HARARE – A National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) party member has become the latest Zimbabwean to approach the Constitutional Court seeking to have the entire Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.3), 2026 declared null and void, arguing that both parliament and President Emmerson Mnangagwa failed to fulfil their constitutional obligations in passing and assenting to the law.

Vhurande Mahlupeko, a Chiredzi East voter and member of the NCA’s national executive committee, filed the application on July 18. He is represented by Lovemore Madhuku.

Mnangagwa assented to the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Bill (No.3), 2026 on or about 7 July, converting it into the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (No.3), 2026, gazetted as Act No.6 of 2026. The Bill had earlier been passed by the Senate 75 votes to four, with Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) senators under Sengezo Tshabangu among those who voted in its favour.

Mahlupeko’s is at least the fourth constitutional challenge to CAB3 to be filed since the Bill’s passage, following applications lodged by Prince Dubeko Sibanda, Youngerson Matete and Tambara Casper. Unlike some of the earlier applications, Mahlupeko’s papers target the validity of the entire amendment exercise rather than individual clauses, and ask the court to strike down the whole Bill and the Act that flowed from it.

The first of Mahlupeko’s grounds concerns section 328(3) of the constitution, which bars parliament from amending any constitutional provision unless the precise terms of the proposed amendment were gazetted at least ninety days before being tabled in the National Assembly or Senate. He contends that parliament “went on a frolic of its own” and amended nine provisions of the constitution that were never contained in the Bill as originally gazetted by the Speaker of the National Assembly.

The nine sections he lists are: section 94(3), on the assumption of office by a vice-president acting as president; section 101, on presidential succession; section 145, on the first sitting of a new parliament; section 163, on the composition of the judiciary; section 166, on the make-up of the Constitutional Court; section 181, on the appointment of acting judges; section 243, on the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission; section 277, on local authority elections; and section 285, on the National Council of Chiefs.

Mahlupeko argues that some of these unannounced changes carry serious consequences that the public never had a chance to debate. He notes that the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice have, by an amendment to section 168, been removed from the Supreme Court bench while remaining part of the High Court under section 170, and that the removal of the cap on the number of Constitutional Court judges under section 166 “may lead to undermining the independence of the judiciary through a phenomenon known as ‘packing the bench.’”

He also flags the shifting of responsibility for convening the first sitting of a new parliament to the Clerk of Parliament, an office he says was never intended for so “sensitive and onerous” a duty, and changes to the appointment of acting judges that he warns could see “politically partisan legal practitioners” appointed to the bench for short-term political ends.

The second ground goes to section 328(7) of the constitution, which bars parliament from amending any “term-limit provision” in a way that benefits sitting office-holders.

Mahlupeko points to clauses in the Bill that extended the length of the presidential and parliamentary terms from five years to seven, amending sections 95 and 143 of the constitution.

He argues this squarely benefits the incumbents: both Mnangagwa and the current parliament will now serve two years longer than they would have under the unamended constitution. His affidavit states that debate in both the National Assembly and the Senate, including the second reading speeches, made clear that the sole reason for the amendments was to allow the president to extend his term.

The third ground concerns section 328(2) of the constitution, which prohibits parliament from amending any provision “by implication.” CAB3 rewrote section 92 to have the president elected by parliament sitting jointly, rather than directly by voters. Mahlupeko argues this, by implication, also amends sections 67, 91 and 155, which respectively guarantee citizens the right to vote for elective public office, describe the presidency as an elective office, and entrench the principle of “universal adult suffrage and equality of votes.”

“Without expressly amending sections 67, 91 and 155,” the affidavit states, the Bill’s amendment of section 92 removes ordinary citizens’ direct vote for president “by implication,” which he says is not permitted under section 328(2).

He makes a fourth argument that parliament failed to give public notice, as required by section 131(5)(b) of the constitution, of the date on which the Bill was transmitted to the president for his assent and signature. Mahlupeko says the public only learned that Mnangagwa had already signed the Bill after the fact, on July 7, with no prior notice published in the Government Gazette or elsewhere.

The fifth and final ground is directed at the president personally. Mahlupeko argues that section 196(2), read with section 110(2)(a) of the constitution, obliged Mnangagwa not to assent to a Bill in which he had a direct personal interest, and that he ought to have recused himself and left an acting president to sign it.

“It is common cause that the amendments… was exclusively to benefit the president,” the affidavit states, adding that the proposals to extend the presidential and parliamentary terms “originated from the president’s political party.”

Mahlupeko is asking the Constitutional Court to declare that parliament and the president each failed to fulfil their respective constitutional obligations, and to declare the passage of the Bill by both Houses “null and void and of no force or effect,” which would in turn render Act No.6 of 2026 itself a nullity.

His draft order asks, in the alternative, that the court strike down only the affected portions of the Bill if it is not minded to invalidate the whole document.

His affidavit argues there should be no room for the court to separate “objectionable” from “unobjectionable” portions of a constitutional amendment, submitting that with a document as significant as a Constitutional Bill, the outcome “ought to be either all or nothing.”

The draft order also asks that parliament, as first respondent, pay costs on the higher legal practitioner-and-client scale.

Parliament, the President, the Attorney-General and the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs are cited as first to fourth respondents respectively.

Under the Constitutional Court’s rules, respondents who wish to oppose the application have 21 days from service to file a notice of opposition.