Faced with this crisis, it should be admitted that we in the ANC-led
alliance have not always found it easy to effectively position ourselves. Of
course, Zimbabweans themselves must find their own solutions, but no-one doubts
that South Africans – whether in government or in civil society – also have an
important role to play. So why our difficulty?
In the first place, we in
the South African liberation movement have a long, common history with the
ruling party in Harare. In the late 1960s and through the 70s, the ANC’s
alliance was rather more with ZAPU than with the now dominant ZANU component of
the present ruling party. But, after Zimbabwean independence in 1980, ZANU PF
played an absolutely critical role in standing up to apartheid destabilisation
throughout our region. Zimbabweans paid a high price for their principled
position in the fight, for instance, against Pretoria’s Renamo contras in
Mozambique. The Zimbabwean CIO was instrumental in uncovering apartheid hit
squad networks directed against ANC operatives, saving many lives. This history
should never be forgotten.
It should also be remembered that, in the
immediate post-independence period, the Zimbabwean liberation movement led the
country on a significant social redistribution programme, with notable gains in
education and health-care.
However, it is also incontrovertible that much of the present crisis is
centred on ZANU PF itself, including internal stagnation, social distance from
its historic mass base, factionalism, and serious policy mistakes. For the first
decade of independence, the ruling party accommodated a capitalist growth path
in the industrial and dominant commercial agriculture sectors, encouraging some
capitalist indigenisation, while pursuing progressive welfarist redistributive
policies for the majority: the so-called “two economies” approach which
essentially left the mainstream capitalist economy untouched. There were
successes, as noted above, but by the mid-1990s the redistributive social
programmes could no longer be sustained fiscally within the constraints of a
dominant and largely untransformed capitalist economy. With a burgeoning debt,
Zimbabwe was increasingly vulnerable to an externally enforced structural
adjustment programme.
All of the leading ZANU PF cadres we have spoken to
readily admit that their mid-1990s implementation of a structural adjustment
programme was a disaster. Soaring food prices and mass retrenchments in the late
1990s resulted in a deepening divide between the party and the trade union
movement. Social hardships also produced a groundswell of civil society protests
in townships and rural villages. These all resulted in an opposition electoral
project that emerged in 2000 and that continues to be grouped around the
MDC.
President Mugabe himself has also spoken several times recently
about the grave dangers of corruption, factionalism and the abuse of state
office by leading cadres from within the ruling party. He himself has raised
concerns about illegal land-grabbing by some of his own senior officials in the
recent “land reform” programme. Opposition politicians in Zimbabwe argue that
these critiques are themselves selective and factional. South African comrades
may argue that this is, or is not, the case - but either way it is obvious that
there are major problems inside of the ruling party.
From an ANC-led alliance perspective, then, ZANU PF
presents a complex challenge. The complexities have not been helped by a wider
domestic setting in which certain opposition parties (notably the DA) have run a
thinly disguised racist campaign. They have sought to use the Zimbabwean crisis
as an example of what happens when “THEY” (a black majority) take over. This is
complemented by a nauseating barrage of white voices sermonising on Zimbabwe on
radio phone-in programmes, and in this case the racism is even less
disguised.
Various opposition forces in our society also eavesdrop on
every internal ANC and alliance debate looking for signs of difference.
Differences get played up by these would-be (and uninvited) mid-wives of an
“MDC” project in South Africa. They don’t give a hoot about Zimbabwean peasants,
or about South Africa trade unionists – but they need our alliance to break so
that they can have a shot at an electoral breakthrough for themselves. At a
popular level within our country and movement, there has often been a knee-jerk
back-lash against these currents: “If Tony Leon insults Robert Mugabe, then
Robert Mugabe must be a super-hero.” All of this has muddied the waters a great
deal in South Africa.
We should, of course, not allow any of this to
deflect us from a sober, thoughtful and comradely intra-Alliance analysis and
discussion of Zimbabwe. But it is possible that we have not always succeeded in
doing this. Nor have we given ourselves time to debate the Zimbabwean situation
fully in the alliance and reach a common approach.
Yet another complicating factor has been the role
played by external forces, notably the UK government. Although there have been
signs of a certain toning down of rhetoric from these quarters, earlier loose
talk about a “regime change” agenda from the Blair government was certainly not
helpful. We only have to look at Iraq to understand that long-distance,
externally-imposed regime changes are inevitably a disaster for the local people
and the region in which they are located.
It is against this general
background that last week’s heavy-handed expulsion of a COSATU fact-finding
delegation to Zimbabwe occurred. The expulsion, defying a Zimbabwean court
order, resulted in various reverberations back here in SA. All of this has once
more underlined the need for our Alliance to discuss and harmonise perspectives
on Zimbabwe. It is essential we develop complementary analyses, strategies and
programmes of action to ensure that we assist as best as possible a resolution
of the crisis in our neighbouring country.
This paper is intended as an
SACP contribution to this discussion.
The SA Government approach to the
Zimbabwean crisis
We believe that the following are the main features of
the South African government approach to the Zimbabwe crisis:
1. While
the crisis in Zimbabwe has multiple dimensions, the critical blockage at present
is political in character. A political resolution as such will not resolve all
the other economic, social and moral problems, but it is the precondition for
being able to make any serious headway. The SACP agrees.
2. Based on
the assumption of 1 above, the South African government has, with the (apparent)
concurrence of the two major political protagonists in Zimbabwe, identified free
and fair elections, whose outcome will be accepted by both major parties, as the
key unblocking mechanism. The assumption is that after such elections, and
regardless of who wins, the political conditions will have been created for some
kind of patriotic, nationally unifying developmental project that addresses the
all-round crisis. The SACP believes that this MIGHT well be the best hope that
Zimbabweans have. Therefore we believe that every effort must be made to give
this option a chance – without necessarily foregoing other considerations, and
certainly without being over-optimistic about the short-term prospects of
success.
3. The South African government, again with the
(apparent) concurrence of ZANU PF and MDC has identified a three-step process to
unblock the political impasse and to arrive at conditions for free and fair
elections:
3.1 negotiations between ZANU-PF and MDC to agree on the
measures necessary for the holding of such elections, including agreement on
constitutional reforms to underpin such elections and to ensure stability beyond
elections;
3.2 the phased implementation of these agreed
pre-electoral measures and constitutional amendments and other confidence
building steps;
3.3 the actual holding of parliamentary
elections.
Given our unqualified agreement on 1 above, the
SACP believes that this 3-step process is absolutely essential if elections as
envisaged under 2 are to be realised. We believe that all progressive South
African formations, and especially our alliance forces, should be very firm,
constructive and focused in supporting attempts to realise this 3-step
process.
The SADC protocols
The SADC Principles and Guidelines
Governing Democratic Elections, which were agreed upon in Mauritius in August
this year, have now added a very important additional reference point. These are
the basic principles to which SADC governments (including the Zimbabwean
government) have solemnly committed themselves. In warmly welcoming these
protocols, we need to guard against two potential dangers:
the protocols must not be seen as “ideal” objectives to be
approximated as best as possible in actual election processes. They are the
minimum requirements for free and fair elections, and paragraph 7.1 commits SADC
governments to implement them “scrupulously”.
the protocols do not now
render unnecessary the country-specific pre-electoral agreements and measures as
envisaged in the 3-step process noted above. The protocols are an important
bench-mark endorsed by all SADC governments, they are not an implementation
programme as such.
But are free and fair elections in Zimbabwe actually a realistic short-term
prospect?
The 2000 launch of MDC to contest (successfully) a constitutional
referendum, and then (nearly successfully) parliamentary elections in 2000, and
subsequent presidential elections in 2002, has resulted in a Zimbabwean
political reality that is very (perhaps excessively) focused on
ELECTIONS.
(It should be noted that this electoral focus is now considerably at
variance with the popular mood within Zimbabwe, if the comprehensive polling
conducted by Professor Chavunduka is anything to go by. According to his recent
polliing the great majority of ordinary Zimbabweans, across the political
divide, are thoroughly weary of and apprehensive about any forthcoming
elections.)
On the side of the MDC, the very rapid rise to electoral prominence has
meant that social movement, trade union and other energies have been
considerably focused on an electoral project, on winning elections, on
contesting in court the results of elections, and on preparing the ground for
different elections. Leading MDC MPs are styled as “shadow ministers”, and there
has been a palpable sense that everything will change at the “next elections”.
In a sense the strategy has been regime change through the ballot box.
On the side of ZANU PF the electoral rise of the MDC has led to an
ever-narrowing laager mentality. Conspiracies are seen (or constructed)
everywhere. The hastily launched land reform programme was less about land
reform, and more about seeking to consolidate the ZANU PF apparatus and its
electoral base. The unleashing of youth militias and other violence is also very
much based on electoral calculations, with heightened violence occurring around
by-elections, etc. Anti-democratic steps – tightening up on media laws,
outlawing newspapers, the prosecution of the MDC leadership – are all also
driven essentially by electoral calculations. ZANU PF is less and less a
liberation movement confidently fostering a progressive hegemony in its own
country and in the region, and more and more a repressive machine focused
narrowly on holding on to power.
The trajectory of the MDC and the trajectory of ZANU PF over the last few
years have tended to reproduce each other. The 2002 presidential election, which
our own South African alliance had fervently hoped would lay the basis for a
resolution of the crisis (regardless of the winner), has itself become fuel to
the fire.
For all of these reasons, the SACP believes that while pushing firmly for
democratic elections in Zimbabwe, we must be sober in our expectations. There is
very little to suggest that ZANU PF, in particular, is seriously and confidently
preparing to lay the foundations for a democratic process. Almost all of the
indicators (including the expulsion of Cosatu) are pointing in the opposite
direction for the moment.
In these conditions, the worst possible option we could take as the
Alliance in South Africa would be a “pragmatic” acceptance of ZANU PF’s
unilaterally-declared March 2005 election date, and a “pragmatic” making the
best of a bad deal in the hope that somehow, after a flawed election, a
victorious ZANU PF would be more magnanimous and a reduced MDC would be more
realistic. In a way, this would be to re-play the illusions of the 2002
presidential election. Such an election would not lay the basis for any
sustainable resolution of the crisis. It would nullify the progress made within
SADC on democratisation principles, and it would also contribute to an ongoing
stagnation of progressive analysis and debate on Zimbabwe in our own
country.
ZANU PF
In the view of the SACP, the crisis in Zimbabwe is considerably rooted in
the social reality of the class force dominant in the leadership echelons of the
ruling party. This class force is a bureaucratic capitalist class reliant on its
monopoly of the state machinery for its own social reproduction. This class
force, dominant in ZANU PF ruling circles, is unable to provide a coherent and
hegemonic strategic leadership capable of beginning to address Zimbabwe’s
political, moral, economic and social crisis.
Indeed, in many respects, it
thrives (at least over the short-term) in conditions of crisis, using its access
to state power for land grabs, and currency and other speculative activities. It
is also able to use state power as an insulation against the terrible impact the
crisis is having on most other strata. But, unlike other fractions of the
bourgeoisie, it is also incapable of surrendering direct control over state
power. This double-bind, an inability to constructively and strategically use
political leadership on the one hand, and an inability to cede some bureaucratic
dominance, on the other, lies at the heart of the present blockage.
There are, from time to time, signs that there are more far-sighted
groupings within ZANU-PF leadership, who are prepared, for instance, to explore
the possibility of some kind of patriotic power-sharing deal with the MDC. But,
at least for the moment, these elements are easily outflanked within the
leadership dynamics of the ruling party – it is hard to sell the idea of ceding
some power, when that means that some in the ruling party will have to do the
ceding.
Having said this, the SACP believes that there is no solution to the
Zimbabwe crisis, at least within any foreseeable future, without ZANU-PF…(or,
for that matter, without the MDC). This means that there needs to be ongoing
honest, robust engagement with ZANU-PF from the side of South Africa, and
particularly by those forces most capable of exerting a positive influence.
Challenges that arise include:
what can be done to limit and indeed
reverse the economic advantages to a bureaucratic bourgeoisie of the ongoing
crisis?
how can significant sectors of the ZANU-PF leadership be
weaned away from the unsustainable (in the medium-term) laager into which they
are increasingly retreating?
ZANU-PF might actually have lost its hegemony and therefore have to
negotiate with all those forces that disillusioned with its rule. The cosatu
EXPULSION might as well have closed people-to-people contact between Zimbabwean
mass formations and South African progressive forces thus running the danger of
isolating our government in seeking our solution to the impasse.
The role of the SA government and the Alliance
Progressive South African formations need to premise their engagement on
the basic principle that Zimbabweans have the prime responsibility for finding
their own solutions. There are also no easy solutions. However, we do have a
responsibility to Zimbabwe, and we do have a responsibility to our own national
democratic struggle.
Our solidarity towards Zimbabwe needs to be
multi-pronged. Government to government, party to party, and people to people
engagements are all part of what is required.
We also have a responsibility for the estimated 3 million Zimbabweans
living in our country, many as a direct result of the present crisis.
In developing our solidarity, we must guard against expecting our
government to behave like a trade union movement…or COSATU to behave like a
government. We must also ensure that we do not allow tactical differences within
our Alliance, for instance, to cloud and confuse us, and to become the main
issue to the detriment of pursuing a converging strategic objective in Zimbabwe.
The crisis is not in differences of tactic within our Alliance. The crisis is in
Zimbabwe.
We should agree:
to pursue and support as a priority the SA
government’s 3-step approach to securing free and fair elections in
Zimbabwe;
that success in this regard will require engagement but
also pressure on the relevant formations within Zimbabwe;
that in
engaging with all formations within Zimbabwe, different components of our
alliance will have better prospects in different directions. We should
appreciate this, while not allowing the differences in Zimbabwe to become
strategic differences amongst us back at home.
that, while free and
fair elections in Zimbabwe are probably the most likely breakthrough
possibility, solidarity and engagement must not be narrowly confined to an
electoral objective.
Which is to say, amongst other things…anti-democratic measures and human
rights abuses in Zimbabwe – regardless of the source – must be clearly condemned
by our entire alliance. We need to send a clear signal, not just to Zimbabwe,
but to our own mass base about the moral and democratic foundations of our own
revolution.
From Business Day (SA), 8 November
Mugabe faces mounting
pressure
Jonathan Katzenellenbogen
The acquittal of Morgan
Tsvangirai, leader of Zimbabwe's main opposition
party, the Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC), on treason charges last
month has generated a wave
of optimism about the chances for a settlement on
a legitimate Zimbabwean
political leadership. And the recent meeting between
President Thabo Mbeki
and Tsvangirai in Pretoria further boosted that
optimism. There is little
doubt that pressure is mounting for a settlement,
but there are also hurdles
that could create a longterm standoff between the
ruling Zanu PF party and
the MDC, deepen the political crisis and raise the
risk of mass violence.
One hurdle comes from the endless mixed signals from
President Robert
Mugabe. This raises the obvious question of whether he can,
in fact, be a
negotiating partner. Recently, in a double whammy to
expectations that
Mugabe intends pursuing a path of reconciliation, he
kicked out of the
country a delegation from trade union federation, the
Congress of South
African Trade Unions (Cosatu), and then had parliament
sitting as a court
impose a severe sentence on an opposition MP for assault.
Tsvangirai's trial
early next year, on another treason charge, could be
another test of
Mugabe's openness to talks. It is unlikely that there will
be an indication
of who will succeed Mugabe at next month's Zanu PF
conference, which will be
on the eve of an election.
The biggest hurdle to a deal is that of
ensuring the elections are free and
fair. Zanu (PF) may crave international
legitimacy, but the party also wants
to stay in power. So far an independent
election commission has not been
appointed, and two laws that severely
restrict the opposition have not been
repealed. Another complication is that
talks if and when they do occur will
have to resolve constitutional issues
that give Mugabe overarching power.
Relinquishing these presidential powers
is the key to bringing about a
leadership settlement in the country, and is
increasingly urgent as the next
parliamentary election is scheduled for
March next year. Under the
Zimbabwean constitution, 120 parliamentary seats
are contested and 30 are
appointed by the president. That means that the MDC
could win a majority of
the seats, but Mugabe's party could still control
parliament. And even if
the MDC can control parliament, it cannot form a
government by appointing
ministers as that is the prerogative of the
president. Therefore, even if
the MDC is satisfied that the election process
is free and fair and lifts
its "suspension of participation" in all polls,
it faces loaded dice in any
path to power. And thwarting the political will
in so blatant a manner
could, if the MDC obtains a majority of the poll,
only bring on massive
dissatisfaction and raise the chances of deepening the
crisis and violence.
That standoff could potentially continue for years as
Zimbabwe is caught in
a cycle of alternating parliamentary and presidential
elections either three
or two years apart.
Pressures are building
on Mugabe for a deal, but it cannot be guaranteed
that he or his coterie
read the landscape in this way. Mugabe's tactic has
been to suppress the
opposition and bid for time a strategy that has been
successful so far. The
difference now is that there are a number of
pressures that could help, but
are not guaranteed, to bring about a
settlement. One source of pressure to
which Mugabe does respond is that he
craves legitimacy. While viewed by some
as a strategic error, the MDC's
decision to "suspend participation" in all
elections, including next year's
parliamentary poll, is his most immediate
barrier to legitimacy. He has
largely crushed the MDC's ability to campaign
effectively internally, but it
holds the power to confer legitimacy on him.
The MDC says it will
participate in the poll if the election process can be
guaranteed as free
and fair and Zimbabwe can meet the election principles
and guidelines laid
down by Southern African Development Community (SADC).
It is now up to the
SADC, says the MDC, to pressure Mugabe into making the
process free and
fair.
Without overt South African and SADC
pressure it is unclear there will be
change. Waiting for Mugabe to pass from
the political scene, or hoping for
free and fair elections, will worsen the
situation. Zanu PF needs
international legitimacy to open donor aid flows
that will ease the pressure
on the country's balance of payments. Until
recently Mugabe may have had
scope for largesse to buy off the political
elite and army, but he no longer
has that room. While the region may accept
him as legitimate, that has no
sway with donors. The type of settlement, if
and when it does emerge, has to
be internationally acceptable. Another
source of pressure comes from Mbeki
talking to the MDC and engaging the
party as a partner. A little more than
two years ago a senior South African
official dismissed the MDC as "a
DA-type party" that whined but had little
internal support. That view in
Pretoria has now changed, and is a
development that Mugabe cannot ignore.
And a further source of pressure is
coming from Cosatu. Mbeki showed his
deep irritation that a Cosatu
delegation had even ventured to go to
Zimbabwe. The feeble statement issued
by the foreign affairs department,
that Zimbabwe was a sovereign country and
had the right to take any action
under its immigration policy, was an
attempt to assure Mugabe that SA's
foreign policy would continue to be
driven from the Union Buildings and not
from Cosatu House.
But
Cosatu's threat to blockade the Zimbabwe-SA border post at Beit Bridge
if
any of its delegation were arrested has put a new and more serious type
of
pressure on both Mbeki and Mugabe. A border blockade now an imminent
possibility if called for at some stage by Zimbabwean trade unions would be
a turning point in SA's domestic politics, as it would pit government
against another member of the tripartite alliance. Further pressure for a
settlement to Zimbabwe's political status is building abroad. It is likely
that Zimbabwe will be on a list of US policies that are up for
reconsideration, particularly as it is more than two years since the US
handed the mandate for a settlement of the crisis to Mbeki. The outcome may
be an extended mandate, but it will not be as openended as it was before. At
next year's G-8 meeting , the UK will place Africa at the top of the agenda.
Trade and debt concessions are likely, but so is emphasis on the display of
stronger African will in solving the continent's crises. Are these gathering
pressure enough to prompt a deal? Or will the crisis continue to paralyse
the country? An answer to that depends to a large extent on whether SA and
the SADC are prepared to break new ground.
The Media Line - Middle East
WILL ZIMBABWE BECOME AL-QAEDA'S
NEWEST HUB?
The role played by failed states in harboring militant
Islamist groups
is a feature of the war on terror that is likely to receive
a great deal of
attention in the coming years. Africa has been singled out
as particularly
vulnerable in this regard, not least because of the endemic
dysfunctional
character of many states across the continent, some of which
contain
significant Muslim populations. U.S. concern is currently
concentrated on
countries located in the north, east and west of the
continent, including
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Chad, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Tanzania, Kenya, Sudan and
Somalia. Thus far,
comparatively little attention has been paid to southern
Africa, and, in
particular, to one country that, for all intents and
purposes, appears to be
on the verge of full-scale breakdown -
Zimbabwe.
The Deteriorating Situation in Zimbabwe
A
former British colony, Zimbabwe is currently in dire straits. The
country's
first ten to fifteen years as an independent and sovereign entity
were
marked by a booming economy, ethnic harmony, a transparent and largely
accountable system of law and order, a world-class tourist industry and a
comparatively efficient government bureaucracy. It was, in short, a
successful state that was widely hailed as a model for post-colonial
stability and racial reconciliation.
By 2004, however, Zimbabwe
had an external debt burden of some US$6
billion, one of the highest
inflation rates in the world (roughly 622% at
the time of writing), a full
70 percent of the country living under the
poverty line, chronic shortages
of everything from gasoline to toothpaste
tubes, a HIV/AIDS epidemic that
afflicts nearly 1/3 of the population and a
life expectancy of just 34
years. The government presently pays little
regard to freedom of the press,
routinely ignores rulings from the Supreme
Court and systematically uses
terror and violence to maintain power. [1]
Zimbabwe and
al-Qaeda?
Do these deleterious conditions hold a realistic
potential for
harboring or otherwise facilitating an al-Qaeda presence?
Operationally, it
would seem unlikely that Zimbabwe would serve as a major
focus of activity.
There are few symbolic political or economic targets of
worth to attack,
western tourists are now almost non-existent and civilian
deaths - in a
country already marked by human suffering of major proportions
- are
unlikely to elicit major international attention. If al-Qaeda were to
decide
on a campaign of terror in this part of Africa, South Africa would
seem to
be a far more logical and operationally relevant choice. Indeed in
August of
this year, several Islamist militants who were reportedly planning
a series
of attacks in the country were seized in Pakistan. According to law
enforcement sources in Gujrat who carried out the arrests, the detainees
were captured with maps and plans allegedly detailing strikes against
various high profile targets including the Johannesburg stock exchange, the
Sheraton Hotel and U.S. Embassy in Pretoria, the national Parliament, a
waterfront tourist complex in Cape Town and, reportedly, the Queen Elizabeth
2 (QE 2) cruise ship while it was docked at the Port of Durban.
[2]
Equally, Zimbabwe does not offer particularly fertile ground
for
recruitment. While there is clearly considerable discontent on the
ground,
no organized Islamist groups of any import exist in the country.
Moreover
there is no sizeable indigenous Muslim element among the local
population
and most people remain too pre-occupied with basic day-to-day
survival to
concern themselves with politico-religious prerogatives -
extremist or
otherwise. [3]
Logistically, however, there may be
more reason for concern. Opaque,
largely lawless states offer inherent
advantages for terrorists - both as
sanctuaries and as territorial mediums
through which to smuggle people,
arms, materiel and contraband. In this
respect, Zimbabwe may be no different
than other ungoverned regions of
western and eastern Africa (or, for that
matter, Central or South
Asia).
The country borders South Africa to the south, Mozambique to
the East
and lies close to the neighboring territory of Angola to the west.
The
first, as noted above, offers an attractive operational theater on
account
of its modern and largely western character. Gaining entry to South
Africa
from Zimbabwe would be far easier than arriving by land or sea - both
on
account of major road transportation networks connecting the two
countries
and the lack of concerted border controls, even at major crossings
such as
Beitbridge.
With regards Mozambique and Angola, these
two countries represent
significant sources of weaponry as a result of
stocks left over from former
civil wars and the failure of internationally
mediated disarmament programs.
Because Zimbabwe is situated ideally between
both of these "markets," it is
able to act as a useful center from which to
procure and subsequently
disseminate a wide range of combat weaponry. Many
of these munitions are
exceptionally cheap; an AK47, for instance, can
reportedly be bought on the
Mozambique border for as little as $14, or
simply exchanged for a bag of
rice or sugar. Moreover, the existence of
shady arms brokerage/dealership
firms - some of which have been directly
tied to the procurement activities
of prominent terrorist organizations such
as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) - ensures that weapons can be
purchased in bulk quantities if
so desired.[4]
Zimbabwe has
also emerged as a relatively significant hub for more
generalized organized
crime, much of which is run by West African syndicates
from Ghana and,
especially, Nigeria. Law enforcement sources estimate that
several thousand
gang members may be present across southern Africa,
engaging in everything
from drugs smuggling and the trafficking of human
beings to vehicle theft,
poaching, counterfeiting and so-called 419 scams
(advanced fee swindles).
Zimbabwe, itself, is known to have been exploited
as a transshipment point
for cross-continental consignments of cannabis,
heroin and cocaine as well
as blood diamonds derived from civil wars in
Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC). [5] In addition,
the country is believed to have
served as an "off-shore" documentation
forgery center, particularly for
South Africa - the main destination for
much of the illicit regional trade
in people.
The existence of these organized criminal enterprises
would,
conceivably, be of considerable interest to al-Qaeda, providing an
ideal
nexus through which to garner operational capital and facilitate the
covert
infiltration of cadres to potential attack sites. More pointedly,
while the
Zimbabwean authorities are no doubt aware of the activities of
Nigerian and
Ghanaian syndicates, it is unclear whether they are willing to
move
concertedly against these operations - possibly because they are
directly
profiting from their illicit activities. In this sense, Zimbabwe
offers the
same benefits and overall latitude of action that is commonly
associated
with other weak or failing states that have been connected to the
logistical
preferences of al-Qaeda on the African continent such as Nigeria,
Sierra
Leone, Liberia, Sudan and Somalia.
Finally Zimbabwe
retains well-established air links with several major
western cities,
including London, Amsterdam (both non-stop), New York and
Perth (each of
which can be reached via Johannesburg). These corridors, at
least in the
short run, could conceivably prove to be more attractive in
terms of
covertly infiltrating operatives into Europe, North America and
Australia
largely because Zimbabwe has no major identifiable link with the
Muslim
world and has yet to be recognized as a significant operational hub
for
al-Qaeda.
The possibility of a logistical link emerging between
Islamist
extremism and Zimbabwe has been the subject of a degree of
speculation since
9/11. According to Kroll Associates, a prominent
U.S.-based risk consultancy
service, there is some evidence to suggest that
diamonds procured from the
DRC are being traded via Lebanese traders linked
to al-Qaeda.[6]
Investigative journalists in South Africa have also
periodically hinted that
Bin Laden has specifically sought to establish a
logistical base in
Zimbabwe - possibly on some of the large, remote
land-holdings appropriated
from white farmers in Mashonaland - and that his
second-in command, Ayman
al-Zawhiri has traveled to the country on at least
two occasions to
facilitate such an arrangement. [7] Finally, regional
commentators have
occasionally averred to the possibility of Zimbabwe (and
other neighboring
states) acting as a sub-Saharan "way-station" for a
militant East African
Muslim network that connects cadres from the Persian
Gulf to Cape Town.[8]
Implications for U.S. Policy
If
the United States is to ameliorate these potential concerns and
challenges,
it will need to transform what is presently a benign environment
for
terrorist logistical activities to one that is hostile. The best way to
achieve an outcome of this sort will be to institute a strategy that is
based on three sequential policy tenets.
First, concertedly
back an international process to remove Robert
Mugabe from power, ideally
implemented through influential organizations
such as the United Nations,
the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) and the Commonwealth. Such
policies have been shown to work if
applied consistently and forcefully
enough as the example of Charles Taylor
in Liberia
demonstrates.
Second, conclude a workable program of bilateral
assistance with a
new, more responsible Zimbabwean government that is aimed
at rooting out
corruption, heightening the professionalism of the security
and law
enforcement establishment and strengthening extant border, custom
and
immigration procedures.
Third, integrate and extend the
scope of these measures with
neighboring states under the auspices of a
formalized sub-regional security
arrangement, possibly modeled along the
lines of the Pan Sahelian Initiative
(PSI) already up and running in West
Africa. Embracing Mali, Chad,
Mauritania and Niger, this $100 million
program provides at least 60 days of
training to military and law
enforcement units within the four participating
nations, coaching them in
everything from border surveillance to remote
terrain navigation in addition
to providing a range of transportation and
communications
equipment.
One of the key lessons to have emerged from the
post-9/11 era is that
unexpected contingencies can quickly arise from areas
of the world that have
traditionally had little, if any, connection to
international terrorism.
Islamist bombings in Mombassa, Bali and Casablanca
readily underscore this
reality. While Zimbabwe has yet to be directly tied
to the logistical and
operational designs of al-Qaeda, the potential
certainly exists. Moving to
ameliorate the conditions that work in favor of
such a nexus would not only
play an important contributory role in the
general global war on terrorism,
it would also usefully serve the
accompanying objective of bolstering
regional governance and stability -
both defining features of contemporary
U.S. foreign and international
security policy.
Notes:
1. "Failed States in a World of
Terror," Foreign Affairs (July/August
2002).
2. "South Africa Warns
Against al Qaeda 'Paranoia.'" India Daily,
October 19, 2004; "Suspects
Allegedly Targeted South Africa," The Associated
Press (Johannesburg),
August 5, 2004; Micahel Wines, "Arrests and Plots Give
South Africans a New
Problem," The New York Times (South African Bureau),
August 09,
2004.
3. RW Johnson, "al-Qaeda and the Zimbabwe Nexus" Focus 34, June
2004,
1.
4. One 1997 swindle that reportedly involved Zimbabwe
Defense
Industries (ZDI), for instance, is believed to have netted the LTTE
some
32,000 mortar bombs. For an interesting account of the incident see
Mike
Winchester, "Ship of Fools: Tamil Tigers' Heist of the Century,"
Soldier of
Fortune 23/8 (1998).
5. Peter Gastrow, Organized Crime
in the SADC Region: Police
Perceptions (Pretoria: Institute of Security
Studies Monograph 60, August
2001), chapter 6; Johnson, "al-Qaeda and the
Zimbabwe Nexus"; Douglas Farah
"Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade," posted
on ZWNEWS.com, November 3,
2001.
6. Johnson, "al-Qaeda and the
Zimbabwe Nexus".
7. Ibid, 3-4.
8. Interviews, London, Nairobi
and Dar es Salaam, 2003-2004.
===========================================
Andrew Holt is an
independent, US-based terrorism and security
analyst. Reproduced with
permission of the Jamestown Foundation.
By Andrew Holt on Monday,
November 08, 2004
Financial Mail
WE WILL NOT FLINCH
By Zwelinzima
Vavi
Cosatu's campaign complements the work of governments that use
diplomacy to
get all African states to conform with Nepad's
objectives
Cosatu is part of the liberation
movement, with a well-documented
record of struggle against apartheid and
colonialism. It has always been
politically close to Zanu-PF but recent
events have opened a debate in
Cosatu as to whether Zimbabwe is not a
typical example of a derailed
revolution.
Cosatu has been
forced to publicly criticise the Zimbabwe government
after it trampled on
workers' fundamental rights. We will not keep mum when
freedom leads to
disrespect for workers' and human rights. Liberation means
a decent life for
all, not a select few.
I am proud of the 13 brave members of
the Cosatu mission who were
deported from Zimbabwe last week. They went
through 24 hours of hell -
arrested, shoved on and off buses, physically and
mentally abused, deprived
of food and finally dumped at Beit Bridge at 5 am.
But they succeeded
brilliantly in their mission: to highlight what sort of
society Zimbabwe has
become. The mission's short visit proved beyond doubt
that this is a society
where human rights and civil liberties are being
crushed. Our members'
nightmare lasted a day. For Zimbabwe unionists and the
people as a whole it
lasts 365 days a year.
In support of
our comrades in the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
(ZCTU), we have sent
numerous letters to the Zimbabwe authorities,
complaining about restrictive
laws, police attacks on union meetings and the
arrest of ZCTU leaders. They
have all gone unanswered.
Our national congress resolved to
send a fact-finding mission to get a
full, first-hand picture of the
conditions under which our sister
organisation operates. It was to engage
constructively with the broadest
range of organisations, including the
government and ruling party.
The collapse of the political
system and economy of Zimbabwe would
have profound implications for all of
Southern Africa.
So why would a government that claims to be
progressive and
revolutionary feel threatened by 13 people with writing pads
and pens from a
left-wing trade union movement with which it shared the
trenches in the
struggle against the Ian Smith and apartheid regimes? The
only reason was
fear of what it might uncover.
So it first
deported our members and then wheeled out (information
minister) Jonathan
Moyo's propaganda machine to make absurd allegations that
we were acting on
behalf of (UK prime minister) Tony Blair and that the
mission was "an act of
aggression against the country".
Moyo's buffoonery is such that
no-one can take him seriously, but what
is frightening is the dangerous
level of the government's paranoia. Anyone
who is critical of its awful
human rights record or its policies that have
caused record unemployment and
hunger is labelled an agent of Blair or
Western interests or to be working
with the enemy. Hitler, the master
propagandist from whom Moyo must have
learnt his tricks, believed in
repeating a lie until it becomes the "truth"
in people's minds.
Unfortunately most Zimbabweans will know
nothing about the real
reasons for the Cosatu mission, because media freedom
has been virtually
snuffed out; only the government's views are published.
But truth will out
and President Robert Mugabe and Moyo will learn that "you
cannot fool all
the people all the time".
President Thabo
Mbeki, at the launch of the African Union (AU) on July
9 2002, said: "We
must mobilise all segments of civil society, including
women, youth, labour
and the private sector, to act together to maximise our
impact and change
our continent for the better."
Cosatu is playing the role he
demanded: mobilising in support of human
rights. The objectives of the AU
and the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (Nepad), which we share,
must not be left only to the political
leaders; it must be propelled from
below. Workers and citizens must be
mobilised to demand their freedom and a
better life. Cosatu's campaign
complements the work of governments who use
diplomatic channels to get all
African states to conform with Nepad's
objectives.
Cosatu supports efforts to find a diplomatic
solution to Zimbabwe's
problems, but that does not mean we must suspend
action in solidarity with
our colleagues until this happens. A diplomatic
breakthrough can happen only
when Mugabe is forced to change by a mass
movement from the people, assisted
by a campaign of international solidarity
action, to compel him to restore
human rights, repeal repressive laws and
allow free elections.
Cosatu will not flinch from its
international duty to organise
activity in solidarity with its ZCTU comrades
and the people of Zimbabwe.
Zwelinzima Vavi is general
secretary of the Congress of SA Trade
Unions
Rough road home for illegal immigrants
[ This report does not necessarily
reflect the views of the United Nations]
MUSINA, 8 Nov 2004 (IRIN) -
In the South African border town of Musina,
authorities regularly detain
dozens of undocumented immigrants, sometimes
for days on end, in an outdoor
facility without toilets or running water.
Men, women and children,
including those seeking refugee status in South
Africa, are held behind a
chain-link fence and razor wire in the yard of the
Musina police
station.
"We arrest someone, put them in a [holding enclosure], with no
roof, no
water, no toilets," said the police station's commissioner,
Superintendent
Mainganye Godfrey Nephawe. "It's not human, and we're worried
about most of
them."
Located just 12 km south of the Zimbabwe border,
Musina is on the front line
of South Africa's efforts to curb illegal
immigration - an increasingly
controversial issue in this nation of an
estimated 46 million people. Yet,
while individual officials express concern
about conditions in the detention
facility in Musina, the South African
authorities have been accused of not
moving quickly enough to rectify the
situation.
SCORES DEPORTED DAILY
In a joint effort with South
Africa's Department of Home Affairs and the
South African National Defence
Force, the Musina police conduct daily
patrols in the town and on the
surrounding farms, arresting dozens of
individuals who cannot present proper
identity papers.
Station spokesperson Captain Mashudu Malelo said the
authorities determined
which undocumented individuals were immigrants by
interrogating them in
local dialects and asking questions about city
landmarks - at least
three-quarters of those arrested were from
Zimbabwe.
He said the station deported an average of 100 undocumented
immigrants every
day, ferrying them in a steady stream of armoured trucks to
the police
station in Beitbridge on the Zimbabwe side of the
border.
But after dark, or when the station does not have enough trucks
to transport
detainees, undocumented immigrants have to spend the night in
the detention
facility.
"Sometimes they stay for two, three, four, or
five days," said Eric T. Ndou
of the Musina Community Police Forum, which
partners with the Musina police
station in addressing community
issues.
CONDITIONS INSIDE THE FACILITY
At midday last Tuesday,
three dozen individuals sat on the dirt floor of the
holding facility, where
more chain-link fencing and razor wire separate the
men from the women and
children. As temperatures reached 35ºC (95ºF), most
sought refuge under the
shade cast by the concrete wall and the yard's only
tree.
There is no
toilet inside the facility. During daylight hours, detainees
say,
authorities will escort them to an outdoor toilet, but at night they
must
urinate and defecate inside the enclosure.
The facility has no running
water, so detainees cannot wash.
For drinking water, individuals scoop
water from a single cooking pot set up
on a table in the sun.
Police
spokesperson Malelo admitted that the station "does not have
[suitable]
cells to detain them". They had requested the department of home
affairs and
defence force to stop bringing undocumented foreign nationals at
night, as
this would allow the police to deport the immigrants on a daily
basis rather
than having them spend time exposed to the elements.
"Immediately, when
we've got a full load of the people as well as their
goods, the truck
leaves," he said.
But the station commissioner told IRIN that detainees
slept overnight in the
pen.
"They stay overnight when we are tired of
deporting them," said
Superintendent Nephawe. "You cannot work 24 hours a
day."
Mduduzi Nkomo, 20, a detainee from Gwanda in Zimbabwe, said he had
been fed
twice since arriving the day before, and each meal had consisted of
one
slice of bread and a cup of tea.
Nephawe said the station shared
what little it had with detainees, "because
we must give them food".
Although he believed the meals were insufficient,
he said the station was
doing its best to cope with the constant influx of
immigrants.
"You
understand, small kids are sleeping out in the open, at night, on the
ground, because if they come in at midnight or one [o'clock in the morning],
we must keep them [overnight]," he explained. "But if it is raining, it
rains on them."
ASYLUM-SEEKERS DETAINED
At least three young
men detained in the facility last Tuesday were
attempting to attain refugee
status in South Africa.
Shebani Celeste, Manga Mmbyula, and Kiza Djuma
said they were from Southern
Kivu, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
where dissident soldiers are
currently battling the Force Armees de la
Republique Democratique du Congo
(FARDC). Speaking in French, they said they
came to South Africa by train
and had been held in the facility since
Saturday. They didn't know whether
they would be deported or
not.
Mmbyula and Djuma showed IRIN documents from the South African
Department of
Home Affairs, requesting that they report to one of the
country's five
Refugee Reception offices. There is no Refugee Reception
office in Musina -
the nearest one is in Pretoria, nearly 500 kilometers
away.
Rudolph Jansen, a director of Lawyers for Human Rights, a South
African
legal-advocacy organisation, said the authorities needed to be more
sensitive to the needs of those claiming to be refugees.
"Police
stations are ill-equipped to detain foreign nationals," he said.
"For those
who are fleeing persecution, it's absolutely crucial that they
are given
access to services; that their status is determined; and that
they're given
documentation to prove that status as soon as possible."
ZIMBABWEANS AT
HEART OF DEPORTATION EFFORT
In recent years, Zimbabwe has been crippled
by massive food shortages, a
disintegrating economy and political
instability. Millions of Zimbabweans
have crossed the porous, 225 km border
into South Africa, either by cutting
through fences or crossing the
crocodile-infested Limpopo River. They reside
in South Africa as exiles,
constantly at risk of being caught and deported.
Standing behind the
chain-link fence at Musina police station, Raymond Moyo,
32, from Plumtree,
Zimbabwe, said he had been detained for two days. "We
come to South Africa
because we are suffering, [and are looking] for a job,"
and added that he
had been deported once before, but had returned to Musina
to work in a
hotel.
As a Zimbabwean without proper documentation, Moyo is a primary
target in an
escalating deportation effort in Limpopo Province, where Musina
is located.
Des Venter, head of immigration in the Department of Home
Affairs in the
provincial capital, Polokwane, said South Africa was
deporting growing
numbers of Zimbabweans from Limpopo.
In the first
10 months of this year, he noted, the South African government
had deported
41,069 Zimbabwean citizens from the province, a nine percent
increase from
the total of 37,796 deportations in 2003.
Because there is no
internationally recognised conflict in Zimbabwe, the
South African
government maintains that undocumented immigrants from
Zimbabwe are
"economic migrants", rather than refugees. But Refugees
International, a
Washington DC-based humanitarian organisation, has reported
that 80,000
Zimbabweans are currently seeking political asylum in the
country.
Police spokesperson Malelo said he didn't have "any idea"
whether anyone
deported to Zimbabwe had sought refugee status, but those who
had been
deported "have not been afraid to be taken back to
Zimbabwe".
Zimbabweans who crossed the border looking for food and work
also deserved
adequate treatment while detained, said Tara Pozel, director
of the Rural
Research Project of the Forced Migration Studies Programme at
the University
of the Witwaterstrand.
"South Africa is legally able
to deport them as immigrants, but the question
is, basically, whether basic
human rights are being respected in that
process," she said.
SENIOR
AUTHORITIES AWARE OF CONDITIONS
Nephawe said National Police Commissioner
Jackie Selebi had visited the
facility on 27 January and was "very much
concerned" about the existing
conditions. "The minute he saw this place he
sat right here and called his
office, and instructed his representatives to
fly to Musina the following
day."
Nephawe said plans to create a new,
R50-million (about US $8.1-million)
facility for detained foreign nationals
in Musina were contingent on
acquiring additional land, which required the
cooperation of the Musina
Local Municipality. He had contacted the council
about the matter as
recently as 27 October, but had been told that an
investigation of the
request was still pending.
In the interim,
Nephawe said, he hoped to receive about R1 million (about US
$163,000) to
renovate a nearby vacant military barracks to house the
undocumented
immigrants.
"If we can get money ... we can fix it," he said. "We must
not leave people
suffering."
But Kaajal Ramjathan-Keogh, director of
the Refugee Rights Project at
Lawyers for Human Rights South Africa, said
there had been talk about using
the army barracks for years.
"There
were rumours going around about creating a facility at the army
barracks,
but that never happened," she said.
Telecommunications strike threatens fragile economy
08 Nov 2004 15:16:11
GMT
Source: IRIN
JOHANNESBURG, 8 November (IRIN) - The suspension of
thousands of telephone
operators in Zimbabwe was likely to place a further
strain on an already
weak economy, a senior trade unionist has
warned.
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) president Lovemore
Matombo
confirmed on Monday that about 3,600 striking workers at two
state-owned
companies, Tel One and Zimpost, had received letters of
suspension. In
October the workers walked out in protest against the
management's failure
to pay them a salary increase recommended by an
arbitrator in March.
"We engaged with management on several occasions and
were led to believe
that the salary increments agreed upon would
materialise. Unfortunately,
there has been no real progress since March,
which led to the walk-out,"
Matombe told IRIN.
He added that ZCTU
would continue negotiations with management to reverse
the suspensions until
a "reasonable agreement" was reached.
In March the labour arbitration
court ruled that the lowest Tel One worker
be paid a net salary of Zim $861
241 (about US $160) to cushion them from
hyperinflation, now hovering around
250 percent after declining from around
600 percent in
January.
Matombo said Tel One management unilaterally implemented the
award at 100
percent less than the amount decided by the
arbitrator.
Harare-based economist Denis Nikisi said the suspension of
the workers would
have a serious impact on the business sector.
"Both
parastatals have a significant customer base, and if complaints are
not
addressed timeously it could lead to a loss of business opportunities -
already several businesses are struggling to stay afloat," Nikisi
said.
Last month Zimbabwean teachers went on a nationwide strike to press
for
better pay and allowances following a breakdown in negotiations with the
government to increase salaries by 100 percent.
The Zimbabwe Teachers
Association had been threatening since June this year
to pursue industrial
action over low salaries, after giving the government a
15 September
deadline.