Community's principles
governing democratic elections. MDC secretary-general Welshman Ncube, who
accompanied Tsvangirai to Botswana, said his party was intensifying
engagements with African leaders in search of a solution to the Zimbabwe
crisis. He said the next stop would be East Africa. The opposition has
suspended participation in the elections pending the implementation of the
SADC guidelines
When the
late and founding president of Tanzania stepped down and was replaced by Ali
Hassan Mwinyi, one daring journalist asked President Mugabe then if he was
going to do the same. The answer was: "I thought I was Robert Mugabe and not
Julius Nyerere. I will do things the Robert Mugabe way." That apparently
includes not choosing a successor. President Mugabe has always insisted that
it is not his prerogative to choose a successor as the onus was on the
people who had duly elected him. This led to one letter writer to this paper
to remark, in response to an earlier article, that :"Having said the
Congress is the supreme organ, is it not an issue worth projecting to the
readers what the Zanu PF Constitution says about the composition of the
Politburo; that is, it arrogates powers to compose the Politburo to the
President? Does he have any obligation to consult anyone in the exercise of
those powers? If all the big fish literally depend on him for their
political fortunes (politburo wise) how realistic is it then that anyone
could manoeuvre their way to the Presidency without active assistance of the
incumbent President - how honest is President Mugabe when he says he won't
choose a successor because it is the people's prerogative to do
so?"
The big fish referred to by the writer have however taken a cue
from the President's stance with none of them openly declaring their desire
to succeed him - with the exception of the late veteran nationalist, Dr
Eddison Zvobgo who quipped that every politician would aspire to be
president in as much as every lawyer would aspire to be Chief Justice. But
it is precisely that natural ambition that many in Zanu PF have been
skirting, while President Mugabe has stood firm about not choosing a
successor. However, African founding leaders of independent states have
generally shouldered the responsibility of not only choosing, or at least
influencing the choice of their successors, but also shaping the direction
that the people take even after their days in office. When Nyerere realised
that the one-party system was failing, he advised Tanzania to introduce a
multi-party system which saw the rise of Benjamin Mkapa becoming the
President of a multi-party government in March 1992. In Southern Africa
,former presidents Nelson Mandela, Fredrick Chiluba and Sam Nujoma literally
handpicked their successors, Thabo Mbeki, Levy Mwanawasa and Hifikepunye
Pohamba respectively.
Ironically, upon his arrival at the
Johannesburg Airport in South Africa for the inauguration ceremony of
President Mbeki in 1999 he was asked whether he would do things the Mandela
way. Although he expressed appreciation, respect and recognition for the
path that South Africa had taken, he did not mince his words in predicting a
different course for Zimbabwe; "In Zimbabwe we believe leaders are supposed
to come from the people." Mugabe was elected President of the ruling Zanu PF
at an extra-ordinary Chimoio Congress in 1977. A leadership vacuum and
crisis had been created, allegedly because of the inconsistency, cowardice
and treachery of the founding President Ndabaningi Sithole and also partly
because of the sudden and tragic death of party chairman Herbert Chitepo,
who was assassinated in 1975. Mugabe was perceived to have in abundance the
very qualities Sithole allegedly lacked and consequently cost him the
presidency through the "palace coup" of the Mugagawu Declaration. However,
back then, regional leaders like Samora Machel and Kenneth Kaunda were part
of the international coalition of resistance to his leadership, alongside
the leadership of the powerful Soviet Union. He weathered the
storm.
Will he retire in 2008 as he has hinted? Who will succeed him?
These questions have sent tongues wagging leading to great anticipation of
the forthcoming party congress where a succession roadmap is expected to
emerge. Whilst President Mugabe is expected to retain his position at the
helm of the party, the election of the two Vice-Presidents and National
Chairman is certainly going to provide a pointer as to who could eventually
take over as State President should Zanu PF sustain its popularity and
majority until the next Presidential elections in 2008. Constitutionally,
the Vice- Presidency is a stepping stone to the highest office in the land
of Zimbabwe. Said one commentator: "Mnangagwa (party secretary for
administration) has been quoted as saying ' It is a crime to conceive the
exit of head of state' but where that head of state has said he intends to
retire and has even said the succession debate is acceptable, it is only
proper to prepare for it. That is the general trend in the region and for
Zanu PF to pretend that the issue is taboo, or continue to postpone it, will
be running away from responsibility - which could have negative
consequences"
In 2001, President Chissano of Mozambique criticised
leaders who stay on for too long, which was generally seen as a reference to
Zambian President Fredrick Chiluba, who at the time was considering a third
term, and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, then in his fourth term. In
line with Chissano's prescription, Frelimo has through its Central
Committee, with the ratification of its 8th Congress on June 8,
overwhelmingly voted Armando Guebuza (a top office bearer since the party's
second Congress held in 1968) as new Secretary General and candidate for the
forthcoming Presidential election. Chissano is to retain his post as
President of Frelimo - so it is likely that for the first time in that
country's history, the two posts of President of Frelimo and Head of State
will be held by different people. Although such trends are not in keeping
with "the Robert Mugabe way, " (against a background of clear tendencies to
divide the party on tribal, regional, gender, status, age and other lines),
President Mugabe shoulders the challenge to keep the party united and
focused - much as he might want to respect the will of the people, it is
also his mandated responsibility to direct it. And the 'Joyce Mujuru
factor', seemingly at the behest of the Women's League, could be one of the
cunning ways he has used to do this and scuttle the aspirations of male
party hopefuls he does not approve of, as the recent emergency Politburo
meeting which endorsed the call by women, would seem to confirm. It's only
one week before the historic National People's Congress, where succession
across the party hierarchy is decided, so it remains to be seen if he will
do things the "Robert Mugabe way".
TWO conferences held
in Africa recently continued the relentless search for peace on the
continent.
The United Nations Security Council met in Nairobi
to mount another attempt at peace to Sudan's Darfur region. A peace deal was
signed by the combatants but it is too early to predict how sincerely the
signatories will regard their commitment to peace.
Sudan
has suddenly developed into quite a prize catch in economic terms. The
discovery of oil has brought players into the peace scenario who would have
paid scant attention to political developments in the vast country before
then.
In Dar es Salaam, a group of African leaders met to seek
a peaceful solution to the problems of the Great Lakes region. They included
President Robert Mugabe, who controversially sent thousands of his soldiers
to fight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
His
decision cost the country billions of dollars and may have sent the economy
into a near-comatose state from which it may never fully recover. Even after
the combatants in that conflict signed peace pacts, there has been little
respite for the people from the constant boom of guns and screams of
terror.
Again, only if the leaders are sincere will there be a
chance for peace for the millions of people in the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and
Uganda. A lack of sincerity has blighted most attempts at making peace, not
only in the Great Lakes region, but also all over Africa.
For instance, the Ivory Coast will remain in turmoil as long as the
government and the rebels continue to trade insults instead of thinking
seriously of restoring peace to a country which, until only a few years ago,
was a rare example of peace and prosperity in Africa.
It
seems that power has undermined sincerity among many African leaders. Most
are now so obsessed with the retention of power they are quite willing to
lie through their teeth, if that will keep them in power.
The
peace efforts on behalf of the people of Sudan and the Great Lakes region
will come to nothing if all those involved continue to believe that
sincerity is an alien element of African politics.
If
foreigners, some of them genuinely anxious to end Africa's propensity for
settling all disputes with bloodshed, decide to get involved, then African
leaders should not complain.
It is their insincerity which has
caused Africans so much misery.
The SA Communist Party (SACP) today called for an end to
security force and militia attacks on the general population of
Zimbabwe.
"We are also concerned about a rushed attempt to hold elections
in March 2005 without all of the necessary conditions being in place," the
alliance partner with the ANC and Congress of SA Trade Unions (Cosatu), said
in a statement. It was released today following a weekend meeting of its
augmented central committee.
"Elections in such conditions will
deepen the overall political, social and economic blockage in Zimbabwe." The
SACP also called for more effective intra-alliance information sharing,
debate and discussion on Zimbabwe challenges, "in order to ensure that the
African National Congress and its alliance are able to provide effective
leadership to its own mass base and the wider South African
public".
The SACP also said it would monitor the progress of the Mzansi
National Bank, the account for the previously unbanked, which it said had
seen more than 100 000 accounts opened and R35million deposited in 15
working days. The account is a joint effort between the country's big four
commercial banks - Standard Bank, First National Bank (FNB), Absa, Nedbank
and the state-owned Postbank. "This is a resounding confirmation of the
SACP's persistent but previously dismissed insistence that hundreds of
thousands of South Africans who have been unbanked because of high bank
charges and the general inaccessibility of the sector to working people and
the poor," read the statement. - Sapa
Zimbabwean civil society agencies (CSOs) based in South
Africa have resolved to join hands to find a common approach to helping
refugees who have fled to the country to escape poverty and persecution
under Robert Mugabe's government.
CSOs working on humanitarian
projects would coordinate their programmes under the umbrella of the Heal
Zimbabwe Trust, Tendai Dumbutshena, its chairperson said today that after a
weekend workshop in Braamfontein. Those dealing with issues of advocacy and
governance would unite under the banner of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.
Each would remain responsible for the financing and management of its own
projects.
The 21 CSOs' common goal was to create a genuinely democratic
Zimbabwe, said Dumbutshena. Of the 3.4 million Zimbabweans about 25% of the
country's population believed to have left the country, an estimated one to
two million were living in South Africa, legally and illegally, they
claimed. This was testimony that all was not well in Zimbabwe, they added,
criticising the South African government's "quiet diplomacy" approach to the
problem.
Foreign policy It was time the South African government
was true to its commitment to the guiding principles of the Southern African
Development Community, the African Union and its own foreign policy premised
on the need to uphold human rights throughout the world. Appealing to South
Africa to consider as genuine asylum seekers those who had fled Zimbabwe
because of political persecution or poverty, the organisations said many
refugees were having a hard time submitting their applications to home
affairs and getting them considered, claiming it processed only about five a
week.
Others arrived destitute and were forced to beg on the streets, and
some ended up living in "awful conditions" in the Lindela repatriation camp,
said Elinor Sisulu, the co-ordinator of Crisis in Zimbabwe South
Africa.
Joining forces would enable CSOs to avoid duplication of their
work, develop common approaches to donors, exchange ideas and support each
other's visions, giving them clarity of purpose and helping them come up
with a common agenda. As things stood, it was difficult to quantify the work
done on the humanitarian side since the upheaval began in 2000, with much of
it carried out through informal assistance networks in a fragmented way,
said Sisulu. Most of the CSOs were also relatively new, she said. - Sapa
England and Wales
Cricket Board chairman David Morgan has sought advice on what to do should
he meet despotic Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe.
Morgan will
travel to Zimbabwe with England, who were obliged to tour despite harbouring
moral reservations.
"I have been in contact with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office for protocol advice as to what to do.
"It's
understood there will be no state occasions for the captain and players, so
no handshakes," Morgan said.
He told BBC Radio Five Live's
Sportsweek programme: "I have had a meaningful conversation with someone at
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and will be receiving their advice [on
Monday].
"As we still have diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe, I
would expect to be following any advice."
The International
Cricket Council's rigid schedule meant England had no choice but to tour,
however Morgan remained diplomatic over his own feelings on the
matter.
"I think it's very clear we go to Zimbabwe with very heavy
hearts, but in the reality of the situation we are bound by the ICC's future
tours programme regulation," he said.
"The programme is a
regulation of the ICC, and the ECB would be in breach of that regulation if
we failed to tour without there being acceptable non-compliance, which
currently is government instruction, or safety and security."
An ECB delegation travelled to Zimbabwe last month and decided the country
was safe to visit.
Mugabe wants female vice president - report November 21
2004 at 02:03PM
Harare - Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has
said he wants a woman to occupy one of the country's two vice-presidential
posts, the state-run Sunday Mail newspaper reported.
Mugabe
told his ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (Zanu-PF)
in Harare on Saturday that the party's highest decision-making body, the
politburo, had decided that one vice-president should be a woman, the paper
said.
"I agree with the decision. We must elevate our women because
in other countries they have women prime ministers and even presidents,"
Mugabe said.
If the ruling party approves the decision, a woman
could be elected vice president during the Zanu-PF national congress due in
two weeks' time, the report said.
There is currently a vacancy
for the post of vice-president following the death of veteran politician
Simon Muzenda last year.
The post is a key one - some reports have
suggested that Muzenda's replacement will be the figure most likely to
succeed Mugabe who has hinted he may retire when his term expires in
2008.
There have been reports of intense jockeying within the party
to fill the position, and Mugabe hinted that not everyone agreed with the
decision to appoint a woman.
Several high-ranking men have been
reported to be in the running for the vice-presidency, including
parliamentary speaker Emmerson Mnangagwa, retired army chief Vitalis
Zvinavashe and cabinet ministers Didymus Mutasa and Ignatius
Chombo.
"There might be problems at congress. Those who are not
happy might show their true colours. So women must have consensus and avoid
divisions so that congress is not divided," the 80-year-old president told
his supporters.
The powerful Zanu-PF woman's league has been
pushing for a woman to represent them at vice-presidency level since 1999,
but the league is reported to be split over two candidates: Thenjiwe Lesabe,
the most senior woman in the league and Water Resources Minister Joyce
Mujuru.
Lesabe is a former member of the Zimbabwe African People's
Union (Zapu), which fought alongside Mugabe's party during the war for
independence against Britain in the 1970s. The two parties were merged in
1987. - Sapa-AFP