Mnangagwa’s regime is adamant on taking Zimbabwe back to the Lancaster House Constitution

Tendai Ruben Mbofana

As Zimbabwe moves towards yet another constitutional amendment designed to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s tenure beyond the expiry of his current second and final five-year term in 2028, a deeply troubling pattern is once again unfolding.

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It is increasingly difficult to escape the sense that the country is being deliberately dragged back to the notorious Lancaster House constitutional order.

This is not a mere rhetorical flourish.

It is a conclusion borne out of a clear pattern of constitutional regression, executive overreach, and systematic dismantling of the democratic safeguards painstakingly embedded in the 2013 Constitution.

Any attempt to extend Mnangagwa’s rule immediately evokes memories of the pre-2013 constitutional era, when Zimbabwe had no presidential term limits.

Under that arrangement, Robert Mugabe ruled continuously for 37 years, presiding over economic collapse, institutional decay, and democratic suffocation, until he was eventually removed not by the ballot but through a military coup d’état in November 2017.

Term limits were one of the most important safeguards introduced by the 2013 Constitution precisely to ensure that such a tragedy would never be repeated.

To tamper with them now is to reopen a dark chapter Zimbabweans overwhelmingly resolved to close.

What makes this moment particularly disturbing is the context in which these constitutional manipulations are taking place.

The 2013 Constitution was not imposed by elites or negotiated behind closed doors.

It was endorsed by an emphatic 94 percent of voters in a national referendum, making it one of the most legitimate and democratically grounded founding documents in Zimbabwe’s history.

It represented a collective national consensus—a social contract—designed to break decisively with the authoritarian excesses of the Lancaster House Constitution and its many self-serving amendments.

Ironically, it was under Robert Mugabe—no icon of constitutionalism—that this document was adopted and, for the most part, left intact.

Mugabe, despite his long record of authoritarianism, appeared at least outwardly respectful of the 2013 Constitution’s core architecture, particularly its term limits.

In stark contrast, it is under Mnangagwa’s so-called “Second Republic” that the Constitution has come under sustained and calculated assault.

From the very outset of his administration, constitutional amendments became a tool not for democratic deepening but for power consolidation.

Since 2017, every major amendment to the 2013 Constitution has had one overriding purpose: strengthening presidential authority and weakening institutional checks and balances.

Not a single amendment has sought to expand citizens’ rights, open democratic space, enhance accountability, or improve the material wellbeing of Zimbabweans.

The amendments have been nakedly elite-centric, regime-protective, and self-serving.

Key provisions that once insulated the judiciary from executive interference have been steadily dismantled.

Public interviews for senior judicial appointments—a transparency mechanism designed to depoliticize the bench—were removed, returning effective control of the judiciary to the President.

The separation of powers, a cornerstone of the 2013 settlement, has been hollowed out.

These developments mirror the Lancaster House era, during which the executive exercised overwhelming influence over the courts and other state institutions.

Equally telling is the removal of the presidential running mate provision before it could even be tested in practice.

Introduced to promote continuity, accountability, and electoral clarity, this reform was discarded because it threatened to dilute presidential dominance and empower potential successors.

Instead of strengthening democratic institutions, the Mnangagwa administration has systematically stripped them of autonomy, ensuring that power remains firmly centralized in the presidency.

The irony is painful.

The same administration that speaks incessantly about constitutionalism and the rule of law owes its very existence to an event that was patently unconstitutional.

In November 2017, Mnangagwa came to power through the military’s removal of a sitting, elected president.

No amount of legal gymnastics can disguise the fact that tanks on the streets of Harare and soldiers occupying state institutions are incompatible with constitutional democracy.

Yet, in one of the most controversial judicial rulings in Zimbabwe’s history, then High Court Judge George Chiweshe declared the military’s actions constitutional and lawful—an interpretation that strained credibility and confirmed long-standing fears about judicial capture.

That moment was not an aberration; it was a harbinger.

It signaled the kind of constitutional order the new regime would preside over—one in which legality is retrofitted to suit power, and institutions exist to legitimize authority rather than restrain it.

The subsequent amendments to the Constitution merely entrenched this reality.

Now, the prospect of extending Mnangagwa’s presidency beyond 2028 threatens to complete Zimbabwe’s return to the Lancaster House constitutional mentality.

That constitution, particularly after its many amendments, became a malleable instrument of incumbency, altered whenever it proved inconvenient to those in power.

It is precisely this culture that the 2013 Constitution sought to uproot by entrenching term limits, strengthening independent institutions, and prioritizing popular sovereignty.

Amending term limits would not merely benefit one individual; it would permanently damage Zimbabwe’s constitutional culture.

It would send a clear message that no constitutional safeguard is sacred, that national consensus counts for nothing, and that political expediency trumps the will of the people.

Once that line is crossed, the Constitution ceases to be a shield for citizens and becomes a weapon in the hands of the powerful.

Zimbabwe’s crisis has never been the absence of laws or constitutions.

It has always been the deliberate refusal by those in power to submit themselves to restraint.

The 2013 Constitution offered a rare opportunity to reset the nation on a democratic path.

The tragedy is not that it has failed, but that it is being deliberately undone.

If Zimbabwe is to have any hope of a democratic future, it must resist this backward march.

Constitutions are meant to tame power, not sanctify it.

A regime that is confident in its legitimacy does not fear term limits, independent courts, or strong institutions.

Only those determined to cling to power at all costs feel compelled to rewrite the rules of the game mid-play.

The choice before Zimbabweans is stark: defend the spirit and letter of the 2013 Constitution, or quietly acquiesce to a return to a constitutional order that has already proven catastrophic.

History has shown us where that road leads.

We ignore its lessons at our peril.

• Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a social justice advocate and writer. Please feel free to WhatsApp or Call: +263715667700 |  +263782283975, or email: mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com, or visit website: https://mbofanatendairuben.news.blog/